Morteza Feizi Satar v Pendakwa Raya (B-05(H)-171-05/2016 (IRN) DIDENGAR BERSAMA B-05(SH)-175-05/2016 (IRN))

(a) Against the First Respondent (P4): “Bahawa kamu pada 13 Januari 2011, jam lebih kurang 1.00 petang, di kawasan Balai Ketibaan Antarabangsa, LCCT di dalam Daerah Sepang, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan telah memperedarkan dadah berbahaya sejumlah berat 1,884 gram Methamphetamine dan oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.”

(b) Against the Second Respondent (P5): “Bahawa kamu pada 13 Januari 2011, jam lebih kurang 12.25 tengahari, di tempat Balai Ketibaan Antarabangsa, LCCT di Bahagian Pemeriksaan 100% Kastam, di dalam Daerah Sepang, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan telah memperedarkan dadah berbahaya sejumlah berat 2,594.2 gram Methamphetamine dan oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah 3 seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.”

(c) Against the Third Respondent (P6): “Bahawa kamu pada 13 Januari 2011, jam lebih kurang 12.25 tengahari, di tempat Balai Ketibaan Antarabangsa, LCCT di Bahagian Pemeriksaan 100% Kastam, di dalam Daerah Sepang, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan telah memperedarkan dadah berbahaya sejumlah berat 1,693.2 gram Methamphetamine dan oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.” [2] All the Respondents were jointly tried and at the conclusion of the trial, the learned High Court Judge (‘learned trial Judge’) discharged and acquitted all the Respondents of the respective charges without calling for their defence on the ground that no prima facie case had been established against each of the Respondent. [3] On appeal by the prosecution, the Court of Appeal (YA Datuk Wira Mohtarudin Baki, YA Dato’ Abdul Rahman Sebli, YA Datuk Abdul Karim Abdul Jalil, JJCA) had on 2.2.2016 allowed the prosecution’s appeal and ordered the Respondents to enter upon their defence. [4] After considering their defence, the learned trial Judge once again acquitted and discharged the Third Respondent. However, the First Respondent and the Second Respondent were convicted on a lesser charge of possession under section 12(2) punishable under section 39A(2) of the Act. Both were sentenced to 13 years imprisonment from the date of their arrest. In respect of First Respondent, the learned trial Judge 4 further imposed 10 strokes of whipping as mandated under the punishable section of 39A(2) of the Act. [5] Aggrieved with the learned trial Judge’s decision, the First Respondent appealed to this Court vide Appeal No. 171 against the sentence imposed by the learned trial Judge. On the other hand, the Public Prosecutor appealed to this Court against the whole of the said decision of the learned trial Judge. [6] The appeal by the prosecution against the outright acquittal of the Third Respondent had been struck out by this Court on 27.2.2018 as the prosecution was unable to serve the Notice of Appeal to the Third Respondent. [7] We heard the appeals against the First and Second Respondents on 26.6.2018. Before we could hear on the merits, the First Respondent withdrew his appeal against sentence. We therefore struck off the First Respondent’s appeal No. 171. We then proceeded to hear the merits of the prosecution’s appeal No. 175. After hearing the parties, we unanimously allowed the prosecution’s appeal. We set aside the learned trial Judge’s convictions and sentences and substituted them with a convictions under section 39B(1)(a) and we imposed the mandatory death sentence on both the Respondents as mandated under section 39B(2) of the Act. [8] We now give our reasons in allowing the prosecution’s appeal against the First and Second Respondent. 5 The prosecution’s case [9] The prosecution’s case was well encapsulated in the learned trial Judge’s grounds which may be summarised as follows. On 13.1.2011 at or about 12.25 p.m., Inspector Didi Fairuz Bin Zainal Abidin (PW8) together with a team of police officers were on observation duty at the International Arrival Hall of the Low Cost Carrier Terminal (LCCT), Sepang. While on duty, PW8 saw the Second and the Third Respondents with another female later identified as Khorsid Esamaeili Momen (‘Khorsid’) each carrying a luggage bag behaving suspiciously. PW8 approached them and identified himself as a police officer. PW8 then ordered them to open their luggage. PW8 conducted a physical examination of their luggage but nothing incriminating were found in them. [10] PW8 then instructed Detective Corporal Nor Azilah Binti Mohd Sharif (PW4) and Detective Corporal Linda Binti Abdol Wahab (PW7) to take the Second and Third Respondents to an examination room for a physical examination. Upon physical examination, PW4 and PW7 found the Second and the Third Respondents had each worn an abdominal girdle around their waists. On further checking, PW4 and PW7 found that the girdle contained a plastic packet with substances suspected to be dangerous drugs. [11] On the same day at around 1.00 p.m., PW8 saw a Middle Eastern man, later identified as the First Respondent behaving suspiciously while carrying a black backpack. Examination conducted on the black backpack revealed nothing incriminating. Upon physical examination, PW8 discovered that the First Respondent had worn an abdominal girdle around 6 his waist. On further checking, PW8 found the girdle contained plastic packets containing substances suspected to be dangerous drugs. [12] Similar type of girdle which contained similar substances were also found on Khorsid. All the Respondents and Khorsid were arrested and brought to Sepang Police Headquarters for further action. The three Respondents were later handed over to the Investigating Officer, ASP Abdul Rahim Bin Abdullah (PW6) together with all the exhibits seized from the three Respondents. Meanwhile Khorsid and the exhibits seized from her were handed over to Inspector Syazana Syarliza Binti Abdul Ghani (PW12) for further action. [13] All the drugs exhibits were later sent to the chemist, Muzaiyanah Binti Mohd Kaprawi (PW5) for analysis. PW5 confirmed upon analysis that the crystalline substances found hidden in the girdles worn by the three Respondents contained 1,884 grammes in respect of First Respondent, 2,594.2 grammes in respect of Second Respondent and 1,693.2 grammes in respect of Third Respondent, of Methamphetamine respectively, now being the subject-matter of their respective charges. PW5 also confirmed that Methamphetamine is a dangerous drug listed in the First Schedule of the Act. The Defence [14] As alluded to earlier in our judgment, at the end of the prosecution’s case, the learned trial Judge acquitted and discharged all the Respondents holding that no prima facie case had been established by the prosecution. On appeal by the Public Prosecutor, the Court of Appeal had ordered all 7 the Respondents to enter upon their defence. All the Respondents elected to give evidence under oath. Basically the Respondents raised the defence of innocent carrier without knowledge of the impugned drugs. [15] The First Respondent testified that the girdle he wore belonged to his friend, Farshad and two others, Afsaneh and Ali. The girdle was put around his waist by Ali when they were in a toilet at Imam Khomini Airport in Tehran, Iran. Farshad told him that the girdle contained gold dust and asked him not to touch the girdle until after he arrived in Malaysia. The First Respondent also put in his cautioned statement (D94) as part of his evidence. [16] The Second Respondent testified that she came to Malaysia together with Khorsid. They met Afsaneh at the airport and they were asked by Afsaneh to carry gold dust hidden in an abdominal girdle into Malaysia and for that, each of them will be paid USD1,000 when they reached Malaysia. Second Respondent put in her cautioned statement (D73) as part of her evidence. [17] The Third Respondent meanwhile testified that she was forced by her daughter, Khorsid to wear the abdominal girdle and was told that the girdle contained gold dust. The Third Respondent also put in her cautioned statement (D72) as part of her evidence. [18] After considering the defence of the three Respondents, the learned trial Judge had accepted the defence of the Third Respondent that she was an innocent carrier without knowledge. Thus, the Third Respondent was acquitted and discharged. 8 [19] With regard to the First and the Second Respondents, the learned trial Judge found that they lacked knowledge of the impugned drugs. Therefore, the learned trial Judge acquitted and discharged both the Respondents of the trafficking charges. Notwithstanding making this pronouncement, the learned trial Judge at the same time found that both the Respondents liable for possession simpliciter or passive possession and convicted them for possession of the impugned drugs under section 12(2) and punishable under section 39A(2) of the Act and sentenced them accordingly. The learned trial Judge relied on PP v. Goh Yeong Hock & Anor [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep) 240 and Ooi Hock Khang v. PP [2014] 1 LNS 685 for holding that there was lack of overt-acts on the part of the First and the Second Respondents and in not convicting them on the trafficking charges. Hence this appeal by the prosecution before us. The Appeal [20] We were only concerned with the appeal by the prosecution against the First and the Second Respondents. Before us, the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor (‘learned DPP’) canvassed only one solitary issue for us to allow their appeal which was whether the Respondents’ defence had cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case. The main crux of the learned DPP’s argument was that the Respondents were not innocent carriers without knowledge as they were guilty of wilful blindness. Learned DPP relied on Hoh Bon Tong v. PP [2010] 5 CLJ 240, PP v. Amil bin Akmad [2007] 5 MLJ 561, Kazem Habibi Hassan v. PP [2014] 6 MLJ 622, Munusamy Sundar Raj v. PP [2015] 6 MLJ 214, Wjchai Onprom v. PP [2006] 5 MLJ 415, Teng Howe Seng v. PP [2009] 3 CLJ 733 and PP v. Herlina Purnama Sari [2017] 1 MLRA 499. 9 Our Deliberation and Decision [21] The learned trial Judge accepted the defence of innocent carrier put forth by both Respondents. We agreed with the learned DPP’s complaint that the learned trial Judge erred in law and in fact for the failure of his Lordship to consider the Respondents’ defence of innocent carrier in the light of the doctrine of wilful blindness as enunciated in plethora of cases decided by the higher court. We also agreed that the learned trial Judge erred when he decided that the Respondents were not the real traffickers for lack of knowledge. Even though the learned trial Judge accepted the fact that the Respondents had custody and control of the girdle worn by them, his Lordship failed to invoke the presumption of knowledge and possession as provided for under section 37(d) of the Act. [22] How the learned trial Judge handled the issue of innocent carrier without knowledge on the part of the Respondents can be found in the learned trial Judge’s grounds which we reproduced as follows: “Dari rentetan Pembelaan yang disampaikan, apa yang jelas Tertuduh (1) hanyalah seorang ‘innocent carrier’ yang tidak mempunyai sebarang pengetahuan mengenai dadah yang dibawanya. Jika dilihat pada isi pembelaan beliau, beliau menyatakan terdapat individu ketiga yang terlibat, iaitu penama Ali. Peranan Ali tidak boleh dikesampingkan. Di pihak Tertuduh (2) pula, isi pembelaan yang sama seperti Tertuduh (1) diketengahkan. Beliau dengan jelas dan tegas menyatakan tiada pengetahuan yang bengkung yang dipakai olehnya itu mengandungi dadah. Malah keterangan pembelaan beliau itu adalah konsisten dengan percakapan beramarannya (D94). Melalui keterangannya dapat dilihat yang individu bernama Afsaneh adalah merupakan perancang utama di 10 dalam sindiket ini. Digunakan individu yang susah dan kesempitan wang bagi meneruskan kegiatan jenayahnya. Afsaneh tahu Tertuduh (2) memerlukan wang untuk mengubati anaknya yang sakit. Pendapatan Tertuduh (2) sebagai pemandu teksi pastinya tidak mencukup bagi menampung kos perubatan anaknya. Dipergunakan insan daif seperti Tertuduh (2) ini bagi meneruskan kegiatan jenayahnya. Pada anggapan Tertuduh (2), bengkung yang melilit pinggangnya itu adalah mengandungi serbuk emas. Dia bersetuju untuk memakainya sebab dia telah dijanjikan upah yang lumayan setibanya dia di Malaysia kelak. Dia pula tidak tahu yang perbuatan menyeludup masuk serbuk emas merupakan suatu kesalahan. Saya mendapati penjelasan yang diberikan oleh Tertuduh (2) ini adalah setara dengan pengetahuan dan pemahaman beliau tentang apa yang dibawa olehnya di dalam bengkung yang dipakainya. Bagi saya, Tertuduh (2) yang tidak berpendidikan tinggi, keterangannya itu jelas jujur dan berjaya membangkitkan suatu keraguan yang munasabah. Dari segi mata kasar sekalipun, keterangan SP8 dan SP12 yang mereka sahkan tidak dapat melihat atau memastikan apakah isi kandungan di dalam bengkung-bengkung itu tanpa ditoreh, dipotong, jelas memperlihatkan akan ketiadaan pengetahuan di pihak Tertuduh (2). Keterangan dari saksi-saksi Pendakwaan ini (SP8 dan SP12) jelas menunjukkan bahawa Tertuduh (2) tiada berpengetahuan ke atas dadah yang terdapat di dalam bengkung tersebut. Apa yang dia tahu, bengkung itu mengandungi serbuk emas, sepertimana yang diberitahu kepadanya oleh Afsaneh. Seperti di kedudukan Tertuduh (1), terdapat dua inferens yang berbeza terhadap isi kandungan bengkung samada ia mengandungi dadah atau serbuk emas. Adalah menjadi prinsip Undang-undang yang mantap apabila timbulnya dua inferens yang berbeza, inferens yang menyebelahi Tertuduh adalah terpakai. Dari rentetan Pembelaan yang disampaikan, apa yang jelas, Tertuduh (2) juga merupakan seorang ‘innocent carrier’ yang tiada mempunyai pengetahuan akan dadah yang dibawa olehnya. Jika dilihat kepada isu Pembelaan beliau, terdapat 11 individu ketiga yang terlibat iaitu Afsaneh. Isu dan peranan Afsaneh tidak boleh dikesampingkan begitu sahaja. ……. Juga tidak ditampilkan sebarang keterangan bagi menunjukkan terdapatnya ‘overt acts’ di pihak para Tertuduh di sepanjang proses penggeledahan dijalankan. Kedudukan fakta yang sama wujud, di dalam kes PP v. Goh Yeong Hock & Anor [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep). “At the end of the prosecution case, the Court found that there was evidence that 9736.19 gram of heroin were found concealed in 3 bags albeit there was no evidence of over acts on the part of both the accused indicating they knew that the bags contained the heroin.” Dari fakta dan keterangan yang telah disampaikan, apa yang jelas dan nyata ialah Tertuduh (1) dan (2) hanyalah mempunyai milikan yang pasif sahaja terhadap dadah tersebut. Tiada wujud keterangan untuk mengatakan yang dadah-dadah tersebut dibawa untuk diserah atau diedarkan kepada orang lain. Di dalam pemahaman serta kepercayaan Tertuduh (1) dan (2), apa yang terdapat di dalam bengkung yang dipakai oleh mereka adalah serbuk emas yang hendak diseludup masuk ke Malaysia setelah mereka berdua dijanjikan dengan upah. Manakala Tertuduh (3) pula jelas tidak mengetahui apa-apa pun. Dari segi fizikalnya pun, jelas memperlihatkan kedaifannya. Diletakkan sepenuh kepercayaan kepada Khorsid, anaknya dan kepada perempuan yang berniqab. ……. Elemen pengetahuan yang ketiga-tiga Tertuduh mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai isi kandungan di dalam bengkung-bengkung 12 yang melilit pinggang mereka, telah gagal dibuktikan oleh pihak Pendakwaan melebihi keraguan yang munasabah. Malah melalui keterangan, SP8 dan SP12 sendiri mengesahkan bahawa isi kandungan bengkung-bengkung tersebut hanya dapat dilihat apabila potongan atau torehan terhadap bengkung-bengkung itu dilakukan. Tanpa torehan, adalah mustahil untuk seseorang itu mengetahui kehadiran serbuk Kristal. Jadi, anggapan serta pemahaman Tertuduh-Tertuduh yang mereka membawa gold powder/serbuk emas di dalam lapik bengkung yang dililit di pinggang mereka masing-masing bukanlah suatu rekaan. Seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam penyataan beramarannya (D94), mereka diupah untuk membawa serbuk emas itu ke Malaysia. Keterangan tersebut jelas menguatkan lagi kes pihak Pembelaan yang Tertuduh-Tertuduh sebenarnya tiada mempunyai pengetahuan ke atas dadah tersebut. Melalui percakapan beramaran yang dikemukakan iaitu D72 – untuk Tertuduh 1, D94 untuk Tertuduh 2 dan D73 untuk Tertuduh 3, jelas menyatakan bahawa bengkung tersebut adalah kepunyaan rakannya bernama Ali (Untuk Tertuduh (1)). Ali dikatakan telah memasang bengkung dan dililitkan di pinggang Tertuduh (1) semasa Tertuduh (1) berada di dalam tandas di Lapangan Terbang Imam Khomini di Iran. Menurut Tertuduh (1), Ali menyatakan kepadanya bahawa ianya adalah serbuk emas dan melarang Tertuduh daripada mengusik atau menyentuhnya sehingga sampai di Malaysia. Lantas elemen pengetahuan terhadap dadah-dadah yang terdapat di dalam bengkung-bengkung tersebut dinafikan. Begitu juga halnya dengan Tertuduh (2) dan (3). Kedudukan yang sama juga terdapat di dalam penyataan beramaran Tertuduh (2) (D73) dan Tertuduh (3) (D72). Dinyatakan melalui percakapan beramaran itu bahawa mereka tidak tahu itu adalah dadah. Mereka menyatakan yang mereka percaya yang isi kandungan bengkung-bengkung itu adalah ‘gold powder’. Mereka menyatakan yang mereka diupah untuk membawa ‘gold powder’ tersebut ke Malaysia. Untuk Tertuduh (2), suatu Petisyen telah 13 dikemukakan oleh suami Tertuduh (2) (IDD75) yang isi kandungan Petisyen tersebut menyatakan minta penyiasatan dilakukan terhadap seorang bernama Afsaneh Baharloo yang telah mempergunakan isterinya (Tertuduh 2) untuk membawa ‘gold powder’ ke Malaysia dengan dijanjikan upah dibayar harga separuh tiket. Di dalam hal ini, SP6 selaku Pegawai Penyiasat kes Khorsid tiada melakukan penyiasatan lanjut tentang perkara yang dinyatakan di dalam IDD75.” [23] It is thus clear from the above that the learned trial Judge did not at all consider the doctrine of wilful blindness before deciding that the Respondents were innocent carriers without knowledge. [24] In Hoh Bon Tong v. PP (supra) the defence of innocent carrier was discussed and this Court held that: “[73] The defence of innocent carrier must necessarily bring into the picture the concept of wilful blindness. And according to Yong Pung How CJ (Singapore) in Public Prosecutor v. Hla Win (supra) at p. 438, “the concept of wilful blindness qualifies the requirement of knowledge.” And his Lordship continued further by saying (at the same page): As Professor Glanville Williams aptly remarked in his Textbook on Criminal Law, at p. 125: ….the strict requirement of knowledge is qualified by the doctrine of wilful blindness. This is meant to deal with those whose philosophy is: ‘Where ignorance is bliss, ‘tis folly to be wise’. To argue away inconvenient truths is a human failing. If a person deliberately ‘shuts his eyes’ to the obvious, because he ‘doesn’t want to know,’ he is taken to know’. [74] Continuing at the same page, his Lordship said: 14 In Ubaka v. PP [1995] 1 SLR 267, the principles laid down in Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 2 All ER 356; [1968] 2 WLR 1303 and modified in Tan Ah Tee v. PP [1980] 1 MLJ 49 were applied by the trial judge. In its grounds of judgment, this court quoted the following passage by the trial judge: Ignorance is a defence when there is no reason for suspicion and no right and opportunity of examination, and ignorance simpliciter is not enough. [75] Here, we have evidence that the drugs were placed inside transparent plastic packets and the contents can be seen from outside. It was mere folly on the part of the accused not to examine what he carried in his pockets. It is a classic case of wilful blindness.”. [25] In a more recent decision of the Federal Court in PP v. Herlina Purnama Sari [2017] 1 MLRA 499 on the same issue of wilful blindness, Raus Sharif, PCA (as His Lordship then was) at great length said: “[43] In our judgment, that the manner in which the impugned drugs, were concealed in the two boxes which were found in the respondent’s luggage goes to show that the respondent knew the contents of the two boxes. It is not enough for the respondent to merely assert absence of knowledge. On the facts, there are many reasons for the respondent to be suspicious that the luggage she was carrying contained impugned drugs. But she wilfully shut her eyes. It is preposterous to accept the respondent’s defence that she had agreed to carry something in the luggage to help Jo, a total stranger, to have the two boxes delivered to Jo’s friend in Laos. [44] In our assessment, looking at the evidence in totality, the respondent could not exculpate herself from her involvement in the trafficking of the seized drugs by saying that she had no knowledge or that she was an 15 ‘innocent carrier’ in this transaction. In our view, she could not be ‘innocent’ when she voluntarily agreed to hand over the boxes to a third party that she hardly knew in another country without enquiring further as to the contents of the said boxes. The respondent, without any such inquiry, which she wound have been reasonably expected to make in any event, had agreed to give the boxes to someone just as a favour for her friend Vivian. The respondent should have refused to carry out such an assignment if no satisfactory explanation as to their contents was forthcoming from Vivian whom she was in contact with. Her failure to do so makes her guilty of wilful blindness. [45] Wilful blindness necessarily entails an element of deliberate action. If the person concerned has a clear reason to be suspicious that something is amiss but then embarks on a deliberate decision not to make further inquiries in order to avoid confirming what the actual situation is, then such a decision is necessarily a deliberate one. The key threshold element in the doctrine of wilful blindness itself is that of suspicion followed by (and coupled with) a deliberate decision not to make further investigations. Whether the doctrine of wilful blindness should be applied to any particular case would be dependent on the relevant inferences to be drawn by the trial judge from all the facts and circumstances of the particular case, giving due weight, where necessary, to the credibility of the witnesses. (see PP v. Tan Kok An [1995] 4 MLRH 256). [46] The concept of “wilful blindness” had been discussed in a number of local cases but it seems to have had its genesis in the dissenting judgment of Yong Pung How CJ (Singapore) in the case of Public Prosecutor v. Hla Win [1995] 2 SLR 424. The doctrine of “wilful blindness” can be summarized to be applicable to a situation where the circumstance are such as to raise suspicion sufficient for a reasonable person to be put on inquiry as to the legitimacy of a particular transaction. To put it another way, if the circumstances are such as to arouse suspicion, then it is incumbent on a person to make the necessary inquiries in order to satisfy 16 himself as to the genuineness of what was informed to him. Should he fail to embark upon this course of action, then he will be guilty of ‘wilful blindness’. In other words, he is then taken to know the true situation. He then cannot be said to have either rebutted the presumption of knowledge or have raised a reasonable doubt as to his knowledge of the situation. [47] Most of the cases where the concept was held to apply concerned cases in which the accused was asked to carry certain articles, or a package, or a bag, or to swallow certain items. In these circumstances, where the request to do any of those things mentioned would be such as would arouse the suspicion of a reasonable person as to the contents, it was upon the accused to make sufficient inquiries so as to dispel or to set straight such suspicions. Should the accused not make any or any sufficient inquiries under those circumstances, the concept to wilful blindness would apply so as to fasten upon him or her the necessary knowledge as to the nature of those contents. In other words, if he deliberately ‘shuts his eyes’ to the obvious, because he ‘doesn’t want to know’ he is taken to know. [48] In the present case, based on the evidence, it is our view that the respondent is not an innocent carrier but a trafficker. As we have alluded to earlier, in essence the defence of innocent carrier raised by the respondent has no merit because the respondent had every opportunity to check for herself what she was carrying. In our judgment any reasonable person similarly circumstanced would have asked what were in those boxes. The respondent here is not a hapless victim caught in the web of inevitable circumstances beyond her control. We find no ring of truth in her story.” [26] Back to the instant appeal before us, the story of the Respondents that they were given the girdle to wear by Ali, a total stranger to them while they were at the airport was hard to be believed. There were many reasons 17 for the Respondents to be suspicious that the abdominal girdle they wore contained the impugned drugs and not gold dust as was told to them by Ali. The Respondents voluntarily agreed to wear the girdle to be taken to Malaysia and they were paid USD1,000 for their services. They had ample time and opportunity to check and examine the girdle as it could easily be opened. They could do this either at the airport in Tehran, during the flight to Malaysia or at the LCCT airport before they approached the customs check point. [27] How could the Respondents believe what Ali told them when in fact Ali was only known to them when they were at the airport in Tehran. The Respondents could not be that dim witted to have believed Ali. Any reasonable person in similar situation would have asked further about the contents of the girdle. The explanation given to them by Ali that the gold dust could not be put in the checked in luggage as it is an offence and that they wanted to evade from paying tax was most illogical explanation. The Respondents were supposed to hand over the girdle to a person by the name of ‘Afsaneh’ in Malaysia but no particulars of ‘Afsaneh’ was ever revealed to them as well as to the investigating officer. [28] From the evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses, it showed that the conduct of the Respondents looking frightened before the discovery of the drugs had a direct bearing on the fact in issue. Yet the learned trial Judge in his judgment said there was no overt act. The conduct of the Respondents was relevant on the issue of knowledge and admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act, 1950. The Respondents could not avail themselves of the defence of innocent carrier. Their conduct of looking frightened compounded with their deliberate actions not to make further 18 inquiries in order to avoid confirming what the actual situation was, made them guilty of wilful blindness. [29] We were of the considered view that the request by Ali, Farshad or Afsaneh for them to carry the abdominal girdles strapped to their waists would arouse the suspicion of a reasonable person as to the contents of those girdles. It was upon the Respondents to make sufficient inquiries so as to dispel or to set straight their suspicions. In this appeal, the failure of the Respondents in not making any inquiries attracted the concept of wilful blindness so as to fasten upon them the necessary knowledge as to the contents of the girdles. The deliberate conduct of the Respondents to shut their eyes to the obvious because they deliberately did not want to know the true and actual contents of the girdles had led us to conclude that they did know that there were drugs in them. [30] As regards to the fact that the impugned drugs were securely concealed in the girdles, we echoed the view of Yong Pung How CJ (Singapore) in Zulfikar bin Mustaffah v. PP [2001] 1 SLR 181 as follows at page 187: “….In the course of the appeal before us, counsel for the appellant relied heavily on the fact that the contents of the bundles were securely wrapped in newspapers and could not be identified. We were accordingly invited to draw the inference that the appellant had no knowledge of the contents of the bundles.