[135] Nonetheless, I was aware that the failure on the part of the first accused to put his case to the prosecution’s witnesses could never, by itself, relieve the prosecution of its duty to establish the charges beyond a reasonable doubt: Alcontara a/l Ambros Anthony v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 1 MLJ 209. A court must still consider the defence of an accused no matter how incredible it may seem, including the afterthought. However, such failure also means that the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses could not be disputed at all. It is not merely a technical rule of evidence but it is a rule of essential justice to prevent surprise at trial and miscarriage of justice: AEG Carapiet v. AY Derderian AIR 1961 Cal. 359. [136] If there was really a proper investigation that was conducted by entering PW7’s house, on the drugs that were found and the detention of PW4 and PW7, why was no police report made by any of the accused? And why was no senior police officer present? All the accused were from the rank and file in the police force. This court could not accept that they could do as they please without having regard to the rules and regulations of the police force. Thus, I did not accept the contention there was an actual and legitimate investigation made by the first accused as casting a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. [137] In paragraphs 4 and 5 of WSSD1, the first accused alleged that upon interrogation, PW4 admitted that he kept drugs at his mother’s house. Purportedly, that was why all of them went to the mother’s house to investigate. At the house, he further alleged that PW4 gave him a few small empty plastic bags that were suspected to contain drugs. I found that all this was also an afterthought since it was never put as such to PW4 during the trial. PW4 had testified that he was brought to his mother’s house to borrow money from his mother because a bribe was solicited from him. [138] In paragraph 8 of WSSD1, the first accused again denied that he had solicited and obtained the bribe at the material time because he was not with PW4 and PW7. This was because he was somewhere else. I had also considered this contention and did not accept it since it was never put to the two witnesses when they testified. Further, the first accused did not even forward any defence of alibi pursuant to section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code for this court to consider. [139] In paragraph 9 of WSSD1, the first accused further denied the charges against him because the money was not found on him or any of his properties. In my view, it was not incumbent for the prosecution to prove as such. As long as this court was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence that he had corruptly solicited and obtained the bribe, then it would have been sufficient for the prosecution to prove its cases. The Act is a special law that was enacted for corruption. In any event, that the money must be found in the accused’s possession was never an ingredient of the offence for the prosecution to prove against the accused in the first place. [140] Apart from that, ID21 was a copy of the first accused’s police pocketbook that was tendered in court by the prosecution. It was also delivered to the first accused under section 51A of the Criminal Procedure Code. For reasons best known to them, the prosecuting officers chose not to tender the original pocketbook as evidence during the trial. This was despite initially indicating that it would be tendered as part of the evidence for the prosecution: see section 51A(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Counsel for the first accused applied to this court under the said section 51A for an order to instruct the prosecution to produce the original pocketbook as part of the evidence. Presumably, what the first accused wrote in the pocketbook might be used as evidence in his favour. I disallowed the application because there was nothing in the said provision that could allow me to order as such. [141] Not to be deterred, Counsel made the same application pursuant to another provision which was section 51 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Since it was made after the commencement of the trial i.e. in the course of the trial, then the rule of relevancy must strictly be followed: PP v. Raymond Chia Kim Chwee & Anor [1985] 2 MLJ 436 (SC). Given that the issue of relevancy was not submitted and argued at all by the first accused, the application was dismissed. [142] Despite that, I had also considered the writing that was allegedly made by the first accused in the pocketbook. It was on the last page where PW4’s name was written together with an identity card number, an address, a number plate of a motorcycle, a date and telephone numbers. According to the first accused, he wrote the particulars to locate a stolen motorcycle. The question was how would the writings exculpate the first accused from all the evidence adduced by the prosecution that he had corruptly solicited and obtained the bribe from PW4? Even if ID21 was admitted as evidence and marked as P21, I did not think that the writings in the pocketbook alone could exonerate the first accused from all the ingredients of the offences that were proved by the prosecution. In my view, the writings failed to cast a reasonable doubt to support his afterthought defence that he was gathering intelligence for the theft of motorcycles, that he was not present when the two criminal acts were committed and his bare denial that he did not commit the crimes. [143] To conclude, I found the first accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. I was guided by the often-quoted principle that a reasonable doubt must be a doubt arising from the evidence or want of evidence and cannot be imaginary doubt unrelated to evidence: Public Prosecutor v. Saimin & Anor [1971] 1 LNS 115. The evidence by the second accused (DW2) [144] The second accused echoed what the first accused contended that they went to PW7’s house to conduct an investigation concerning the theft of motorcycles. I did not accept this version as raising any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case for the same reasons I found from the testimony of the first accused. [145] The second accused further said at first they wanted to conduct a urine test for PW4 and PW7 at the Gelang Patah Police Station. However, they decided not to do so because PW4 wanted to provide information on someone by the name of Ahpet concerning the motorcycle theft. Since it was more important to pursue the investigation of the theft concerned, then the urine test was not conducted. I did not accept and did not believe this assertion for the following reasons. [146] It was suggested to PW4 that he gave information about Ahpet and because of that, the urine test was not done. PW4 disagreed with the suggestion. This could be seen in the notes of evidence: : Masa di Balai Polis Gelang Patah saya cadangkan kepada kamu, kamu ada memberi maklumat tentang seseorang yang digelar dengan nama panggilan Ahpet yang terlibat dengan sindikit curi kenderaan setuju atau tidak? : Tidak setuju. ......................... .......................... : Saya cadangkan kepada kamu oleh sebab kamu ada ingin memberi maklumat tentang Ahpet yang dikatakan terlibat dengan sindiket curi kenderaan maka kesemua polis-polis menahan kamu ini telah menukar fikiran dengan tidak mahu menahan kamu setuju atau tidak? : Tidak setuju. [Emphasis added] [147] The second accused also said that PW4 wanted to show Ahpet’s house and that he did show them Ahpet’s house. This was suggested to PW4 during the trial. However, PW4 denied that he wanted to show the house and further denied that he had shown the house. The notes of evidence read: : Saya cadang kepada kamu, kamu memang ada tunjuk satu rumah iaitu rumah Ahpet yang kamu kata terlibat dengan sindiket curi kenderaan? : Memang tiada. [Emphasis added] [148] As this court had found, PW4 was a credible witness. When he testified, he categorically denied all the suggestions that were put to him by the accused. And this court had accepted his denials. Therefore, it was no longer open for the accused to ask this court to revisit its earlier finding that PW4 was telling the truth on the evidence adduced. Further, as I understood it, a mere suggestion or a question in cross-examination is not evidence. They only showed the stand taken by the accused or indicative of the case put forward. They cannot be substituted for evidence if the suggestions are repudiated or disagreed by a witness such as PW4 in the instant case: Emperor v. Karimuddi AIR 1932 Cal 373; Public Prosecutor v. Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim (No.3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1. The suggestions do not prove anything and will remain nothing unless agreed or admitted by a witness. Since PW4 disagreed with the suggestions, no reasonable doubt could be raised since the suggestions were not evidence. [149] The second accused gave his version of why they went to PW4’s mother’s house. He said they went there because PW4 wanted to get his telephone to be able to call Ahpet. The information concerning Ahpet was on the telephone. Therefore, the purpose of going there was different from what PW4 said during his testimony or what the first accused alleged previously. The second accused put the said version to PW4 when PW4 testified previously. The suggestion was also unequivocally denied by PW4. Incidentally, his co-accused who was the third accused also put the same version to PW4 even though it was not seriously challenged by him because the word “kononnya” was repeatedly used. Anyway, the suggestion was denied by PW4. This could be seen from the notes of evidence which read: : Saya katakan juga kepada Encik Usamah yang akhirnya Encik Usamah bawa OKT-OKT ke rumah Encik Usamah kerana kononnya untuk mengambil telefon yang ada di rumah mak Encik Usamah yang kononnya mengandungi informasi berkenaan suspek Ahpet? : Tidak setuju juga. [Emphasis added] [150] Given that PW4 denied that it was to acquire the telephone to call Ahpet, I found that no reasonable doubt could be cast in the evidence by the prosecution. The prosecution had proved the purpose PW4 went to his mother’s house was to borrow some money to give to the policemen to secure his release and not for any other reasons. [151] About the third charge that he alone was facing, the second accused gave this version. He said he went to the restaurant by car to fetch PW4 because the first accused instructed him to do so. This was because the first accused wanted to further question PW4. Obviously, this version was to deny that he went to see PW4 in his attempt to obtain the gratification amounting to RM1,400.00. Was the suggestion put to PW4 and the first accused when they testified? I found that it was never put to PW4 but it was put to the first accused. However, the first accused said he did not remember having asked the second accused to do so. This meant the version by the second accused that he brought PW4 to the Balai Polis Kangkar Pulai for further questioning could not be supported by anyone. A question then arose. On what authority could PW4 be brought to the police station for further questioning by the first accused given that PW4 was released and no police report was made to launch an investigation? Similarly, the second accused’s contention that PW4 tried to escape whilst the car was being driven to the police station could not be accepted because it was never put to PW4 previously. [152] Thus, nothing turned for the second accused. I found that his denial that he did not attempt to obtain the bribe failed to cast any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. The evidence by the third accused (DW3) [153] On the night of 10.4.2018, the third accused admitted he went to PW7’s house together with all of his co-accused. He went there to assist because the first accused had information about the theft of motorcycles. He went inside PW7’s house to conduct an investigation. PW4 and PW7 were present. He was informed about someone by the name of Ahpet but he did not remember who did. He denied that he or his co-accused had solicited any money. [154] In his further testimony, he said that PW4 went home to get his telephone to call Ah Pet. PW4 then called Ahpet but later told the third accused that Ahpet could not be reached. Was this version suggested or put to PW4 by the third accused when PW4 gave evidence before? I found that the third accused never put to PW4 that PW4 had called Ahpet and later said Ahpet could not be contacted. Therefore, this was an afterthought. It must be pointed out that the evidence adduced by PW4 was that he had to go to his mother’s house to get the money to give to the policemen, and not because Ahpet could no longer be disputed by the third accused. [155] Likewise, the third accused alleged that PW7 showed him a building block where Ahpet’s house was said to be located. Of course, this testimony was to support his assertion that they were investigating the theft of motorcycles and were not to obtain a bribe from PW4. However, the third accused never put to PW7 or asked PW7 about this contention during his short cross-examination of PW7 previously. Again, I found this was another afterthought and a recent invention by the third accused. [156] In the premises, I found the third accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. The evidence by the fourth accused (DW4) [157] The fourth accused testified through a written statement (WSDW4). I had also allowed further questions by his Counsel. [158] In the first paragraph of WSDW4, he denied that he had solicited the RM7,000.00 and obtained the gratification amounting to RM1,600.00 from PW4 or PW7. [159] In the second and third paragraphs of the written statement, the fourth accused said he was together with the other accused at the first accused’s house after finishing work. Later, the first accused said he had information about motorcycle theft. Then all of them went to PW7’s house to conduct a raid. [160] In paragraph 11, he firmly denied the two charges against him. This was because he was not with PW4 and PW7 on the two occasions where the bribe was solicited and obtained. Was this argument put to PW4 and PW7 by the fourth accused when both of them testified earlier? [161] I found that during the cross-examination of PW4, the fourth accused never challenged or put to PW4 that he was not present when the bribe was solicited and later obtained by the first accused. In fact, PW4 testified that when the bribe was solicited, all four accused including the fourth accused were present. For the solicitation, it was proved from paragraphs 8 and 9 of PW4’s written statement (WSSP4). Further, in paragraph 13, it was the fourth accused who suggested that PW4 lied to his mother about an accident to obtain the bribe. And for the second charge, PW4 said in paragraph 16 of WSSP4 that the fourth accused was present when the RM1,600.00 bribe was obtained. In point of fact, in the said paragraph 16, it was the fourth accused who took out the RM100.00 that was seized from PW4 and gave the money to the first accused so that the bribe obtained amounted to RM1,600.00. [162] As for PW7, I also found that during his cross-examination, the fourth accused never challenged or put to PW7 that he was not present when the bribe was solicited and afterwards obtained by the policemen. I further found that the fourth accused failed to forward any defence of alibi under section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code to support his allegation that he was elsewhere when the bribe was solicited and obtained. [163] Hence, it was my finding that the fourth accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt since what he alleged was a bare denial and an afterthought to dispute all the ingredients of the offences that were proved against him. Just like with the three accused previously, the fourth accused crucially failed to explain and defend himself on why they entered and searched PW7’s house without any senior police officer present according to the rules and regulations. [164] And just like with the other three accused earlier, I did not accept or believe the fourth accused’s explanation and it did not raise in my mind any reasonable doubt as to his guilt: Mat v. PP [1963] 1 LNS 82. The evidence by DW5 [165] The second accused called DW5 to testify on his behalf. She was the second accused’s ex-wife. They divorced in 2022. [166] She testified that on 10.4.2018, she was with the second accused at a bazaar which was the Bazar Karat. I took judicial notice that this bazaar was in Johor Bahru and not too far away from this court. She was there from about 7.30 pm until 9 pm. She wanted to buy herself shoes. During the time there, DW5 said the second accused received a telephone call from his friend. She was unsure who that friend was. However, he told her that his friend needed his help. As a result, he sent her back home and then he went out. That was in essence DW5’s evidence in her short testimony. [167] It was apparent to me that the second accused called DW5 to testify to support his contention that he went to see the first accused on the night in question. And by extension, to contend that his version was the truth in that all of the accused went out for an official duty i.e. an investigation concerning motorcycle theft and had nothing to do with any nefarious or criminal activity. After all, he had to leave his wife who purportedly required his presence at the bazaar. [168] I had also carefully considered this line of defence. To my mind, even if DW5 was telling the truth that the second accused received the telephone call and his assistance was needed, it would be a real stretch to hold that he must be telling the absolute truth that he did not participate in the three charges against him. There was other evidence against him that was deliberated earlier by this court and proved by the prosecution which he was required to answer, namely all the ingredients of the offences that were established previously. [169] Again, nothing turned for the second accused. I found that from DW5’s testimony, the second accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. The evidence by DW6 [170] The third accused called DW6 to testify on his behalf. DW6 was a retired senior police officer. In 2018, he was working at the Iskandar Puteri District Police Headquarters as the Head of the Narcotics Crimes Investigation Division. [171] Counsel for the third accused asked DW6 whether an arrest could be discontinued due to bargaining of information made. In other words, whether the police could bargain with a suspect concerning certain information. A reference to the notes of evidence should be clearer: : Saya ulang, adakah menjadi kebiasaan untuk mana-mana anggota polis apabila dia buat satu tangkapan tetapi beliau tidak ditahan atau diteruskan tangkapan tersebut kerana ada informasi berkaitan mana-mana jenayah yang lain, ada atau tidak? : Tidak ada, semua tangkapan mesti dibuat laporan polis dan diserahkan kepada pegawai penyiasat bahagian-bahagian yang tertentu mengikut kesalahan. : Kalau tangkapan ini boleh menawarkan apa-apa informasi berkenaan satu jenayah yang lebih serius daripada tangkapan dia, apa prosedur dia? : Kalau tangkapan telah dibuat walaupun orang itu nak bagi maklumat, kita tidak ada prosedur untuk tawar menawar. Itu mengikut arahan dan juga peraturan yang ditetapkan. : Apa akan berlaku dengan informasi yang diterima ini? Adakah kita buang sahaja information ini? : Maklumat yang diterima sama ada maklumat itu dia boleh bertindak sendiri ataupun boleh salurkan kepada pihak mana. Kalau andai kata maklumat itu berkenaan dengan narkotik boleh salurkan ke pejabat kami. Jika tindakan yang dia buat sendiri pihak kami tidak akan bertanggungjawab kecuali ada tangkapan. [Emphasis added] [172] If by calling DW6 the third accused thought he would be vindicated and absolved of any wrongdoing, then he was gravely mistaken. DW6’s answers and explanation not only did not do any favour to him, but they were also adverse to his defence. In no uncertain terms, DW6 said that it was not the norm for a policeman to discontinue any arrest due to other information concerning other crimes. He added that a police report must be lodged on an arrest and that it must be forwarded to the investigation officer in the respective division according to the offence committed. This certainly made a lot of administrative sense. It illustrated what all the accused did by not lodging a police report was clearly wrong after the drugs were found in PW4’s bag. It could not be condoned by the police department. In any case, PW4 and PW7 were not properly arrested since no police report was made, they were not brought inside any police station and were only detained by all the accused for the purpose of soliciting and obtaining a bribe before they were let go. [173] Further, DW6 said there was no such procedure according to the rules and regulations for bargaining with other information concerning a more serious crime. This put to rest and repudiated any contention by the third accused that there was such a bargain. Further, DW6 added that any information concerning narcotics should be directed to his office which none of the accused did after the drugs were found from PW4. [174] DW6 was asked other questions in his examination-in-chief. They were these: : ASP kalau satu-satu information, bila saya tahan satu orang ada kes kecil tetapi information yang saya boleh dapati daripada dia adalah boleh menyelesaikan kes yang lebih besar, apakah value kedua-dua benda ini? : Ini tanya pendapat saya, pendapat saya tangkapan yang pertama nak tanya value dengan yang akan diberi. Yang akan diberi belum ada value sebab belum tahu berlaku atau tidak. Further, : Maklumat ASP kata belum ada nilai, sekiranya maklumat itu ada nilai bagaimana? : Perkara yang belum berlaku pada pendapat saya tidak boleh diberi nilai sebab kita tidak tahu benda belum berlaku. [Emphasis added] [175] It was obvious the two questions asked above were obviously speculative in nature. They should have been objected to by the prosecution. And they properly deserved the said answers given by a senior police officer like DW6. It seemed to me the purpose of the two questions was an attempt to bolster the contention by the third accused that it was permitted to release PW4 because of a more serious crime which was motorcycle theft. Clearly, the purpose had failed based on the answers given. Further, a pivotal question was this. Since when did the four accused get to choose and decide that drug possession was less serious than motorcycle theft? Under what legal basis and whose authority could they determine as such? Regardless, there was no evidence that all the accused were actually investigating the theft given that PW4 had denied the allegation. And all that was left was the evidence concerning the bribery solicitation and the obtaining of the bribe. [176] In the upshot, the testimony by DW6 failed to justify or support the detention that was discontinued, the absence of a further investigation on the drugs found and the claim that all the accused could decide that motorcycle theft was more important than a narcotic case. Thus, the third accused failed to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. The evidence by DW7 [177] The second accused called DW7 to testify. DW7 was a MACC officer. In his examination-in-chief, he admitted that he was involved in the detention of the second accused when he was arrested by the MACC. DW7 further said that the second accused’s handphone was seized by another MACC officer which was PW11. He disagreed that the handphone was not taken from the second accused. That was all the salient evidence by DW7. [178] In his written submission, the second accused did not forward any submission or argument on the reason why DW7 was called to testify. Thus, it was unclear to me why the witness had to testify. In any case, I found that all the evidence adduced by DW7 failed to create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. The evidence by DW8 [179] DW8 was called to testify on behalf of the third accused. He was a police corporal who worked at the Kangkar Pulai Police Station. He knew all the four accused. In his examination-in-chief, he said a monthly meeting was held while he was working at the police station. Amongst others, it discussed the crime index and other information including the names of suspects. According to DW8, the index on crime such as motorcycle theft was given priority and more focus by the police station as compared to narcotic cases. [180] In an answer to a question, he said that if anyone is detained for a narcotic offence but the detainee could provide more information on a more serious criminal case, then the focus should be on the criminal case. In an answer to another question by Counsel, DW8 said the name of Ahpet was mentioned during the monthly meeting allegedly because he was a person of interest. He did not name anyone else. He said Ahpet was mentioned by the third accused during one of the monthly meetings. [181] I had carefully considered the evidence by DW8. First, on the contention that a detainee could provide more information on a more serious offence. It should be noted that this was resolved and repudiated through the evidence of DW6 previously. I accepted and believed what DW6 testified as opposed to what DW8 said. Further, I found that at no time did PW4 say he provided or wanted to give any information on Ahpet about motorcycle theft. Therefore, what DW8 said was merely a conjecture in an answer to a speculative question. It had no relevance to cast any reasonable doubt that the third accused was conducting a police investigation and was not involved in the two bribery offences. As I had discussed and analysed, it was inherently improbable that all the accused did only concern a police investigation. Rather, to release PW4 and PW7 for the drugs found, the RM7,000.00 was solicited and thereafter the RM1,600.00 was obtained by all the accused. [182] On the claims that motorcycle theft was given more focus by the police station and Ahpet’s name that the third accused allegedly mentioned during the monthly meeting, were they put to any of the prosecution’s witnesses especially to PW2 who was the Head of the Kangkar Pulai Police Station? I found that they were not. The third accused did not put the contention or challenge PW2 that Ahpet was a person of interest by the police station. As the head of the police station, a challenge should have been put to him to support the claims. Instead, the third accused chose to call the police corporal who was a subordinate to support his claim. Why was that? Further, if the third accused alleged that PW4 was not telling the truth about Ahpet, then it behoved him to challenge PW2 and PW4 to raise a reasonable doubt. However, this was also not properly done. In Timhar Mindani Ong & Anor v. PP [2010] 3 CLJ 938, the Court of Appeal said: It is trite that if the defence had any misgivings on the authenticity or suspicious nature of any narration of the evidence by the prosecution’s witness, then that witness should have been cross-examined on that disputed fact so that an explanation can be given to be properly assessed by the trial court. [Emphasis added] [183] Further, the evidence adduced through DW8 was also an afterthought and a recent invention. Therefore, I found that the evidence failed to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. The evidence by DW9 [184] DW9 was called to testify on behalf of the fourth accused. She was the wife of the fourth accused. She testified that on 11.4.2018, the fourth accused went back to their home between 3 am to 3.15 am. That was the only important evidence in her short testimony. Based on her evidence, it was submitted the fourth accused was not present when the second offence was committed at the time stipulated in the second charge. [185] I had considered and discussed earlier the evidence by the fourth accused after he testified. I found that the fourth accused never challenged or put to PW4 that he was not present when the bribe was corruptly obtained. PW4 had testified that the fourth accused was present together with the other accused. This could clearly be seen in paragraph 16 of PW4’s written statement which was WSSP4. In the said paragraph, it was none other than the fourth accused himself who took out the RM100.00 that was seized from PW4 and handed it to the first accused so that a total of RM1,600.00 was corruptly obtained by all the accused. [186] It was the same when the fourth accused decided not to challenge PW7 that he was not present when the bribe was obtained. As a result of the failure, what DW9 testified was clearly an afterthought and a recent invention. This meant that the testimonies by PW4 and PW7 could not be disputed in that the fourth accused was present when the bribe was obtained from PW4. As alluded to, it was not merely a technical rule of evidence but it was a rule of essential justice in an adversarial system. The fourth accused further failed to forward any defence of alibi under the Criminal Procedure Code to support his claim that he was at home when the bribe was obtained. [187] Thus, nothing turned for the fourth accused as well. I found the evidence of DW9 failed to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. Whether all the accused managed to rebut the presumption of section 50(1) of the Act on the balance of probabilities. [188] Now, did all the accused manage to rebut the presumption of section 50(1) of the Act on the balance of probabilities? It was well-settled that this legal burden was heavier than raising a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case for them to obtain an acquittal. It was for them to give an innocent explanation which the court considered more likely than not that it was true, i.e on the balance of probabilities, the test applied in civil proceedings: Thavanathan Balasubramaniam v. Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 CLJ 150 FC. Based on the analysis made earlier, I was constrained to find that all the accused failed to rebut the presumption. [189] What then, will constitute sufficient proof for them to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities? I think that the proof must relate to the probabilities of each particular case. Based on the evidence adduced, this court could not find that it was more probable than not that all the accused managed to do so. It would be against all probabilities of the case to find that they managed to discharge the burden. Lord Denning in Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 347 said: If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say ‘We think it more probable than not’ the balance is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal, it is not. [190] My other point is this. If they failed to succeed in their defence on the lighter burden of raising a reasonable doubt, then I did not think that they could be found to have successfully rebut the legal presumption on the heavier burden. This heavier burden could not be discharged merely through afterthought evidence or bare denials and conjectures. These were what all the accused adduced in their testimony. [191] Section 50(1) of the Act placed an onus on them to discharge their legal burden. A heavier burden was on them to rebut the statutory presumption on the balance of probabilities. The duty was on them to prove their defence that they did not commit the three offences. I found that they failed to do so. In Mohd Khir Toyo v. PP [2015] 8 CLJ 796, the Federal Court observed: [105] A presumption stands “unless the contrary is proved”. “The words ‘unless the contrary is proved’ mean that the presumption raised … has to be rebutted by proof and not by mere explanation which may be merely plausible …” (State of Assam v. Krishna Rao (1973) 3 SCC 227 at 237; see also T Shankar Prasad v. State of AP at 766, SN Bose v. State of Bihar [1968] 3 SCR 563 at 571). [Emphasis added] [192] “Proved” is defined in section 3 of Act 56. A fact is said to be “proved’ when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. Further, it must be distinguished between the duty to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case and the duty to prove a defence on the balance of probabilities. The distinction between the two burdens was explained by the Court of Appeal in Abdul Aziz Miew Yiong v. PP [2014] 1 LNS 1875 where Abdul Rahman Sebli JCA (as he then was) opined: In law there is a distinction between the duty to merely cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case and the duty to prove a defence on the balance of probabilities. In the former case all that the accused needs to do to entitle him to an acquittal is to cast a reasonable doubt in the trial judge’s mind as to his guilt: Mat v. PP (supra). He has no duty to prove or disprove anything whereas in the latter case affirmative admissible evidence of the facts constituting the defence must be established, failing which he will be convicted of the offence charged. [Emphasis added] [193] Based on the reasons discussed earlier, I found that none of what all the accused alleged in their testimonies and in the written submissions could be accepted as proof of affirmative admissible evidence. They consisted of bare denials, conjectures, afterthought and recent inventions. The four accused failed in their duties to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities. Therefore, all of them failed to rebut the presumption under section 50(1) of the Act. Conclusion at the close of the defence’s case [194] At the conclusion of the trial, this court found that not only did all the accused fail to raise any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution, but they also failed to rebut the legal presumption on the balance of probabilities on the three charges. [195] Irrespective of whether a court is otherwise convinced in its own mind of the guilt or innocence of the accused, its decision must be based on the evidence adduced and nothing else: Sia Soon Suan v. Public Prosecutor [1966] 1 MLJ 116. Having considered all the evidence adduced, it was my firm finding that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against all the accused: see section 173(m)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code. [196] Therefore, I found that they were guilty of the charges that they were indicted. Accordingly, all the accused were convicted of the charges. The sentence [197] Section 24(1) of the Act reads: Any person who commits an offence under sections 16, 17, 20, 21, 22 and 23 shall on conviction be liable to-