Mohd Johari Bin Tarmidi v Joseph E LIM @ LIM Ee Ping (JA-12B-61-09/2022)

F.A. WAGEN SDN BHD ... PERAYU-PERAYU

JOSEPH E LIM @ IM EE PING ] seorang kurang upaya dan ] membawa tindakan ini melalui ] isteri yang sah dan wakili litigasi ] iaitu Nora binti Abd Rahim iaitu ]

Plaintif Kedua NORA BINTI ABD RAHIM ... RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [DALAM PERKARA MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO: JA-B53KJ-179-11 TAHUN 2019

JOSEPH E LIM @ IM EE PING ] seorang kurang upaya dan ] membawa tindakan ini melalui ] isteri yang sah dan wakili litigasi ] iaitu Nora binti Abd Rahim iaitu ]

Plaintif Kedua NORA BINTI ABD RAHIM ... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF

F.A. WAGEN SDN BHD ... RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN] ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini merupakan rayuan oleh Perayu-Perayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen Johor Bahru bertarikh 30.08.2022 dalam satu kes tuntutan gantirugi akibat kemalangan jalanraya. [2] Perayu-Perayu merupakan Defendan-Defendan ketika prosiding di Mahkamah Sesyen sementara Responden merupakan pihak Plaintif. [3] Bagi mengelakkan apa-apa kekeliruan dan untuk tujuan pemahaman mudah kesemua pihak, pihak-pihak akan dikenalpasti dalam alasan penghakiman ini seperti mana mereka ketika prosiding di Mahkamah Sesyen. [4] Mahkamah Sesyen melalui keputusan bertarikh 30.08.2022 telah mendapati Defendan-Defendan bertanggungan 100% ke atas Plaintif berkenaan kemalangan jalan raya yang berlaku pada 05.06.2018. [5] Setelah itu, Mahkamah Sesyen mengarahkan ganti rugi am sebanyak RM365,000.00 dibayar kepada Plaintif berserta ganti rugi khas sebanyak RM219,790.32 diikuti faedah dan kos sebanyak RM41,799.00. [6] Mahkamah ini pada 02.01.2024 setelah mendengar rayuan Defendan-Defendan ke atas keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen telah menolak rayuan Defendan-Defendan dengan kos sebanyak RM 4,000.00 tertakluk kepada fii alokatur. [7] Defendan-Defendan kini merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan ke atas keputusan Mahkamah ini melalui Notis Rayuan bertarikh 30.01.2024. Fakta Kes [8] Secara ringkasnya, fakta kes ini ialah seperti berikut:- [9] Pada jam lebih kurang 10.30 pagi pada 05.06.2018, si mati (Joseph E Lim @ Lim Ee Ping) iaitu suami Plaintif yang merupakan seorang pesara guru semasa menunggang kenderaan motosikal nombor pendaftaran JHE 5016 telah terlibat dalam satu kemalangan jalan raya dengan sebuah kenderaan motorkar (nombor pendaftaran VBN 6353) (“kenderaan motokar tersebut”) yang dipandu oleh Defendan Pertama. [10] Kenderaan motokar tersebut dimiliki oleh Defendan Kedua. [11] Defendan Pertama semasa kejadian sedang memandu uji kenderaan motokar tersebut. [12] Tuntutan Plaintif sebagai balu kepada si mati adalah di bawah:-

Seksyen 7 Akta Undang-Undang Sivil (CLA) 1956 untuk gantirugi kesedihan dan kedukacitaan (“bereavement”) serta kos perkuburan;

Seksyen 8 CLA 1956 untuk kesakitan dan penderitaan (“pain and suffering”) dan kos-kos yang timbul serta perbelanjaan yang dialami oleh si mati semasa beliau masih hidup akibat daripada kemalangan ini sebelum beliau meninggal dunia pada tahun 2020 [13] Semasa perbicaraan di Mahkamah Sesyen, seramai empat (4) orang saksi memberikan keterangan bagi pihak Plaintif iaitu:-

Tey Lee Kheng (SP1) - Jurujual kenderaan motokar yang dimiliki

Sarjan Mejar Zainuddin Bin Mustapha (SP2) - Pegawai Penyiasat kes;

Syamala A/P Rajindran (SP3) - Ketua Jururawat, Econ Medicare Centre Sdn Bhd dan;

Nora Binti Abd Rahaim (SP4) - Isteri Si Mati. [14] Bagi pihak Defendan-Defendan hanya Defendan Pertama (SD1) yang memberikan keterangan. Tugas Mahkamah di peringkat rayuan [15] Mahkamah ini dalam menjalankan bidang kuasa rayuan akan biasanya campur tangan ke atas keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen apabila keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen sesuatu yang jelasnya salah (“plainly wrong”). [16] Sesuatu keputusan adalah jelas salah apabila tidak ada penilaian kehakiman (“no judicial appreciation”) atau penilaian yang dibuat adalah tidak mencukupi (“insufficient judicial appreciation”) ke atas keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan mengikut kes UEM Group Bhd v Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2019] 9 CLJ 785 (Mahkamah Persekutuan) muka 800: - “Thus, the prime issue in respect of Questions 1 to 3 is whether the Court of Appeal had erred in interfering with the findings of facts of the trial judge. It is well settled law that an appellate court will not generally speaking, intervene with the decision of a trial court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. A plainly wrong decision happens when the trial court is guilty of no or insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence." [17] Analisis yang salah ke atas keterangan ataupun salah tafsir ke atas keterangan penting juga membolehkan keputusan hakim perbicaraan diubah di peringkat perbicaraan mengikut Azman Bin Mahmood & Anor v SJ Securities Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 CLJ 573 (Mahkamah Persekutuan): - "[25] The law on appellate intervention on findings of fact by a trial Judge is trite. In this context it may be useful to refer to the case of Multar v. Lim Kim Chet and Anor [1982] CLJ Rep 237; [1982] 1 MLJ 184 (FC), wherein it was held that an appellate court will interfere and disturb the finding of fact by the trial judge if crucial evidence had been misconstrued resulting in the uncertainty on one party's evidence - and the consistency of the other party's evidence being disregarded. In the Privy Council case of Choo Kok Beng v. Choo Kok Hoe and Ors [1984] 1 LNS 40; [1984] 2 MLJ 165 it was held that when a trial judge had so manifestly failed to derive proper benefit from the undoubted advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses at the trial, and in reaching his conclusion, has not properly analysed the entirety of the evidence which was given before him, it is the plain duty of the appellate court to intervene and correct the error lest otherwise the error results in serious injustice." [18] Rujuk kes Lee Ing Chin & Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97 (Mahkamah Rayuan) muka 116: - “Suffice to say that we re-affirm the proposition that an appellate court will not, generally speaking, intervene unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. But appellate interference will take place in cases where there has been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence. It is, we think appropriate that we say what judicial appreciation of evidence involves.” [19] Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Lee Ing Chin selanjutnya memutuskan di muka 116:- “A judge who is required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. He must, when deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness test it against relevant criteria. Thus, he must take into account the presence or absence of any motive that a witness may have in giving his evidence. If there are contemporary documents, then he must test the oral evidence of a witness against these. He must also test the evidence of a particular witness against the probabilities of the case. A trier of fact who makes findings based purely upon the demeanour of a witness without undertaking a critical analysis of that witness' evidence runs the risk of having his findings corrected on appeal. It does not matter whether the issue for decision is one that arises in a civil or criminal case: the approach to judicial appreciation of evidence is the same. There are a number of important and leading cases in which the point has been considered.” Rayuan Defendan-Defendan - isu liabiliti [20] Di dalam kes ini, keterangan penting yang perlu dipertimbangkan ialah keterangan SP1, SP2 dan SD1 yang mana mereka saksi-saksi material kepada kemalangan yang berlaku pada 05.06.2018. [21] Berkenaan dengan keterangan SP1, Mahkamah Sesyen dengan panjang lebar telah mempertimbang keterangan SP1 dan membuat dapatan terperinci sebelum memutuskan untuk menerima keterangan SP1 tersebut. [22] Di perenggan 6 sehingga 9 alasan penghakiman, Mahkamah Sesyen telah pertama sekali menyatakan SP1 seorang saksi bebas. Mahkamah menerima dapatan ini mengambil kira SP1 tiada apa-apa kepentingan di dalam kes ini serta seorang saksi mata kepada kemalangan yang berlaku. [23] Keterangan SP1 yang kekal utuh walaupun diasak bertalu-talu semasa pemeriksaan balas oleh peguam Defendan ialah seperti berikut:-

SP1 duduk di kerusi penumpang belakang kenderaan motokar tersebut semasa tarikh kejadian kemalangan kerana SD1 bersama-sama isterinya sedang memandu uji kenderaan kenderaan motokar tersebut;

SP1 semasa kenderaan motokar tersebut diuji telahpun meminta SD1 untuk memperlahankan kelajuan tetapi SD1 tidak berbuat demikian;

Apabila kenderaan motokar yang dipandu SD1 sampai di sebuah flyover di Skudai, SD1 masih kekal memandu secara laju. Apabila tiba di sebuah lampu trafik, semasa SD1 hendak melakukan pusingan U, SP1 ternampak motosikal yang ditunggang si mati juga sedang mengubah laluan dari lorong sebelah kanan juga untuk membuat pusingan U.;

Melihat keadaan di atas, SP1 sekali lagi meminta SD1 memperlahan kelajuan kenderaan motokar tersebut tetapi SD1 gagal berbuat demikian;

Perlanggaran antara kenderaan motokar tersebut yang dipandu SD1 dan motosikal yang ditunggang si mati kemudian berlaku memandangkan kedua-dua mereka hendak membuat pusingan U;

Keterangan SP1 juga ialah SD1 memandu kenderaan motokar pada kelajuan 120 kilometer sejam sedangkan had kelajuan 70 kilometer sejam;

SP1 juga melihat si mati memberikan isyarat untuk memusing dan pada masa tersebut memakai topi keledar. [24] Selanjutnya, Mahkamah Sesyen juga telah menerima keterangan SP2 selaku pegawai penyiasat kes di perenggan 10 sehingga 12 Alasan Penghakiman. [25] Keterangan SP2 dengan jelas menyokong keterangan SP1. [26] SP2 telah menjalankan satu siasatan terperinci ke atas kes kemalangan pada 05.06.2018 ini. [27] Siasatan SP2 dapat diringkaskan seperti berikut:-

Jalan di tempat kemalangan adalah lurus dan luas;

Cuaca pada hari kemalangan iaitu 05.06.2018 adalah cerah tanpa halangan pandangan di jalan tersebut;

Had laju di kawasan kemalangan 60 kilometer sejam;

Kenderaan motokar tersebut dipandu dengan kelajuan 120 kilometer sejam;

SD1 nampak si mati buat pertama kalinya dalam jarak 200 meter ketika kedua-dua mereka mahu membuat pusingan U di mana siasatan SP2 ialah walaupun diminta mengurangkan kelajuan kenderaan motokar tersebut oleh SP1, SD1 gagal berbuat demikian;

SD1 gagal untuk mengamalkan satu jarak yang selamat dengan motosikal si mati tersebut;

Kemalangan berlaku apabila kenderaan motokar yang dipandu SD1 melanggar kenderaan motosikal si mati daripada arah belakang;

Kecuaian pada SD1 yang memandu kenderaan motokar tersebut dalam keadaan yang terlalu laju dan melulu (120 kilometer sejam) sehingga gagal mengawal kenderaanya semasa hendak membuat pusingan U sehingga melanggar kenderaan motosikal si mati yang berada di hadapannya dari arah belakang [28] Berikutan dengan kelajuan dan kedudukan kenderaan motokar tersebut yang datang dari belakang dan melanggar Plaintif, maka Plaintif hanya boleh dikatakan bersalah sekiranya dibuktikan Plaintif gagal berikan peluang kepada kenderaan dibelakangnya untuk mengelakkan kemalangan. Panduan sebegini telah diberikan dalam kes Kamaruddin Mohd Nor & Anor v Soon Soo Moe & Anor [1998] 4 CLJ SUPP 301 (Mahkamah Tinggi): - “In that situation if the rear vehicle is not given the opportunity to avoid the collision, due to the suddenness of the entry of the front vehicle onto the road or path, be it to cut across, do a U-turn or even for purposes of continuing his journey, the blame must be placed on that front vehicle." [29] Seterusnya, Mahkamah Sesyen juga didapati telah mengupas dan menganalisis keterangan SD1 iaitu Defendan dalam kes ini di perenggan 14 dan 15 alasan penghakiman dan mendapati: -

SD1 mengesahkan sebelum kemalangan kenderaan motosikal si mati berada di hadapan SD1;

SD1 gagal untuk memberikan perhatian dan tumpuan sepenuhnya kepada keadaan lalu lintas jalan semasa memandu kenderaan motokar tersebut;

Terdapat kecuaian di pihak SD1 [30] Berkenaan isu di atas, rujuk kes Thangachimmah & Anor v Flower [1968] 2 MLJ 248 (Mahkamah Tinggi): - “Applying the principles laid down in The Merchant Prince [1892] P 179, 190, 189, 187. I hold that the defendant John Flower had failed to discharge the onus placed upon him to show that the cause of the accident was a cause not produced by him and the result of which he could not avoid. On the evidence before me and after hearing the witnesses, I find as a fact that the defendant was guilty of negligence in driving his car at a speed which in the circumstances of this case was excessive and in failing to stop his car in time to avoid running into the cyclist who was travelling on his proper side of the road.” [31] Mahkamah Sesyen juga telah mengambil kira bahawa SD1 banyak tidak pasti dan tidak ingat berkenaan kelajuan kenderaan motokar tersebut. Jawapan yang sama turut diberikan berkenaan jarak kenderaan motokar beliau dengan kenderaan motosikal si mati serta berkenaan bila beliau nampak si mati buat pertama kali. [32] SD1 juga tidak dapat mengesahkan samada amaran diberikan kepada beliau untuk memperlahankan kenderaan motokar tersebut dan keberadaan beliau di lorong mana semasa kemalangan tersebut. Rujuk kes Lee Thiam v Fatimah Binte Salleh [1981] 1 MLJ 285 (Mahkamah Persekutuan): - “Assuming that the appellant's evidence is the correct version, i.e. that the deceased had come out from the kampung path on the right side of the road, the appellant must have seen him among the padi fields approaching the road and should have taken care by slowing down to ascertain where he was going to or he should have at least given some warning of his approach. In any case, on his own evidence when the motorcycle was approaching the centre, there is nothing to show that he took evasive action by moving slightly to the left. If the accident had happened the way he described it, the motorcycle would not have been hit from behind, as the learned trial judge found, and in the centre of the road. The sketch plan shows that 'X' blood spot is just at left side of the centre line but the red broken glass pieces from the motorcycle's lamp are on the right side of the road near the centre line. Knowing a motorcycle, the red broken glass pieces on the road must have come from the rear lamp or reflector of the motorcycle. On this evidence, it is clear that the van must have been all the way travelling on the crown of the road and it must have hit the motorcycle from the rear after the motorcycle had straightened out on the right side of the road, and not, as the appellant said, while it was on the left side of the road in the path of the van. If the van had only kept to its side, it would not have hit the motorcycle.” [33] Dalam keadaan sedemikian, Mahkamah Sesyen telahpun dengan jelas menilai kedua-dua versi Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan sebelum memilih untuk menerima versi Plaintif. Rujuk Guan Teik Sdn Bhd v Hj Mohd Noor Bin Hj Yakob & Ors [2000] 4 CLJ 324 (Mahkamah Rayuan) muka 330: - “In cases where conflicting evidence are presented before a court, it is the duty of the court not only to weigh such evidence on a balance of probabilities but it is also encumbent upon the court to look at all the surrounding factors and to weigh and evaluate contemporaneous documents that may tend to establish the truth or otherwise of a given fact. In this instance the learned trial judge discredited the evidence of the appellant, accepted the evidence of the respondents wholeheartedly and disregarded the contemporaneous documents totally. We say that he had erred as he had failed to direct his mind as to the probative effect of the contemporaneous documents. He should, after accepting the respondents' evidence, weighed it against the contemporaneous documents and evaluate whether such documents support the respondents' oral testimony. We say that this evaluation exercise is most crucial for it must be remembered that the respondents were testifying to events that happened eighteen years ago whilst the contemporaneous documents speak of matters then existing at the time such documents, were issued.” [34] Setelah meneliti keterangan saksi-saksi melalui rekod rayuan yang difailkan, Mahkamah tidak ada sebab untuk campur tangan dalam dapatan-dapatan yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Sesyen di atas. Rujukan dalam hal ini bolehlah dibuat kepada kes Tek Chand v Dile Ram [2001] AIR SC 905 (Mahkamah Agung) di muka 916: - “No doubt, an appeal Court will be slow in disturbing a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court based on proper appreciation of evidence but it is also the duty of the appellate Court to disturb it if the burden of proof is not discharged by cogent, positive and acceptable evidence in the light of law laid down by this Court. More so when there is non consideration of material evidence and appreciation of evidence is not objective and one sided.” [35] Selanjutnya, keterangan-keterangan SP1 dan SP2 bukanlah inherently improbable lebih-lebih lagi apabila kredibiliti mereka kekal utuh selaku saksi-saksi bebas yang memberikan keterangan di Mahkamah tanpa apa-apa motif ataupun kepentingan. [36] Sebagai pihak yang mempunyai kelebihan audio-visual untuk memerhatikan perilaku (“demenour”) saksi-saksi di atas ketika memberikan keterangan, Mahkamah Sesyen dalam kedudukan yang lebih baik untuk meneliti krebiliti saksi-saksi tersebut. [37] Maka, mengikut undang-undang mantap, Mahkamah ini akan berjaga-jaga dalam mengubah apa-apa dapatan berkenaan isu fakta dan kredibiliti yang dibuat Mahkamah Sesyen. Rujuk kes Beldeu Singh v Dr Kenneth Andrew [2011] 4 MLJ 769 (Mahkamah Rayuan) muka 775: - “[18] We are mindful of the fact that an appellate court does not have the audio visual advantage which the trial court has, in seeing, hearing and assessing the witnesses at the trial. Hence, an appellate court is not likely to reverse or depart from the trial judge's finding save where he has misdirected himself: see eg Owners of Steamship Hontestroom v. Owners of Steamship Sagaporack [1927] AC 37, 47 (HL); China Airlines Ltd v. Maltran Air Corp Sdn Bhd (formely known as Maltran Air Services Corp Sdn Bhd) and another appeal [1996] 3 CLJ 163; [1996] 2 MLJ 517, 527E, 527I and 528A-B (FC); Powell and Wife v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home [1935] AC 243 at p 250 (HL) which was followed in Chow Yee Wah & Anor v. Choo Ah Pat [1978] CLJU 32; [1978] 1 LNS 32; [1978] 2 MLJ 41 at p 42 (PC)." [38] Pada masa yang sama, dapatan-dapatan fakta yang dibuat Mahkamah Sesyen seperti yang dinyatakan di atas juga adalah konsisten dengan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan secara keseluruhan dalam kes ini serta konsisten dengan perjalanan kes secara keseluruhan. [39] Mahkamah juga menerima dapatan Mahkamah Sesyen berkenaan SD1 yang mana keterangan beliau secara keseluruhannya banyak mengandungi jawapan-jawapan bahawa beliau tidak ingat ataupun tidak pasti kepada perkara-perkara penting seperti yang dinyatakan dalam perenggan 15 alasan penghakiman mahkamah sesyen iaitu berkenaan isu kelajuan dan isu jarak kenderaan motokar SD1 dengan kenderaan motosikal si mati dan isu amaran oleh SP1 kepada SD1 untuk mengurangkan kelajuan kenderaan motokar yang dipandunya. [40] Dapatan yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Sesyen diterima Mahkamah ini yang mana perkara-perkara ini menunjukkan dan membuktikan sikap tidak berhati-hati dan kecuaian SD1. [41] Rujuk kes Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Anor [2020] 10 CLJ 1 (Mahkamah Persekutuan) muka 19: - “It was a long settled principle, stated and restated in domestic and wider common law jurisprudence, that an appellate court should not interfere with the trial judge’s conclusion on primary facts unless satisfied that he was plainly wrong”. [42] Perkara di atas dikuatkan dengan keterangan SD1 sendiri yang tidak nampak dan tidak pasti di mana kenderaan motosikal si mati ketika kemalangan berlaku yang mana ini menunjukkan kegagalan SD1 untuk memberikan perhatian dan tumpuan sepenuhnya kepada keadaan lalu lintas dan jalan ketika memandu kenderaan motokar tersebut. Versi SD1 tidak lain dan tidak bukan pengataan kosong yang tidak bermerit. Rujukan boleh dibuat kepada kes Supertindent of Lands And Surveys Kuching Division & Anor v Mohamad Rambli Kawi [2014] 1 LNS 851 (Mahkamah Rayuan) perenggan 11: - “The standard of proof in civil cases is upon a balance of probabilities. This balance of probabilities is not the proof beyond reasonable doubt required in criminal cases. This balance of probabilities may be visualised as a scale with the plaintiff placing his evidence on one side and the defendant likewise on the other. The court evaluates the evidence as to the weight it carries. Of course incredible evidence carries no weight. Denials without evidence to justify the denial likewise can carry no weight, and hence the term "bare denial". At the end of the case, the court determines who, between the plaintiff and the defendant, has placed such evidence that the scale tilts in his favour. Sections 101 and 102 mean that to succeed, the scale must tilt in his favour.” [43] Maka, Mahkamah Sesyen tidak boleh dikatakan sebagai terkhilaf apabila memilih untuk menerima versi Plaintif berbanding versi Defendan-Defendan. Rujuk kes Looh Keo v Looh Chee Peng & Ors [2024] 1 CLJ 467 (Mahkamah Tinggi) muka 514: - “In deciding the matter, I will make clear that I have preferred the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses, whom I viewed as 'more credible' in support of the plaintiff's contentions, as compared to the defendants' witnesses, whom I found 'evasive' when troubling questions were put to them, and were not credible. The defendants' witnesses' evidence simply does not add up. Even if there were discrepancies in the plaintiff's witnesses' evidence, if at all, were minor and not relevant, and on the whole, the plaintiff's witnesses were forthright, their evidence was comprehensive, compelling, convincing and consistent with the documents and the overall probabilities.” [44] Maka, Mahkamah ini mengesahkan dapatan Mahkamah Sesyen bahawa Defendan bertanggungan 100% ke atas kemalangan yang berlaku pada 05.06.2018 melibatkan si mati. Rayuan Defendan-Defedan atas isu kuantum [45] Berkenaan isu kuantum, keputusan Mahkamah ini akan terhad kepada ganti rugi am sahaja. Hal ini demikian kerana memorandum rayuan mahupun hujahan bertulis Defendan hanya terhad kepada ganti rugi am sahaja tanpa apa-apa cabaran dikemukakan berkenaan ganti rugi khas. [46] Dalam isu kuantum ini, ianya undang-undang matan bahawa Mahkamah ini dalam menjalankan bidang kuasa rayuan hanya akan campur tangan berkenaan awad ganti rugi sekiranya Defendan dapat menunjukkan bahawa Mahkamah Sesyen bertindak atas prinsip undang-undang yang salah ataupun telah salah tafsir fakta yang dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan ataupun membuat perkiraan salah atas kerosakkan dan kecederaan yang dialami. [47] Rujuk kes Topaiwah v Salleh [1968] 1 MLJ 284 (Mahkamah Persekutuan): - “So far as this Court is concerned we should, to paraphrase Greer LJ in Flint v. Levell [1935] 1 KB 354, 360 be disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial Judge as to the amount of damages merely because we think that if we had tried the case in the first instance we would have given a lesser sum. To justify reversing him, we should be convinced that he acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage. The assessments which the Courts have made over the years form some guide to the kind of figure which is proper and which the appellate Court will follow in the light of the special facts of each particular case.” [48] Rujuk juga kes Sambaga Valli K R Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors & Another Appeal [2017] CLJU 500 (Mahkamah Rayuan):- “[7] Before we dwell upon the competing submissions advanced by the parties, it would be useful to remind ourselves of certain trite principles. [8] First, the Court of Appeal may interfere with the decision of a judge in chambers (in relation to an appeal from the Registrar) but only on well-established principles of appellate intervention (See C.M Van Stillevoldt BV v. E L Carrier Inc[1983] 1 WLR 207 at 208 - 209.) The Court of Appeal may interfere with the quantum of damages awarded by the judge only if it is shows that the latter: -

acted on the wrong the principles;

misapprehended the facts; and

had for these or other reasons made a wholly erroneous estimate of his damages. [9] In Singapore case of Hong Leong Bank Bhd v Soh Seow Poh [2009] 4 SLR (K) 525, the Court held that the Court of Appeal can only interfere to overrule the discretion of a judge in awarding damages where: -

the judge was misguided with regard to the principle under which his discretion was to be exercised;

the judge took into account matters which he ought not to have or failed to take into account matters which he ought to have; or

the judge's decision was plainly wrong.” [49] Satu analisa ke atas Memorandum Rayuan Defendan baik Hujahan Bertulis mereka tidak mendedahkan bagaimana Mahkamah Sesyen dikatakan terkhilaf dalam ganti rugi am yang diberikan. [50] Sebaliknya, pertikaian Defendan-Defendan adalah mengenai jumlah ganti rugi yang dikatakan terlalu tinggi dan/ atau dikatakan tidak munsabah dan/ atau melampau. [51] Defendan-Defendan juga tidak dapat membuktikan samada Mahkamah Sesyen bertindak atas perkiraan yang salah ataupun khilaf dari segi undang-undang. [52] Lagipun, penelitian ke atas alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Sesyen di perenggan 17 (i)-(vi) mendedahkan perkara-perkara berikut:- [53] Pertama sekali, Mahkamah Sesyen telahpun mengambil kira kesemua jenis kecederaan relevan yang dialami oleh si mati dalam menentukan ganti rugi am yang diberikan. [54] Kedua, dapatan-dapatan Mahkamah Sesyen berkenaan ganti rugi am berdasarkan jenis kecederaan dialami si mati turut disokong nas-nas undang-undang iaitu keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah terdahulu. [55] Ketiga, Mahkamah Sesyen turut bersandarkan kepada Revised Compendium of Personal Awards bertarikh 16.10.2018. [56] Dalam erti kata lain, Mahkamah ini mendapati Mahkamah Sesyen telahpun bertindak mengikut undang-undang dalam memberikan ganti rugi yang relevan kepada Plaintif. Rujuk kes Inas Faiqah Mohd Helmi (A Child Suing Through Her Father And Next Friend; Mohd Helmi Abdul Aziz) v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2016] 2 CLJ 885 (Mahkamah Persekutuan) muka 894: - It is trite that damages serve as compensation, not a reward, less still a punishment (see Ong Ah Long v. Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 CLJ 198; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 300; [1983] 2 MLJ 324). In assessing damages, the court should not be motivated by sympathy and award fair compensation based on cogent evidence. The court should not descend into a domain of speculation. The evaluation of those evidence, which form the basis of any risk of future damage, must therefore still be undertaken. And the trial judge can only evaluate such evidence based on the recognised balance of probabilities standard. As was stated in Schrump: Thus, future contingencies which are less than probable are regarded as factors to be considered, provided they are shown to be substantial and not speculative.” (emphasis added) [57] Selanjutnya, Mahkamah Persekutuan di muka surat 895 kes Inas Faiqah memutuskan: - “With the above proposition, we are of the view that the standard of proof with regard to the assessment of future loss or damage is on the balance of probabilities, but with a lower degree of certainty as to the occurrence of such loss or damage in the future. From the authorities, one can say that such a lower degree to be attached is best termed by the word "possibility", "chance", "risk", "danger" or "likelihood", but regardless of the words used and their semantics, they must also essentially be a substantial one and not speculative, and that the standard of proving such "possibility", "chance", "risk", "danger" or "likelihood" of the future damage is still, in our opinion, on a balance of probabilities.” [58] Mahkamah ini oleh yang demikian tiada sebab untuk campur tangan ke atas kuantum ganti rugi yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Sesyen. Rujuk kes Tan Kuan Yau v Suhindrimani Angasamy [1985] 1 CLJ 429 (Mahkamah Persekutuan): - “The principle that should guide this Court in determining whether it should interfere with the quantum of damages is crystal clear. What is also clear is that much depends on the circumstances of each case in particular the amount of the award. In a particular case therefore it is for the appeal Court to consider whether in the light of the circumstances of that case there is an erroneous estimate of the amount of the damage in that, either there was an omission on the part of the Judge to consider some relevant materials, or he had admitted for purpose of assessment some irrelevant considerations. If the Court is satisfied or convinced that the Judge has acted upon wrong principle of law then it is justified in reversing; indeed, it is its duty to reverse the finding of the trial Judge.” Kesimpulan [59] Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan di atas, Mahkamah dengan ini menolak rayuan Defendan-Defendan dengan kos sebanyak RM4,000.00 dibayar kepada Plaintif tertakluk kepada fii alokatur. Tarikh: 22hb DISEMBER 2024 …………………………………………. (NOOR HISHAM BIN ISMAIL) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi, Johor Bahru Peguam untuk Perayu/Defendan-Defendan: Puan Nurul Dalilah Binti Darmawi Tetuan Othman Hashim & Co Johor Bahru Peguam untuk Responden/Plaintif: Encik G. Shanmuka Thasan Tetuan The Chambers of Sri Kuala Lumpur Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

UEM Group Bhd v Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2019] 9

Azman Bin Mahmood & Anor v SJ Securities Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 CLJ 573 (Mahkamah Persekutuan)

Lee Ing Chin & Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97 (Mahkamah

Kamaruddin Mohd Nor & Anor v Soon Soo Moe & Anor [1998] 4 CLJ SUPP 301 (Mahkamah Tinggi)

Thangachimmah & Anor v Flower [1968] 2 MLJ 248 (Mahkamah Tinggi)

Lee Thiam v Fatimah Binte Salleh [1981] 1 MLJ 285 (Mahkamah

Guan Teik Sdn Bhd v Hj Mohd Noor Bin Hj Yakob & Ors [2000] 4 CLJ 324 (Mahkamah Rayuan)

Tek Chand v Dile Ram [2001] AIR SC 905 (Mahkamah Agung)

Beldeu Singh v Dr Kenneth Andrew [2011] 4 MLJ 769 (Mahkamah Rayuan)

Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Anor [2020] 10 CLJ 1 (Mahkamah

Supertindent of Lands And Surveys Kuching Division & Anor v Mohamad

Looh Keo v Looh Chee Peng & Ors [2024] 1 CLJ 467 (Mahkamah Tinggi)

Topaiwah v Salleh [1968] 1 MLJ 284 (Mahkamah Persekutuan)

Sambaga Valli K R Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors &

Inas Faiqah Mohd Helmi (A Child Suing Through Her Father And Next Friend; Mohd Helmi Abdul Aziz) v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2016] 2 CLJ 885 (Mahkamah Persekutuan)

Tan Kuan Yau v Suhindrimani Angasamy [1985] 1 CLJ 429 (Mahkamah Persekutuan) Undang-undang yang dirujuk: Seksyen 7 dan 8 Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956