Lonely Planet Inn Sdn Bhd v Amber Court Management Corporation (WA-22NCvC-187-04/2023)

LONELY PLANET INN SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 1012724-P)

ONG PHAIK KOOI (No. K/P: 630202-07-5294) [mendakwa dalam kapasiti persendirian dan sebagai seorang wasi & wakil kepada si mati LAW NAM POH (No. K/P: 501006-08-5099)]

JOANN WEN LAW (No. K/P: 860310-91-5020)

LAW WEY ANN (No. K/P: 940621-21-5914) …PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN AMBER COURT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (No. P.T.BTG 15/B/13) …DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Management corporations of strata developments are creations of statute; more specifically, by operation of s.17(3) of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (“STA 1985”). All these management corporations depend wholly on payment of Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution by the parcels proprietors to fund the management and maintenance of common property within the strata development. Thus, when the proprietors of a large number of 04/02/2026 13:12:04 WA-22NCvC-187-04/2023 Kand. 187 parcels defaulted in paying up promptly, a Management Corporation could be seriously crippled. [2] An individual unit in a subdivided building is defined in the STA 1985 as a “parcel”. The Plaintiffs in this case are proprietors of 66 parcels of condominiums in a strata development known as Amber Court Inn (“Amber Court”) located in Genting Highlands. The Defendant is the Management Corporation of Amber Court. The Plaintiffs’ very lengthy Statement of Claim concluded with a 91st paragraph that sets out their 18 prayers. Their prayer No.13, for General Damages, branches into 14 sub-prayers – (a) to (n), thus effectively making it a Statement of Claim that has 31 prayers. The Plaintiffs pray for declarations, mandatory injunctions, prohibitory injunctions, general damages, aggravated damages, exemplary and punitive damages, pre-judgment interest and costs – literally every conceivable relief that could be ordered by a civil court. [3] After reading the pleadings and witness statements as well as hearing the oral evidence of the Plaintiffs’ two witnesses, it became apparent that this civil suit is actually all about the Plaintiffs’ refusal to pay Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution to the Defendant. The Plaintiffs’ first prayer is in fact for a declaration that they are not “defaulters” – even though the Strata Management Tribunal has issued awards to order them to pay the Defendant arrears of Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution. [4] As the term “defaulter” has been statutorily defined in the Third Schedule of the Strata Management (Maintenance And Management) Regulations 2015 (“the Strata Management Regulations”), I find no difficulty, based on the evidence adduced during trial, in concluding that the Plaintiffs are indeed “defaulters”. This Court is also constrained to rule that the Defendant has acted within its powers conferred by By-law No. 6(4) of the said Third Schedule. [5] Since this Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ claims are devoid of merit, all their prayers must be dismissed. Further, as the Plaintiffs had obtained an interlocutory injunction on 6th July 2023 (issued by my predecessor) which had the effect of restraining the Defendant from exercising its powers under the said By-law No.6(4) pending trial, it is necessary for this Court to set aside the said injunction, pronounce that the Plaintiffs should not have sought the issuance of the injunction in the first place, and consequentially to order damages to be assessed pursuant to the undertaking given by the Plaintiffs. This is in light of Soo Boon Siong @ Saw Boon Siong v Saw Fatt Seong [2008] 1 MLJ 27 which requires a specific finding to be made: that the injunction should not have been sought in the first place. [6] My full grounds are as explained below. Background Facts [7] The 1st Plaintiff is a private limited company, which shareholders and directors are members of the same family. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs are members of the said family. [8] The 1st Plaintiff owns 46 parcels of condominiums in Amber Court while the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs own several parcels, totalling 20 parcels. In total, the Plaintiffs own 66 parcels. [9] There is no issue about the proprietorship of the Plaintiffs’ 66 parcels. The dispute is only about the Plaintiffs’ refusal to pay Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution to the Defendant. In a nutshell, the issues are simply whether the Plaintiffs are defaulters who could be subjected to the restrictions stated in By-law No.6(4) of the Third Schedule of the Strata Management Regulations. The Plaintiffs’ Position [10] The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant had unlawfully and arbitrarily denied them (and/or their tenants) access to the common property of Amber Court, specifically the lifts and staircases. [11] It was further contended that the Defendant had unlawfully deactivated lifts access cards which were issued to the Plaintiffs and thus compelled their tenants and guests to use the stairs. [12] The Plaintiff also pleaded that the Defendant's actions were ultra vires the Strata Management Act 2013 (“SMA 2013”) and STA 1985, taking the law into its own hands and ignoring statutory mechanisms for recovery of charges. [13] Learned counsel relies on Perbadanan Pengurusan Endah Parade v Magnificent Diagraph Sdn Bhd [2014] 5 CLJ 881 to submit that a management corporation, as a body incorporated under statute, may only levy payments mandated by the statute. [14] Learned counsel also refers to Perbadanan Pengurusan Solaris Dutamas v Suruhanjaya Tenaga Malaysia & Anor [2022] 6 CLJ 219 which affirmed that a management corporation cannot act beyond its statutory boundaries. [15] Much weight was placed on the judgment of the High Court in John Denis de Silva v Crescent Court Management Corp [2006] 3 MLJ 631 as authority that a management corporation may not resort to ‘self-help remedies’ over alleged arrears of Maintenance Charges. [16] The Plaintiffs’ learned counsel even ‘threw in’ Article 13 of the Federal Constitution, alleging that the Defendant had infringed and deprived the Plaintiffs’ right to the use of property otherwise than in accordance with law. [17] In support of their claim for various heads of damages, it was submitted for the Plaintiffs that they had allegedly lost tenants, including termination of a major tenancy by a company by the name of Nadi Bumi Sdn Bhd, involving 46 units, and that their rental income fell by almost 40% annually amounting to losses of approximately RM800,000 per annum. [18] In conclusion, the Plaintiffs prayed for the 31 prayers lengthy Statement of Claim (as mentioned at the outset in para [2] above) to be allowed. The Plaintiffs’ Evidence [19] The Plaintiffs called only 2 witnesses. Their first witness was the 1st Plaintiff’s director, one Mr.Law Kim Loon (PW1). PW1 is also the son of the 2nd Plaintiff and a brother of the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs. [20] The Plaintiffs’ second witness was Raja Nor Aznin binti Raja Hassan (PW2). She testified that she used to work as a “chief warden” with a company by the name of Nadi Bumi Sdn Bhd which is said to be a tenant of the 1st Plaintiff. [21] I shall reproduce excerpts of their testimonies and discuss them in my analysis of evidence below, wherever relevant. The Defendant’s Position [22] The Defendant’s learned counsel submits that the Defendant had, sometime in September 2022, installed an Access Card System requiring electromagnetic cards to be used within Amber Court common property to use the lifts and access the staircases. [23] It was further averred by the Defendant that a Notice dated 14th September 2022 was issued to all registered proprietors stating that they must apply for electromagnetic cards to use lifts and staircases. On 4th October 2022, the Plaintiffs submitted their applications for access cards in response to the said notice. [24] In December 2017, the Defendant filed a civil suit against the 1st Plaintiff in Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court claiming RM709,131.66 as arrears due and payable. The said suit was subsequently withdrawn by the Defendant, with liberty to file afresh. The Defendant has chosen to file its claim at the Strata Management Tribunal instead. [25] The Defendant also highlighted the fact that the Strata Management Tribunal has issued awards on the claims filed by the Defendant. [26] Learned counsel for the Defendant contends that the crux of the dispute is the definition of “Defaulter” found in subparagraphs 6(1)(a) and (b) of the Strata Management Regulations (Note: learned counsel for the Defendant mis-stated as Section 6(1)(a) and

(b)). He emphasised that a defaulter is simply a proprietor who has not fully paid the maintenance charges or sinking fund contribution after the expiry of 14 days from the date of receipt of a notice from a management corporation. [27] On the law, it was submitted that the Federal Court in Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor [2010] 5 MLJ 145 and Krishnadas Achutan Nair & Ors v Maniyam Samykano [1997] 1 MLJ 94 respectively had held that unless a statutory definition is unclear, the courts cannot include other written law within the definition, and that the court's function is to interpret statute to ascertain legislative intent primarily by reference to the actual words in the enactment. [28] In short, the Defendant is contending that the Plaintiffs who have not fully settled outstanding Maintenance Charges and sinking fund contribution fall squarely within the definition of “Defaulters” under the Strata Management Regulations. [29] Finally, it was submitted by the Defendant’s learned counsel that subparagraphs 6(4) and 6(5) of the Strata Management Regulations empowers the deactivation of access cards of defaulters. The Defendant’s Evidence [30] The Defendant too called only 2 witnesses. [31] Its first witness (DW1) was one Mr. Viknesh A/L Ealumalai from the security company that provides the services of security guards for Amber Court. [32] The Defendant’s second witness (DW2) was a lady by the name of Irene Bessie Schumacher whose company has been appointed the property manager for Amber Court. [33] The excerpts of their testimonies, wherever relevant, shall be quoted and discussed in my analysis of evidence below. Issues on Admission of Evidence [34] First, a preliminary issue to be put on record here. When this case was first called on the first day of trial, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs made an oral application to reclassify some documents which their own solicitors had earlier classified as Part A documents, i.e. authenticity and contents are undisputed. In other words, the Plaintiffs applied orally on the morning of the first day of trial to reclassify/move those documents to Part B of the Common Bundle of Documents. The excuse given was that they just noticed it, presumably the day before while preparing to come to court. Needless to say, learned counsel for the Defendant objected vehemently, saying that they have prepared for cross-examination of the Plaintiffs’ witnesses based on the existing classification of documents, and that they would have been prepared to adduce other evidence and call more witnesses if those Part A documents had been classified in Part B during case management. [35] Since the Common Bundle of Documents and classification were attended to and filed by the Plaintiffs’ solicitors, this Court was constrained to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ said oral application. Trial proceeded thereafter with the calling of the Plaintiffs’ first witness. For this Court to decide otherwise would have opened the floodgates for parties in litigation to adopt a cavalier attitude about the classification of documents in common bundles of documents, and to cause adjournment of trials unnecessarily. [36] Secondly, an issue of admission of evidence arose during the trial. A video recording and several documents in Part C of the Common Bundle of Documents were marked as “IDP”, i.e. IDP1 to IDP8, for identification purposes. The Plaintiffs’ counsel should have asked their witnesses relevant questions to submit that IDP1 to IDP8 ought to be admitted in evidence and to be re-marked as exhibits P1 to P8. However, he omitted to do so and their witnesses had been released. I am bound to follow the recent judgment of the Federal Court in Live Capital Sdn Bhd v Pioneer Conglomerate Sdn Bhd [2025] 4 MLJ 420 which held that no weight is to be given to any document unless it had properly been admitted in evidence. The relevant edifying passages in the judgment of Rahman Sebli CJSS (as he then was) on the fundamental principles on admission of evidence are as shown below: “[26] More importantly, for P1 and P2 to be used as evidence in support of the respondent’s claim, they must first be proved to have been properly admitted in evidence. It was not the duty of the appellant to ensure proper admission of the two documents as exhibits, let alone to prove that they had been forged, altered or tampered with. [29] Did the learned JC follow the correct procedure in admitting and marking the two vouchers as exhibits? We think not. The proper procedure was for him to postpone the marking of IDP1 and IDP2 as exhs P1 and P2 until after the maker or makers of the documents were called to give evidence, which was never done. Until then, the two vouchers should remain as IDP1 and IDP2, ie for identification purposes only and not for the purpose of proving the truth of their contents as they were disputed both as to authenticity and contents. [30] By ‘description’ the learned JC could only mean the contents of P1 and P2 which he made clear the respondent still needed to prove although the two documents had been marked as exhibits. But that goes more to the issue of weight rather than to the issue of admissibility. For any weight to be attached to the contents of the documents, the documents must first of all be documents that had properly been admitted in evidence. Nothing short of that will suffice.” [37] Bearing in mind Live Capital Sdn Bhd (supra), I decided to give the Plaintiffs a second chance by granting them leave to call additional witnesses, for eg. to call the person who did the filming of the video, to prove those IDPs. It was obvious that the Plaintiffs’ first witness could not have been the person who filmed the video because he could be seen in the video recording that was played in court when he was testifying. [38] The following screenshots of the relevant part of Notes of Proceedings are self-explanatory: [39] Time was given for the Plaintiffs to call additional witnesses. However, on the Friday fixed for continued trial, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs informed this Court that they have decided not to call any additional witnesses. The following excerpt from the Notes of Proceedings is self-explanatory: [40] Before the Plaintiffs closed their case, their learned counsel attempted to repair their omission. He sought leave, by referring to Order 32 rule 13 Rules of Court 2012, for leave to admit 3 affidavits as evidence for the trial. According to him, those 3 affidavits which were previously filed to support a Notice of Application could be admitted as evidence for the trial because he had filed a Notice of Intention the day before. The following excerpts from the Notes of Proceedings recorded the above discourse: [41] Form 58 of the Rules of Court 2012 is a Notice of Intention to refer to affidavits filed earlier. It is obviously applicable only to applications which are to be heard by way of affidavit evidence. Once trial commences, the parties must call witnesses to testify. There is no room for affidavit evidence to be considered. Order 38 rule 1 Rules of Court 2012 makes it amply clear on this point of procedural law. This Court did refer learned counsel to Form 58 and O.38 r.1 to give him an opportunity to respond. He conceded after reading O.38 r.1, as could be seen in the following excerpt from the Notes of Proceedings: Analysis of the Evidence and Law [42] As highlighted at para [2] hereinabove, the Plaintiffs pray for literally every conceivable relief that could be ordered by a civil court: declarations, mandatory injunctions, prohibitory injunctions, general damages, aggravated damages, exemplary and punitive damages, pre-judgment interest and costs. However, the main issues are simply whether the Plaintiffs are “defaulters” as statutorily defined in the Third Schedule of the Strata Management Regulations and whether the Defendant has acted within its powers conferred by By-law No. 6(4) of the said Third Schedule. [43] The following excerpts from the Notes of Proceedings recorded the admission by the Plaintiffs’ main witness (PW1) that the Plaintiff have been refusing to pay despite having been by ordered by the Strata Management Tribunal (in its awards) to pay up. The Plaintiffs’ main witness PW1 is identified by his initials “LKL” while the Defendant’s counsel is “DS” in the Notes of Proceedings: [44] It was pointed out to the Plaintiffs’ main witness (LKL) that it is a statutory obligation for parcel proprietors to pay Maintenance Charges, to which he admitted that he knows. [45] There is also no doubt whatsoever that the Plaintiffs were aware that the awards issued by the Tribunal added up to more than RM622,000 but the Plaintiffs have refused to pay. [46] The Plaintiffs’ witness admitted that they refused to pay, stating in in equivocal words: “We refuse to pay it”. [47] Even though the Plaintiffs are disputing the calculation of Maintenance Charges and complaining that they were not allowed to vote at Annual General Meetings on the ground that they were “defaulters”, the Plaintiffs’ witness admitted that they had never raised any issue or motion about the calculation of share unit and how the Maintenance Charges are computed. [48] Legally, it was actually not the Defendant that prevented the Plaintiffs from attending and voting at the Annual General Meetings. It is a statutory provision, in para 21(2) of the Second Schedule to the SMA 2013, that prohibits a proprietor who has yet to pay up all arrears of Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution at least 7 days before the Meeting date, from voting at the meeting. It reads: “(2) A proprietor shall not be entitled to vote if, on the seventh day before the date of the meeting, all or any part of the Charges, or contribution to the sinking fund, or any other money due and payable to the management corporation in respect of his parcel are in arrears.” [49] The issue of whether the Plaintiffs have raised the access card issue or their classification as defaulters in any AGM or EGM was asked of the Plaintiffs’ main witness more than once. The evidence shows that despite the Plaintiffs having been barred from voting at the AGMs by virtue of para 21(2) of the Second Schedule to the SMA 2013, they had failed to ventilate their grounds for refusing to pay. They had just simply been refusing to pay up. This is seen from the following excerpt of the Notes of Proceedings: [50] Before delving deeper into the Plaintiffs’ refusal to pay Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution, it is apt at this juncture to refer to the provisions of law that govern the calculation of Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution. Prior to the enactment of the SMA 2013, Maintenance Charges used to be calculated based on square footage, for example if the applicable rate determined by the Joint Management Body was, say RM0.20 per square foot, a parcel proprietor whose parcel has an area of 1,000 square feet would be required to pay Maintenance Charges of RM200 per month. [51] The Strata Titles (Amendment) Act 2013 was timed to come into force to amend the STA 1985 on 1st June 2015, i.e. on the same date as the SMA 2013 – so as to synchronise the SMA 2013 with the STA 1985. The then new SMA 2013 and amended STA 1985 together introduced significant changes. One of the significant changes affecting the management of stratified properties was the change in calculation of Maintenance Charges; from a formula based on square footage (see para [50] above) to one based on Share Units instead, which is by multiplying the number of Share Units for a parcel with the Amount payable per Share Unit. [52] In the preliminary stage whilst the developer is still managing the strata development after handing-over of vacant possession to purchasers, S. 12(3) of the SMA 2013 states that the developer is to determine Maintenance Charges in proportion to their Share Units. After the formation of a Joint Management Body (JMB), s.21(2)(a) mandates that the JMB is also to collect Maintenance Charges based on the allocated Share Units, and likewise in the final phase when a Management Corporation (MC) has been incorporated by operation of law, s.59(2) makes it mandatory for the MC to compute Maintenance Charges based on the Share Units of each parcel. [53] Next, I would refer to several provisions of the law on “Share Units” before moving on to explain my finding that the Plaintiffs’ refusal to pay Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution is legally unjustifiable. [54] In the STA 1985, “share units” is defined, in respect of a parcel, as “the share units determined for that parcel as shown in the strata register”. This definition is not enlightening because it uses the very same words “share units” that it is supposed to define. Be that as it may, the last phrase “as shown in the strata register” is very important. [55] In my view, “as shown in the strata register” serves to confirm that the number of Share Units allocated to a parcel is as stated in a strata title – which states the particulars of that parcel as recorded in the strata register for that strata development. “Share Units” reflects the area of a parcel, i.e. its size. This could perhaps be best understood by referring, analogically, to a register of land titles maintained by the Registrar of Land Titles (who is the Director of Lands and Mines for the State or the Federal Territory). In all land titles, the land area would be stated to record the size of the land. The older titles show the area in acres, roods, poles and square feet but the new titles adopt the metric system – in hectares and square meter. [56] Housing developers were used to market their apartments in square feet but due to various issues (which are not relevant in this case), it was enacted that information about the size of parcels in a strata development would be recorded in terms of “Share Units”. Even though other factors are taken into account in calculating the Share Units, the key component in the computation of Share Units for a parcel is still its floor area. The formula is as stated in para 2(1) of the First Schedule to the SMA 2013 as follows: “Allocated share units of a parcel = (area of parcel × FP1 × FP2) + (area of accessory parcel × WF3)” [57] The formula shown above is meticulously explained in the First Schedule to the SMA 2013. It is unnecessary to delve into the formula for the calculation of Share Units here due to two reasons. First, I have brought it up to show that the number of Share Units stated in a strata title is not an arbitrary figure but is derived by using a statutory formula that uses the area of the parcel, i.e. its size, and other factors as explained in the First Schedule, i.e. FP1, FP2 and WF3. Secondly, the Plaintiffs are not challenging the Share Units allocated for their 66 parcels. This was recorded in the Notes of Proceedings: [58] Maintenance Charges in this case are calculated by a simple multiplication exercise. Amount of Maintenance Charges = the Share Units of a parcel x Amount Payable Per Share Unit. [59] Since the Share Units are as stated in the strata titles, the Plaintiffs are wise enough not to dispute that. Essentially, they are challenging the “Amount Payable Per Share Unit” which is a rate determined by the Defendant Management Corporation. [60] Before I move on to consider other points about the Plaintiffs’ claims, just a few words about the Sinking Fund of a Management Corporation. It is akin to a savings account – to save for future major expenditure, such as repainting of the buildings. The amount of Sinking Fund contribution is a small percentage of the Maintenance Charges, wholly a mathematical function of the Maintenance Charges. Thus, Sinking Fund contribution is a non-issue here. [61] The jurisdiction of the Strata Management Tribunal under the SMA 2013 clearly covers such a dispute between a parcel proprietor and a Management Corporation. Paras 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the Fourth Schedule to the SMA 2013 are self-explanatory, as set out below: “1. A dispute or complaint concerning an exercise or the performance of, or the failure to exercise or perform, a function, duty or power conferred or imposed by this Act the subsidiary legislation made under this Act, except for those specifically provided for in this Part.

A claim for the recovery of Charges, or contribution to the sinking fund, or any amount which is declared by the provisions of this Act as a debt.

A claim for an order to invalidate proceedings of meeting where any provision of the Act has been contravened.

A claim for an order to nullify a resolution where voting rights has been denied or where due notice has not been given.

A claim for an order to nullify a resolution passed at a general meeting.” [62] Since the Plaintiffs are essentially trying to justify their refusal to pay Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution by challenging the “Amount Payable Per Share Unit” and other small items in the invoices/ statements issued by the Defendant, a simple solution for them would have been to lodge a claim with the Strata Management Tribunal to seek a variation of the “Amount Payable Per Share Unit”, etcetera. [63] The evidence adduced before this Court shows that the Plaintiffs did not challenge the “Amount Payable Per Share Unit” and other small items in the invoices/ statements issued by the Defendant by filing a claim at the Tribunal or at the High Court. Instead, the Plaintiffs had chosen to continue to ignore the reminders from the Defendant to pay up the arrears in Maintenance Charges due and payable. [64] From the mouth of the Plaintiffs’ main witness came the admission that the 1st Plaintiff – which owns 46 parcels of condominiums in Amber Court – has been refusing to pay any Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution for about 7 years, since year 2018. [65] I asked the Plaintiffs’ witness PW1 (denoted as “LKL” in the Notes) when was the last payment made because it is a relevant fact that this Court ought to know about the length of default, bearing in mind that the Plaintiffs were using their 66 parcels to collect rentals. This, viewed from a neutral perspective, is a situation of the Plaintiffs taking undue advantage by continuing to use their 66 parcels to generate rental income when they well knew that there are recurring and continuing expenditures to be incurred by the Defendant Management Corporation to manage and maintain the Common Property and common facilities, for example, payment for the services of security guards, electricity bills to operate the lifts, etcetera, so that the occupants, including the Plaintiffs’ numerous tenants, could continue to reside there. [66] When the Defendant invoked By-law No. 6(4) of the Third Schedule of the Strata Management Regulations to restrict the use of common facilities by the Plaintiffs and their tenants, the Plaintiffs were able to overcome it by filing this civil suit and obtaining an interlocutory injunction (issued by my predecessor) in July 2023 to restrain the Defendant. [67] This Court finds, from the evidence, that the Plaintiffs have continued to refuse to pay Maintenance Charges for August 2023 onwards even though the Defendants had demanded payment for only the fundamental items, for eg. the Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution, and had ceased to demand payment for smaller items that were contested by the Plaintiffs. [68] As highlighted in para [43] & [45] above, the Plaintiffs’ main witness PW1 admitted their failure to pay the Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution despite having been by ordered by the Strata Management Tribunal (in its awards) to pay up. Just those Tribunal awards alone added up to more than RM622,000. [69] The term “defaulter” is statutorily defined in para 6(1)(a) of the Third Schedule to the Strata Management Regulations as a proprietor who has not fully paid the Maintenance Charges or contribution to the Sinking Fund in respect of his parcel or any other money imposed by or due and payable to the Management Corporation under the Act at the expiry of the period of fourteen days of receiving a notice from the management corporation. The phrase “who has not fully paid” means that a proprietor who made partial payments would still be considered a defaulter. [70] Once a parcel proprietor becomes a defaulter, the Defendant Management Corporation is empowered to invoke By-law No. 6(4) of the Third Schedule of the Strata Management Regulations which states as follows: “(4) The management corporation may, at the expiry of the period of fourteen days specified in subparagraph 6(1)(a) of these by-laws, and without prior notice, deactivate any electromagnetic access device such as a card, tag or transponder, issued to a defaulter until such time that the any sum remaining unpaid in respect of his parcel has been fully paid, together with a charge not exceeding ringgit fifty that may be imposed by the management corporation for the reactivation of his electromagnetic access device. During the period of the deactivation of his electromagnetic access device, the management corporation may require the proprietor to sign in a defaulters’ register book each time that the defaulter requires any assistance for entry into or exit from the building or the development area.

The management corporation may stop or suspend a defaulter from using the common facilities or common services provided by the management corporation, including any car park bay in the common property that has been designated for the use of the defaulter.” [71] Given the finding of facts made by this Court based on the evidence adduced, all the authorities cited by learned counsel for the Plaintiffs are of no assistance to them. Perbadanan Pengurusan Endah Parade v Magnificent Diagraph Sdn Bhd (supra) merely ruled that the management corporation as a body incorporated under statute can only levy payments which are mandated by the statute. That is indeed true regarding Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contribution. The Court of Appeal in Perbadanan Pengurusan Solaris Dutamas v Suruhanjaya Tenaga Malaysia & Anor (supra) held that statutory powers (under the SMA 2013) that cannot be expanded and or varied without an amendment to the statute itself. That is trite law. [72] As for John Denis de Silva v Crescent Court Management Corp [2006] 3 MLJ 631, it is a judgment of the High Court pronounced in 2006, some 10 years before the Third Schedule of the Strata Management Regulations came into force in year 2015. Cases of parcel proprietors refusing to pay up Maintenance Charges and Sinking Fund contributions – but shamelessly expecting the Management Corporation to survive on payments made by other parcel owners – had become rampant over the years. This pervasive situation had no doubt made it necessary to empower Management Corporations to take prompt action (“at the expiry of the period of fourteen days”) to compel defaulters to pay up. [73] Further, it is my judgment that powers for the management corporations to deactivate access cards, etcetera, cause no injustice because a defaulter can pay up, albeit under protest, and then file a claim at the Strata Management Tribunal. On this point, I bear in mind that Maintenance Charges are incurred monthly for as long as the parcel proprietor remains the proprietor of his parcel. Even though he might well succeed at the Tribunal in reducing the amount payable to the Management Corporation, it would not be a situation of him being totally absolved from paying any Maintenance Charges. Thus, it is perfectly equitable to require the defaulter to pay up first and leave it to the Tribunal to allow a defaulter who succeeds in his claim at the Tribunal to set-off payments that he made earlier. It is a not money that could become irrecoverable by the parcel proprietor. The converse situation of allowing defaulters to delay for years could cause a Management Corporation to be financially crippled and unable to perform its statutory duties. This is especially so when a parcel proprietor is refusing to pay the whole invoice issued by the management corporation simply by raising “triable issues” about a small part of the invoice – as in this case. Conclusion [74] In summary, the Plaintiffs did not deny having received multiple notices from the Defendant. They have refused to pay even when ordered by the Strata Management Tribunal to pay up. The 1st Plaintiff has refused to pay since year 2018 (see para [64] above). Counsel for the Plaintiff: Sharan A/L Chandrasekeran (Isaac Sachdev Pereira and Tan Li Shern with him) SOLICITORS FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MESSRS ALVIN JOHN & PARTNERS Advocates & Solicitors No. 210, Block E, Phileo Damansara 1, No. 9, Jalan 16/11, 46350 PETALING JAYA, SELANGOR Counsel for the Defendant: Bernard Liew Kin Jong (Mugelen Chandran with him) SOLICITORS FOR THE DEFENDANT: MESSRS KIN JONG & CO Advocates & Solicitors 43A Redwood, Empire Residence, Jalan PJU 8/1, PJU 8, Damansara Perdana, 47820 PETALING JAYA, SELANGOR. CASES REFERRED TO:

Soo Boon Siong @ Saw Boon Siong v Saw Fatt Seong [2008] 1 MLJ

27.

Perbadanan Pengurusan Endah Parade v Magnificent Diagraph Sdn Bhd [2014] 5 CLJ 881.

Perbadanan Pengurusan Solaris Dutamas v Suruhanjaya Tenaga Malaysia & Anor [2022] 6 CLJ 219.

John Denis de Silva v Crescent Court Management Corp [2006] 3

Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor [2010] 5 MLJ 145 and Krishnadas Achutan Nair & Ors v Maniyam Samykano [1997] 1

Live Capital Sdn Bhd v Pioneer Conglomerate Sdn Bhd [2025] 4 MLJ

420.

S.17(3) Strata Titles Act 1985.

S. 12(3), S.21(2)(a), S.59(2) Strata Management Act 2013.

By-laws 6(1)(a) and (b), 6(4) and 6(5) Third Schedule of the Strata Management (Maintenance And Management) Regulations 2015 4. Article 13 Federal Constitution 5. Order 38 rule 1 Rules of Court 2012 6. Para 21(2) Second Schedule to the Strata Management Act 2013.

Para 2(1) of the First Schedule to the Strata Management Act 2013.

Paras 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of the Fourth Schedule to the Strata