Content
1 letter were of choice and select - plain and precise in its natural meaning, accurately applying the facts to the case. Therefore, the language being clear and exclusive, no extraneous evidence can be supplied or implied to the contrary or to bring about any other conclusion. To support his judgment the learned judge cited Kamla Devi v. Takhatmal AIR [1964] Vol. 51, a Supreme Court of India decision where Subba Rao J at p. 386 held: Section 94 of the Evidence Act lays down a rule of interpretation of the language of a document when it is plain and applies accurately to existing facts. It says that the evidence may be given to show that it was not meant to apply to such facts. When a court is asked to interpret a document, it looks at its language. If the language is clear and unambiguous and applies accurately to existing facts, it shall accept the ordinary meaning, for the duty of the court is not to delve deep into the intricacies of the human mind to ascertain one's undisclosed intention, but only to take the meaning of the words used by him, that is to say his expressed intentions. Similar sentiment was expressed by the Privy Council in North Eastern Railway Company v. Hastings [1900] AC 260 where Earl of Halsbury LC at p. 263 said: The words of a written instrument must be construed according to their natural meaning, and it appears to me that no amount of acting by the parties can alter or qualify words which are plain and unambiguous. So far as I am aware, no principle has ever been more universally or rigorously insisted upon than that written instruments, if they are plain and unambiguous, must be construed according to the plain and unambiguous language of the Instrument itself. Lord Brampton in the same case at p. 270 said: As it stands, it seems to me to be clear and free from ambiguity, and incapable of any other construction that assigned to it by the respondent. Certainly there is nothing to be found in the rest of the agreement to suggest any other interpretation. But it is said that it must have been differently understood by the parties themselves, and that the omission by the plaintiff and his predecessor for upwards of forty years to claim the rents now sought to be recovered is cogent evidence that such was the case. I grant that if the clause were capable of two constructions, one of which would support, the other of which would defeat the claim, the omission would afford irresistible proof that the latter was the interpretation intended by the parties. No such ambiguity, however, exists, and it seems therefore to me that, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, it must be assumed that the parties knew and understood the language they were using, and that in executing the agreement containing that clause they were truly expressing their intentions, and are bound by the writing they have signed. Why the agreement was so framed - what were the considerations which induced it - and why the claim was so long allowed to sleep are mere matters of speculation; but one has no right to act upon speculation to set aside a deed or agreement which is on the face of it clear and definite. As can be seen the letter is short, simple and straightforward without any ambiguity whatsoever. When the appellant wrote the letter and enclosing the cheques the intention of the appellant was to make full and final settlement of the judgment sum and the interest thereon. Apparently, in advancing an amount in excess of the judgment sum awarded by the court, the appellant had calculated the interest up to the date when the payment was made, ie, the date the letter was written. In my view the letter is incapable of any other meaning because the words used are plain and simple