Mark Saw Khay Liang v Andrew Saw Khay Chi (PA-22NCvC-60-03/2021)

MARK SAW KHAY LIANG

CHARMAINE SAW CHIN PUAY (NO. K/P: 720921-07-5708) …PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN ANDREW SAW KHAY CHIN (NO. K/P: 700528-07-5105) …DEFENDAN 29/12/2025 10:42:59 PA-22NCvC-60-03/2021 Kand. 125 Page 2 of 48 JUDGMENT

This suit is about two Wills. The deceased testator (Father) wrote a Will in March 2014 (2014 Will). Under the 2014 Will, Father bequeathed (gave) the family home at No. 1 Jalan Scott, Penang, as well as his watches and jewellery to his younger daughter: the Second Plaintiff (Charmaine), and his residuary estate (the rest of his assets) to his wife (Mother).

But if Mother predeceased (died before) him, Father gave his residuary estate to his four children in equal shares.

The other three children are the First Plaintiff: the elder son (Mark), the Defendant: the younger son (Andrew), and the elder daughter: Samantha, who is not a party to this suit.

In this suit, the most pertinent asset is Father’s 20,000 shares in the family’s company: Tai Chuan Realty Sdn Bhd (Tai Chuan). These Tai Chuan shares are a part of Father’s residuary estate.

Under the 2014 Will, if Mother predeceased Father, then Father’s 20,000 shares in Tai Chuan would have been shared among the four children equally. Each of them would have inherited 5,000 shares.

Mother passed away in July 2014.

Later, in 2017, Father wrote another Will (2017 Will). The 2017 Will was different to the 2014 Will. Under the 2017 Will, the family home was still given to Charmaine. That has not changed. But the watches and jewellery were given to Mark and Andrew.

More importantly, Father’s 20,000 Tai Chuan shares were specifically given to Andrew only. This would make Andrew the single biggest shareholder in Tai Chuan among the siblings.

This change in Father’s Will is the subject of Mark’s and Charmaine’s grievance.

Mark and Charmaine sue Andrew—

to declare the 2017 Will invalid and to have it revoked;

to declare the 2014 Will valid and enforceable, and for probate to be given for it;

for damages.

Andrew counterclaims against them—

to declare that the 2017 Will revokes the 2014 Will;

for probate to be granted for the 2017 Will; Page 4 of 48

to remove Mark and Charmaine as executors of the 2017 Will. The three of them are co-executors. This prayer is no longer at issue, as it was dropped (withdrawn) at trial.

for Andrew to be appointed the sole executor under the Will (which it also dropped, and hence not at issue).

The question that will determine this suit is: Is the 2017 Will, Father’s valid and enforceable last Will?

The trial took six days to finish.

Mark and Charmaine called six witnesses—three medical doctors (who treated Father, but who are all witnesses of fact), the nurse who looked after Father, and Mark and Charmaine.

Andrew called three witnesses—Andrew himself, and the two witnesses to the 2017 Will. One of them is Father’s lawyer: Madam Lim Swee Gaik (DW1), who prepared and witnessed both the 2014 Will and the 2017 Will. The other is Mr Khaw Hang Peng (DW3), Father’s long-time employee.

The following are the pertinent asserted facts in the form of a chronology.

December 1965—Father and his father incorporated Tai Chuan. Father was the primary decision maker in Tai Chuan. Tai Chuan is a family business.

August 1968—Taisho Company Sdn Bhd (Taisho) was incorporated.

1994—Mark joined the family companies. The family companies are made up of Tai Chuan, Taisho and another company named Lock Huat Holdings Sdn Bhd.

2001—Mark left the family, and the family companies. He returned all his shares and resigned from his directorships. Charmaine moved home and stayed with Father and Mother. She continues to reside there.

2002/2003—Andrew returned home to work in the family business. He was made director of Tai Chuan and Taisho.

September 2010—Father started consulting Dr Ong Mei Lin (DW1) for his medical conditions. She is a consultant cardiologist.

October 2010—PW1 (Dr Ong) implanted a pacemaker in Father.

December 2010—Father started consulting Dr Suntharalingam (PW3). He is a consultant orthopaedic surgeon.

January 2011—Father reconciled with Mark, and Mark’s shares in the family companies were returned to him.

June 2011—Mark was reappointed as a director of Tai Chuan.

October 2012—Mark was reappointed as a director of Taisho.

September 2013—Charmaine started to look after both Father and Mother. When Mother passed away (in July 2014), Charmaine became the primary caregiver to Father.

2014—Andrew’s salary was doubled from RM90K to RM180K.

30.

4.3.2014—Father made the 2014 Will. Mother made her Will on this date too.

31.

22.7.2014—Mother passed away.

32.

31.7.2014—Andrew was made joint managing director of Tai Chuan. (Note: Mark and Charmaine wanted me to note that this was a mere nine days after Mother passed away.)

January 2015—PW3 (Dr Suntharalingam) reported that Father was given monthly hyaluronic acid injections to both knees. Hyaluronic acid injections are used to treat joint pain. Father had difficulty walking. He stopped walking in March 2015.

2015—Dr Suntharalingam, in his report dated 8.3.2021, stated that he noticed in 2015 that Father was quiet and moody, in comparison to his earlier jovial personality. He would get upset about physiotherapy. Dr Suntharalingam also noticed that Father had difficulties recalling simple advice given to him, and that this condition worsened over time. Dr Suntharalingam observed behavioural changes such as mood disturbances, agitation, forgetfulness and confusion.

February 2015—Charmaine re-wrote her Will. Charmaine testified that DW1 (Miss Lim Swee Gaik), who prepared Charmaine’s Will, suggested to her that she gives all her Tai Chuan shares to Andrew, as he is managing Tai Chuan.

End of February 2015—At their home in Margaret River, Australia, Father told Charmaine and Andrew that he wanted to give his 20 (20,000) Tai Chuan shares to both of them, but did not say the percentage (ratio) each of them would get.

A few days later—Father said 12 - 8 (12,000 shares: 8,000 shares), but did not say in whose favour between Charmaine and Andrew.

End of March 2015—Back in Penang, Father said that he wanted to distribute his Tai Chuan shares 11 – 9 (11,000 shares: 9,000 shares), but again did not say in whose favour.

End of March 2015—Andrew handed Father a share distribution document for Father’s Tai Chuan shares, highlighting Mother’s distribution of her Tai Chuan shares too.

Early April 2015—The April 2015 resolution: Andrew handed to Charmaine a 15 - 5 resolution concerning Father’s shares, i.e. 15,000 shares to Andrew and 5,000 shares to Charmaine. Charmaine signed the resolution but later deleted (“scratched out”) her signature.

41.

16.4.2015—Video recording of a conversation between Father and Charmaine (which I watched and listened to). Charmaine asked Father whose idea it was for Andrew to be given control of Tai Chuan. Father answered that it was Andrew’s idea.

42.

16.5.2015—Andrew asked Father to give Charmaine and him 7 - 13 shares respectively, i.e. 7,000 shares to Charmaine and 13,000 shares to Andrew, so that they would both hold an equal Page 9 of 48 number of shares. Father did not respond. (At the time, Charmaine had 23,000 shares. With 7,000 more shares, she would hold 30,000 shares. Andrew had 17,000 shares. With another 13,000 shares, he would also have 30,000 shares.)

July 2015—Video recording of conversation between Charmaine and Father (which I watched and listened to), where she reminded Father about his wish to distribute his shares 11 - 9 and whether Father wanted to let the matter rest. In response, Father nodded.

June 2016—Andrew asked Charmaine about what they were going to do about Father’s shares. Charmaine said that she did not think that Father recalled this issue, and told Andrew to sort out Mother’s probate first. (Note: Charmaine testified in her Witness Statement, at Q&A 6, that Andrew told her that if she gave him her shares, he would ensure that her interests in the family companies would be sustained, i.e. directorships, remuneration and medical claims.)

45.

15.9.2016—The September 2016 resolution: Andrew handed Charmaine a 20 - 0 resolution, i.e. 20,000 shares to Andrew, none to Charmaine—which Father had signed. Charmaine, however, did not sign it. Charmaine took the resolution to Father and handed it to Father. Father then crossed out (scratched out) his signature on the resolution, with the red pen which Father used to do his word search puzzle. (Note: I took note that in Page 10 of 48 September 2016—ten months before the 2017 Will—Father was doing word search puzzles. And, more significantly, he understood what Charmaine meant when she handed him the September 2016 resolution, which he had signed earlier, but had then changed his mind by crossing out his signature.)

46.

9.11.2016—PW1 (Dr Ong) prescribed Father a daily dose of Bio-Biloba. PW1 (Dr Ong) testified that Bio-Biloba is a supplement for early dementia. She testified that she believed that Father had poor memory at the time (in 2016).

2017—Mark testified in his Witness Statement that on several occasions—namely in 2017, 2018 and 2019—Father asked him to be Tai Chuan’s managing director. Mark raises this fact because Father had forgotten that Andrew had already been Tai Chuan’s managing director since 2014.

February 2017—PW4 (Tan Ken Jin): Father’s nurse, testified in his Witness Statement that on one occasion—when he, Father and Charmaine went out for dinner—Father gave DW4 all the money he had in his pocket, which was not normal for him.

April 2017—Charmaine testified in her Witness Statement that Father gave all the cash from his handbag (more than RM2K) to DW4, which was again out of character. When Charmaine Page 11 of 48 asked Father about it the next day, he could not remember doing that.

50.

22.6.2017—In PW1’s (Dr Ong’s) medical report dated 22.6.2017, Dr Ong reported that Charmaine informed her that Father’s memory was failing. He would ask the same question a few times in a period of a few minutes. Dr Ong advised Charmaine to consult a neurologist for a mental status examination. Dr Ong also suggested a daily dose of Aricept, which is a medication for dementia.

51.

14.7.2017—Andrew took Father out of the house to the office. The 2017 Will was made. Father was 83 years old at the time. The 2017 Will was prepared by DW1 (Miss Lim Swee Gaik). It was witnessed by her and DW3 (Khaw Hang Peng).

July 2017—PW3 (Dr Suntharalingam) observed that in the three visits that Father made to see Dr Suntharalingam in 2017, Father was quiet, withdrawn and irritable. Dr Suntharalingam said that in one of the visits, Father could not answer questions about his pain and the exercises he was doing, nor follow instructions to lift up his leg.

Note: There is evidence of many other facts that parties allege are relevant to this suit, which I considered, but I find that the Page 12 of 48 facts asserted above are the pertinent facts that bear on the merits of this suit

Note: The following asserted facts are facts which occurred after the 2017 Will was made.

55.

22.12.2017—Mark testified in his Witness Statement that on this day, when they were having a meal at Chin's Chinese restaurant, an old family friend came to greet Father, but Father looked at her and asked her who she was. Mark also observed that in his visits to see Father in 2017, Father communicated less, and when he spoke, his speech was slurred.

2018—Andrew’s bonus payout increased (from RM22,500.00 in 2013) to RM216K in 2018.

2018—There are several asserted facts against Andrew’s corporate conduct, such as purchasing an expensive car without the board of directors’ knowledge. But I do not consider these facts pertinent to the merits of this suit.

58.

24.10.2019—Father’s pacemaker generator box needed to be changed. PW1 (Dr Ong) testified that Father was not able to give his consent for the procedure. Dr Ong had to ask Charmaine for consent.

2020—There are several more asserted facts against Andrew, such as his removal as one of the joint managing directors of Taisho by an Extraordinary General Meeting on 27.2.2020. But again, I do not consider these facts pertinent to the merits of this suit.

60.

22.5.2020—PW2: Dr Sim Bee Fung, a consultant neurologist, saw Father. In Dr Sim’s report dated 5.4.2021, she reported that in May 2020, she had diagnosed Father as having advanced dementia.

61.

23.8.2020—Father passed away.

The parties went to trial with these three agreed issues to be tried (ITBT)—

Concerning the 2017 Will—

Did Father have the testamentary capacity, on 14.7.2017, to sign it?

(ii) Did Father know and approve the contents when he signed it?

(iii) Were there suspicious circumstances or vitiating circumstances (such as undue influence, fraud or deception) surrounding the making of the Will that render it invalid? Page 14 of 48 Note: I note here that the parties should have broken down this sub-issue (iii) into two parts—

the question of dispelling “suspicious circumstances”, which is on the propounder of the will to prove, and

the question of “extraneous vitiating elements” such as undue influence or fraud, which is on the challenger of the will to prove. I will elaborate on this below.

If the 2017 Will is declared invalid, should the 2014 Will be declared as Father’s last Will?

If the 2017 Will is declared Father’s last Will, is there sufficient cause under section 34 of the Probate And Administration Act 1959 to remove Mark and Charmaine as the executors and trustees of the 2017 Will, thus leaving Andrew as the sole executor?

I gather from the Agreed ITBT that the primary and pivotal issue is whether the 2017 Will is valid.

I also note that Mark and Charmaine’s suit here—to declare the 2017 Will invalid and have it revoked—is not on the ground of forgery or non-compliance with the Wills Act 1959.

A review of the law on testamentary capacity discloses the following case law authorities, and the principles propounded in Page 15 of 48 them about what it means to have the testamentary capacity to make a valid will.

Firstly, from the seminal English case law authority on testamentary capacity: Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549; (1861-73) All ER Rep 47; (1870) 7 WLUK 15, per Cockburn CJ, I glean principles that include the following principles—

The testator must “understand the nature” and “effects” of his/her will.

There must be “no disorder of the mind” that can “poison his affections”, or “pervert his sense of right” or “prevent the exercise of his natural faculties”. In other words, he is not under the “influence” of any “insane delusion”.

It is the testator’s “soundness of mind” that matters, not his “state of bodily health”. His body may be in a state of disability, but he may still have the “sufficient understanding” to direct how his assets are to be given away.

Secondly, from the Federal Court case of Chin Jhin Thien v Chin Huat Yean [2020] 4 MLJ 581(FC); [2020] 5 AMR 541; [2020] 7 CLJ 137; [2020] 4 MLRA 324, I glean the following principles—

Simply put, testamentary capacity is someone’s ability to make a valid will. The testator must have a “sound disposing mind”. The requirements are that at the time the will is made, the testator must be “fully conscious”; have “a sound mind”; and he must “understand and approve the contents” of his will—at paragraphs [52], [58].

A “partial unsoundness of mind”, which does not affect the testator’s “general faculties”, is “not sufficient to deprive” him “of the power to dispose” of his property in his will—paragraph [54]. Page 16 of 48

Thirdly, from the Court Of Appeal case law authority of Tan Cheu Kee v Lim Siew Hwa [2016] MLJU 1599 (CA); [2016] AMEJ 2304; [2016] CLJU 1684; [2016] MLRHU 1649, I glean principles that include this principle—

Applying the test in Banks v Goodfellow (supra), I must decide whether the testator suffered from any “disease of the mind” or “insane delusion”. And by “insane delusion”, the Court Of Appeal means that the testator “was delusional to the extent of insanity”.

Fourthly, from the Court Of Appeal case law authority of Tho Yow Pew & Anor v Chua Kooi Hean [2002] 4 MLJ 97 (CA); [2002] 3 AMR 3703; [2002] 4 CLJ 90; [2002] 2 MLRA 213, I glean these principles—

The case law authorities show very clearly that “very slight testamentary capacity is required for the making of a will”. The cases where the wills were held to be invalid for lack of testamentary capacity are cases where the testators were “utterly insane” on the finding of the probate court or the committee appointed to manage the affairs of the testator on grounds of insanity.

What is required to vitiate testamentary capacity is “an insane delusion” at the time when the will was made, or at the time the testator gave instructions to make the will.

Fifthly, from the Federal Court case of Chin Jhin Thien (supra), at paragraph [80], citing the Federal Court case of Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1 (FC); [2004] 6 AMR 781; [2004] 4 CLJ 309; [2004] 2 MLRA 1, these principles were given—

Where the validity of a will is challenged, the burden of proving “testamentary capacity” and “due execution” is on the propounder of the will. The propounder of the will also has the burden of “dispelling any suspicious circumstances” surrounding the making of the will. Page 17 of 48

The proponent’s burden is discharged “by establishing a prima facie case”. A prima facie case is where the proponent’s evidence “satisfies the court judicially that the will propounded is the last will of a free and capable testator".

Once the proponent establishes a prima facie case of testamentary capacity and due execution, the burden shifts to the challenger of the will to prove any extraneous vitiating elements such as undue influence or fraud.

To displace the propounder’s prima facie case, “mere proof of illness is not sufficient”. There must be clear evidence that the testator suffered from illness which affected his “mental faculties”. Plus, there must be “clear evidence” that undue influence or fraud was in fact committed.

The “opinion of witnesses” on testamentary capacity carries “little weight”. The “opinions of attesting witnesses” have “some weight”, but the court must judge “from the facts that they state and not from their opinions”. FIRST ISSUE: Did Father have the testamentary capacity to make the 2017 Will? Did Father know and approve the content of the 2017 Will when he signed it? Were there any suspicious circumstances surrounding the making of the 2017 Will, which made it invalid?

These are my analyses and findings on the questions that make up the first ITBT—on testamentary capacity, on knowing and approving the 2017 Will, and on whether there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the 2017 Will. Did Father have the testamentary capacity to make the 2017 Will? The testimony of DW1 (Miss Lim)

One—DW1 (Miss Lim) testified that Father instructed her to prepare the 2017 Will. Father instructed her over the phone. Page 18 of 48 Over the phone, he informed her of the changes he wanted to make to his previous Will. She noted down his instructions. She told him that she would prepare a draft will for him to approve.

Two—Miss Lim testified that Father was “a very, very careful man”. She testified that, from all the years of doing work for Father, she knows that Father “reads everything himself”. And “he doesn’t sign blindly”. Also, “he reads everything, what he doesn’t understand, he always asks”.

She relayed the instance of a loan agreement containing a term that he did not understand about being jointly and severally liable. He asked DW1 what the meaning of “severally” was. He wanted to know the meaning of that word. He read his documents carefully. This was the extent of their interaction over the years.

Relatedly, Miss Lim had prepared six Wills for Father—in 1999, 2000, 2003, 2013, 2014 and finally 2017. Factually, this means that Miss Lim had communicated and interacted with Father on six different occasions of making his will. She had no suspicious circumstances to report in her examination-in-chief (i.e. through her Witness Statement). In Miss Lim’s cross-examination, Mark and Charmaine could not get Miss Lim to admit to, or even accept, that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the making and signing of the 2017 Will.

Three—in her cross-examination, it was put to Miss Lim that since it was Andrew who called her about making the 2017 Will, there was something cynical (distrustful) about it. Miss Lim verified that it was Andrew who had called her and not Father. But these are the facts that Miss Lim testified to when she was tested in cross-examination—

Before the 2017 Will was signed, Andrew telephoned her. Andrew merely told her that Father had wanted to speak with her. Andrew had called her at her office. Andrew did not have her mobile phone number.

Although she was not accustomed to receiving a call from Andrew, the phone call from Andrew did not surprise her. All Andrew said was that Father wanted to speak with her. Miss Lim also deduced that when Andrew called her, he was probably near Father, because he could immediately pass the phone to Father.

Father’s exact words were that he wanted to make a new will, but he also wanted to see his old will. Father said that he would send someone to collect the 2014 Will. Andrew collected the 2014 Will for him.

After Andrew collected the 2014 Will, there was another phone call when Father instructed Miss Lim about the changes he wanted to make to his will. Father wanted to make five changes to his will. This second phone call, when Father gave instructions to DW1 to make the five changes to his will, took about 10 minutes. The main change was the Tai Chuan shares—he wanted to give them all to Andrew. Page 20 of 48

Miss Lim prepared the draft new will. Andrew collected the draft new will. Andrew then called again and, as before, passed the phone to Father. Father told her to go ahead and fair the new will. Andrew similarly collected the new will from her. These facts occurred a few days before the 2017 Will was signed.

On 14.7.2017, Miss Lim met Father in his office. He was seated behind his desk. He was his normal self. He was “not the chatty type”. He was a “very reserved man”. He was “not talkative”. She did not know that he was in a wheelchair. She had never seen Father in a wheelchair.

Father asked DW3 (Khaw) to witness the 2017 Will, along with Miss Lim. When the 2017 Will was signed, only three persons were present—Father, Miss Lim and Khaw. Andrew was not present

When it was put to Miss Lim: (i) that shortly before the signing of the 2017 Will, Charmaine had told Father’s doctor: PW1 (Dr Ong) that Father’s memory was failing,

(ii) that he could be asking the same question several times in ten minutes, (iii) that Dr Ong had advised that Father consulted a neurologist for a mental status examination, and (iv) that Dr Ong had prescribed a daily 5mg dose of Aricept (which Miss Lim was told is a medication for dementia and Alzheimer’s disease), and Miss Lim was asked: if she had known that Father suffered these medical conditions, would she have gotten a doctor’s advice—Miss Lim answered yes, but she remarked: “but he was normal though”. Page 21 of 48

I note that Miss Lim, as a fact, did not know—at the time that Father signed the 2017 Will—that Father had these medical conditions. To Miss Lim—at the time when she interacted with Father when he signed the 2017 Will (including advising him that he had to sign the will before two witnesses; with Father then calling Khaw to be the second witness)—Father was normal. And in cross-examination, when Miss Lim was told that Father had those medical conditions, she reinforced that Father was nevertheless normal.

Four—It was put to Miss Lim that Father signed the 2017 Will without approving its contents; that he did not know the nature and consequences of the 2017 Will. Miss Lim withstood the rigours of cross-examination and answered: “Not true. The draft was sent to him. He read through it, he approved it and told me over the phone. When the will was presented to him, I told him to read through. Are these the changes you want? He read through and then he said yes. And then when he lifts [sic] his pen, he was about to sign and I stopped him. I said no, the will should be signed in the presence of two witnesses. So, immediately he lifted up his phone and called Mr Khaw to come in to be the 2nd witness.”

Five—Miss Lim is a neutral person with nothing to gain from the making of the 2017 Will. Miss Lim was Father’s and Mother’s Page 22 of 48 lawyer. They were old friends. They went out for dinners over the years. Sometimes Miss Lim phoned them. At other times, Father or Mother phoned her. Charmaine came along for those dinners. She also prepared Father’s 2014 Will and Mother’s Will. She also prepared Charmaine’s Will. She was Father’s trusted family lawyer and friend.

Six—I am guided by the Federal Court case of Chin Jhin Thien (supra) that the “opinions of attesting witnesses” have “some weight”. As Miss Lim was a witness to the 2017 Will, I give due weight to her testimony, because, from the evidence, and in all likelihood, she was the only person who knew the content of the 2017 Will, and hence the “nature” and “effects” of the 2017 Will.

Seven—Mark and Charmaine did not plead any aspersions against Miss Lim. They did not plead that she colluded or conspired with Andrew to get the 2017 Will signed. They did not plead that she was negligent or reckless in preparing the 2017 Will. Charmaine admitted in her cross-examination that they did not lodge a complaint against Miss Lim with the Bar Council. They did not make her a party to this suit.

Eight—Mark and Charmaine failed to show that there were any “extraneous vitiating elements” such as undue influence or fraud. I find that there could not have been vitiating elements like undue influence, because the instructions to make the 2017 Will, and instructions for its contents—came directly from Page 23 of 48 Father. Also, the beneficiaries, particularly Andrew, were not present at the signing of the 2017 Will.

I have no reason to doubt the evidence that proves these facts above. Mark and Charmaine—in their cross-examination of DW1—have given me no reason to doubt Miss Lim’s sworn testimony, to convince me to make these findings on the balance of probabilities. The testimony of DW3 (Khaw)

One—Khaw (DW3) was the financial controller of Taisho, and the joint company secretary for Taisho and Tai Chuan. He had worked in the family companies from December 2007 until August 2020. Khaw testified that he considered himself Father’s trusted employee because Father asked him to be a witness in his will. And during his tenure with the family companies, Khaw was signing documents together with Father. For example, Khaw would witness the share transfer forms that Father had signed. More pertinently, after the signing of the 2017 Will, Father instructed Khaw to keep the 2017 Will.

I find that the act of calling Khaw to go to his room to be the second witness to the 2017 Will (when he was advised by Miss Lim that the 2017 Will must be attested by two witnesses), and the act of specifically instructing Khaw to keep the 2017 Will— were not acts of a person who had no testamentary capacity to sign a will. They were not the acts of a person who was not of Page 24 of 48 sound mind, or a person who was not fully conscious that he was making a will, or a person who did not understand the nature and effect of his will, or a person who was seriously delusional or insane.

Two—Khaw saw Father read the 2017 Will before he was ready to sign it.

Three—Like Miss Lim, Khaw is a neutral person who had nothing to gain from the 2017 Will.

Four—Khaw testified that throughout his 13-year tenure with the family companies, he had known of no challenge to Father’s signature, i.e. his capacity to sign the corporate documents that Father was required to sign, such as board of directors’ meeting minutes.

More specifically, from 2014 (the year of the 2014 Will which Mark and Charmaine seek to declare as Father’s valid last will) and 2017 (the year of the impugned 2017 Will)—there is no evidence about any challenge or question raised about Father’s ability to understand the corporate documents, and the nature or effects of the corporate documents, that he signed. Page 25 of 48 Father signed corporate and personal documents that were unchallenged 90. The evidence produced discloses that Father signed numerous corporate and personal documents from before the 2017 Will was signed, right through to 2019. All of these documents were accepted and acted upon without challenge. Such documents included board of directors’ meeting minutes, company resolutions, share transfer forms, dividend assignments, and other important business documents.

For instance, in May 2017 (on 26.5.2017), just six weeks before the 2017 Will was signed, Father signed minutes and resolutions concerning the declaration of interim dividends for Tai Chuan.

Then, in June 2017 (on 16.6.2017), less than a month before the 2017 Will was signed, Father signed board meeting minutes dealing with matters like audited financial statements, and directors’ fees and remuneration.

On the same day as the 2017 Will (on 14.7.2017), Father signed a Tai Chuan’s members’ written resolution concerning audited financial statements, directors’ fees and remuneration, re-election of directors, and reappointment of auditors.

After the 2017 Will was signed, Father continued to sign many important documents in 2017, 2018 and 2019. Most significantly, in September 2019 (on 3.1.2019)—some 18 months after the 2017 Will was signed—Father transferred his shares in Swift & Swiftlets Sdn Bhd to Charmaine, and resigned as its director. The documents that Father signed to effect this transfer and resignation included resolutions, transfer forms and the resignation letter.

Charmaine accepted and registered the share transfer, without any objection or reservation that Father lacked any capacity to sign those documents. In cross-examination, Charmaine admitted that from 2014 to 2019, based on all the documents shown to her that Father signed, the only document she challenges is the 2017 Will. I am of the view that this selective challenge to the 2017 Will, while accepting all other documents Father signed around the same time as the 2017 Will and after—seriously undermines Mark and Charmaine’s assertion of a lack of testamentary capacity, and a lack of understanding of the content of the 2017 Will.

I am further of the view that this evidence of Father’s continued competent decision-making in his corporate and personal affairs is highly probative of his testamentary capacity, particularly when these documents he signed required an understanding of financial statements and corporate governance matters, which were more complex than his Page 27 of 48 testamentary dispositions (the five simple changes he wished to make to his will). The testimony of PW2: Dr Sim 97. PW2: Dr Sim is the consultant neurologist who testified for Mark and Charmaine. Even though Dr Sim testifies on matters of both fact and opinion, Mark and Charmaine represented to me that they rely on Dr Sim as a factual witness. Dr Sim was not produced as an expert witness. Dr Sim also did not produce an expert’s report on Father, at the material time when he made the 2017 Will, for her testimony to be considered as pertinent opinion evidence.

Dr Sim testified that by May 2020—that is, almost three years after Father made the 2017 Will (in July 2017)—Father had advanced dementia. She had thought that a condition called multi-infarct dementia caused his cognitive decline. Dementia could occur like this—according to Dr Ong (Father’s cardiologist), Father had an irregular heartbeat, which could cause Father to have mini-strokes. Clots could form in the heart. The clots could be pushed to the brain. The mini-strokes could cause brain cell damage, which in turn could cause cognitive and memory decline.

Dr Sim also said that dementia does not occur overnight. It progresses over a few years. For a patient like Father, the progression is between three to five years. As Dr Sim examined Page 28 of 48 Father in May 2020, Dr Sim said that the dementia could have started three to five years before that, i.e. between May 2015 to May 2017.

Dr Sim also said that dementia has many stages. In the early stage, the patient has memory impairment. He may not remember that he had already asked a question. Or he would ask the same question over and over.

I note here that Dr Ong reported that Charmaine informed her that Father’s memory was failing; that he would ask the same question a few times in a period of a few minutes. I note that this was what Dr Ong reported on the consultation with her on 22.6.2017, which was less than a month before the 2017 Will was signed. So, Mark and Charmaine want me to consider that Father had the early-stage dementia that Dr Sim elaborated on.

However, early-stage dementia does not mean that Father did not have the testamentary capacity to make a valid Will on 14.7.2017.

And, even if I were to find that Father had early-stage dementia when he made the 2017 Will—which I am not prepared to find (merely based on Dr Sim’s statements, which Mark and Charmaine rely on purely as statements of fact)—there is no evidence that he did not have the testamentary capacity to Page 29 of 48 make a valid Will. There is no evidence that he did not know the content of the Will that he signed.

On the contrary, there is direct evidence that Father instructed Miss Lim to prepare the 2017 Will. Miss Lim discussed the 2017 Will with him. He went to his office to sign it. He asked Khaw to witness the 2017 Will, together with Miss Lim. And he put his signature to the 2017 Will. Khaw testified that Father read over the 2017 Will before he signed it. These acts, to me, are specific and deliberate acts that require decision and judgment.

Two—Dr Sim said that advanced dementia is the most severe stage of dementia. By May 2020, Father was at the advanced dementia stage. He cannot talk, he was bedridden, and he cannot even swallow.

However, May 2020 is not the material time at which I should consider Father’s state of mind, in the context of this testamentary capacity. May 2020 is almost three years after he signed the 2017 Will. I should consider Father’s state of mind when considering his testamentary capacity, on 14.7.2017—the date Father made the 2017 Will.

The testimony of PW4 (Tan Ken Jin) PW4 (Tan) was Father’s nurse. Mark and Charmaine rely on anecdotal evidence of Father being forgetful and repeating the same questions. Tan testified about the February and April 2017 incidents when Father gave him all the money in his pocket and all the money in his handbag.

But in cross-examination, Tan admitted that he was not in a position to say that Father would simply sign documents without reading them. He admitted that it was not his place to say that in July 2017, Father was not mentally sound, or could not comprehend his actions, when he made the 2017 Will.

I do not accept DW4’s anecdotal evidence as having any weight in proving that Father did not have the testamentary capacity to sign the 2017 Will.

The testimony of PW1 (Dr Ong) about Father’s bed sores Mark and Charmaine make much of the bed sores that Father developed in January 2017. But the evidence does not support the inference that bed sores necessarily indicate a lack of testamentary capacity. Dr Ong testified that bed sores suggested that Father was unable to move, and that these could be a sign of dementia. However, I find that Father’s immobility was primarily due to his bad knees and other orthopaedic problems, not necessarily cognitive impairment. A person, even Page 31 of 48 an elderly person, can be physically immobile, while retaining a high mental capacity.

While bed sores may be relevant to Father’s general health (particularly mobility), they do not by themselves prove a lack of testamentary capacity. No medical evidence that Father lacked the testamentary capacity to make a valid will on 14.7.2017

The medical evidence that Mark and Charmaine rely on does not prove the lack of testamentary capacity on the date the 2017 Will was signed. While Father had various health problems and he showed signs of age-related cognitive decline, the medical evidence falls far short of proving that he did not have the requisite testamentary capacity to make the 2017 Will.

Dr Ong prescribed Bio-Biloba in November 2016 for poor memory. But Dr Ong accepted, and Andrew correctly pointed out—Bio-Biloba is a dietary supplement containing ginkgo extract, which can be bought over the counter. It is not a psychotropic drug. Dr Ong’s prescription of Bio-Bilabo does not, of itself, prove that Father was suffering from dementia of such severity as to deprive him of testamentary capacity.

More importantly, while Dr Ong suggested Aricept in June 2017, it was never actually prescribed by Dr Ong. It was not Page 32 of 48 administered to Father. Charmaine verified this fact in her cross-examination.

If Father’s condition had been so severe as to render him incapable of making a will, I would imagine that a suggested course of treatment would have been followed immediately. But neither Dr Ong nor Father’s family deemed it necessary to proceed with Aricept, nor the suggested consultation with a neurologist. Although Father had some memory problems, his condition was not so serious as to take away his mental capacity.

Dr Ong did not refer Father to a neurologist until 2020, almost three years after the 2017 Will was signed.

Dr Sim’s evidence arose from examining Father on two occasions—22.5.2020 and 23.5.2020. Dr Sim never saw Father before these dates. Dr Sim’s diagnosis of advanced dementia in May 2020 cannot be extrapolated backwards to prove Father’s mental condition on 14.7.2017.

Dr Sim admitted that she had no personal knowledge of Father’s mental condition in July 2017. She admitted that she could not conclusively say that in July 2017, Father—(i) could not give instructions to his lawyer (Miss Lim), (ii) could not read, and (iii) could not comprehend what he was doing.

PW3 (Dr Suntharalingam) was the orthopaedic surgeon who treated Father for his bad knees. While he noted that in 2017, Father was quiet, withdrawn and irritable compared to before, he was treating Father only for Father’s orthopaedic problems. Not for any mental condition.

In cross-examination, Dr Suntharalingam admitted that Father’s mental health and mental condition were outside of this purview. He made no diagnosis of Father’s neurological condition and did not perform any medical tests to assess Father’s mental capacity.

His evidence remained only his observation that Father was relatively quiet, withdrawn and irritable. This hardly constitutes medical evidence of a lack of testamentary capacity.

My findings There is no medical evidence that at the time he signed the 2017 Will, Father was of unsound mind, or that he was so delusional that he was insane.

I find that Father understood the nature of making his will, as he had made five previous wills before the 2017 Will. I find that Father also understood the effect of the changes that he made to his will. He knew precisely which assets he wanted to give away and to whom, and which assets he wanted to give to Page 34 of 48 someone else. He changed his wishes to give his watches and jewellery, no longer to Charmaine, but to Mark and Andrew. And he expressed his specific wish to give his 20,000 shares in Tai Chuan only to Andrew.

The evidence of the persons who communicated and interacted with Father immediately before he signed the 2017 Will does not disclose to me any unsoundness of mind or any delusional conduct, like he was insane. He instructed his lawyer: Miss Lim, what he wanted to put into the 2017 Will. He purposely went into his office to sign the 2017 Will. He asked the financial controller: Khaw, to be one of the witnesses to the 2017 Will. Khaw testified that he saw Father read over the 2017 Will before he signed it. After signing the 2017 Will, he asked Khaw to keep it for him until it was time to disclose it.

This was not the conduct of someone who was not of sound mind, or who suffered from delusion or who was insane.

I therefore find that Father had the testamentary capacity to make the 2017 Will, that there was due execution of the 2017 Will, that there were no suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the 2017 Will, and that there were no extraneous vitiating elements, such as undue influence or fraud, that may have tainted the validity of the 2017 Will. Page 35 of 48 Did Father know and approve the content of the 2017 Will when he signed it?

First, the evidence shows that Father gave clear instructions to Miss Lim to prepare the 2017 Will. In this connection, I note that while Andrew made the phone calls to Miss Lim for Father to speak to her, there is no evidence that Andrew interfered with or influenced the substance of the instructions that Father gave to her. Miss Lim took instructions directly and only from Father.

Second, the sequence of events shows that Father understood what he was doing. He went to the office to change his will by making another will. When Miss Lim told him that there was a need to have two witnesses, Father immediately used the intercom to call Khaw to be the second witness.

This conduct shows an understanding of the requirements for the making of the 2017 Will. It shows a conduct of active engagement with the process of making a valid will.

Then, Father gave clear instructions to Khaw to keep the 2017 Will safe for him. This conscious instruction for safekeeping demonstrates that Father knew what the document was, that he understood its importance, and that he wanted to ensure that it was properly preserved. A testator who did not know or approve of the content of the will would not likely give separate and specific instructions to a specific person for its safekeeping.

Third, before the signing, both Miss Lim and Khaw observed Father reading the 2017 Will. This is, I find, cogent evidence of knowledge and approval of the 2017 Will. Father signed it after reading it.

Fourth, the changes made in the 2017 Will were rational and understandable. They reflected the changed circumstances since the 2014 Will. The 2014 Will was made when Mother was alive. She was named an executrix, and was the primary beneficiary of Father’s estate. After her death, it was natural for Father to review his testamentary dispositions.

He excluded Mother from executorship (as she had passed on) and decided that the residuary estate would go to all four children in equal shares. But the distribution of his watches and jewellery was changed from Charmaine only, to Mark and Andrew. I note that this is a change that neither Mark nor Charmaine challenges.

More significantly, the 2017 Will provided specifically for Father’s Tai Chuan shares. Father gave all the shares to Andrew.

This change, while dramatic, was not irrational or unexplainable. Father had appointed Andrew the joint managing director of Tai Chuan in August 2014, and of Taisho Page 37 of 48 in 2015. This discloses Father’s intention for Andrew to take charge of the family companies.

The evidence also shows that Father had wanted to transfer the shares to Andrew inter vivos (meaning gift while he was alive) through two resolutions. (The documents concerned are actually the board of directors’ meeting minutes, which contain the resolution, and an attached table (schedule) of approval, which contains the names of the directors in columns for each of them to sign, if they approve the resolutions. This was the practice of the family companies. These documents constituted the resolutions passed by the board.) The resolutions are the April 2015 resolution (containing the 15 - 5 split between Andrew and Charmaine), and the September 2016 resolution (concerning the 20 - 0 split between Andrew and Charmaine).

I find that Father had wanted to transfer the shares with the 15 - 5 and 20 - 0 splits, because he signed these resolutions. He signed both the minutes of the board meetings that passed the resolutions, and he signed on the respective tables of approval attached to them.

But Father’s wishes were not completed. Concerning the April 2015 resolution—Charmaine, in fact, signed the resolution, but when she realised that the split stated in that resolution was 15 - 5 and not the 11 - 9, which was more favourable to her (which Page 38 of 48 Father talked about in Penang in March 2015), she deleted her signature from that resolution.

Concerning the September 2016 resolution, although Father had earlier signed the resolution, Charmaine did not sign it. The evidence disclosed that Father’s signatures on the resolution (on the minutes and the table of approval) were scratched out in red ink.

I must also now refer to the evidence of Father’s intention to change the disposition of his Tai Chuan shares when they were in their home at Margaret River in Australia. In February 2015, Father told Charmaine and Andrew that he wanted to give his Tai Chuan shares to them. A few days later, Father said he wanted a 12 - 8 split, but did not mention in whose favour. Then, in March 2015, back in Penang, Father wanted to give the shares with an 11 - 9 split.

This evidence shows me that—

Father wanted to change the distribution of his Tai Chuan shares;

(ii) Father had been contemplating it at least since February 2015;

(iii) the desire to change the disposition of his Tai Chuan shares started in February 2015, where he contemplated a 12 - 8 split; then to March 2015, where he contemplated an 11 - 9 split; then to April 2015, where he not only Page 39 of 48 contemplated but actually signed off on a 15 - 5 split resolution (which could not be effected because Charmain did not agree to it); then to September 2016 (a year and five months later), where he again not only contemplated but again signed off on a 20 - 0 split resolution (which again could not be effected because his signatures were scratched out).

There is no direct evidence that Father scratched out his signatures with red ink on the September 2016 resolution. Charmaine testified that she left the resolution with Father and left without saying anything. But when she went back to him later, his signatures were scratched out, inferring that Father must have scratched them out. If Father had scratched them out, it would show that he changed his mind at that point in time. It does not necessarily show that Father would never have decided on a 20 - 0 split in favour of Andrew in his eventual 2017 Will. Changing his mind about the split in September 2016 cannot conclusively mean that he must have abandoned the 20 - 0 entirely, never to decide on a 20 – 0 split again.

Relatedly, I also deliberated about Mark and Charmaine’s challenge to Father’s testamentary capacity, which necessarily means his mental capacity, to make a valid 2017 Will. Mark and Charmaine assert that Father did not have the capacity to make the 2017 Will. But Mark and Charmaine do not challenge Father’s capacity to change the disposition of his shares by Page 40 of 48 signing the April 2015 resolution documents (which included the relevant transfer forms), and to change the disposition of his shares by signing the September 2016 resolution documents (which also included the transfer forms).

My finding I find, on the balance of probabilities, that Father knew and approved the contents of the 2017 Will when he signed it on 14.7.2017. The evidence of Miss Lim and Khaw, plus Father’s acts of—giving instructions to Miss Lim, reviewing the draft will, reading the 2017 Will before signing it, calling for Khaw to be the second witness, and instructing Khaw about keeping the will safe after signing—all point inescapably to the conclusion that Father was a testator who knew what he was doing. He knew the dispositions he was making, and he approved the contents of the 2017 Will, which permitted him to make those dispositions. Were there suspicious circumstances surrounding the 2017 Will?

First, Father had been wanting to give his Tai Chuan shares to Andrew for some time, i.e. at least since the February 2015 mention of the 12 - 8 split at Margaret River. Charmaine herself testified that at various times, Father spoke of distributions of 12 - 8 and 11 - 9 (although she was unclear in whose favour these distributions were to be). The documentary evidence gives a clearer narrative. In April 2015, Father signed a resolution, with Page 41 of 48 supporting documents, for a 15 - 5 split in Andrew’s favour. But this wish could not be carried out because Charmaine did not sign her approval for it. And then in September 2016, Father signed another resolution, with supporting documents, for a 20 - 0 split in Andrew’s favour, only for his signatures to be scratched out later.

To me, this discloses the direction, or the purpose, of Father’s intention. The consistent direction and purpose of Father’s intention was to give his shares to Andrew, who was managing the family companies. Rather than dividing them equally among all four children. The 2017 Will represents the culmination of Father’s intention.

It was not a sudden or irrational change of mind, unlikely to be brought about by Andrew’s coercion. Instead, I could see that it was Father’s considered judgment, formed over several years, about how best to ensure the continuity in the management of the family companies.

Second, the timing of signing the 2017 Will (on 14.7.2017) when Charmaine was abroad in Australia for a few days, does not, of itself, establish suspicious circumstances, or vitiating elements such as undue influence or fraud. Father was entitled to make a new will at any time he chose. He need not have waited for Charmaine to return from Australia to make the new 2017 Will.

Indeed, given Charmaine’s previous opposition to the earlier attempts at an amicable inter vivos transfer (and I am not making a finding of fact here, since there is no need for me to make this finding of fact to support my judgment; I am just making a contemplation), it may be understandable for Father to finalise his testamentary dispositions in her absence, since the disposition was not in her favour, perhaps to avoid further family conflict.

Andrew assisted Father in carrying out what Father intended to do—make the phone calls to Miss Lim, collect the draft will, take him to the office, etc. But I do not find that this evidence of filial assistance concerning Father’s purpose of making a new will can be transformed into evidence of undue influence or fraud.

Third, Andrew was not present when the 2017 Will was signed. The 2017 Will was signed before Father’s trusted lawyer and friend: Miss Lim, and before Khaw. Neither of them testified about any apprehension on Father’s part when the will was signed. Instead, they both testified that they observed nothing unusual in Father’s demeanour. Without Andrew there, Father could have raised any concerns or uncertainties that he might have had about the making of the 2017 Will, or about the very contents of the 2017 Will. But he did not.

Fourth, Mark and Charmaine’s reliance on audio and video recordings of conversations among family members does not Page 43 of 48 establish vitiating elements such as undue influence or fraud. The fact that Andrew expressed his views about Father’s disposition of Father’s Tai Chuan shares, even raising his voice at moments of frustration, does not amount to the manner of coercion that vitiates a will. What must be demonstrated is that Andrew’s conduct overpowered Father’s judgment, to the extent that the 2017 Will did not reflect Father’s true wishes. Mark and Charmaine have not established this.

Indeed, the very fact that Father decided not to see through the April 2015 (15 – 5) resolution and the September 2016 (20 – 0) resolution, shows me that Father was capable of exercising his own judgment. He would not even defer to Andrew.

Fifth, the change in the distribution of the shares from equal division among all four children to giving all the shares to Andrew is not, in itself, evidence of undue influence or fraud. Testators are entitled to make unequal distributions among their children if they have their reasons for doing so.

Here, Father appointed Andrew the joint managing director of both Tai Chuan and Taisho. Andrew was the child who was actively managing the family companies. It was rational and understandable for Father to decide that Andrew should be rewarded further for managing the family companies, or to have control of more shares to enable effective management of the family business.

Mark and Charmaine may very well feel aggrieved with this disposition. But the law does not require a testator to treat their children equally. And the Court does not interfere with the testator’s wishes just because the dispositions appear unfair or harsh to some beneficiaries.

Sixth, I am mindful that Charmaine, as Father’s primary caregiver, who lived with and looked after him, may feel that she deserved a greater share of the estate in the form of Father’s Tai Chuan shares. But the evidence discloses that Father took a different view. He gave the family house to Charmaine in both the 2014 and 2017 Wills, recognising her role as caregiver. And because it had been her home for the many years that she lived there to look after him. It was more likely than not that he gave his Tai Chuan shares to Andrew to ensure effective management of the family companies. To me, these were rational decisions that Father was entitled to make.

My findings I find that Andrew has satisfactorily dispelled any suspicions that might attach to the 2017 Will. I also find that Mark and Charmaine have not been able to produce evidence of vitiating elements such as undue influence or fraud that might have affected the validity of the 2017 Will. Page 45 of 48 SECOND ISSUE If the 2017 Will is declared invalid, should the 2014 Will be declared as Father’s last Will?

With my findings on the First Issue: that the 2017 Will is valid, this second issue does not require determination.

However, I would observe that if I had found the 2017 Will invalid, then the 2014 Will should be declared as Father’s last valid will. Neither party challenges the validity of the 2014 Will. If the 2017 Will is invalid, the 2014 Will would remain in force. THIRD ISSUE If the 2017 Will is declared Father’s last Will, is there sufficient cause under section 34 of the Probate And Administration Act 1959 to remove Mark and Charmaine as the executors and trustees of the 2017 Will, leaving Andrew as the sole executor?

This third ITBT concerns one of Andrew’s prayers in his counterclaim. Prayer 56.2 of his counterclaim is for an Order that Mark and Charmaine be removed as executors of the 2017 Will.

Mark, Charmaine and Andrew are co-executors of the 2017 Will. Andrew’s prayer 56.2 was included for fear that even if I decide that the 2017 Will is Father’s last will, Mark and Charmaine (having a majority of 2 -1 over Andrew) can prevent an application for probate from being made on the 2017 Will. In other words, even if he succeeds in his defence to the claim and Page 46 of 48 succeeds in his counterclaim, he may not get probate for the 2017 Will.

But when Andrew realised that this Court has the power to grant the probate for either of Father’s wills which I find is Father’s valid and last will, and Mark and Charmaine both agree that this Court has that power—Andrew withdraws his prayer 56.2. This means that I do not have to determine the third ITBT about ordering Mark and Charmaine’s removal as executors.

Andrew also withdraws his claim in prayer 56.10 for damages.

CONCLUSION For these reasons, I dismiss Mark and Charmaine’s (the Plaintiffs’) claim. And I allow Andrew (the Defendant’s) counterclaim at prayers 56.1 and 56.3, which are for—

a declaration that the 2017 Will is the valid will of the late Saw Eng Loke @ Saw Eng Lock, which has revoked all his earlier wills;

an Order that probate be granted for the 2017 Will of the late Saw Eng Loke @ Saw Eng Lock.

As for costs, after hearing arguments on costs, I order the Plaintiffs to pay the Defendant costs of RM100K, because there were six days of trial with nine witnesses, with substantive written and oral submissions by both sides, and because this Page 47 of 48 suit has a claim as well as a counterclaim. Costs are subject to the allocatur. Dated: 29 December 2025 KENNETH ST JAMES HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA GEORGETOWN PULAU PINANG Solicitors for the Plaintiffs : B. Jeyasingam & Kiranjeet Kaur Baldeep Singh Messrs. Ghazi & Lim Solicitors for the Defendant : Karin Lim Ai Ching & A. Suppiah, Nicholas Lim Wei Jian Messrs. Presgrave & Matthews Page 48 of 48 Legislation referred to:

Section 34 of the Probate And Administration Act 1959. Cases referred to:

Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549; (1861-73) All ER Rep 47; (1870) 7 WLUK 15.

Chin Jhin Thien & Anor v Chin Huat Yean @ Chin Chun Yean & Anor [2020] 4 MLJ 581; [2020] 5 AMR 541; [2020] 7 CLJ 137; [2020] 4 MLRA 324.

Tan Cheu Kee v Lim Siew Hwa [2016] MLJU 1599; [2016] AMEJ 2304; [2016] CLJU 1684; [2016] 1 LNS 1684; [2016]

Tho Yow Pew & Anor v Chua Kooi Hean [2002] 4 MLJ 97; [2002] 3 AMR 3703; [2002] 4 CLJ 90; [2002] 2 MLRA 213.

Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1; [2004] 6 AMR 781; [2004] 4 CLJ 309; [2004]