My Dental Care Sdn. Bhd. v Azahar Bin Yaakub @ Ariffin (BA-12ANCC-32-08/2025)

first, although the parties initially discussed the alleged misrepresentations at the meeting on 11 October 2023, it was finally resolved and agreed that D1 would return each 2024, as recorded in the Mutual Agreement. The cause of action in the Sessions Court was for breach of the Mutual Agreement, not for the misrepresentations by D3 and D4; second, the Mutual Agreement constitutes an acknowledgement of indebtedness by D1 towards all the Plaintiffs. D1 is now estopped from altering its position and is obliged to pay RM50,000.00 to each Plaintiff. (Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v. Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 1 MLRA 738; [1995] 3 MLJ 331; [1995] 4 CLJ 283; [1995] 3 AMR 2871); S/N cbyOgj3hmkWlIaoZ58pw fourth, both KFA and SA acknowledged and acted in accordance with the Mutual Agreement as demonstrated below: S/N cbyOgj3hmkWlIaoZ58pw in a letter dated 15 December 2023, SA forwarded these documents to KFA: (i) Form of Transfer of Securities; (ii) Letter of Transfer of Shares; (iii) Letter of Mutual Agreement of Shareholders Withdrawal from D1 and Refund of Investment for MDC KL Traders; and (iv) Letter of Mutual Agreement of Shareholders Withdrawal from D1 and Refund of Investment for MDC Kelana Jaya Transfer Documents S/N cbyOgj3hmkWlIaoZ58pw fifth, based on the correspondence dated 30 November 2023 and 15 December 2023, KFA and SA were aware of contention that there was no communication of acceptance of the Mutual Agreement is devoid of merit. (Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Chang Ching Chuen & Ors and Another Appeal [1995] 3 CLJ 639; [1995] 2 MLJ 770 CA; Lee Tee @ Lee Kim Mok & Anor v. Seek Lai Neo & Anor [2000] 2 CLJ 761; [2000] 1 MLJ 466 CA); sixth, D1 would not have supplied the Transfer Documents to SA for subsequent transmission to KFA if it had been unaware of or impugned the Mutual Agreement. In this instance, D1 elected not to challenge the Mutual seventh, in a letter dated 11 July 2024, KFA reaffirmed its position to SA that the Transfer Documents and the Mutual Agreement will be sent to SA only after D1 accounts, which KFA will hold as a stakeholder; S/N cbyOgj3hmkWlIaoZ58pw eighth, reference should also be made to the letter dated 18 July 2024 issued by Messrs Suzana Ismail & Partners SIP . S/N cbyOgj3hmkWlIaoZ58pw in the aforesaid letter dated 18 July 2024:

SIP used this title on their letterhead: Per: PEMULANGAN WANG PELABURAN-KLINIK MY DENTAL CARE KL TRADERS

(ii) requested an extension of time until 18 September 2024 on behalf of D1 to sell the New Clinic to a third party;

(iii) SIP did not challenge the validity of the Mutual Agreement;

(iv) bligations under the Mutual Agreement;

he arguments of the Learned Counsel for D1 that the letter dated 18 July 2024 by SIP cannot be referred to in the Summary Judgment proceeding in the Sessions Court and in this appeal, simply because it bears the , are devoid of merit for these reasons: S/N cbyOgj3hmkWlIaoZ58pw

the letter dated 18 July 2024 was issued after D1, and the Plaintiffs reached an amicable settlement, as alluded to in the Mutual

(ii) the contents of the letter dated 18 July 2024 by SIP confirmed the terms of the Mutual Agreement;

(iii) the original deadline under the Mutual Agreement for D1 to make payment was on 10 April 2024. Vide the letter dated 18 July 2024, SIP was merely seeking an extension of time until 18 September 2024 for D1 to make the payment under the Mutual Agreement;

(iv) there was no genuine negotiation to resolve disputes between the parties because an agreement had already been reached, as shown in the Mutual Agreement. In East Coast Economic Region Development Council v Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd & Anor And Other Appeals [2019] 5 MLRA 345, the Federal Court held that: S/N cbyOgj3hmkWlIaoZ58pw governing the admissibility of evidence and is founded upon public policy to encourage litigants to settle their disputes instead of going to trial: see Rush & Tompkins Ltd Appellants v. Greater London Council and Another respondents [1989] AC 1280. It is automatically render a document so marked privileged and to be inadmissible. If privilege is claimed but challenged, the court can look at the document so headed in order to determine its nature: see South Shropshire DC v. Amos [1987] 1 All ER 340; Malayan Banking Bhd v. Foo See Moi [1981] 1 MLRA 641; CE Ling Shipbuilding Sdn Bhd v. Hoe Seng Huat Hardware Co (Pte) Ltd [2003] 4 MLRH 307; N Balasingam v. Singapore [Emphasis added] S/N cbyOgj3hmkWlIaoZ58pw ninth, through letters dated 2 August 2024 and 6 August 2024, KFA demanded a refund of the investment as LODs no letter from D1 or its solicitors questioning KFA demands. Therefore, D1 is deemed to have accepted the contents of the LODs, particularly the Mutual Agreement, as correct; and tenth, based on the Mutual Agreement, this is a straightforward case for Summary Judgment against D1, as there are no triable issues warranting a full trial. D1 against the decision of the Learned Sessions Court Judge, which entered the Summary Judgment against D1, is dismissed with costs of RM5,000.00, subject to an allocatur fee. Accordingly, the Summary Judgment entered by the Learned Sessions Court Judge against D1 is affirmed; and D2, D3 and D4 against the decision of the Learned Sessions Court Judge, which entered Summary Judgment against them, is allowed with costs of RM5,000.00, subject to an allocatur fee. Accordingly, S/N cbyOgj3hmkWlIaoZ58pw S/N cbyOgj3hmkWlIaoZ58pw