1. ) Newara Sdn Bhd v Johor Land Berhad (JA-22NCvC-214-12/2019)

NEWARA SDN. BHD. 10

LIM LIN LI

YESS COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMEN SDN. BHD.

PAU GEOK TOR

CHEW KHENG POH

CHUA LIAN KHIM 25

SEOW FOOK SIONG

SIOW SOOK CHAN

CHONG WUI LEANG

LAI SEE MEN

PAU YEK MUI 40 (KP NO: 630405-01-6120) 17/08/2022 14:34:59

PAU TIAM PENG

LEONG CHIN LING 5 (KP NO: 850622-14-5492) …PLAINTIFFS AND 10 JOHOR LAND BERHAD (NO. SYARIKAT: 12379-K) …DEFENDANT 15 HEARD TOGETHER WITH MALAYSIA IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT JOHOR BAHRU IN THE STATE OF JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM 20 CASE NO. JA-22NCVC-170-11/2020

NEWARA SDN. BHD. 25

LIM LIN LI

YESS COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMEN SDN. BHD.

PAU GEOK TOR

CHEW KHENG POH (KP NO: 711116-01-5265) Page 3 of 10 MTJB-JA-22NCVC-214-12/2019/NSB/az/r178 6. CHUA LIAN KHIM

SEOW FOOK SIONG

SIOW SOOK CHAN

CHONG WUI LEANG 10

LAI SEE MEN

PAU YEK MUI

PAU TIAM PENG

LEONG CHIN LING (KP NO: 850622-14-5492) …PLAINTIFFS 25 AND PERBADANAN JOHOR …DEFENDANT 30 JUDGMENT (Enclosure 27) [1] This appeal arose out of my ruling to disallow the application by the 35 plaintiffs in enclosure 27 for summary judgment under O14 ROC 2012. In my considered view taken under advisement, the ruling I made is not a decision which finally disposes the rights of the parties herein and ergo not appealable. My reasons are as follows. Page 4 of 10 The Law [2] In the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (Act 91) it is stated: “Section 3 - 5 “decision” means judgment, sentence or order, but does not include any ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause or matter which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties;” [3] The Malaysian Civil Procedure (White Book) 2018 edition states: 10 “ “decision”—The definition must be given its ordinary and natural meaning: Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v PP [2011] 5 AMR 11 at 28, CA, per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA. The definition was applied in an action under s 226(3) of the Companies Act 1965 to determine whether leave 15 of the winding-up court is mandatory (Mechanalysis Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) v Appraisal Property Management Sdn Bhd [2017] 3 MLRH 98, HC). A decision must have the effect of finally disposing of the rights of the 20 parties: Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v PP [1999] 1 AMR 846 at 853; [1999] 1 MLJ 321 at 326, CA, per Lamin PCA; Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim & Anor v PP [2000] 3 AMR 2899; [2000] 3 MLJ 638, CA; Kee Yeh Maritime Co Ltd v Coastal Shipping Sdn Bhd [2000] 4 AMR 4190, HC; Richard Teoh Poh Keong Sdn Bhd v Shinhan Engineering & Construction Co 25 Ltd [2001] 2 AMR 1782; [2001] 2 MLJ 50, HC; Thong Guan Construction Sdn Bhd v Shencourt Properties Sdn Bhd [2001] 2 AMR 1515, HC; Re Abu Bakar b PC Kuaya; ex parte Navaratnam a/l Sivasamboo [2002] 2 AMR 1293; [2002] 7 MLJ 528, HC; Letchumanan a/l Suppiah v PP (and Another Appeal) [2010] 1 AMR 657; [2009] 5 MLJ 597, FC; PP v Dato’ 30 Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim (and Another Appeal) [2010] 3 AMR 1; [2010] 2 MLJ 353, CA; Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v PP [2010] 4 AMR 292; Page 5 of 10 [2010] 6 MLJ 585, FC; Malaysia British Assurance Berhad v Chung Choi Yoke [2003] 4 AMR 124, HC; EON Bank Berhad (dahulu dikenali sebagai Oriental Bank Berhad yang mana EON Bank Berhad telah mengambilalih hak dan liabiliti Oriental Bank Berhad menurut Perintah bertarikh 5.12.2000) v BH Steel Sdn Bhd (dahulunya dikenali sebagai 5 Vest Hong Enterprise Sdn Bhd) (Guan Seng Steel Sdn Bhd– Intervener) [2005] 2 AMR 335, HC; [2005] 2 MLJ 753, HC; Chong Su Kong & Ors v Sia Hiong Tee & Ors (Messrs Johari & Zalika, third party) [2013] 10 MLJ 317, HC; John Willibrod Concisom a/l Willie Brod v PP [2014] 2 MLJ 284, HC; PP v Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim [2014] 4 10 MLJ 495; [2014] 4 MLRA 97, FC; Christopher ak Bandi @ Josay v Tumbung ak Nakis & Anor (Jamil bin Sindi, third party) [2015] 11 MLJ 597, HC; Hong Leong Bank Berhad v PP [2016] 5 AMR 497; [2016] 5 MLJ 450; [2017] 3 MLRA 115, CA; Norhazeni b Ahmad v PP [2017] 1 AMR 555, HC. A “decision” is said to be final if in effect it has determined 15 the principal matter before the court thereby concluding the main dispute. Consequently, it does not require further hearing or decision of the case to be made by the court on the whole of the proceedings (Tetuan J&S Holdings Sdn Bhd v A Karim bin Hasan & Anor [2001] 1 AMR 79 at 91; [2000] 6 MLJ 739 at 747, HC, per VT Singham J). For 20 example, a judgment from a striking-out application (Sitrac Corporation Sdn Bhd v Lim Siew Eng (p) [2002] 3 AMR 3748; [2002] 3 MLJ 315, HC; Samsudin bin Ismail & 4 Ors v Yeoh Oon Theam (sebagai pentadbir harta pesaka Lim Mah Ee @ Baba Mahee, simati) & 3 Ors (and Another Suit) [2003] 6 AMR 201; [2003] 6 MLJ 596, HC; PP v Utrakumaran a/l 25 Samivel [2007] 1 MLJ 529, HC) or a summary judgment application (Alexander John Shek Kwok Bun v WAB Keluarga Realty Sdn Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 570, HC; Seabance Ge Capital Sdn Bhd v Dynabuilders Sdn Bhd dan satu lagi [2002] 5 MLJ 152, HC; Malaysia British Assurance Berhad v Chung Choi Yoke [2003] 4 AMR 124, 30 HC; MBf Factors Sdn Bhd v Keh Hua t/a Jag Trading [2004] 4 AMR 22, HC; Ahmad Hashim v Tetuan Johari, Nasri & Tan [2013] 2 MLRA 14, CA) or judicial review application (Ringgit Exoticka Sdn Bhd v Pengarah Tanah & Galian Selangor & Ors [2014] 8 MLJ 111, HC) or a decision on Page 6 of 10 the reduction of a charge (PP v Tang Kheng Teong & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 637, CA) or where the judge recuses himself on his own motion without giving the parties an opportunity to address him (Wong Kie Chie & Ors v Kathryn Ma Wait Fong (as the personal representative, executrix and trustee of the estate of the late Wong Kie Nai) & Anor and other appeals 5 [2017] 3 MLJ 350, CA) is a “decision” which is appealable. It is clear from the definition that it has the intention of excluding decisions in interlocutory appeals made in a pending suit. Examples would be a decision from a bail application (Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v 10 PP [1999] 1 AMR 846, CA) or from a preliminary objection depending on the facts of the case (Tetuan J & S Holdings Sdn Bhd v A Karim bin Hasan & Anor [2001] 1 AMR 79, HC; Haris Fathillah Mohd Ibrahim v PP [2016] 3 MLRA 433, CA; c.f. Perak Hanjoong Simen Sdn Bhd v Perindustrian Tenaga Mix Sdn Bhd [2009] 3 AMR 270; [2008] 8 MLJ 15 567, HC) or from a ruling of the court (Takang Timber Sdn Bhd v Syarikat Tingan Lumber Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 AMR 4974, HC; Teo Kim Huatt v Aetna Universal Insurance Berhad (No 1) [2002] 2 AMR 2242, HC; Drilltech Oilfield Services Ltd & Anor v Witech Sdn Bhd [2003] 6 MLJ 650, HC; Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v PP [2011] 4 AMR 201, CA; Santeran a/l 20 Arumugam & Anor v PP [2015] 3 AMR 600, HC; PP v Datuk Hj Wasli bin Mohd Said [2015] 3 MLJ 35; [2014] 3 MLRA 487, CA; PP v Jarau Anak Kerukar & Ors [2015] 4 MLRA 88, CA; Tiong Kiong Choon v PP (and 2 Other Appeals) [2016] 4 AMR 858; [2016] 5 MLJ 233, CA; Pentadbir Tanah Kuala Selangor v Maybank Islamic Berhad; Menteri Besar 25 Selangor (Pemerbadanan) (Pencelah) & Lain-Lain Rayuan [2016] 1 MLRA 163, CA) or from that of an Election Judge (Yong Teck Lee v Harris Mohd Salleh & Anor [2002] 3 AMR 2752 at 2768, CA, per Abdul Hamid Mohamad JCA; Datuk Seri Tiong King Sing v Datuk Seri Ong Tee Keat & Anor [2014] 6 AMR 179; [2015] 1 MLJ 847, CA, where Azahar 30 Mohamed JCA followed the decision in Syarikat Tingan Lumber Sdn Bhd v Takang Timber Sdn Bhd [2003] 3 AMR 13; [2003] 2 MLJ 495, CA; Ahmad Zubair @ Ahmad Zubir bin Hj Murshid v PP [2015] 1 AMR 105; [2014] 6 MLJ 831; [2014] 6 MLRA 269, FC) or a ruling of the trial Page 7 of 10 judge in refusing to recuse himself from hearing or continuing to hear the trial (Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v PP [2011] 5 MLJ 535, CA) or an order of transmission by a Magistrate under s 41A of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (Act 234) (PP v Punanesvaran a/l Kesavan (and 3 Other Cases) [2007] 5 AMR 702; [2007] 3 MLJ 203, HC) or a finding on prima 5 facie case against a defendant at the end of the prosecution’s case (Saad bin Abas & Anor v PP [1999] 1 MLJ 129, CA; Lim Hung Wang & Ors v PP [2011] 9 MLJ 752, HC; Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v PP [2012] 5 MLJ 293; [2012] 4 MLRA 511, FC; PP v Hii Tiong Hsia & Anor [2015] 2 AMR 673, CA) or a discharge order not amounting to an acquittal (PP 10 v Tiong King Guan & Anor [2015] 2 AMR 742; [2015] 4 MLJ 235; [2015] 3 MLRA 180, CA) or an extension of time granted by the registrar to a bidder to offer his bid in a public auction (EON Bank Berhad (dahulu dikenali sebagai Oriental Bank Berhad yang mana EON Bank Berhad telah mengambil alih hak dan liabiliti Oriental Bank Berhad menurut 15 Perintah bertarikh 5.12.2000) v BH Steel Sdn Bhd (dahulunya dikenali sebagai Vest Hong Enterprise Sdn Bhd) (Guan Seng Steel Sdn Bhd– Intervener) [2005] 2 AMR 335; [2005] 2 MLJ 753, HC) or issuance of notice under s 61 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 (Act 613) (Azmi bin Osman v PP (and Another 20 Appeal) [2016] 2 AMR 597; [2016] 3 MLJ 98, CA) or a decision on an application to amend the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim (Christopher ak Bandi @ Josny v Tumbung ak Nakis @ Anor (Jamil bin Sindi, third party) [2016] 4 MLJ 100, CA).” 25 [4] In the fairly recent case of Asia Pacific Higher Learning Sdn Bhd (registered owner and licensee of the higher learning institution Lincoln University College) v. Majlis Perubatan Malaysia & Anor [2020] 2 MLJ 1 the Federal Court, speaking through YAA Azahar Mohamed CJM, held as follows: 30 Page 8 of 10 “The right to appeal in civil matters under s 67 of the CJA is subject to the definition of ‘decision’ as found in s 3 of the CJA. Although s 67(1) of the CJA provides that the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to determine appeals from any ‘judgment’ or ‘order’ of any High Court in civil matters, it is clear from a plain reading of s 3 of the CJA that a ‘decision’, 5 ‘judgment’ or ‘order’ excludes a ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing that does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. Further, the Federal Court in Kempadang’s case held that it was clear and unambiguous that the definition of ‘decision’ as per s 3 was applicable to civil appeals inasmuch as it applied to criminal appeals. Hence, the 10 uncertainty on whether s 3 applied to civil appeals in the absence of the word ‘decision’ in s 67(1) has been laid to rest in Kempadang’s case where the Federal Court held that the principles underlying the application of s 3 in criminal appeals were applicable in civil appeals. The decision is a clear authority to support the proposition that s 67(1) 15 read with s 3 and s 68(1) of the CJA precluded a litigant’s right of appeal against a High Court decision in an amendment application made in the course of trial that does not finally dispose of the rights of parties. Otherwise, it would allow parties in civil matters to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the definition of ‘decision’ in s 3 of the CJA and 20 thereby appeal against every decision of trial court, which would indisputably delay the administration of justice. At the same time it is important to realise that reading s 68 with s 3 of the CJA to limit the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to hear and determine civil appeals would accord with the constitutionally entrenched principle that the Court 25 of Appeal’s jurisdiction is intended to be narrowly defined. As such, the reason for reading the additional exclusion to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal is within the four corners of the Act in the form of the definitions of ‘decision’, ‘cause’, ‘matter’, ‘action’ and ‘proceeding’ as well as the presence of the words ‘judgment’ and ‘order’ in the definition of ‘decision’ 30 and ss 67-68 of the Act. On the other hand, declining to read s 3 as instilling an additional exclusion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal would offend the rule that permits additional words to be read Page 9 of 10 into statutory provisions to prevent an absurdity from resulting. As such, the decision made by the High Court in the amendment application was not appealable. Since the decision of the High Court in the amendment application was not appealable, the defendants’ appeal against the decision of the High Court was incompetent and not properly brought 5 before the Court of Appeal. Therefore, the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal and it committed a jurisdictional error when it heard the appeal.” [5] Therefore, based on the matters adumbrated and discussed above, 10 the plaintiffs’ appeal is misplaced and incompetent as the ruling to disallow summary judgment under O14 ROC 2012 is not a final decision which is appealable. The matter will be fixed for trial where a final decision will be rendered which can then be appealed. In this instance I have only made a ruling to say that I found there to be triable issues which needs to be 15 heard at the trial proper and not disposed off summarily. I did not make any decision on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim. [6] Ergo cadit quaestio. 20 Dated 17th August, 2022 -Signed- ………………………… 25 ASLAM B ZAINUDDIN Judge High Court in Malaya Johor Bahru 30 Page 10 of 10 Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Datuk Dr. Clarence Edwin (R Paramanandan with him) Messrs. Clarence Edwin Law Offices 5 Advocates & Solicitors No. 112 Jalan Keris Taman Sri Tebrau 80050 Johor Bahru [2019/6881/CE/dy] 10 Counsel for the Respondent: Rohana Ngah 15 (Zainursyazwani Zakaria with her)