1. ) Mohammad Shakry Bin Yaacob v 1. ) Rohana Binti Hasan (CA-25-7-09/2022)

MOHAMMAD SHAKRY BIN YAACOB

NILA KESUMA BINTI ABDUL RAHIM (NO/ K/P : 680121-02-5194) ...PEMOHON-PEMOHON

ROHANA BINTI HASAN

KETUA PENDAFTAR

KERAJAAN NEGERI PAHANG ...RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN

Pemohon-Pemohon memfailkan permohonan Semakan Kehakiman bagi membatalkan keputusan Panel Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah Pahang bertarikh 14 Jun 2022 yang menolak rayuan Pemohon-Pemohon dan dengan itu keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Kuantan bertarikh 26 Jun 2018 adalah sah dan terpakai.

Setelah menelitikan kertas-kertas kausa yang difailkan dan setelah menimbangkan penghujahan kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi ini tidak mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar permohonan Semakan Kehakiman ini yang mana pada asasnya adalah untuk menyemak keputusan yang di buat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah Pahang dan dengan itu permohonan Pemohon-Pemohon adalah ditolak dengan kos.

Responden Pertama merupakan bekas isteri Pemohon Pertama yang mana telah bercerai talak satu kali ketiga pada 07 Mac 1998.

Pemohon Pertama dan Pemohon Kedua telah berkahwin pada 11 Ogos 1990 di mana Pemohon Kedua adalah pemilik hartanah HS(D) 27718 Lot 17476 Mukim Batu/Selayang yang punya alamat No. 7476, Jalan 2, Taman Selayang, 68100 Batu Caves, Selangor.

Pada 29 Disember 1998, satu Penghakiman Persetujuan telah dimasuki antara Pemohon Pertama dan Responden Pertama dan telah direkodkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Kuantan di bawah kes Mal. No: 6198.

Pada 09 November 2012, Responden Pertama telah memfailkan satu Permohonan (ex-parte) Kebenaran Penghakiman Luar Masa di Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah melalui kes Mal. No: 06100-034- 081302012 (Permohonan (ex-parte) Kebenaran Pelaksanaan).

Semasa Permohonan (ex-parte) Kebenaran Pelaksanaan difailkan, pindaan pada Penghakiman Persetujuan melalui Perintah bertarikh 29 Disember 1998 telah di buat pada 26 Oktober 1999 (Pindaan Penghakiman Persetujuan) juga difailkan.

Pada 10 Januari 2013, Permohonan (ex-parte) Kebenaran Pelaksanaan tersebut telah dibenarkan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah. Susulan daripada itu, Responden Pertama telah memfailkan permohonan untuk menetapkan masa dan mendapatkan Perintah melaksakan Pindaan Penghakiman Persetujuan (Permohonan Menetapkan Masa). Pada 10 Jun 2013, Permohonan Menetapkan Masa telah dibenarkan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Kuantan.

Pemohon Pertama telah merayu akan Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah pada 18 Jun 2013 di Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah Pahang (Rayuan Pertama). Pada 09 Mac 2016, Panel Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah Pahang telah menolak Rayuan Pertama ini.

Pada 04 April 2017, permohonan lanjutan masa tempoh rayuan telah dibenarkan dan Pemohon Pertama telah memfailkan Rayuan Kedua di Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah Pahang (Rayuan Kedua). Pada 06 Julai 2017, Panel Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah Pahang telah membenarkan Rayuan Kedua dan Perintah Permohonan Menetapkan Masa bertarikh 10 Jun 2013 dibatalkan.

Pada 10 Ogos 2017, Responden Pertama telah memfailkan semula Permohonan untuk menetapkan masa (Permohonan Menetapkan Masa Kedua) di Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Kuantan telah membenarkan Permohonan Menetapkan Masa Kedua tersebut.

Pada 04 Julai 2018, Pemohon Pertama telah merayu akan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah yang membenarkan Permohonan Menetapkan Masa Kedua (Rayuan Ketiga). Pada 14 Jun 2022, Panel Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah Pahang telah menolak Rayuan Ketiga dan Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Kuantan bertarikh 25 Jun 2018 dikekalkan.

Daripada afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa cuma terdapat dua isu untuk dibicarakan iaitu : i. Sama ada Mahkamah Tinggi Sivil ini punya bidang kuasa untuk menyemak Keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah dan juga Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah; dan ii. Sama ada perintah yang di buat oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah dan juga Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah tergolong di bawah keputusan public authority.

Mahkamah dengan ini merujuk kepada peruntukan Fasal (1) Dan Fasal (1)(A) Perkara 121 Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang memperuntukan seperti berikut :

“Judicial power of the Federation

There shall be two High Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and status, namely—

one in the States of Malaya, which shall be known as the High Court in Malaya and shall have its principal registry at such place in the States of Malaya as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may determine; and

(b)… and such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law; and the High Courts and inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law.

The courts referred to in Clause (1) shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts.”

Merujuk kepada kes Ketua Pegawai Penguatkuasa Agama & Ors v Maqsood Ahmad & Ors And Another Appeal [2021] 1 MLJ 120 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan seperti berikut: “[75] It is crystal clear therefore that within the larger framework of our Federal Constitution and legal history, Syariah jurisdiction was always intended to be limited and exclusive. Despite this clear demarcation of jurisdictions, there has been conflicts between the two systems which have been well documented by the renowned late Tan Sri Datuk Professor Ahmad Ibrahim in his Article The Amendment to Article 121 of the Federal Constitution: Its Effect on Administration of Islamic Law [1989] 2 MLJ xvii. [76] In the abovementioned article, the late Professor documented certain cases one of which is Myriam v Mohamed Ariff [1971] 1 MLJ 265. In that case the Kathi had adjudicated upon a couples’ divorce and the custody of their children. The woman subsequently married someone else and applied to the High Court for a new custody arrangement. The High Court relied on s 45(6) of the Selangor Administration of Muslim Law Act 1952 to find that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter and proceeded to issue a new custody arrangement. By doing so, the High Court had essentially adjudicated upon matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts. It is for this reason that the late professor became the ‘prime mover’ behind the insertion of art 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution. See generally the judgment of the Federal Court in: Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati bte Sharibun & Anor [2007] 5 MLJ 101 at para 50. [78] By virtue of the amendment, the Syariah Courts were perpetually granted exclusive jurisdiction over all matters related to Syariah as defined in Item I, List II of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. Thus, at least on paper, solved was the legal conundrum of civil courts exercising Syariah jurisdiction.”

Dengan menggunapakai kes di atas, adalah jelas bahawa Mahkamah Sivil tidak punya apa-apa bidang kuasa berkaitan dengan apa-apa perkara yang melibatkan Mahkamah Syariah.

Juga, dengan merujuk kepada Butiran 1 Senarai II – Senarai Negeri Jadual Kesembilan Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang memperuntukan kuasa negeri membuat undang-undang dalam perkara-perkara seperti berikut : “1. Except with respect to the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya, Islamic law and personal and family law of persons professing the religion of Islam, including the Islamic law relating to succession, testate and intestate, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy, guardianship, gifts, partitions and non-charitable trusts; Wakafs and the definition and regulation of charitable and religious trusts, the appointment of trustees and the incorporation of persons in respect of Islamic religious and charitable endowments, institutions, trusts, charities and charitable institutions operating wholly within the State; Malay customs; Zakat, Fitrah and Baitulmal or similar Islamic religious revenue; mosques or any Islamic public place of worship, creation and punishment of offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against precepts of that religion, except in regard to matters included in the Federal List; the constitution, organization and procedure of Syariah courts, which shall have jurisdiction only over persons professing the religion of Islam and in respect only of any of the matters included in this paragraph, but shall not have jurisdiction in respect of offences except in so far as conferred by federal law; the control of propagating doctrines and beliefs among persons professing the religion of Islam; the determination of matters of Islamic law and doctrine and Malay custom.”

Merujuk kepada kes SIS Forum (M) v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (Majlis Agama Islam Selangor, intervener) [2022] 2 MLJ 356 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut : “[55] While the respondent relies on the above passage in support of their position, the case, in my view, is against them and rebuts their contention. The passage clarifies that the substantive jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts is strictly defined by item 1, State List, Ninth Schedule. Reading the above passage another way, what it means is this. Item 1 is not only an enabling provision but also establishes its own limits on what it enables. Item 1 allows the State Legislature to enact State laws with the effect to establish and confer Syariah Courts with the jurisdictions referred to in item 1 and that too only over persons professing the religion of Islam. The Syariah Court will therefore only become seized with those jurisdictions once it is conferred by the State law or laws and only those jurisdictions which item 1 allows. The power of judicial review or the power to grant public law remedies is noticeably absent in item 1 of the State

Merujuk kepada kes Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati bte Sharibun & Anor [2007] 5 MLJ 101 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut : “[19] For our present purpose it is sufficient for me to make the following points. First, art 74(1) gives the Federal Parliament power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Federal List or the Concurrent List, ie the First or the Third List of the Ninth Schedule. [20] Secondly, art 74(2) gives power to the Legislature of a State to make laws in respect of any of the matters enumerated in the State List. [21] Among the matters enumerated in the Federal List are external affairs, defence, internal security and so on. However, item 4 should be reproduced:

Civil and criminal law and procedure and the administration of justice, including —

(a)Constitution and organization of all courts other than Syariah Courts;

(b)Jurisdiction and powers of all such courts;

(c)Remuneration and other privileges of the judges and officers presiding over such courts;

(d)Persons entitled to practise before such courts;

(e)Subject to paragraph (ii), the following:

(i)Contract; partnership, agency and other special contracts; master and servant; inns and inn-keepers; actionable wrongs; property and its transfer and hypothecation, except land; bona vacantia; equity and trusts; marriage, divorce and legitimacy; married women's property and status; interpretation of federal law; negotiable instruments; statutory declarations; arbitration; mercantile law; registration of businesses and business names; age of majority; infants and minors; adoption; succession, testate and intestate; probate and letters of administration; bankruptcy and insolvency; oaths and affirmations; limitation; reciprocal enforcement of judgments and orders; the law of evidence;

(ii)the matters mentioned in paragraph (i) do not include Islamic personal law relating to marriage, divorce, guardianship, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy, family law, gifts or succession, testate and intestate; [24] To give one example, while Parliament may make law in relation to marriage and divorce, it is not permitted to make law on the same subject-matter affecting Muslims because it falls under paragraph (ii) as Islamic personal law relating to marriage and divorce. The net effect is that marriage and divorce law of non-Muslims is a matter within the jurisdiction of Parliament to make, while marriage and divorce law of Muslims is a matter within the jurisdiction of the Legislature of a State to make.”

Di dalam kes Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ 181 Mahkamah Persekutuan juga memutuskan seperti berikut : “[78] To summarise, Syariah Courts may only exercise jurisdiction over a person or persons on two conditions. Firstly, the person shall profess the religion of Islam. This can generally be classified as jurisdiction ratione personae — where the jurisdiction of the tribunal or court is contingent on the litigant’s legal persona. The phrase is most commonly used in disputes where one party is a sovereign, a foreign state, or one who enjoys diplomatic immunity and privileges cloaking him with immunity from legal process. [79] Secondly, even if Syariah Courts may exercise jurisdiction ratione personae, they must still ensure that they have jurisdiction over the subject-matter as expressly enumerated in the said Item 1. This may be classified as jurisdiction ratione materiae — or subject-matter jurisdiction.”

Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada Subseksyen 122(1) Enakmen Undang-undang Keluarga Islam 2005 [Enakmen 3 Tahun 2005] di mana kuasa Mahkamah Syariah bagi perntah pembahagian harta sepencarian adalah seperti berikut : “Seksyen 122. Kuasa Mahkamah memerintah pembahagian harta sepencarian

Mahkamah adalah mempunyai kuasa apabila membenarkan lafaz talaq atau apabila membuat suatu perintah perceraian untuk memerintah supaya apa-apa aset yang diperolehi oleh pihak-pihak itu dalam masa perkahwinan dengan usaha bersama mereka dibahagi antara mereka atau supaya mana-mana aset yang diperolehi oleh pihak-pihak itu dalam masa perkahwinan dengan usaha bersama mereka dibahagi antara mereka atau supaya mana-mana aset itu dijual dan hasil jualan itu dibahagi antara pihak-pihak itu.”

Berdasarkan kepada kes-kes dan peruntukan di atas, adalah jelas bahawa Mahkamah Sivil tidak punya apa-apa bidang kuasa berkaitan dengan apa-apa perkara yang melibatkan keputusan Mahkamah Syariah di mana di dalam kes ini prosiding berkenaan dengan tuntutan harta sepencarian telahpun bermula sejak tahun 1998 yang mana ianya menjadi subject matter di dalam permohonan Semakan Kehakiman ini yang mana ianya adalah di dalam bidang kuasa mutlak Mahkamah Syariah. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini tidak punya kuasa untuk mengganggu atau menyemak apa-apa keputusan yang telah dibuat oleh Mahkamah Syariah.

Di dalam kes A v Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2022] 11 MLJ 548 di mana Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan antara lain : “[80] I am of the considered view that the arguments by the applicant’s counsel are of no merit. Firstly, it is clear that the Syariah Courts have done nothing wrong in determining and deciding on the applicant’s case since it is their jurisdiction to do so. The Syariah Courts have not acted ultra vires when they made the order nor the orders were illegal and unlawful. [81] The Syariah Courts have the power to hear the plaintiff’s/applicant’s case under s 46(2)(b)(x) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 (Act 505) which provides:

A Syariah High Court shall — …

in its civil jurisdiction, hear and determine all actions and proceedings in which all the parties are Muslims and which relate to — …

other matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by any written law. [83] Secondly, as stated above, the civil courts cannot and has no jurisdiction to review decisions from the Syariah Courts. Even though the power for JR lies within the civil courts, but in this case, the applicant’s application is to review the Syariah Court’s decision in her application for renunciation. Unlike Indira Gandhi which involves unilateral conversion, this application has no place in the civil court’s jurisdiction. [86] But, the crux of the matter now is the application by the applicant for JR against the decision of the Syariah Courts which have dismissed her application to renounce Islam. The question now is; what power do the civil courts have to review a decision of the Syariah Courts which its original jurisdiction to determine the case (renunciation of Islam) is within the Syariah Courts? The answer is none, the civil courts have no power to review the decisions of the Syariah Courts in cases where the Syariah Courts are possessed with the jurisdiction to hear the case. The applicant’s argument is therefore baseless and without merit.”

Juga, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes majlis Majlis Agama Islam Selangor v Dahlia Dhaima Abdullah & Another Appeal [2023] 1 LNS 69 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan seperti berikut: “[117] This application by the respondent to the Syariah High Court of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur was made under s. 46(2)(b)(x) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993. The respondent had chosen to submit to the jurisdiction of the Syariah High Court of Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. Throughout the entire process, including at the Syariah Court of Appeal, the respondent was represented by Syarie counsel. About four months after the date of the Syariah Court of Appeal order, the respondent on 10 May 2021 instituted the instant OS, this time in Shah Alam Civil High Court against the appellants. Thus, the respondent chose to commence her suit in Kuala Lumpur Syariah High Court but later initiated the OS in Shah Alam Civil High Court. [118] In any event, the respondent's religious status having already been determined by Kuala Lumpur Syariah High Court and Syariah Court of Appeal, also means that this OS is res judicata, and potentially an abuse of court process. Since her status as a Muslim has already been judicially determined by the Syariah Courts, the respondent has no locus standi to re-litigate a similar application before the Civil High Court by way of this OS. Moreover, when there are multiplicity of proceedings in any court(s), the court is vested with power to strike out the subsequent proceeding on the plea of res judicata, as mandated under s. 25(2) and item 11 of the

Adalah jelas bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi Sivil tiada bidang kuasa berkaitan dengan apa-apa perkara di dalam bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah dan dengan itu tidak boleh menyemak apa-apa keputusan yang telah dibuat oleh Mahkamah Syariah tersebut.

Isu seterusnya adalah sama ada perintah yang di buat oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah dan Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah tergolong sebagai keputusan yang di buat oleh public authority.

Bagi isu ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes GIN POH HOLDINGS SDN BHD v PENGARAH TANAH & GALIAN PULAU PINANG & ORS [2018] 1 LNS 1036 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan antara lain : “WRONGFUL MODE OF ACTION AND/OR ABUSE OF COURT PROCESS [39] The Defendants' main contention in connection with the Plaintiff's claim arising from the acts of the Defendants in the acquisition of land was that the Plaintiff ought to have sought judicial review under Order 53 RC 2012, rather than commencing a writ action. [40] In determining whether the a person was entitled to commence its action by writ instead of judicial review, reference was made to the Federal Court case of Ahmad Jefri Mohd Jahri v. Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor & Ors [2010] 5 CLJ 865 where James Foong FCJ had stated as follows:- "[21] In view of this, let us begin by first asking ourselves a preliminary question: is the appellant's complaint or grievance amenable for judicial review (before even considering whether the procedure adopted by him is appropriate)? If his complaint is not amenable for judicial review then there is no dispute as to the procedure adopted since he is at liberty to commence his action by way of writ or originating summons. So first we have to determine the parameters of matters which are amenable for judicial review. [22] It is widely accepted that not every decision made by an authoritative body is suitable for judicial review. To qualify there must be a sufficient public law element in the decision made. For this, it is necessary to examine both the source of the power and the nature of the decision made; whether the decision was made under a statutory power (see para. 61 Halsbury Laws of England, 4th edn, 2001 Reissue, vol. 1(1)). To illustrate this, we will refer to a number of authorities involving dismissal from service by a public authority or a purported public authority. ... [35] Having considered the persuasive authorities cited above, we conclude that for the appellant to be amenable for judicial review there must be the presence of a public law element necessary to attract the remedies of administrative law... ... [37] Thus, it is our considered opinion that the decision to dismiss the appellant was made under a statutory law by a body which acted within the scope of such statutory power. Though this decision involves the dismissal of an employee by an employer, much like a master dismissing his servant, which is a private law matter, the fact that there are statutory conditions and restrictions imposed by the Regulations on the conduct and dismissal of the appellant underpins the public law element in this case. This is not a case of a public authority being delegated with authority to hire and fire like what has occurred in Regina v. East Birkshire Health Authority, Ex-parte Walsh and Wendal Swann v. Attorney General of the Turks and Caicos Islands. Here, a special statutory provision bears directly upon the right of a public authority to dismiss the appellant. This injects the element of public law necessary in this context to attract the remedies of administrative law making it amenable for judicial review. ... [62] We observed that a challenge on the use of appropriate procedure is very much fact based. Thus, it is necessary for a judge when deciding on such matter to first ascertain whether there is a public law element in the dispute. If the claim for infringement is based solely on substantive principles of public law then the appropriate process should be by way of O. 53 RHC. If it is a mixture of public and private law then the court must ascertain which of the two is more predominant. If it has a substantial public law element then the procedure under O. 53 RHC must be adopted. Otherwise, it may be set aside on the ground that it abuses the court's process. But if the matter is under private law though concerning a public authority, the mode to commence such action under O. 53 RHC is not suitable. Aside from this, there could be other circumstances like the kind in YAB Dato' Dr. Zambry. Much depends on the facts of the case. But generally the court should be circumspect in allowing a matter which should be by way of O. 53 RHC to proceed in another form. To say that it is open to an applicant seeking judicial review to elect any mode he prefers, as implied in Kuching Waterfront, would, in our considered opinion, be rendering O. 53 RHC redundant. This is certainly not the intention of the drafters of this rule who had a purpose in mind. When the purpose of this rule is in the interest of good administration, then this rule must be adhered to, except in the limited and exceptional circumstances discussed." (emphasis added)”

Keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut telahpun dikekalkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dan juga Mahkamah Perekutuan dan dengan itu, Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa keputusan yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah dan juga Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah bukanlah tergolong di bawah perintah yang dibuat oleh public authority.

Seterusnya, di dalam kes YKK (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian Johor [2021] MLJU 1206 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan bahawa : “[67] It is our judgment that, in suggesting for a flexible approach to be adopted, counsel for the plaintiff failed to address its mind to the fact that O 53 of the ROC is enacted specifically to address Judicial Review of the decisions of public authorities when an infringement of individual’s rights to which he is entitled to be protected under public law. This is a special provision for an aggrieved party seeking relief, incorporating a declaration against a public authority for infringement of his rights to which he was entitled to be protected under public law, as opposed to the general provision under O 15 r 16 of the ROC or section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. In this regard this Court in Ahmad Jefri (supra) has explained extensively that: “[61] Aside from mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any others described under the pre-amended O 53 RHC, an alternative remedy for an aggrieved party seeking relief against a public authority for infringement of rights to which he was entitled to be protected under public law is for a declaration. The courts had for a long time recognized their power to grant a declaration under common law. But s. 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 armed them with the statutory authority to do so. It is commonly accepted that O 15 r 16 RHC also provides the High Court with such power (see Lord Diplock’ s judgment in O ‘Reilly v Mackman (supra) at p. 1127). However O 53 RHC sets out a specific procedure for an aggrieved party seeking relief, incorporating a declaration (as provided by s. 41 of the Specific Relief Act) against a public authority for infringement of his rights to which he was entitled to be protected under public law, to follow. It is our view that when such an explicit procedure is created (as compared to a general provision set out under O 15 r 16 RHC) to cater for this purpose, then as a general rule all such application for such relief must commence according to what is set down in O 53 RHC, otherwise it is liable to be struck off for abusing the process of the court. This general rule enunciated in O’Reilly v Mackman (supra) has in fact been acknowledged by this court in Majlis Perbandaran Ampang Jaya v Stephen Phoa Cheng Loon & Ors (supra) and repeated in YAB Dato’ Dr. Zambry (supra). However, like all general rules, there are exceptions. This again was recognized by Lord Diplock in O’Reilly v Mackman where he referred to “particularly where the invalidity of the decision arises as a collateral issue in a claim for infringement of a right of the plaintiff arising under private law or where none of the parties objects to the adoption of the procedure by writ, or originating summons. Then of course, there is the exception for a claim against the public authority for negligence as decided in Majlis Perbandaran Ampang Jaya v Stephen Phoa Cheng Loon & Ors. There may be others and these “are left to be decided on a case by case basis” as spoken by Lord Diplock in O’ Reilly v Mackman. The circumstances in YAB Dato’ Dr. Zambry is obviously one such exception where this court found that a challenge by the appellants on their suspension from attending the State Legislative Assembly is a matter that affects their legal status. For this, the aggrieved party can commence their claim by way of an originating summons rather than an application under O 53 RHC.”

Berpandukan kepada kes di atas, permohonan Pemohon di sini bagi mencabar perintah yang di buat oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah dan juga Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah bukanlah tergolong di bawah perintah yang di buat oleh public authority dan dengan itu mod yang digunakan oleh Pemohon ini adalah salah.

Daripada nas-nas yang dirujuk dan juga peruntukan Perlembagaan Persekutuan, adalah jelas bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi Sivil ini tidak punya apa-apa bidang kuasa untuk menyemak dan seterusnya mengketepikan apa-apa perintah yang telah di buat oleh Mahkamah Syariah yang mana jika ini dibenarkan, ia akan melanggar peruntukan Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang telah jelas membahagikan kuasa-kuasa kepada pihak berkuasa negeri untuk membuat undang-undang berkaitan dengan hal ehwal Mahkamah Syariah.

Mahkamah juga memutuskan bahawa keputusan yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Rayuan Syariah dan juga Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah bukanlah satu keputusan yang dibuat oleh public authority dan dengan itu tidak boleh disemak di bawah Aturan 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012.

Dengan itu, permohonan Pemohon-Pemohon adalah ditolak dengan kos. t.t ZAINAL AZMAN BIN AB AZIZ HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA KUANTAN PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR BERTARIKH : 09 OGOS 2023 Peguam cara Pemohon Pertama dan Kedua: Encik ‘Adil Safwan bin Ahmad Shaffie Tetuan Azman & Affenday No. 203A, Blok 1 (Level 2), Laman Seri Business Park Persiaran Sukan, Seksyen 13, 40100 Shah Alam, Selangor Ruj. Tuan : M264/ASPRM 2009(SA)(09/22)Siv.501 Email : admin@azmanaffendy.com Responden Pertama tidak melantik peguam cara dan tidak hadir. Peguam cara Responden Kedua dan Ketiga : Tuan Abdul Hafiz bin Razat (Penolong Penasihat Undang-Undang) Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pahang Tingkat 3, Blok B, Wisma Sri Pahang 25000 Kuantan, Pahang