Nachammai A/p Subramaniam v CHOCKALINGAM A/L KMS KUMARAPPAN CHETTIAR (KA-24NCvC-131-04/2025)

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1 IN THE MATTER OF HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN THE STATE OF KEDAH DARUL AMAN, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO. : KA-24NCvC-131-04/2025 In the matter of the estate of KM.S Kumarappan Chettiar @ KM.S. Kumarappa Chettiar (NRIC No.: 310213-71-5055); And In the matter of the estate of Subramaniam A/L KMS Kumarappan Chettier (NRIC No.: 630911-02- 5601); And In the matter of a Deed of Distribution dated 17-07- 2001; And In the matter of Section 2 and Section 62 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959; And In the matter of Order 7 Rule 2, Order 80 Rule 2, Order 80 Rule 4 and Order 80 Rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012; And In the matter of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012. 25/03/2026 00:23:18 KA-24NCvC-131-04/2025 Kand. 110 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) Brief Facts of the Case [1] The factual matrix leading to this Originating Summons is largely undisputed. KM.S Kumarappan Chettiar ("the Deceased") passed away intestate on 23.02.2001, leaving behind his wife and five children: Chockalingam (the 1st Defendant), Subramaniam (“Subramaniam”), one Ramasamy, Nachammai (the 2nd Defendant), and one Letchimee. The 1st Defendant is the administrator of the Deceased’s estate. [2] The First Plaintiff and Second Plaintiff (collectively, “the Plaintiffs”) are joint administrators for the estate of Subramaniam, who died intestate on 23 February 2001. [3] On 17.07.2001, before the grant of letters of administration was issued, all the beneficiaries executed a Deed of Distribution ("the 2001 Deed"). Under the 2001 Deed, the female beneficiaries, including the 2nd Defendant and Letchimee, agreed to relinquish their rights to the Deceased's estate in consideration of RM200,000.00 each, to be paid upon the sale of a land known as GM 3899, Lot 1130, Mukim Jitra ("PT 2978"). [4] PT 2978 was later sold off for RM3,009,795.62. Following the sale of PT 2978 in 2003, the 2nd Defendant and Letchimee executed a Statutory Declaration acknowledging receipt of the RM200,000.00, alongside an additional gratuitous sum of RM102,179.00 each. [5] For nearly two decades, the 2001 Deed remained unchallenged. The dispute only manifested when the 1st Defendant filed Originating Summons No. KA-24NCVC-115-04/2023 ("OS 115") on 03.04.2023, seeking to distribute the remaining of another unsold land ("PT 2979") to all beneficiaries, including the female beneficiaries who had previously relinquished their rights under the 2001 Deed. OS 115 was subsequently withdrawn following objections from the Plaintiffs. [6] The Plaintiffs, having been appointed as the committee for Subramaniam's estate on 26.03.2023 and subsequently extracting the grant of letters of administration for the Subramaniam's estate on 17.01.2024 following his demise, commenced this present action (“this OS”). Preliminary Issue: Conversion of Originating Summons to Writ (Enclosure 72) [7] At the outset, this Court must address Enclosure 72, an application by the 1st Defendant to convert this OS proceedings into a Writ action arguing an alleged mental health issue of the deceased Subramaniam of being diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2010. [8] This belatedly raised factual contention regarding mental capacity raised by the 1st Defendant on mental health must be given its day in court. Thus, for the sake of fairness and justice, this Court adjourned the matter, allowed both Plaintiffs and Defendants to file further affidavits, and scheduled another day of oral submissions. [9] In gist, via Enclosure 72, learned counsel for the 1st Defendant heavily contended that the Plaintiffs’ introduction of a medical report (Exhibit N-10) (“Medical Report”) diagnosing the late Subramaniam with schizophrenia at the eleventh hour raised substantial disputes of fact regarding his mental capacity. The 1st Defendant argued that this Medical Report was brought in merely to challenge the validity of the LHDN documents and Fixed Deposit accounts, thus requiring a full trial with viva voce evidence and cross-examination. Furthermore, the 1st Defendant pointed to alleged "multiple inconsistencies" across the Plaintiffs' numerous affidavits in reply as grounds for a writ. [10] The Plaintiffs rebutted this argument by asserting that the diagnosis was confirmed in 2010, whilst the Deed of Distribution was signed in 2001. In a forceful rebuttal, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs submitted that their claim is essentially confined to two clear equitable and statutory reliefs: an order for the 1st Defendant to render accounts, and a declaration to enforce the validly executed 2001 Deed. The Plaintiffs contended that the mental health order (“2023 Mental Health Order”) and the medical capacity of the late Subramaniam do not affect the validity of the 2001 Deed, nor is the claim grounded in a fraudulent breach of trust. The Medical Report was introduced strictly in response to the Defendants' equitable defence of laches. [11] Having scrutinised the affidavits, this Court finds no merit in Enclosure 72. As elucidated by the learned authors of The Malaysian Rules of Court 2012, An Annotation, an originating summons under Order 80 Rule 2 is the precise procedural mode for initiating proceedings concerning the administration of an estate, unless the claim is grounded on foundational allegations of fraud. The 2023 Mental Health Order and the Medical Report do not alter the contractual and statutory nature of the Plaintiffs' claim. The documentary evidence before me is more than sufficient to dispose of this matter. Consequently, the primary relief sought in Enclosure 72 is dismissed. This Court, however, exercises its discretion to allow the prayer for the filing of further supplemental affidavits, thereby affording all parties a full and fair opportunity to address the specific factual contentions regarding the late Subramaniam’s mental capacity. Issue 1: The Statutory Duty to Account, Limitation, and Laches [12] Through this OS, the Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, an order compelling the 1st Defendant, as administrator, to exhibit a true and perfect inventory and account. This duty is statutorily entrenched in Section 62 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 (“PAA 1959”). [13] The Plaintiffs, in support of their application, submitted that the Court of Appeal case of Dr Chan Chin Cheung v Chan Chak Cheung & Anor [2005] 2 CLJ 405 is the authority regarding the obligation to render account. In delivering the judgment, Augustine Paul JCA held that (at pp 418-419): “A trustee is obliged to render accounts of the trust property to a beneficiary. In this regard reference is made to Halsbury's Laws of Malaysia, vol 5 which says at p. 720: A trustee must furnish to a beneficiary, or to a person authorised by him, on demand, information or the means of obtaining information as to the mode in which the trust property or his share in it has been invested or otherwise dealt with, and as to where it is and full accounts respecting it, whether the beneficiary has a present interest in the trust property or only a contingent interest in remainder, or is only an object of a discretionary trust. If the trustee neglects or fails to do so, he is liable for the costs of proceedings to compel production of information or accounts. He must also allow a beneficiary to inspect the trust accounts and all documents relating to the trust, and has a duty to explain to a beneficiary what his rights are. And at p. 855: One of the remedies available against the personal representative of a deceased person for those seeking information about the deceased person's estate is to be supplied with an account of it. It is the imperative duty of the personal representative to keep proper accounts from the time he begins to administer the estate so as to render proper account to any beneficiary who demands the same throughout the administration of the estate. The duty to render accounts is therefore a constituent element of the administration of the estate of a deceased person. The action brought by the appellant against the respondent is therefore one for the administration of the estate of the deceased.” [Emphasis added] [14] The Plaintiffs further build their contention upon the bedrock of another Court of Appeal case, Damayanti Kantilal Doshi & Ors v Jigarlal Kantilal Doshi & Ors [1998] 4 CLJ 81, which had established that the duty to render accounts is a vital duty of executors or trustees. [15] Shaik Daud Ismail JCA in that case held at para 14: “The duty to render accounts is one of the basic duties of all executors or trustees. It is the duty of the personal representatives to keep clear and accurate accounts, and to be ready at all times to render such accounts when called upon to do so, see Halsbury's 4th Edn Vol 17 at para 1551 under "Liability to Account". By the terms of the deceased's will the issue of accounts is all important since the residue for distribution is derived at only after deductions of debts and expenses have been made. Without the accounts being rendered periodically or at all (as in this case), the beneficiaries would not have any means of knowing whether the estate is being administered properly.” [Emphasis added] [16] Learned counsel for the 1st Defendant vehemently opposed this prayer, asserting that the 1st Defendant had fully discharged his duty. The 1st Defendant relied on a summary of accounts provided in Exhibit N-6 of Enclosure 2, a ledger exhibited in Enclosure 19, alongside Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri (“LHDN”) tax records and fixed deposit (“Fixed Deposit”) receipts. Relying on the Court of Appeal decision in Lek Eng Hock & Anor v Leck Ah Bah [2020] CLJU 1651; [2020] MLRAU 296, the 1st Defendant argued that it is not for the Plaintiffs to dictate the form and contents of the accounts. [17] In response, the Plaintiffs’ counsel critically dismantled these documents. It was noted that the ledger in Enclosure 19 was tendered in instalments and lacked primary source documents. Most devastating to the 1st Defendant's defence was the revelation regarding the Fixed Deposit accounts. The Plaintiffs highlighted that the Fixed Deposit purportedly providing distribution to the late Subramaniam was, in fact, opened in the joint names of three beneficiaries (the 1st Defendant, Subramaniam, and Ramasamy). [18] This Court finds the Plaintiffs’ position to be legally unassailable. This Court rejects the first Defendant’s submission. Under Section 62 of the PAA 1959, an administrator bears an imperative, non-delegable statutory obligation to exhibit a "true and perfect inventory and account". The Court of Appeal in Lek Eng Hock (supra) makes it abundantly clear that this fiduciary duty is continuous and subsists until the estate is fully wound up. The 1st Defendant’s admission that the ledgers were produced piecemeal and belatedly, coupled with the glaring failure to provide primary source documents such as bank statements and the actual Sale and Purchase Agreements, constitutes a flagrant breach of this statutory duty. The duty of an administrator to render accounts is a continuous, imperative fiduciary obligation that subsists until the estate is fully wound up. If the proceeds of the sale of PT 2978 had genuinely been distributed to the beneficiaries as their absolute individual entitlements as claimed by the 1st Defendant, the funds logically and legally ought to have been deposited into their respective individual accounts, not commingled in a joint Fixed Deposit account. A ledger and tax statements reflecting accrued income do not satisfy the rigorous requirements of a proper estate account. A proper (and, most crucially, detailed) statement of account must be rendered to provide a comprehensive reconciliation of all capital disbursements, including the exact distribution of legacies and the justification for all administrative expenditures. The 1st Defendant has failed to discharge his statutory burden. [19] Furthermore, this Court agrees with the Plaintiffs' oral submissions that the 1st Defendant is bound by a solemn testamentary undertaking under Order 71 Rule 33 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) to render a just and true account of his administration when lawfully required. If the 1st Defendant lacked the personal capability or accounting expertise to prepare these estate accounts, he is statutorily empowered under Section 28(1) of the Trustee Act 1949 to employ and pay an independent accountant to perform this duty. The ledger (by instalments) provided by the 1st Defendant, however, is devoid of the requisite granular detail, offering nothing more than rudimentary bookkeeping entries that fall short of a 'true and perfect' account. The 1st Defendant's failure to utilise this statutory mechanism further underscores a fundamental abdication of his fiduciary responsibilities. [20] During the hearing and in written submissions, the 1st Defendant fervently relied on the late Subramaniam’s LHDN (Income Tax) records. The 1st Defendant argued that these records demonstrated a sudden "influx of capital" in 2002 and 2003, thereby serving as conclusive proof that the late Subramaniam had received his share of the PT 2978 proceeds. During submissions, the 1st Defendant's counsel rhetorically questioned why the late Subramaniam would declare such a massive influx of capital to the tax authorities if he had not actually received the money. [21] This Court deems the 1st Defendant’s reliance on LHDN statements to be analytically fragile and evidentiary insufficient. The postulation of the 1st Defendant that if the late Subramaniam had not actually received the said money, why would he declare such a massive influx of capital to the tax authorities, does not persuade this Court. From a commercial and forensic accounting perspective, tax statements often reflect notional or accrued liabilities rather than the de facto physical receipt of funds. As astutely submitted by the Plaintiffs' counsel, tax statements are frequently generated based on accrued income or the mere execution of a Sale and Purchase Agreement for tax assessment purposes; they do not equate to the actual, physical receipt of distributed estate funds into a personal account. [22] Second, and more critically, the evidentiary record reveals a glaring omission by the 1st Defendant. While claiming the distribution occurred in 2002 and 2003 following the sale of PT 2978, the 1st Defendant conveniently failed to exhibit the late Subramaniam's LHDN statement for the pivotal year of 2003. The LHDN records produced (Exhibit C-16) merely reflect the Years of Assessment 2000 and 2001. It is a striking evidentiary inconsistency that the 1st Defendant preserved records from 1989 yet failed to produce the singular document pivotal to his defence for the year in which the money was allegedly distributed. [23] Equally illogical is the 1st Defendant's reliance on Fixed Deposit accounts opened in the joint names of three beneficiaries (the 1st Defendant, Subramaniam, and Ramasamy). If the proceeds of the sale of PT 2978 had genuinely been distributed as absolute individual entitlements, the funds legally ought to have been deposited into their respective individual accounts, not commingled. In view of the foregoing, it is demonstrably clear that the 1st Defendant has failed to discharge the rigorous statutory burden under Section 62 of the PAA 1959. [24] During oral submissions, the 1st Defendant's counsel audaciously argued that there was no need for the Court to order the production of an "inventory", contending that the Plaintiffs themselves had already exhibited a list of the estate's assets and liabilities in their own Affidavit in Support (Enclosure 2). [25] This Court firmly rejects this proposition. The statutory duty under Section 62 of PAA 1959 is a positive, non-delegable obligation placed squarely on the shoulders of the administrator. The 1st Defendant cannot absolve himself of this mandatory statutory duty by attempting to rely on a list of assets pieced together by the beneficiaries. The administrator himself must exhibit a formal, verified, and true inventory. [26] The Plaintiff also avers, of which this Court agree, that the Court has jurisdiction under Order 80 rule 2 and Order 80 rule 4 of ROC 2012 to order such inventory and account from the Defendants. Consequently, the 1st Defendant’s obligation as administrator to provide such an account is legally incontrovertible. The Defences of Limitation, Laches, and Acquiescence [27] The Defendants forcefully raised the defence of limitation under Section 23 of the Limitation Act 1953. The 1st Defendant's counsel advanced a highly persuasive argument, contending that the Plaintiffs deliberately filed an Originating Summons for 'accounts' rather than a Writ for 'unpaid monies' because a direct claim for the 2003 sale proceeds would be hopelessly time-barred. The 1st Defendant essentially accused the Plaintiffs of using the continuing duty to account as a backdoor to circumvent the Limitation Act. [28] The 1st Defendant further contended with considerable ingenuity that the Plaintiffs themselves had conceded in their written submissions (Enclosure 81) that the exemption under Section 22 of the Limitation Act 1953 does not apply, as the claim is not grounded on fraud. Therefore, without Section 22, the 12-year absolute bar under Section 23 must strictly defeat the claim. [29] This Court, while appreciating the ingenuity of the argument, cannot accept it. The statutory duty under Section 62 of the PAA 1959 is continuous. As established in Lek Eng Hock (supra), the fiduciary duty to render accounts subsists until the estate is completely wound up. A beneficiary is perfectly entitled in law to demand such accounts at any juncture before final distribution, and exercising this statutory right does not constitute an abuse of process nor an illicit circumvention of the Limitation Act. This Court holds that the defences of laches and limitation have no application against a beneficiary demanding an account from a trustee or administrator in respect of an uncompleted estate. [30] Furthermore, the argument regarding Section 23 completely misses the fundamental point of when the breach actually occurred. Following Nasri v Mesah [1970] CLJU 85, a cause of action founded on a contract accrues on the date of its breach. The Plaintiffs’ cause of action to enforce the 2001 Deed did not accrue in 2001. As evidenced by the chronological facts, the breach only crystallised when the 1st Defendant filed Originating Summons No. KA-24NCVC-115-04/2023 ("OS 115") in April 2023, seeking a distribution fundamentally contradictory to the 2001 Deed. Time only began to run from this explicit threat of infringement, placing the Plaintiffs' claim well within any applicable limitation period. [31] In pressing the equitable defence of laches and acquiescence, the 2nd Defendant relied on Thavamany P Vengadasalam & Ors v Jaya I N Gopan [2025] CLJU 2116 and Hassan Jamaludin & Anor v Saridah Ashaari & Ors [2022] 1 LNS 39, arguing that "delay defeats equity" due to the lapse of 24 years. The 1st Defendant’s counsel also emphasised that the late Subramaniam was alive for twenty years following the 2003 sale and never initiated any legal action. [32] This contention, while possessing a veneer of plausibility, fails to account for the nuanced dynamics of familial arrangements and the late Subramaniam's medical condition. The uncontroverted medical evidence confirms a firm diagnosis of schizophrenia in 2010. This severe mental impairment adequately explains his delay and inaction in proactively managing his affairs or litigating his rights. The Defendants are equitably precluded from leveraging the deceased’s documented psychiatric morbidity as a procedural shield to circumvent their own subsisting fiduciary obligations. [33] The law on the doctrine of laches is well established in the Court of Appeal case of Tung Kean Hin & Anor v Yuen Heng Phong [2019] 9 CLJ 493, whereby Hasnah Mohamed Hashim JCA (later, CJM) at para 37 held that: [37] For laches to be raised, there must be delay amounting to acquiescence (See: Cheah Kim Tong & Anor v. Taro Kaur [1989] 2 CLJ 791; [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 378; [1989] 3 MLJ 252; Foo Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Foo Choon Ying @ Foo Chun Yin (Executor for the Estate of Chen Choi Thai, The Deceased) [2013] 1 LNS 908 HC; Archibald v. Scully

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(1861) 9 HLC 360). The doctrine of laches is based on the maxim that "equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights." Lord Selborne succinctly explained in the landmark case of Lindsay Petroleum Co v. Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC 221: But in every case if an argument against relief which otherwise would be just is founded on mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any Statute of Limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are the length of the delay, and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other so far as relates to the remedy. [38] Edgar Joseph JR J in the case of Alfred Templeton & Ors v. Mount Pleasure Corp Sdn Bhd [1989] 1 CLJ 693; [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 219 explained the doctrine of laches: Laches is an equitable defence implying lapse of time and delay in prosecuting a claim. A Court of Equity refuses its aid to a stale demand where the plaintiff has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. He is then said to be barred by laches. In determining whether there has been such a delay as to amount to laches the court considers whether there has been acquiescence on the plaintiff's part and any change of position that has occurred on the part of the defendant. The doctrine of laches rests on the consideration that it is unjust to give a plaintiff a remedy where he has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though not waiving the remedy, put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted: 14 Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Ed) paras 1181, 1182. Laches has been succinctly described as 'inaction with one eye’s open.'” [Emphasis added] [34] During oral submissions, the 2nd Defendant vigorously pressed the equitable defence of laches, emphasising that four of the six original family members involved in the 2001 Deed—namely, her mother, Letchimee, Ramasamy, and Subramaniam—are now deceased. Relying on Thavamany (supra), the 2nd Defendant argued that it is highly prejudicial to litigate a 24-year-old family arrangement when the key witnesses are no longer alive to testify. [35] This Court, while sympathetic to the evidentiary challenges posed by the passage of time, finds that this does not assist the Defendants. The Plaintiffs' claim is primarily grounded in documentary evidence—the written 2001 Deed—which remains intact and unchallenged as executed. More importantly, this present action is brought against the 1st Defendant strictly in his capacity as the lawful administrator of the Deceased's estate. The statutory duty to render a true and perfect inventory and account under Section 62 of PAA 1959 is a continuous, non-delegable obligation that falls squarely and solely upon the administrator until the estate is fully wound up. [36] Therefore, the passing of the other beneficiaries has absolutely no bearing on the 1st Defendant's continuing statutory and fiduciary duties to the estate. Furthermore, as established earlier, the actionable breach occurred only in 2023, when OS 115 was filed. The Plaintiffs cannot be faulted or penalised under the doctrine of laches for not commencing an action while the other family members were alive, because before 2023, there was no breach or threat of infringement to sue upon. [37] Furthermore, the 2nd Defendant attempted to exploit the Medical Report to void the 2001 Deed altogether, arguing that because the Medical Report noted the late Subramaniam exhibited symptoms of schizophrenia as early as 1985, he lacked the mental capacity to execute the Deed in 2001. [38] This Court finds the 2nd Defendant’s argument to be strategically opportunistic and diametrically opposed to the Defendants’ own evidentiary narrative and record. During the hearing, it was highlighted that the 1st Defendant's own affidavits demonstrated that the late Subramaniam had subsequently executed a tenancy agreement and wrote to AIA Insurance in 2011 to manage his policies. [39] It is utterly inconsistent and self-defeating for the Defendants to rely on commercial documents executed by the deceased in 2011 to prove he was actively managing his affairs, while simultaneously arguing he was incapacitated in 2001 to void a Deed they now find inconvenient. The 2010 firm diagnosis merely explains the Plaintiffs' subsequent delay in taking legal action. Still, it falls far short of proving legal incapacity at the time of the Deed's execution in 2001. Issue 2: Validity and Enforceability of the 2001 Deed of Distribution [40] Via this OS, the Plaintiffs seek to enforce the 2001 Deeds, which exclude all the female beneficiaries, including D2, from the land titles. In support of their application, the Plaintiffs submitted that 2nd Defendant had already received RM200,000-00 to relinquish her rights over the said land distribution, and further RM102,179-00 thereafter. Hence, the doctrine of approbate and reprobate applies; the 2nd Defendant cannot take the agreed-upon money from the deed but later claim the Deed is void. The Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the 2nd Defendant’s assertion that the 2001 Deed is void ab initio is merely an afterthought. [41] The 2nd Defendant mounted a multi-pronged, albeit inconsistent, attack on the 2001 Deed. The 2nd Defendant adopted a shifting stance: she first claimed the Deed was merely "flexible", then argued it was void ab initio, then claimed the proceedings were defective, and finally alleged the late Subramaniam lacked mental capacity. [42] The 2nd Defendant heavily relied on the Federal Court decision in Chor Phaik Har v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 MLRA 566 and the Court of Appeal decision in Lim Sok Wah v Lim Boon Cheow [2021] 6 MLRA 722, arguing that the 2001 Deed is void ab initio because beneficiaries cannot contract out of their entitlements under the Distribution Act 1958 before the letters of administration are obtained. [43] In response, the Plaintiff refers to the case of Ch’ng Cheng Siew v Pemungut Duti Setem [2016] 1 CLJ 724 to support the validity of beneficiaries' renunciation of their rights under a deed of family arrangement, as permitted under the Distribution Act 1958, thereby causing the estate to devolve to the remaining beneficiaries by operation of law. [44] The 2nd Defendant vigorously attempted to distinguish the application of the Court of Appeal's decision in Ch’ng Cheng Siew (supra). The 2nd Defendant argued that, in Ch'ng Cheng Siew, the deed of family arrangement was executed either after the letters of administration were obtained or by a subsequent court order. In contrast, the 2001 Deed in this present case was signed before the grant of representation was issued. The 2nd Defendant further argued that the 2001 Deed was invalid because it was merely a "bare agreement" lacking a specific, itemised list of assets. [45] The Plaintiff rebutted this by citing the Federal Court case of Chor Phaik Har (supra), which established that a beneficiary of an intestate estate does not have an interest in the property until the distribution has been finalised. In the case, Mohamed Dzaiddin FCJ (later, CJ) held:- “[14] Based on the above commentaries, founded no doubt on the analogous principle of law concerning testate succession, it is our conclusion that in law a beneficiary under an intestacy has no interest or property in the personal estate of a deceased person until the administration of the latter's estate is complete and distribution made according to the law of distribution of the intestate estate.” [Emphasis added] [46] This Court considers these distinctions to be legally tenuous. The statutory entitlement of a beneficiary under the Distribution Act 1958 vests eo instanti upon the death of the intestate. A beneficiary is perfectly entitled to renounce this vested interest at any time, even before an administrator is formally appointed by the Court or before the grant of a letter of administration is issued. Upon such renunciation, their interest devolves to the remaining beneficiaries by operation of law. Furthermore, the absence of an itemised asset list does not render the 2001 Deed a "bare agreement", as the intention of the female beneficiaries to unconditionally relinquish all rights to the deceased's estate in exchange for RM200,000.00 was unequivocally clear, acted upon, and the consideration fully paid. The 2001 Deed functions as a conclusive and indefeasible instrument of renunciation, having been ratified by the conduct of the parties and the passing of valid consideration. [47] Relying on Ch’ng Cheng Siew (supra), this Court holds that beneficiaries are perfectly entitled in law to renounce their entitlements under the Distribution Act 1958 even before the administration is complete. Upon such renunciation, the relinquished shares devolve to the remaining beneficiaries by operation of law. [48] The 2nd Defendant alternatively alleged that the 2001 Deed was varied by an oral agreement, supposedly evidenced by an extra gratuitous payment. This contention faces an insurmountable statutory hurdle. By virtue of Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act 1950, oral evidence is strictly inadmissible to contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the express written terms of the 2001 Deed. [49] Most detrimentally to the 2nd Defendant's case, the evidentiary record undeniably proves that she accepted the RM200,000.00 consideration stipulated in the 2001 Deed, along with an additional gratuitous payment of RM102,179.00. The doctrine of approbate and reprobate—often described as the equitable doctrine of election—applies here with clinical precision. As established in Kathryn Ma Wai Fong v Wong Kie Chie & Anor [2025] 1 CLJ 187, a party cannot accept the benefits of a transaction and subsequently turn around to assert that the very same transaction is void to secure another advantage. Having reaped the financial benefits of relinquishing her rights, D2 is unequivocally estopped from challenging the validity of the Deed of Distribution. Equity will not permit a party to blow hot and cold—to accept the fruit of a settlement while simultaneously hacking at its roots. Having elected to receive the consideration, the 2nd Defendant cannot now impeach the very instrument that provided it to secure an additional, inconsistent advantage. [50] For completeness, this Court must address the severe allegations raised by the 2nd Defendant regarding the Plaintiffs' conduct. Relying on the case of Gandahan Sdn Bhd v. Gigatech Engineering Sdn Bhd [2021] MLRHU 2225, the 2nd Defendant vehemently accused the Plaintiffs of approaching the Court without "clean hands," alleging mala fide suppression of the 2023 ex parte Mental Health Order and falsely fabricating evidence. [51] This Court finds these allegations to be entirely baseless and an unsubstantiated attempt to obscure the core legal issues. The 2023 Mental Health Order was obtained lawfully to manage the late Subramaniam's affairs after he became incapacitated, and its belated introduction was strictly to rebut the Defendants' own defence of laches. The Plaintiffs' conduct does not amount to suppression of material facts, nor does it run afoul of the Penal Code. Such assertions are irrelevant to the contractual validity of the 2001 Deed and are unequivocally dismissed. Issue 3: The Non-Joinder of Parties [52] Finally, a heavy point of contention raised by the 1st Defendant during oral submissions was the non-joinder of parties. Relying on the High Court decision in TCB Mining Sdn Bhd v Naam Sdn Bhd [2025] CLJU 1975: [2025] MLRHU 1691, the 1st Defendant's counsel argued that the Plaintiffs' failure to join Letchimee (who also relinquished her rights under the 2001 Deed) or the estate of Ramasamy was fatal to the proceedings, as it purportedly violated the rules of natural justice. [53] This Court firmly rejects this objection. As accurately countered by the Plaintiffs' counsel, the Defendants' reliance on TCB Mining (supra) is entirely misplaced in the specific context of estate administration. The procedural mandate for estate disputes is strictly governed by Order 15, Rule 14 of ROC 2012. This rule expressly provides that an action concerning an estate may be brought against an administrator without joining the beneficiaries, as the administrator sufficiently represents the estate. [54] In the present case, the 1st Defendant, as the lawful administrator, adequately represents the estate. This Court is fully satisfied that all necessary interests are sufficiently represented to make a final, binding determination without offending the rules of natural justice. [55] During the hearing and in written submissions, the 2nd Defendant also submitted that a Declaratory Order cannot be granted if it binds absent parties, citing the decisions in Khaw Poh Chhuan v Ng Gaik Peng & Yap Wan Chuan & Ors [1996] 1 MLRA i and Soo Hoi Ling & Ors v Khoh Keow Bok & Ors [2019] MLRHU 20. [56] This Court is not persuaded. The authorities cited by the 2nd Defendant deal with general civil disputes and the lack of a cause of action against assignees, which are factually distinguishable from the specific administration of an intestate estate. The procedural mandate here is strictly governed by Order 15, Rule 14 of ROC 2012, which expressly provides that an action concerning an estate may be brought against an administrator without joining the beneficiaries. [57] In further oral submissions, the 2nd Defendant relied on the Supreme Court decision in Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697, asserting that a declaratory relief cannot be granted if it directly affects the position of a party who has been denied the opportunity to be heard. [58] This Court has scrutinised the said Supreme Court decision and finds that the 2nd Defendant has blatantly misread and misrepresented the ratio decidendi of the case. In Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan (supra), the Supreme Court actually rejected the very argument advanced by the 2nd Defendant here. The Supreme Court upheld the granting of a declaratory order despite the absence of directly affected parties, because their interests were being actively defended by the parties who were present in court. [59] Delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court, Edgar Joseph Jr SCJ (citing the Privy Council) authoritatively held at page 724: "...there had never been any unqualified rule of practice that forbade the making of a declaration even when some of the persons interested in the subject of the declaration were not before the court. Where... the trial judge took the view that the interested parties not represented were in reality fighting the suit, so to say, from behind the hedge, there was no principle of law which disentitled the judge from making a declaration..." [Emphasis added] [60] This Supreme Court pronouncement squarely defeats the 2nd Defendant's preliminary objection. As established, the evidentiary record indisputably demonstrates that Letchimee’s rights and interests under the 2001 Deed are factually and legally identical to those of the 2nd Defendant. Under the preamble of the 2001 Deed of Distribution, both the 2nd Defendant and Letchimee are grouped and collectively defined as "the second party". Under the express terms of the Deed, both female beneficiaries agreed to completely renounce their rights to the deceased's estate in consideration of an identical sum of RM200,000.00 each. The evidence further confirms that both subsequently received RM200,000.00 in consideration, along with identical additional payments. [61] Given that their factual matrix and legal interests under the 2001 Deed are entirely congruent, Letchimee’s position is mutatis mutandis identical to that of the 2nd Defendant. The 2nd Defendant has actively intervened in these proceedings and fiercely litigated to challenge the validity of the 2001 Deed to protect her share. Consequently, every legal and factual argument that could conceivably be raised to protect Letchimee's interests has already been vigorously canvassed before this Court by the 2nd Defendant. [62] Therefore, relying on the very Supreme Court authority cited by the 2nd Defendant herself, no principle of law or breach of natural justice disentitles this Court from exercising its discretion to grant the declaratory reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs in Letchimee's absence. The Court is satisfied that the 'hedge' principle—whereby an absent party's interests are effectively litigated by a proxy with identical interests—negates any concerns regarding the denial of audi alteram partem. [63] Moreover, this Court finds that the 2nd Defendant's reliance on this authority is misplaced. As mentioned earlier, the present case concerns the specific administration of an estate, which is strictly governed by the procedural mechanism of Order 15 Rule 14 of ROC