1. Niro Ceramic Sales & Services (M) Sdn. Bhd. v 1. Low Chin Guan (22NCVC-695-11/2017)

NIRO CERAMIC SALES & SERVICES (M) SDN. BHD.

NIRO CERAMIC (M) SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 16869-M) ... PLAINTIFFS

LOW CHIN GUAN

LEE HUI MENG

DONGPENG MALAYSIA SDN. BHD.

FURGO CERAMICHE SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 1200756-P) … DEFENDANTS BEFORE Y.A. TUAN GUNALAN A/L MUNIANDY JUDGE, HIGH COURT Page 2 of 29 GROUNDS OF DECISION [1] This is an application (Enclosure 5) by the Plaintiffs in this civil action for an interim injunction to restrain the Defendants (‘D1 – D4’) from doing various acts and an order directing D1 – D4 to deliver up to the Plaintiffs various documents purportedly containing confidential information and trade secrets obtained from the latter whether directly or indirectly. Grounds of Application [2] The grounds in support of Enclosure 5 are, inter alia, these:

D1 and D2 are former employees of the Plaintiffs.

Each of D1 and D2 owes Contractual Duties, Duty of Fidelity, Fiduciary Duties, Duty of Confidence and Statutory Duties to the Plaintiffs.

Without the knowledge nor approval of the Plaintiffs, D1 and D2 caused the incorporation of D3 (Dongpeng Malaysia Sdn. Bhd.) and D4 to market, sell and distribute tiles in competition with the marketing, sales and distribution of NIRO Tiles by the Plaintiffs. Page 3 of 29 At all material times, D1 was the person behind and in control of D3 and D4.

There are bone fide serious issues to be determined in this action.

There is strong prima facie evidence in favour of the Plaintiffs against the Defendants and there is a valid cause of action.

Any monetary award is not an adequate remedy if the Plaintiffs succeed in their claim.

The balance of convenience weighs in favour of the Plaintiffs being granted the injunction. The Material Facts [3] The background facts to the present claim are well summarised in the Plaintiff’s Written Submission as follows: “The Plaintiffs (‘P1 and P2 respectively: Ps collectively’) are members of the Niro Ceramic Group of Companies. P1 is in the business of marketing, sales and distribution of ceramic tiles (‘NIRO Tiles’) manufactured by P2. Page 4 of 29 The Defendants (‘D1, D2, D3 and D4 respectively; Ds collectively’):

D1 and D2 were employees of the Ps.

From 23.11.2009 until his termination on 27.11.2017, D1 held the position of General Manager – Domestic Sales Division and headed that division comprised of 37 subordinates.

Until his resignation on 31.1.2017, D2 held the position of Sales Manager – Project. He was first employed on 1.2.2002.

D3 and D3 are companies incorporated by D1 to sell Dongpeng Tiles manufactured by Dongpeng Holdings Company Ltd. of China. The Plaintiffs’ Claim

The claim against D1 and D2 arose from their breaches of Contractual Duties, Duty of Fidelity, Fiduciary Duties, Duty of Confidence and Statutory Duties. Page 5 of 29

The Ps also claim against D1 for Tort of Inducement of Breach of Contract and/or Fiduciary Duties.

As regards D3 and D4, they are but a façade or an alter ego of D1. Hence, the Ps seek a declaration to that effect.

As against D2, D3 and D4, Ps have also pleaded a claim for Dishonest Assistance; and against all Ds, Tort of Unlawful Interference and Tort of Conspiracy.” Principles Applicable To Interim Injunctions [4] American Cynamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd. [1975] 1 AUER 504 is the leading authority on this aspect of the law where the House of Lords enunciated the guiding principles for the granting of interlocutory injunctions which have been adopted by the Malaysian Courts time and again. [5] In Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor @ Harun bin Abdullah & 2 Ors. [1995] 1 MLJ 193 the Court of Appeal in adopting American Cynamid Co. (supra) laid down the principles as to the approach that the Court should adopt in deciding an application for an interim injunction as follows: Page 6 of 29 “To summarize, a judge hearing an application for an interlocutory injunction should undertake an inquiry along the following lines:

he must ask himself whether the totality of the facts presented before him discloses a bona fide serious issue to be tried. He must, when considering this question, bear in mind that the pleadings and evidence are incomplete at that stage. Above all, he must refrain from making any determination on the merits of the claim or any defence to it. It is sufficient if he identifies with precision the issues raised on the joinder and decides whether these are serious enough to merit a trial. If he finds, upon a consideration of all the relevant material before him, including submissions of counsel, that no serious question is disclosed, that is an end of the matter and the relief is refused. On the other hand if he does find that there are serious questions to be tried, he should move on to the next step of his inquiry;

having found that an issue has been disclosed that requires further investigation, he must consider where the justice of the case lies. In making his assessment, he must take into Page 7 of 29 account all relevant matters, including the practical realities of the case before him. He must weigh the harm that the injunction would produce by its grant against the harm that would result from its refusal. He is entitled to take into account, inter alia, the relative financial standing of the litigants before him. If after weighing all matters, he comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff would suffer greater injustice if relief is withheld, then he would be entitled to grant the injunction especially if he is satisfied that the plaintiff is in a financial position to meet his undertaking in damages. Similarly, if he concludes that the defendant would suffer the greater injustice by the grant of an injunction, he would be entitled to refuse relief. Of course, cases may arise where the injustice to the plaintiff is so manifest that the judge would be entitled to dispense with the usual undertaking as to damages (see Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90). Apart from such cases, the judge is entitled to take into account the plaintiff's ability to meet his undertaking in damages should the suit fail, and, in Page 8 of 29 appropriate cases, may require the plaintiff to secure his undertaking, for example, by providing a bank guarantee; and

the judge must have in the forefront of his mind that the remedy that he is asked to administer is discretionary, intended to produce a just result for the period between the date of the application and the trial proper and intended to maintain the status quo, an expression explained by Lord Diplock in Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130; [1983] 2 All ER 770; [1983] 3 WLR 143 and applied in Cheng Hang Guan. It is a judicial discretion capable of correction on appeal. Accordingly, the judge would be entitled to take into account all discretionary considerations, such as delay in the making of the application or any adequate alternative remedy that would satisfy the plaintiff's equity, such as an award of monetary compensation in the event that he succeeds in establishing his claim at the trial. Any question going to the public interest may, and in appropriate cases should, be taken into account. A judge should briefly set out in his judgment the several factors that weighed in his mind when arriving at his conclusion. Page 9 of 29 It is with these matters in mind that we now return to the case at hand and examine the reasons given by the learned judge for setting aside the injunction.” D1’s Contention [6] As against the Plaintiff’s allegation that the documents in the Schedule annexed to Enclosure 5, D1’s defence was that when the documents in the Schedule were handed to employees of the Plaintiffs (including the 1st Defendant), there was no classification that such documents contained confidential information or trade secret. D1 also specifically averred that two senior managers who resigned from the Plaintiffs and had access to the same documents were never asked to return the documents in their possession when Plaintiffs knew at that time that the two senior managers were going to join the competitors of the Plaintiffs. This fact was never denied by the Plaintiff. [7] These documents were said to have been retracted from the Court records and hidden by the Plaintiff but if the same had been disclosed, they would have revealed that the information is readily available in the public domain and obtainable by subscribing to or purchasing from a trade Page 10 of 29 information service provider or by googling and following up with phone calls. In any event, not an iota of evidence was adduced by the Plaintiffs showing that D1 had utilized the information after he was fired or terminated by the Plaintiffs from their employment. [8] The Plaintiffs’ allegation of breach of confidential information and disclosure of trade secrets was a blatant attempt at restraint of trade and to prevent healthy competition in the market. In support of this contention, D1 cited the Court of Appeal case of the Ganesh Raja a/l Nagaiah & Ors v NR Rubber Industries Sdn. Bhd. [2017] 2 MLJ 396 (CA), where the Court of Appeal ruled as follows: “Held:

The respondent’s prayers did not identify the nature of the information which the respondent sought to seek injunction. The prayers were too wide and sufficient to impinge with the doctrine of restraint of trade (see paras 2 & 16).

The customers, suppliers and forwarders’ list together with their contact numbers must be established to be information of confidential nature. Even access to the information in the company must have been limited only to certain persons. General Page 11 of 29 information available to all employees or public could not per se attract the doctrine of confidentiality.” [9] Also to the Federal Court case of Dynacast (Melaka) Sdn. Bhd. v Vision Cast Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. [2016] 3 MLJ 417 where it was pronounced, inter alia, that: “And on the use of the doctrine of confidential information by employers, the need for a clear case before its invocation and the harmful effects of its abuse, Scott J. in Balston Ltd. v Headline Filters Ltd. (1987) F.R.S 330 at page 351 had this to say: ‘This case is, in my view, yet another example of an attempt by an employer to use doctrine of confidential information to place fetters on the ability of ex-employees to complete.” [10] D1, next contended that the Plaintiffs’ prayers 1(c), 1(d) and 1(e) are an attempt to obtain what the Plaintiffs are not able to obtain by contract because such terms, if placed in a contract will be against Section 28 of the Contracts Act 1950 that renders any provision restraining trade or competition as void. Page 12 of 29 [11] As such, in the context of D1’s termination from the Plaintiffs’ employment, any attempt to restrain D1 from utilizing the knowledge and skills that he obtained during his years of employment with Plaintiffs in the tiles trading industry will be denying D1 of his livelihood and infringe Section 28 of the Contracts Act, 1950. [12] Reference was made to the Court of Appeal case of Millennium Medicare Services v Nagadevan Mahalingam [2016] 2 CLJ 36 where it was held, inter alia, on S. 28 of the Contracts Act as follows: “Negative covenants between employer and employee contracts pertaining to the period post termination and restricting an employee’s right to seek employment and/or to do business in the same field as the employer would be in restraint of trade and, therefore, a stipulation to this effect in the contract would be void. In other words, no employee can be confronted with the situation where he has to either work for the present employer or be forced to idleness; … … the norm is that the employer has an advantage over the employee and it is quite often the case that employees have to sign standard form contracts or not be employed at all.” Page 13 of 29 [13] Finally, that no confidential information or trade secret existed in this case as alleged by the Plaintiffs, who in reality, via the orders sought, are attempting to stifle competition and unlawfully deny D1 his livelihood based on the knowledge and skills that he had gained during his past working years. [14] In Nagadevan Mahalingam v Millenium Medicare Services [2011] 3 CLJ 529; [2011] 4 MLJ 739, the Court had elaborated on the purport and effect of s. 28 as follows: “[11] The said s 28 clearly provides that a contract in restraint of trade is void unless it falls under any of the exceptions thereto. It is apparent to us that the said provision is a statutory codification of the common law principle on this subject. However, we shared the view expressed by Visu Sinnadurai J in Polygram Records Sdn Bhd, that the validity of such covenant is not subject to the ‘reasonableness test’ under the common law. On this issue we also find support in the opinion expressed by Hashim J in Wriggleworth's case, to the effect that the English cases were not applicable in the interpretation of the said section. Further, in our view, the inclusion of the three common law exceptions to the Page 14 of 29 general rule on the covenant in restraint of trade as provided in that section is a clear manifestation of the intention of the legislature to make the said provisions exhaustive.” D2, D3 and D4’s Contentions [15] D2, D3 and D4 relied on the following facts in support of their defence:

D2 had tendered a notice of resignation on 30.11.2016 which took effect 2 months thereafter.

D2 had attempted to tender his notice of resignation in July 2016 but was persuaded by his immediate superior to withhold his resignation due to shortage of manpower at the Plaintiffs’ companies at that material time.

Apart from the contractual duties and the duty of fidelity during his employment with the Plaintiffs, D2 did not owe any other duties such as fiduciary duties to the Plaintiffs.

The documents set out in the Schedule are not confidential information and trade secrets of the Plaintiff as most of the Page 15 of 29 documents can easily be obtained from the distributors or dealers of the Plaintiffs and from B.C.I Asia’s website which are easily accessible by the members of the public and the trade alike.

D2 has confirmed under oath that he does not have in his possession, any of the documents referred to in the Schedule.

The Plaintiffs’ allegation of diverting business opportunity on or around 2015 is baseless as D3 and D4 had not even been incorporated at the material time.

D2 was only appointed as a Director to D3 and D4 respectively in July and October 2017.

All the correspondence addressed to and/or copied to D2 could not in any way indicate that D2 had diverted any business opportunity of the Plaintiffs and/or that he had also divulged or disclosed the purported confidential information and trade secrets of the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs had not produced any document indicating that D2, D3 and D4 had caused the Plaintiffs to suffer loss. Page 16 of 29 Analysis and Finding [16] Having considered the grounds of Enclosure 5, the overall evidence via affidavits of the parties concerned and the contentions of counsel on the law applicable and the facts, the Court finds as follows. [17] First and foremost, the onus is on the Plaintiffs (‘P’) to establish on a prima facie basis one or more of the causes of action pleaded against the Defendants (‘D1 - D 4’) to restrain them via the injunction that is currently being sought, failing which the question of there being a serious question to be tried would not arise. [18] It was in serious dispute as to whether the impugned information in the possession of D1 and D2 was in fact confidential information as alleged. I took note of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Vision Cast Sdn. Bhd. & Anor v Dynacast (Melaka) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors. [2015] 1 MLJ 424 where it was pronounced that: “If the impugned ‘information’ was from within the general fund of the second defendant’s own knowledge, exposure and experience accumulated in the diecast industry over the years as was the case here (and this would include potential customers, price trends in the market/public domain etc.), there was definitely not grounds, in Page 17 of 29 our assessment to hold that there had been a ‘breach of fiduciary duty’ or even a breach of confidentiality by the second defendant in this case.” [19] In any event, as pointed out by D2, D2 – D4 vide their Affidavit In Reply had confirmed that they did not have in their possession the documents as listed down in the Schedule to Enclosure 5. The Plaintiffs did not produce any evidence to prove otherwise. It would, thus, appear that there was no basis to seek an injunctive relief against D2-D4 for the alleged dissemination of the purported confidential information and trade secrets. [20] In essence, P allege that D1 and D2 were in possession of confidential information and trade secrets of P which they misused to the detriment of P. On an evaluation of the evidence presented at this stage, P have failed to prove to the Court’s satisfaction that the documents that D1 and D2 were privy to were classified as confidential information or amounted to trade secrets of P. Importantly, the particulars of the documents were not disclosed to the Court for consideration of their true nature. Furthermore, most of the information appeared to be available in the public domain and accessible online. Equally important is that there was practically no evidence adduced that D1 - D4 had utilised the Page 18 of 29 information and documents in question to the detriment or disadvantage of P to justify the relief sought being sought. [21] In view of the total lack of evidence to support the alleged usage of the Plaintiff’s confidential information and trade secrets and/for unlawful acts by the Defendants to obtain a head start, the circumstances of the instant case did not satisfy the legal test for a spring board injunction as laid down by Haddor Cave J in QBE Management Services (UK) Ltd. v. Dymoke & Ors [2012] IRLR 458 at [240] - [247]. The test enunciated is as follows: “240. First, where a person has obtained a ‘head start’ as a result of unlawful acts, the Court has the power to grant an injunction which restrains the wrongdoer, so as to deprive him of the fruits of his unlawful acts. This is often known as ‘springboard’ relief.

Second, the purpose of a ‘springboard’ order as Nourse L.J. explained in Roger Bullivant v Ellis [1987] ICR 464 is “to prevent the defendants from taking unfair advantage of the springboard which [the Judge] considered they must have built up by their misuse of the information in the card index” (at page Page 19 of 29 476G). May L.J. added that an injunction could be granted depriving defendants of the springboard “which ex hypothesi they had unlawfully acquired for themselves by the use of the plaintiffs’ customers’ names in breach of the duty of fidelity” (at 478E-G). The Court of Appeal upheld Falconer J.’s decision restraining an employee who had taken away a customer card index from entering into any contracts made with customers.

Third, ‘springboard’ relief is not confined to cases of breach of confidence. It can be granted in relation to breaches of contractual and fiduciary duties (see Midas IT Services v Opus Portfolio Ltd., unreported Ch.D, Blackburne J. 21/12/99, pp. 18-19), and flows from a wider principle that the court may grant an injunction to deprive a wrongdoer of the unlawful advantage derived from his wrongdoing. As Openshaw J. explained in UBS v Vestra Wealth (supra) at paragraphs [3] and [4]: “There is some discussion in the authorities as to whether springboard relief is limited to cases where there is a misuse of confidential information. Such a limitation was expressly rejected in Midas IT Services v Opus Portfolio Ltd, an Page 20 of 29 unreported decision of Blackburne J made on 21 December 1999, although it seems to have been accepted by Scott J in Balston Ltd v Headline Filters Ltd [1987] FSR 330 at 340. In the 20 years which have passed since that case, it seems to me that the law has developed; and I see no reason in principle by which it should be so limited. In my judgment, springboard relief is not confined to cases where former employees threaten to abuse confidential information acquired during the currency of their employment. It is available to prevent any future or further economic loss to a previous employer caused by former staff members taking an unfair advantage, and ‘unfair start’, of any serious breaches of their contract of employment (or if they are acting in concert with others, of any breach by any of those others). That unfair advantage must still exist at the time that the injunction is sought, and it must be shown that it would continue unless retrained. I accept that injunctions are to protect against and to prevent future and further losses and must not be used merely to punish breaches of contract.”

Fourth, ‘springboard’ relief must, however, be sought and obtained at a time when any unlawful advantage is still being enjoyed by the wrongdoer: Universal Thermosensors v. Hibben [1992] 1 WLR 840 Nicholls V-C; see also Sun Valley Foods Ltd v. Vincent [2000] FSR 825 esp at 834.

Fifth, ‘springboard’ relief should have the aim “simply of restoring the parties to the competitive position they each set out to occupy and would have occupied but for the defendant's misconduct” (per Sir David Nicholls VC Universal Thermosensors v. Hibben [1992] 1 WLR 840 at [855A]). It is not fair and just if it has a much more far-reaching effect than this, such as driving the defendant out of business [855A].

Sixth, ‘springboard’ relief will not be granted where a monetary award would have provided an adequate remedy to the Claimant for the wrong done to it (Universal Thermosensors v. Hibben [1992] 1 WLR 840 at [855B]).

Seventh, ‘springboard’ relief is not intended to punish the Defendant for wrongdoing. It is merely to provide fair and just protection for unlawful harm on an interim basis. What is fair and Page 22 of 29 just in any particular circumstances will be measured by (i) the effect of the unlawful acts upon the Claimant; and (ii) the extent to which the Defendant has gained an illegitimate competitive advantage (see Sectrack NV. v. (1) Satamatics Ltd (2) Jan Leemans [2007] EWHC 3003 Flaux J.). The seriousness or egregiousness of the particular breach has no bearing on the period for which the injunction should be granted. In this regard, it is worth bearing in mind what Flaux J, said at paragraph [68]: “[68] I agree with Mr Lowenstein that logically, the seriousness of the breach and the egregiousness of the Defendants' conduct cannot have any bearing on the period for which the injunction should be granted - what matters is the effect of the breach of confidence upon the Claimant in the sense of the extent to which the First Defendant has gained an illegitimate competitive advantage. In my judgment, Mr Cohen's submissions seriously underestimate the unfair competitive advantage gained by the Defendants from access to the Claimant's "customer list" and ignore, in any event, the impact (if the injunction were lifted) of actual or potential misuse of other Page 23 of 29 confidential information such as volume of business or pricing information. It is important in that context to have in mind that the Claimant maintains in its evidence that all the information said to be confidential remains confidential.” (emphasis added).

Eighth, the burden is on the Claimant to spell out the precise nature and period of the competitive advantage. An ‘ephemeral’ and ‘short term’ advantage will not be sufficient (per Jonathan Parker J. in Sun Valley Foods Ltd v. Vincent [2000] FSR 825 esp at 834). [22] In addition, several of the orders sought by P appear prima facie to be in reality in restraint of trade against the Defendants and thereby, in conflict with S.28 of the Contracts Act, 1950 (‘C/A’). The Court would not, in principle, grant an order that is against the law. [23] Among the prayers sought by the Plaintiffs is to restrain the Defendants through their agents, employees or servants, on their account or on behalf or in conjunction with any other person from competing in business with the Plaintiffs. In view of the terms of S. 28, C/A D2 should be Page 24 of 29 free to run the operations of D3 and D4 upon the expiration of his employment contract with the Plaintiffs. [24] D2, D3 and D4 have demonstrated that, on this score, the Plaintiffs have been unable to show that their claim is prima facie sustainable for an interlocutory injunction to be granted. [25] For convenience, S. 28 of the C/A states that: “28 Agreement in restraint of trade void Every agreement by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind, is to that extent void.” [26] The Plaintiff had further failed to establish the elements of Dishonest Assistance rendered to D1 by D2 – D4 [See Bullen and Leako and Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings 17 Edition, paragraph 62 - 10]. The law on this point is well stated in the Court of Appeal case of Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v Robert Doran & Ors. [2013] 2 MLJ 174 where Jeffrey Tan, JCA (as he then was) pronounced: Page 25 of 29 “‘Knowing assistance’ is one of two types of third party liabilities under trust law, established in Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, and based on the following dictum of Lord Selbourne LC: (The responsibility of a trustee) may no doubt be extended in equity to others who are not properly trustees, if they are found … actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui que trust. But … strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps of which a court of equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees. And at para[56] As a general rule, there must be a breach of trust or fiduciary duty by someone other than the defendant, the defendant must have helped that person in the breach, and the defendant must have a dishonest state of mind.” Page 26 of 29 [27] There was clearly no case of any fiduciary duty due and owing by D2 to the Plaintiffs. Neither was there any evidence adduced which showed that D2, D3 and D4 had dishonestly assisted D1 as a director of the Plaintiffs’ companies in breach of his fiduciary duties towards the Plaintiffs and/or breach of trust that resulted in loss to the Plaintiff. As pointed out by D2 – D4, in the absence of any clear evidence of any breach of trust by any relevant party, of any dishonest assistance rendered by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants and of any consequential loss suffered by the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs’ clam against D2, D3 and D4 on this ground of dishonest assistance cannot be considered sustainable. [28] Nowhere in the evidence produced by the Plaintiffs was it even suggested that there was in fact any illegal activity having been carried out by D2, D3 and D4 together with D1 whilst D2 was still under the employment of the Plaintiffs by virtue of which the Plaintiffs had suffered loss and damage. [29] Hence, the Plaintiffs had clearly failed to establish the elements of the tort of conspiracy against D1 and D2, whether by unlawful or lawful means, in the setting up of D3 and D4 as profit-making business concerns. Page 27 of 29 There was no evidence of D1 and D2 having done so with the predominant purpose of causing injury and damage to the Plaintiff. [30] On the whole, the evidence relied upon by P is clearly insufficient to establish any of the pleaded causes of action on a prima facie basis. I agree with the defence contention that, P's application is, in short, based on allegations and contentions as to the several breaches of confidentiality, fiduciary duties and fidelity by D1 and D2, who had since left the employment of P. Further, I also agree that Enclosure 5 is in its scope far too wide, excessive, unreasonable to be considered and amounts to unfair protection of P’s business. [31] On the facts and evidence as adverted to and the grounds advanced in support of Enclosure 5, it was manifestly clear that the Plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the established test propounded in American Cynamid (supra) for the grant of an interlocutory injunction and the consequential reliefs as prayed for presently. [32] I, therefore, hold that Enclosure 5 is without merits and ought to be rejected. Page 28 of 29 [33] Enclosure 5 is dismissed with costs to be fixed at the conclusion of the trial. Dated : 4th October 2018 (GUNALAN A/L MUNIANDY) Judge High Court of Malaya Shah Alam COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff : Mr. The Eng Lay together with Mr. Nicholas The Yew De Messrs Cheah The & Su Kuala Lumpur Page 29 of 29 For the 1st Defendant : Mr. C. K. Ung Messrs Phee, Chen & Ung Pulau Pinang For the 2nd to 4th Defendants : Mr. Ringo Low together with Miss Choy Chi Peng Messrs Ringo Low & Association Petaling Jaya, Selangor