Based on the atypical facts of the case concerning a “consent judgment”, I decided that this Court has no power to hear the Plaintiffs’ application and that they ought to have filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal instead of filing an Originating Summons at the Civil Division of the High Court at Kuala Lumpur. For that reason, I decided that this Court ought to order the Plaintiffs’ action to be struck out. Background Facts [2] There was a civil suit filed by the Plaintiffs in the IP Division of this Court, registered as Kuala Lumpur High Court Civil Suit No. WA-22IP-16- 03/2021 (“IP Suit No.16”). S/N zVYpPzD6rkOmEjx5Jut6hQ [3] In IP Suit No.16, the Plaintiffs pleaded copyright infringement and breach of confidential information. There was an Anton Piller Order issued by the High Court on 2nd April 2021 but it was subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeal. I need not delve into this as it is irrelevant for the purpose of dealing with the Plaintiffs’ action in this court. Instead, I shall set out the chronology of material events at the IP Court (based on the Plaintiffs’ affidavit) prior to the filing of this action by the Plaintiffs, as follows: 1st March 2024: Parties attend mediation in IP Suit No.16 before YA Azlan bin Sulaiman JC (as His Lordship then was). Broad terms of settlement was recorded by His Lordship on this date. 7th March 2024: The Plaintiffs' solicitors send their first Draft Consent Judgment to the Defendants’ solicitors. 8th March 2024: The Defendants' solicitors respond with their Amended Draft Consent Judgment. 14th March 2024: The Plaintiffs' solicitors inform the Defendants' solicitors that most of the amendments made in the draft Consent Judgment are not agreeable to the Plaintiffs. 15th March 2024: The Defendants' solicitors write to the Court, stating that parties cannot agree on the terms and request a session with YA Azlan Sulaiman for clarification/settlement of issues. S/N zVYpPzD6rkOmEjx5Jut6hQ 18th March 2024: Counsel of both sides appear before YA Azlan Sulaiman for case management. His Lordship informs counsel that he shall look at both versions of the draft Consent Judgment. 20th March 2024: The Plaintiffs' solicitors write to the IP Court, explaining their disagreement with the Defendants' amendments. 21st March 2024: The IP Court emails both firms of solicitors, informing that the Defendants' version of the Amended Draft Consent Judgment has been approved by His Lordship. 22nd March 2024: The Plaintiffs' solicitors write to the IP Court reiterating no consensus ad idem, and to the Defendants' solicitors requesting them to withhold filing the draft Order. 25th March 2024: The Plaintiffs' solicitors revert with an amended version of the "Defendants’ “Approved’ Draft Consent Judgment". 27th March 2024: Defendants' solicitors write to the IP Court, requesting the Judge allow their version and to disregard the Plaintiffs' amendments. 29th March 2024: A Case Management session was conducted by YA Azlan Sulaiman. His Lordship decided that, based on His Lordship’s review of an audio-visual recording, save for one deletion to be made in paragraph 2(b)(ii) of the Defendants' Draft Consent Judgment, it is to be accepted as the consent judgment of the parties. S/N zVYpPzD6rkOmEjx5Jut6hQ 4th April 2024: The Defendants' solicitors send a clean draft of the Consent Judgment for the Plaintiffs' approval. The Plaintiffs declined to approve the same. 15th April 2024: The Defendants' solicitors serve on the Plaintiffs’ solicitors a sealed Consent Judgment. 26th April 2024: The Plaintiffs’ solicitors filed an Originating Summons in the Civil Division of this Court to commence this action to set aside the “Consent Judgment”. The Plaintiffs’ Prayers in the OS [4] The Plaintiffs’ prayers in this action are as follows: The Plaintiffs’ Position [5] In response to my query about the power and jurisdiction of this Court to hear this action, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs submits that the S/N zVYpPzD6rkOmEjx5Jut6hQ Plaintiffs’ action is within the jurisdiction of this Court because it is a consent judgment. [6] Learned counsel for the Plaintiffs submit that they have followed the correct procedure to set aside the consent judgment by filing a fresh action. Analysis of the Facts and Law [7] It is trite that an impugned consent order, for example, one that was entered into based on fraudulent misrepresentation made to the other party or when there exist such other grounds that vitiate consent to a contract, may be set aside. The leading authority on this point is the judgment of the Federal Court in BADIADDIN BIN MOHD MAHIDIN & ANOR v ARAB MALAYSIAN FINANCE BHD [1998] 1 MLJ 393 where it was held as follows: “The grounds referred to for setting aside a consent order of a judgment by consent are grounds which basically relate to consensus ad idem or the free consent of parties to a binding agreement or contract. It is elementary that if it is proved that there are grounds which vitiate such free consent, the agreement is not binding. Now a consent order or a judgment by consent is undoubtedly based on an agreement of both parties where consent to the agreement must or should have been free in the first place. If the agreement upon which a consent order or judgment by consent is based is vitiated by any ground recognized in equity as vitiating such free consent, such as fraud, mistake, total failure of consideration (see Huddersfield Banking Co Ltd v Henry Lister & Sons [1895] 2 Ch 273 and the cases cited therein), such a perfected consent order or judgment by consent could be set aside in a fresh action filed for the purpose. Grounds which would S/N zVYpPzD6rkOmEjx5Jut6hQ vitiate such free consent should also include misrepresentation, coercion, and undue influence and other grounds in equity.” [8] The common thread in all those cases of setting aside of consent orders is that the dispute that arises, such as fraud, mistake, total failure of consideration, is a dispute between the parties to the consent order, i.e. about the conduct of the opposing parties or their agents, and not about a decision made by a court. [9] In our present case, even though the prayers are for declarations to set aside the said Consent Order, the grounds stated in support of the application are atypical, i.e. not the usual grounds for the setting aside of a consent order. In para (iii) of the grounds for the Plaintiffs’ application, it was alleged that there was an error committed by YA Azlan Sulaiman. A screenshot of the same is pasted below: [10] In other words, the Plaintiffs are seeking to challenge a decision made on 29th March 2024 – which I have emboldened in the chronology of events in para [3] above. The cause papers and the written submissions make it amply clear that the subject matter of this action is actually a decision made by a learned judicial commissioner (as His Lordship S/N zVYpPzD6rkOmEjx5Jut6hQ then was), and not about the conduct of the Defendants. This is evident from the screenshot shown in para [9] above. [11] Further, in para 34.6 of the Plaintiff’s Reply Submissions, counsel submitted as follows: [12] As shown in the chronology set out in para [3] above, on 29th March 2024, during a Case Management session conducted by YA Azlan Sulaiman, His Lordship decided that save for one deletion to be made in paragraph 2(b)(ii) of the Defendants' Draft Consent Judgment, it is to be accepted as a consent judgment agreed by the parties. That decision was based on His Lordship’s review of an audio-visual recording. [13] Now, since the subject matter of this action is about a ruling made by a judicial commissioner, i.e. a decision of the High Court, is it within my jurisdiction, sitting as a judicial commissioner of the High Court, to hear the application and to review that decision? With respect, I think the answer is clearly in the negative. [14] I reiterate my view that the Plaintiffs ought to have filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal to appeal against that decision pronounced by YA Azlan Sulaiman on 29th March 2024 instead of filing an Originating Summons in the Civil Division of the High Court, to attempt to set aside a sealed order of the Commercial Division of the same High Court. S/N zVYpPzD6rkOmEjx5Jut6hQ S/N zVYpPzD6rkOmEjx5Jut6hQ Counsel for the Plaintiffs: K Chandrasekar (Chew Yi Ting, dan Cheryl Chung Ke Han with him) SOLICITORS FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: MESSRS LAW PARTNERSHIP Advocates & Solicitors Level 12, Tower 8, Avenue 5, The Horizon Phase 2, Bangsar South, No. 8 Jalan Kerinchi, 59200 KUALA LUMPUR. Counsel for the Defendants: Henry Ng Zong Hui SOLICITORS FOR THE DEFENDANTS: MESSRS KHENG HOE & LEE YUEN Advocates & Solicitors A3-3-6, Block A3, Solaris Dutamas, No. 1 Jalan Dutamas 1, 50480 KUALA LUMPUR. S/N zVYpPzD6rkOmEjx5Jut6hQ