LOYAL SYNERGY SDN BHD v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Timur Laut (P-01(A)-372-06/2024)

In Woon Ngee Yew and Others v. Ng Yoon Thai and Others, it was stated by Mc Elwaine CJ in the following passage: An Appellate Court should be very loath to differ on a finding of fact by a Court which has seen and heard the witnesses but if the learned Judge can be shown to have misdirected himself on the evidence, or to have rejected evidence for a wrong reason or to have drawn an inference from evidence which was equally capable of supporting a different inference it may be the duty of an Appellate Court to interfere. Whether the learned High Court Judge erred in failing to provide Parties with Written Opinions [13] The learned High Court Judge, in determining the compensation payable for the acquired land, relied substantially upon the Written Opinions. It was an uncontroverted fact, evident from the record, that the Written Opinions were not disclosed to the Parties prior to the delivery of the decision of the learned High Court Judge. 25 February 2026 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 [14] The principles governing the conduct of a land reference hearing are clear. While a judge is not bound by the opinions of assessors, their written opinions form crucial evidence which the court must consider. The parties, in turn, must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to address that evidence. To use the reports as a foundation for the court's decision while denying the parties sight of them is to deny the parties the right to be heard on a central component of the case. This offends the core principle of audi alteram partem.

This Court drew guidance from the authoritative pronouncement in Tegas Sejati Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah dan Daerah Hulu Langat & Anor [2024] 4 CLJ 1 (“Tegas Sejati”). In that case, the Federal Court affirmed that the constitutional right to adequate compensation under article 13 of the Federal Constitution requires transparency and fairness in land reference proceedings. It was further held by the Federal Court that section 40C of the Land Acquisition Act mandates the disclosure of the assessors’ written opinions to the relevant parties and their inclusion in the record of proceedings and appeal.

Section 40C of the Land Acquisition Act and article 13 of the Federal Constitution read: Land Acquisition Act 1960 Section 40C – Opinion of assessors The opinion of each assessor on the various heads of compensation claimed by all persons interested shall be given in writing and shall be recorded by the Judge. *** 25 February 2026 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 Federal Constitution Article 13 – Rights to property

No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law.

No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property without adequate compensation. [17] The failure to disclose the assessors’ written opinions to the parties in Tegas Sejati had breached procedural fairness and amounted to non-compliance with section 40C of the Land Acquisition Act. The Federal Court, in that case, had rejected the view that written opinions of the assessors were merely internal or immune from scrutiny, emphasising that parties must have the opportunity to review and respond to material influencing compensation. The appeal in Tegas Sejati was, therefore, allowed and the matter remitted for rehearing before a different High Court judge. [18] A further issue that had engaged our consideration was whether the decision in Tegas Sejati was applicable to the present appeal, particularly in light of the fact that it had not been raised before the learned High Court Judge at the time His Lordship delivered the impugned decision. [19] Upon a careful perusal of the record and the relevant cause papers, it became evident that the Federal Court’s decision in Tegas Sejati had never been brought to the attention of the learned High Court Judge. There was nothing to suggest that it was cited, relied upon, or even alluded to by any of the Parties during the proceedings below. 25 February 2026 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 [20] This omission was all the more significant considering that the Appellant’s submissions were filed in March 2024, subsequent to the delivery of the Federal Court’s decision on 29 February 2024. Notwithstanding the availability of that decision at the material time, no reference whatsoever was made to Tegas Sejati in those submissions. [21] In fact, the Appellant had only sought disclosure of the Written Opinions in June 2024, which was well after the learned High Court Judge had delivered his decision on 10 May 2024 and had issued his written grounds of judgment on 15 May 2024. The chronology was, therefore, significant: by the time the request was made, the adjudicative process at first instance had already been concluded. We further observe that, upon receiving the request, the learned High Court Judge had duly furnished the Written Opinions to the Appellant in June 2024. [22] In these circumstances, we were of the considered view that it was untenable for learned Counsel for the Appellant to contend that the learned High Court Judge had disregarded the Federal Court authority of Tegas Sejati. Since it was never brought to the attention of the learned High Court Judge in the first place, it does not lie in the mouth of Counsel to criticise the learned High Court Judge for failing to consider an authority which Counsel himself had not cited or relied upon during the proceedings below. [23] Be that as it may, the fact remains that the Federal Court’s decision in Tegas Sejati had in fact been delivered prior to the decision of the 25 February 2026 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 learned High Court Judge. As an appellate court, we are bound by that pronouncement and must give effect to it. [24] In any event, the cases of Ling Peek Hoe & Anor v Ding Siew Ching & Another Appeal [2017] 7 CLJ 641 and JCT Limited v Muniandy Nadasan & Ors and Another Appeal [2016] 3 CLJ 692 affirm that it would be both jurisprudentially incongruous and fundamentally unjust for an appellate court, hearing a live appeal, to uphold a legal position later declared erroneous by the Federal Court simply because the lower court’s decision predated that authoritative ruling. [25] The binding force of a Federal Court pronouncement attaches not to the date of the trial, but to the point of appellate determination. Where an appeal remains pending, the law to be applied is the law as declared by the apex court at the time the appellate court renders its decision. To hold otherwise would compel appellate courts to knowingly affirm errors of law, thereby endorsing decisions that the Federal Court has pronounced to be untenable. [26] We further noted that, although the Respondent had acknowledged the binding pronouncement in Tegas Sejati that the Written Opinions ought to be furnished to the Parties, Counsel nevertheless sought to characterise the learned High Court Judge’s failure to do so as a mere technical or immaterial irregularity. Counsel for the Respondent additionally contended that Tegas Sejati did not prescribe the timing for the provision of such Written Opinions, and that it was sufficient that they were eventually supplied after the Grounds of Judgment had been issued. 25 February 2026 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 [27] We were of the view that this position was untenable. The Written Opinions were not peripheral to the adjudicative process; they were central and instrumental to it. They formed an integral part of the evidential and analytical framework upon which the Court arrived at its determination. [28] It was plain that the Federal Court in Tegas Sejati intended that such Written Opinions be disclosed to the parties at a stage that would enable them to make meaningful submissions both to the Court and, where relevant, to the Assessors, prior to the delivery of the decision. Any other interpretation would render the pronouncement in Tegas Sejati devoid of practical utility and undermine its very purpose. [29] Such conclusion was further reinforced by the learned High Court Judge’s Grounds of Judgment, which meticulously set out the Court’s analysis and acceptance of the various adjustments proposed by the Assessors, encompassing factors such as time, location, size, terrain, shape, and frontage. The final compensation awarded was, in essence, a mathematical derivation from these assessed variables. [30] In such circumstances, to suggest that the Parties could have adequately or fairly advanced their case without access to the very data underpinning the Court’s reasoning was contrary to both logic and fundamental notions of procedural fairness. Conclusion [31] In the upshot, based on the aforesaid reasons, and after judicious consideration of all the evidence before this Court, submissions 25 February 2026 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 of both Parties, and Grounds of Judgment of the learned High Court Judge, we unanimously allowed this Appeal, with the following Orders: a) The Judgment and Order of the High Court are set aside; b) The matter is remitted to the High Court for a rehearing; c) There shall be a specific direction that any written opinion or report provided by any assessor appointed for the rehearing shall be furnished to the Parties within a reasonable time prior to the hearing of the submission of final arguments; and d) There shall be no order as to costs. Dated: 25 February 2026 ………….…Signed…………… (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge of the Court of Appeal Malaysia Counsel: For the Appellant – Tan Kah Hoo and Loh Li Lian; Messrs Gan Teik Chee & Ho For the Respondent – Syarifah Syazwani binti Syed Hussin and Siti Zuhairah binti Zulkifli; State Legal Adviser