1. ) NUR FARIHA BINTI HAIMI (Menuntut sebagai isteri yang sah dan tanggungan yang sah kepada Mohd Helmi Bin Ngadimin (Simati) untuk kehilangan tanggungan, kesedihan dan dukacitaan serta kerugian perbelanjaan di bawah Seksyen 7, Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 serta menuntut untuk faedah estet Simati di bawah Seksyen 8, Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956) v SYED MUZAFFAR SHAH BIN SYED AZMAN SHAH (BA-12B-51-05/2024)

NUR FARIHA BINTI HAIMI (NO. K/P.: 880713-43-5572) [Menuntut sebagai isteri yang sah dan tanggungan yang sah kepada Mohd Helmi Bin Ngadimin (Si Mati) untuk kehilangan tanggungan, kesedihan dan kedukacitaan serta kerugian perbelanjaan di bawah Seksyen 7, Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 serta menuntut untuk faedah estet Si Mati di bawah Seksyen 8, Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956]

MUHAMMAD AFFAN DANIELL BIN MOHD HELMI (NO. K/P.: 091022-14-0271) [Seorang kanak-kanak yang menuntut melalui ibu yang sah dan sahabat wakilnya, Plaintif Pertama, sebagai tanggungan yang sah kepada Mohd Helmi Bin Ngadimin (Si Mati) untuk kehilangan tanggungan, kesedihan dan kedukacitaan serta kerugian perbelanjaan di bawah Seksyen 7, Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956]

MUHAMMAD ANIQQ DANIELL BIN MOHD HELMI (NO. MYKID.: 120927-10-1189) S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg [Seorang kanak-kanak yang menuntut melalui ibu yang sah dan sahabat wakilnya, Plaintif Pertama, sebagai tanggungan yang sah kepada Mohd Helmi Bin Ngadimin (Si Mati) untuk kehilangan tanggungan, kesedihan dan kedukacitaan serta kerugian perbelanjaan di bawah Seksyen 7, Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956]

MUHAMMAD AIMAN DANIELL BIN MOHD HELMI (NO. MYKID.: 140920-10-1993) [Seorang kanak-kanak yang menuntut melalui ibu yang sah dan sahabat wakilnya, Plaintif Pertama, sebagai tanggungan yang sah kepada Mohd Helmi Bin Ngadimin (Si Mati) untuk kehilangan tanggungan, kesedihan dan kedukacitaan serta kerugian perbelanjaan di bawah Seksyen 7, Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956] … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN SYED MUZAFFAR SHAH BIN SYED AZMAN SHAH (NO. K/P.: 751018-08-6189) … RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Sesyen Di Petaling Jaya Dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia Guaman No: BB-A53KJ-166-08/2023 Antara S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg

NUR FARIHA BINTI HAIMI (NO. K/P.: 880713-43-5572) [Menuntut sebagai isteri yang sah dan tanggungan yang sah kepada Mohd Helmi Bin Ngadimin (Si Mati) untuk kehilangan tanggungan, kesedihan dan kedukacitaan serta kerugian perbelanjaan di bawah Seksyen 7, Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 serta menuntut untuk faedah estet Si Mati di bawah Seksyen 8, Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956]

MUHAMMAD AFFAN DANIELL BIN MOHD HELMI (NO. K/P.: 091022-14-0271) [Seorang kanak-kanak yang menuntut melalui ibu yang sah dan sahabat wakilnya, Plaintif Pertama, sebagai tanggungan yang sah kepada Mohd Helmi Bin Ngadimin (Si Mati) untuk kehilangan tanggungan, kesedihan dan kedukacitaan serta kerugian perbelanjaan di bawah Seksyen 7, Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956]

MUHAMMAD ANIQQ DANIELL BIN MOHD HELMI (NO. MYKID.: 120927-10-1189) [Seorang kanak-kanak yang menuntut melalui ibu yang sah dan sahabat wakilnya, Plaintif Pertama, sebagai tanggungan yang sah kepada Mohd Helmi Bin Ngadimin (Si Mati) untuk kehilangan tanggungan, kesedihan dan kedukacitaan serta kerugian perbelanjaan di bawah Seksyen 7, Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956] S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg

MUHAMMAD AIMAN DANIELL BIN MOHD HELMI (NO. MYKID.: 140920-10-1993) [Seorang kanak-kanak yang menuntut melalui ibu yang sah dan sahabat wakilnya, Plaintif Pertama, sebagai tanggungan yang sah kepada Mohd Helmi Bin Ngadimin (Si Mati) untuk kehilangan tanggungan, kesedihan dan kedukacitaan serta kerugian perbelanjaan di bawah Seksyen 7, Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956] … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN SYED MUZAFFAR SHAH BIN SYED AZMAN SHAH (NO. K/P.: 751018-08-6189) … DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

This is the Appellant/Plaintiffs’ appeal against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge (SCJ) on 10 May 2024. The action arises from a fatal road traffic accident involving the deceased, Mohd Helmi bin Ngadimin, and the Respondent/Defendant, Syed Muzaffar Shah bin Syed Azman Shah, on 28 December 2022 at KM 18.6 of the MEX Highway. S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg

The Appellants, consisting of the lawful widow and children of the deceased, filed a dependency claim under sections 7 and 8 of the Civil Law Act 1956. The Sessions Court, after hearing the full trial, dismissed the Appellants’ claim regarding liability but proceeded to assess and award limited damages on quantum.

The Respondent is the registered owner and rider of the motorcycle with registration number BHV 2806, which was involved in the collision with the deceased’s motorcycle, registration number FA 3570.

Dissatisfied, the Appellants appealed against the whole decision, including both liability and quantum.

On the date of the incident, 28 December 2022, the deceased was riding his motorcycle along KM 18.6 of the MEX Highway towards Putrajaya. The Appellants alleged that the Respondent, who was riding ahead in the middle lane, suddenly changed lanes into the left lane without signalling, thereby obstructing the deceased’s lawful path. This, according to the Appellants, left the deceased with no opportunity to avoid a collision. The deceased suffered serious injuries and died on 29 December 2022.

The Respondent’s version, as stated in his Defence and the police report, was that the deceased’s motorcycle collided into S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg the rear of the Respondent’s motorcycle, and that no lane change was made. The Respondent argued that the deceased’s own negligence caused the collision.

At trial, the Appellants called three witnesses: the Investigating Officer (SP1), the deceased’s employer (SP2), and the First Appellant (SP3). The Respondent testified as the sole defence witness (SD1).

Upon hearing the evidence, the learned SCJ held that the Appellants failed to prove liability on a balance of probabilities. The court awarded damages for loss of dependency (RM378,000.00), bereavement (RM30,000.00) and funeral expenses (RM5,000.00), but dismissed the claim for special damages. Costs of RM15,100.00 were awarded to the Respondent.

The appellate jurisdiction of this Court is governed by well-established principles. An appellate court should be slow to disturb findings of fact made by a trial judge who had the benefit of observing witnesses' demeanour. Interventions are only justified if the decision is “plainly wrong” or demonstrates an “insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence” (see: Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395, Gan Yook Chin & Anor v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309, Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67).

In negligence-based claims, the burden rests squarely upon the Plaintiff to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the Defendant’s negligent act caused the accident (See: Jithendren Supramaniam & Anor v. Salleh Abdul Roff [2013] MLRHU 737; Che Pah Itam v. Chang Bek Lee [1988] 2 MLRH 350).

The Appellants contended that the learned SCJ: a. Failed to take into account the totality of the evidence. b. Erred in rejecting the evidence of SP1, the Investigating Officer, whose testimony supported the Appellants’ version. c. Ignored the evidence of SP3, whose testimony on how the accident occurred was never challenged during cross-examination. d. Failed to consider “silent evidence” such as the position and nature of the damage to the motorcycles, and admissions allegedly made by the Respondent. S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg e. Misapplied the burden of proof, imposing a higher standard similar to a quasi-criminal case.

The Respondent argued that: a. The plainly wrong test restricts appellate intervention in findings of fact. b. The learned SCJ had the advantage of hearing and observing the witnesses first-hand, and her findings were supported by the evidence. c. SP1’s conclusions were speculative and lacked physical evidence or independent witnesses, and SP1 was not an expert witness. d. The pattern of damage to the motorcycles was consistent with a rear-end collision caused by the deceased, supporting the Respondent’s account. e. No traffic charge was brought against the Respondent due to insufficient substantive evidence.

The Respondent referred to the case of Che Pah Itam v Chang Bek Lee (supra) and Lim Jeh Haur v Nicholas Thomas Philip & Anor [2019] MLRHU 1023 to highlight that the burden of S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg proving negligence lies entirely with the Plaintiff, and that a court should not rely on an Investigating Officer’s opinion to establish negligence. Whether a party is liable for negligence or otherwise is for the Court to decide.

It is trite law that appellate intervention is justified if the trial judge failed to consider the entire evidence and issues before him, and handed down bare findings of fact without justifiable reasons to support them (MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn. Bhd. v Tan Bock Kwee & Sons Sdn. Bhd. [2016] 2 MLJ 428). After reviewing the Records of Appeal and considering the written and oral submissions of the parties, I find that appellate intervention is not warranted. My reasons are set out below.

It is not the role of this Court to substitute its views simply because it might have arrived at a different conclusion. Intervention is only justified where no reasonable judge, properly directing themselves on the law and evidence, could have reached the same decision.

After carefully reviewing the learned SCJ’s written Grounds of Judgment and the evidence in its entirety, I find that the learned SCJ made relevant factual findings, correctly applied the law, and there is no misdirection in her evaluation of the evidence. S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg

The Appellants’ pleaded case was that the Respondent, while riding in the middle lane, suddenly and without warning swerved into the left lane, thereby obstructing the deceased’s path. SP1 testified that, based on his investigation, the Respondent’s motorcycle changed lane from the middle to the left, causing the deceased to be in a position of danger with no opportunity to avoid a collision. This account was consistent with the Appellants’ pleadings.

The Appellants emphasised that SP1’s evidence was corroborated by SP3, the widow of the deceased, whose testimony on how the accident occurred was never challenged in cross-examination. Referring to the Federal Court decision in the case of Wong Swee Chin v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 212, they argued that unchallenged testimony should be accepted.

The Appellants also relied on what they described as silent evidence, namely the location and extent of the damage to both motorcycles, the Respondent’s alleged admissions made during his oral testimony (SD1), and the argument that these physical indicators were consistent with a sudden lane change.

The Respondent pleaded that the deceased’s motorcycle collided with the rear of his motorcycle while both were travelling in the same direction, and that no lane change occurred at any relevant time. S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg

According to the Respondent, this was supported by the physical damage to the motorcycles, as the Respondent’s motorcycle showed damage exclusively to its right rear side, with no damage at all on the left side; damage that would typically be expected if the collision had occurred laterally during a lane change.

The Respondent argued that SP1’s conclusion about a lane change was speculative and lacked evidence, notably the absence of CCTV footage, independent eyewitness testimony, or physical signs like skid marks or debris patterns that could suggest evasive manoeuvres.

During cross-examination, SP1 acknowledged that the Respondent had never admitted to changing lanes. The Respondent also relied on the absence of any formal traffic charges as further evidence that there was insufficient proof to establish negligence.

The learned SCJ was presented with two conflicting accounts: the Appellants’ version, which mainly relied on SP1’s post-accident reconstruction and SP3’s indirect account of the events, and the Respondent’s version, which was based on the pattern of physical damage observed on the motorcycles and the lack of any supporting physical evidence to confirm the alleged lane change. S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg

SP1’s testimony was based on post-accident investigation rather than personal observation. As noted in Lim Jeh Haur v Nicholas Thomas Philip & Anor (supra), an Investigating Officer’s opinion on negligence has limited weight because it is based on hearsay and secondary evidence.

While SP3’s account was unchallenged, it was based on what she had been told rather than direct observation of the accident. The learned SCJ was entitled to place limited reliance on such testimony, especially when determining whether the Respondent’s conduct constituted negligence.

The physical evidence, especially the pattern and location of damage, is aligned with a rear-end collision. There was no objective proof (such as skid marks or scrape patterns) to support the theory of a last-moment lane change. The lack of such signs, in the learned SCJ’s view, was incompatible with the Appellants’ story.

The learned SCJ concluded that the Appellants had not discharged their burden of proof. In a negligence case, the obligation is solely on the Plaintiff to establish the Defendant’s negligence. The court is not required to accept the Plaintiff’s account when objective evidence indicates otherwise (See: Che Pah Itam v Chang Bek Lee (supra)).

Having reviewed the record, I am satisfied that the learned SCJ evaluated the evidence in its entirety, considering both the S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg Appellants’ and the Respondent’s versions of events. She provided clear reasons for dismissing the Appellants’ theory of a sudden lane change and based her findings on the physical evidence presented, as well as the lack of any corroboration to support the Appellants’ allegations.

The learned SCJ was entitled to dismiss the Appellants’ theory of liability when the primary supporting witness, SP1, formed his opinion without direct observation and lacked corroborative forensic or physical evidence. The law is clear: liability in negligence must be proved by cogent and credible evidence. As stated in Wong Thin Yit v. Mohamed Ali [1971] 1 MLRA 483, the burden of proof rests entirely on the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff cannot succeed without establishing the Defendant’s negligence.

I agree with the learned SCJ’s findings that the alleged lane change by the Defendant was not proven. The objective facts, namely the location of the damage, the absence of braking marks, and the lack of eyewitness accounts, work against the Appellants’ version. The trial court was entitled to prefer the Defendant’s consistent testimony over speculative inferences by the Investigation Officer.

Based on the evidence before her, these findings were well within the learned SCJ’s jurisdiction and cannot be considered plainly wrong. There is therefore no basis for this Court to interfere with or overturn the decision on liability. S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg

Regarding the quantum, the Sessions Court’s award of RM378,000.00 for dependency is consistent with a monthly contribution of RM3,000.00 over a 10.5-year multiplier, based on the First Appellant’s evidence. There is no reason to believe that this assessment is inordinately low or manifestly erroneous to justify appellate intervention.

The principles for appellate interference with damages are well settled in United Plywood and Sawmill Ltd v Lock Ngan Loi [1970] 2 MLJ 237, intervention is warranted only if the award is so inordinately high or low as to amount to a wholly erroneous estimate.

The learned SCJ’s award for loss of dependency was based on a multiplicand of RM3,000.00 per month, a multiplier of 10.5 years, and statutory deductions. Bereavement damages and funeral expenses were awarded in accordance with prevailing trends.

The Appellants have not demonstrated that the awards were outside the normal range in similar cases, nor that there was an error of principle in the calculation. Therefore, there is no reason to alter the award.

Having thoroughly reviewed the record, submissions, and the learned SCJ’s reasoning, I am convinced that the liability decision was well-supported by the evidence and aligned with established legal principles. There was no lapse in judicial S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg evaluation or misapplication of the evidence, and the awarded quantum was fair and reasonable given the circumstances.

For the reasons stated above, I find that the appeal has no merit. There are no significant and compelling reasons for this Court to differ from the conclusions reached by the learned SCJ. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment of the Sessions Court is upheld in its entirety. As the parties have agreed, I make no order as to costs. Dated 15 August 2025 -sgd-JAMHIRAH ALI JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN To the parties’ solicitors: For the Appellants : Ranizan Bin Mokhtar & Muhammad Aliff Shafiq Bin Maskor (Messrs Ranizan Abdullah & Associates) S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg For the Respondent : J.S.Naicker (Messrs Naicker Associates) S/N mrp6OtgwUG4FdkfaDrGbg