NUR SHARMILA BINTI SHAHEEN CHUGTAI v Mohamad Shafiq Azim Bin Shaheen Chugtai (WA-31NCvC-3427-11/2025)

NUR SHARMILA BINTI SHAHEEN CHUGTAI

SHAHRIL REZA BIN SHAHEEN CHUGTAI (NO. K/P: 810806-14-5829) ...PEMOHON-PEMOHON 10/07/2026 15:22:02 WA-31NCvC-3427-11/2025 Kand. 40 DAN MOHAMAD SHAFIQ AZIM BIN SHAHEEN CHUGTAI …RESPONDEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

This matter concerns the Applicant's Notice of Application dated 8 February 2026 ("Enclosure 19"), filed pursuant to Order 71 rule 21 of the Rules of Court 2012 ("ROC 2012") and subsection 4(3) of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 ("PAA 1959"). By the said application, the Applicant, Mohamad Shafiq Azim bin Shaheen Chugtai, seeks an order that he be appointed as an additional administrator of the estate of the late Shaheen Chugtai bin Mirza Habib Jan ("the Deceased").

The application is opposed by the Respondents, Nur Sharmila binti Shaheen Chugtai and Shahril Reza bin Shaheen Chugtai, who are the original applicants in the present proceedings for the grant of Letters of Administration.

The application came before this Court for hearing after the Applicant had entered appearance pursuant to citation proceedings initiated by the Respondents following the Applicant's refusal to execute the requisite consent or renunciation in relation to the proposed grant.

The Court heard full oral submissions from learned counsel for the Applicant and learned counsel for the Respondents. The Court has also carefully considered the affidavits filed by all parties, the documentary exhibits exhibited thereto, the written submissions, the submissions in reply and the authorities relied upon by both parties.

Having considered the totality of the evidence and submissions before the Court, Enclosure 19 was dismissed. These are the full Grounds of Judgment.

Although the affidavits contain extensive allegations concerning family relationships, corporate interests and previous dealings between the parties, the issue before this Court is considerably narrower.

The question is whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds for this Court to exercise its discretion under Order 71 rule 21 of the ROC 2012 and subsection 4(3) of the PAA 1959 to appoint him as an additional administrator of the estate.

The Deceased, Shaheen Chugtai bin Mirza Habib Jan, died intestate on 18 March 2025, leaving assets within the jurisdiction of this Court.

The Deceased was survived by four children, namely:

Nur Sharmila binti Shaheen Chugtai;

Shahril Reza bin Shaheen Chugtai;

Nurul Shameem binti Shaheen Chugtai; and

Mohamad Shafiq Azim bin Shaheen Chugtai.

Following the death of the Deceased, the Respondents commenced the present proceedings seeking a grant of Letters of Administration in respect of the estate. In support of the application, the necessary administration papers were filed, including the administration oaths, the statement of assets and liabilities and the requisite supporting affidavits.

One of the beneficiaries, namely Nurul Shameem binti Shaheen Chugtai, duly executed a renunciation of her entitlement to apply for the grant, thereby indicating that she had no objection to the Respondents being appointed as administrators.

The Applicant, however, neither executed a renunciation nor provided his consent to the proposed grant.

Consequently, the Respondents initiated citation proceedings pursuant to the probate procedure under Order 71 of the ROC 2012 requiring the Applicant to elect whether he intended to accept, renounce or oppose the proposed grant.

The citation was duly served upon the Applicant.

Following service of the citation, the Applicant entered appearance and thereafter filed Enclosure 19 seeking to be added as an administrator of the estate pursuant to Order 71 rule 21 ROC 2012 and subsection 4(3) of the Probate and Administration Act 1959.

The Respondents opposed the application and filed affidavits disputing the Applicant's allegations.

The matter therefore came before this Court for determination after the completion of the exchange of affidavits and written submissions.

Having carefully considered the affidavits filed by the parties, the written and oral submissions of learned counsel, as well as the statutory provisions and authorities relied upon, this Court is of the view that the present application gives rise to the following principal issues:

Whether the Applicant's appearance pursuant to the citation proceedings conferred upon him an automatic or superior right to be appointed as an administrator of the estate.

Whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds to justify this Court in concluding that the Respondents are unsuitable to continue as the proposed administrators of the estate.

Whether this Court ought to exercise its discretion under Order 71 rule 21 of the ROC 2012 and subsection 4(3) of the PAA 1959 to appoint the Applicant as an additional administrator.

Whether, having regard to the circumstances of the present case, the proposed appointment would promote or impede the proper, orderly and efficient administration of the estate.

These issues are closely interrelated. The first concerns the legal effect of the citation proceedings. The second concerns the factual basis relied upon by the Applicant in support of his application. The third and fourth concern the proper exercise of the Court's probate discretion.

It is therefore convenient to first consider the legal principles governing the Court's jurisdiction before examining the parties' respective contentions.

The Court's discretion in probate matters is not exercised to reward or penalise individual beneficiaries, nor to resolve underlying family grievances. Rather, it is exercised to ensure that the fiduciary administration of the estate proceeds in a manner that best safeguards the interests of the estate and all persons beneficially entitled thereto.

This objective remains paramount throughout the Court's consideration of the present application. It follows that the appointment of an administrator is fundamentally fiduciary in nature.

An administrator does not obtain any proprietary advantage over the other beneficiaries by virtue of his appointment. His appointment merely enables him to collect, preserve, manage and distribute the assets of the estate in accordance with law and subject always to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court.

Consequently, the Court's concern is directed not towards rewarding one beneficiary or preferring one family member over another, but towards identifying the arrangement that is most conducive to the due administration of the estate.

This distinction assumes particular importance where, as here, considerable affidavit evidence has been filed concerning wider family disagreements extending beyond the immediate question of administration.

Those disputes may understandably give rise to strong feelings among the parties. Nevertheless, the Court must remain focused upon the statutory purpose of the present proceedings and resist the temptation to determine disputes which do not require determination for the disposal of the application before it.

The Court is therefore concerned only with whether the Applicant has demonstrated sufficient grounds for the Court to exercise its discretion in relation to the appointment of administrators. F.

Equal entitlement does not confer an automatic right of appointment

There is no dispute that the Applicant is one of the children of the Deceased. Equally, there is no dispute that the Applicant belongs to the same class of persons entitled under the law to apply for a grant of Letters of Administration. The Court therefore readily accepts that the Applicant possesses the requisite locus standi to make the present application.

However, the existence of an equal entitlement to apply for a grant must not be confused with an absolute entitlement to be appointed as an administrator. The PAA 1959 does not provide that every person having an equal entitlement must necessarily be appointed.

Likewise, Order 71 of the ROC 2012 does not create an automatic right of appointment merely because an applicant falls within the same degree of entitlement. The statutory scheme instead contemplates that the Court retains an overriding supervisory discretion in determining to whom the grant ought ultimately to issue.

That discretion necessarily requires the Court to evaluate all relevant circumstances surrounding the proposed administration of the estate.

The Court's discretion under Order 71 rule 21 and subsection 4(3)

The Applicant relies upon Order 71 rule 21 of the ROC 2012 together with subsection 4(3) of the PAA 1959 in support of the present application. Those provisions undoubtedly confer jurisdiction upon the Court to appoint an additional administrator where the circumstances of the case justify such appointment.

However, neither provision removes the discretionary nature of the Court's jurisdiction. The language employed by the legislation is permissive rather than mandatory. Accordingly, the Court is not required to appoint an applicant merely because jurisdiction exists to do so.

Rather, the Court must be affirmatively satisfied that the proposed appointment would serve the interests of the estate and facilitate its proper administration.

In exercising that discretion, the Court is entitled to consider all relevant circumstances disclosed by the evidence, including the practical consequences likely to flow from the proposed appointment.

The overriding consideration

Having regard to the statutory framework and the authorities relied upon by learned counsel, this Court is satisfied that the overriding consideration is whether the proposed appointment would promote the proper administration of the estate. The Court is therefore concerned not with the competing wishes of the beneficiaries, but with whether the proposed appointment would facilitate or impede the due administration of the estate.

It is against that principle that the Applicant's case falls to be considered.

Matters which the Court should not determine

Before turning to the factual issues raised by the parties, it is necessary to identify matters which, in the Court's judgment, fall outside the proper scope of the present application.

The affidavits contain numerous allegations relating to the parties' previous dealings concerning family businesses, corporate interests, financial transparency and earlier estate administration. Those allegations are vigorously disputed.

The Court does not consider it either necessary or appropriate to determine those disputed factual controversies within the confines of the present application. The present proceedings are not intended to constitute a trial upon allegations of misconduct.

The Court is satisfied that any attempt to determine those disputed allegations upon affidavit evidence alone would be both inappropriate and unnecessary for the proper disposal of the present application.

The Court has therefore confined itself to those matters which bear directly upon the statutory discretion concerning the appointment of administrators.

Nothing contained in this judgment should be construed as constituting any finding upon the truth or otherwise of the wider allegations exchanged between the parties.

Those issues, if they require judicial determination, may be ventilated in the appropriate proceedings where evidence may properly be adduced and tested. The Court has already explained that the present proceedings are confined to the appointment of administrators. G. ANALYSIS Issue 1: Whether the Applicant's Appearance Pursuant to the Citation Conferred an Automatic Right to Appointment as an Administrator

The Applicant places considerable reliance upon the fact that he entered appearance pursuant to the citation issued by the Respondents.

Learned counsel for the Applicant submits that, having entered appearance and indicated his intention to participate in the administration of the estate, the Applicant ought to be appointed as an additional administrator by virtue of his equal entitlement as one of the children of the Deceased.

The Court accepts, as a matter of fact, that the Applicant duly entered appearance following service of the citation and thereafter elected to oppose the proposed grant by filing the present application under Order 71 rule 21 of the ROC 2012 and subsection 4(3) of the PAA 1959.

The question, however, is not whether the Applicant entered appearance. The question is the legal consequence of that appearance.

In the judgment of this Court, the Applicant's argument attributes a legal effect to the citation proceedings which they do not possess.

The purpose of a citation in probate proceedings is well understood. It is a procedural mechanism designed to require a person having an equal or prior entitlement to a grant of representation to elect whether he intends:

to accept the grant;

to renounce his entitlement; or

to appear and oppose the proposed grant.

The citation therefore serves to protect procedural fairness by ensuring that a person having an equal or prior entitlement is afforded an opportunity to state his position before a grant is issued.

Once the cited party has responded, whether by renunciation, consent or appearance, the purpose of the citation has been fulfilled.

The Court is unable to accept the proposition that the mere act of entering appearance pursuant to a citation transforms an applicant's procedural entitlement into a substantive right to appointment. Such an interpretation would effectively deprive the Court of the discretion expressly preserved under the PAA 1959 and the ROC 2012.

If Parliament had intended that every person entering appearance pursuant to a citation must automatically be appointed as an administrator, clear statutory language to that effect would have been expected. No such provision exists.

On the contrary, the statutory framework proceeds upon the footing that the Court must still determine to whom the grant ought properly to issue after considering all relevant circumstances.

Accordingly, this Court rejects the submission that the Applicant's appearance pursuant to the citation, standing alone, entitles him as of right to appointment as an administrator. The citation afforded the Applicant the opportunity to be heard. It did not predetermine the manner in which the Court should exercise its discretion.

The Court therefore proceeds to consider whether the Applicant has otherwise established sufficient grounds to justify the exercise of that discretion in his favour.

The Applicant's affidavits contain numerous complaints concerning the Respondents.

Broadly stated, those complaints relate to alleged deficiencies in transparency, concerns regarding the handling of family assets, disagreements relating to family businesses, previous estate administration, and allegations of conduct said to render the Respondents unsuitable to administer the estate.

The Respondents have comprehensively denied those allegations.

Their affidavits provide explanations for the matters complained of and contend that the allegations are either misconceived, inaccurate or relate to issues wholly extraneous to the present application.

Having carefully considered the affidavit evidence, this Court is of the respectful view that it is unnecessary, and indeed inappropriate, to resolve those factual disputes within the confines of the present application.

The present proceedings are interlocutory in nature and concern only the appointment of administrators. They do not constitute a trial upon allegations of misconduct.

The Court therefore declines to make findings upon the truth or otherwise of the competing allegations advanced by the parties.

That, however, does not conclude the matter. The Court must still determine whether the evidence, taken at its highest in favour of the Applicant, demonstrates sufficient objective material to justify displacing the existing proposed administrators or adding the Applicant as a further administrator.

In this regard, the Court has carefully examined whether there exists evidence of:

dishonesty;

incapacity;

legal disability;

conflict of interest of such magnitude as to render administration impracticable;

misconduct affecting estate assets; or

any other circumstance demonstrating that the Respondents are unsuitable to continue in that fiduciary role.

Having undertaken that exercise, this Court is unable to reach such a conclusion. While the affidavits undoubtedly disclose a history of disagreement among the siblings concerning various family matters, disagreement alone cannot automatically translate into legal unsuitability.

Probate jurisdiction requires the Court to distinguish between family discord and legal incapacity. Not every disagreement between beneficiaries renders an administrator unsuitable.

Likewise, not every allegation of unfairness, lack of transparency or dissatisfaction with past conduct necessarily warrants judicial intervention in the composition of the administration.

What is required is evidence demonstrating that the proposed administrators cannot properly discharge the fiduciary obligations imposed upon them. On the material presently before the Court, such evidence has not been established.

This Court is therefore unable to conclude that the Respondents should be displaced from the existing administration arrangement or that their continued appointment would jeopardise the due administration of the estate. Issue 3: Whether the Court Should Exercise Its Discretion Under Order 71 Rule 21 ROC 2012 and Subsection 4(3) PAA 1959

Having concluded that the Applicant's appearance pursuant to the citation does not confer an automatic right of appointment, and having further concluded that the Respondents have not been shown to be unsuitable, the Court must now determine whether there nevertheless exists some other sufficient reason for exercising its discretion in favour of the Applicant.

In considering that question, the Court reminds itself that the discretion conferred under Order 71 rule 21 ROC 2012 and subsection 4(3) of the PAA 1959 is a broad but judicial discretion.

It is not exercised upon sympathy, family preference or numerical support among beneficiaries. Equally, it is not exercised for the purpose of achieving parity among competing factions within a family.

Applying the foregoing principles, the Court now turns to consider whether, in the circumstances of the present case, the Applicant has established sufficient grounds to warrant the exercise of the Court's discretion under Order 71 rule 21 of the ROC 2012 and subsection 4(3) of the PAA 1959.

The Court approaches that question from a practical rather than an abstract perspective.

Administrators are fiduciaries entrusted with the collection, preservation and distribution of the estate in accordance with law. In discharging those duties, they are often required to act jointly, execute documents together and cooperate in dealing with financial institutions, public authorities and other third parties.

Accordingly, the practical ability of proposed administrators to work together is a relevant consideration in the exercise of the Court's discretion. It is against that background that the Court now considers whether the Applicant's appointment would facilitate or impede the proper administration of the estate.

The remaining question is whether, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the appointment of the Applicant as an additional administrator would promote or impede the proper administration of the estate.

In addressing this issue, the Court is mindful that the discretion under Order 71 rule 21 of the ROC 2012 and subsection 4(3) of the PAA 1959 must ultimately be exercised by reference to the practical welfare of the estate rather than the competing wishes of individual beneficiaries.

The Court accepts that the Applicant is a beneficiary of the estate and has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the estate is administered properly and transparently.

The Court further accepts that the Applicant is entitled to raise concerns regarding the proposed administration where he genuinely believes that such concerns affect the interests of the estate. However, those considerations do not conclude the enquiry.

The Court must evaluate whether the proposed appointment would, in practical terms, facilitate the administration of the estate or whether it is more likely to hinder that administration.

The affidavit evidence before the Court demonstrates that there has been a significant deterioration in the relationship between the Applicant and the Respondents. It is apparent from the affidavits that each side has levelled serious allegations against the other concerning their conduct, integrity, transparency and management of family affairs. Whether those allegations are ultimately true is not a matter which this Court is required to determine in the present proceedings.

What is material is that the affidavits themselves demonstrate a substantial breakdown of trust between the parties. The Court cannot ignore that reality. The administration of an estate is seldom a purely mechanical exercise.

Administrators are required to work together in carrying out numerous fiduciary responsibilities, including collecting estate assets, obtaining information from financial institutions, dealing with statutory authorities, executing legal documents, settling liabilities, rendering accounts and ultimately distributing the estate according to law. Those responsibilities frequently require cooperation, communication and mutual confidence between co-administrators.

While the law does not require perfect harmony between administrators, it does require a relationship capable of supporting the practical discharge of those responsibilities.

Where the evidence demonstrates an entrenched breakdown in trust and confidence, the Court is entitled to consider whether the proposed appointment is likely to advance or impede the administration of the estate.

This is particularly so where the Court is invited to add an additional administrator to an existing proposed arrangement rather than to replace an administrator who has been shown to be unsuitable.

In the present case, the Court is not satisfied that the addition of the Applicant would contribute positively towards the orderly administration of the estate.

On the contrary, the affidavit evidence demonstrates that the relationship between the Applicant and the Respondents has already become characterised by considerable hostility and distrust.

In the judgment of this Court, such circumstances give rise to a real risk that the appointment sought may result in administrative deadlock, unnecessary delay and further disputes concerning the management of the estate.

The Court is unable to ignore those practical considerations.

Probate jurisdiction requires the Court not merely to consider legal entitlement, but also the practical consequences of the orders sought.

The Court is therefore not persuaded that the proposed appointment would advance the due administration of the estate.

Rather, the Court is satisfied that the proposed appointment is more likely to impede that administration.

It is for this reason that the Court declines to exercise its discretion under Order 71 rule 21 of the ROC 2012 and subsection 4(3) of the PAA 1959 in favour of the Applicant.

Having considered all the evidence before the Court, the statutory framework, the authorities cited by learned counsel and the respective submissions of the parties, the Court is driven to one principal conclusion.

The Applicant has not established any sufficient basis for this Court to disturb the existing administration arrangement. Nor has the Applicant established sufficient objective evidence from which this Court could properly conclude that the Respondents are unsuitable to continue as the proposed administrators of the estate.

The Court accepts that the parties disagree on numerous matters relating to family affairs and the administration of assets. However, those disagreements, standing alone, are insufficient to justify the exercise of the Court's discretion.

At the same time, the material before the Court demonstrates a level of hostility and distrust between the Applicant and the Respondents which cannot realistically be ignored.

In the Court's judgment, the addition of the Applicant as an administrator in those circumstances is more likely to hinder than facilitate the due administration of the estate.

The Court therefore concludes that the Applicant has failed to establish sufficient grounds to justify the orders sought.

Before concluding, this Court considers it appropriate to make one further observation.

Considerable time and attention have been devoted by both parties to allegations concerning family businesses, previous estate administration, financial dealings and various matters extending beyond the immediate question of administration.

The Court has carefully considered those allegations insofar as they are relevant to the present application. Nevertheless, this Court has deliberately refrained from making findings upon the truth or otherwise of those allegations.

Such matters remain disputed. They have not been tested by oral evidence or cross-examination. More importantly, they do not require determination for the purpose of deciding the present application. The Court has therefore confined its findings to those matters necessary for the proper exercise of its probate jurisdiction.

Nothing contained in this judgment should therefore be construed as determining the parties' respective rights in relation to any wider family or commercial disputes.

It is equally important to emphasise what this decision does not determine. The dismissal of the present application does not affect the Applicant's status as one of the lawful beneficiaries of the estate.

The Applicant continues to enjoy all rights available to him under the law as a beneficiary. The Applicant remains entitled to receive such information, accounts and distributions as the law requires during the course of the administration of the estate.

Should any future issue arise concerning the administration of the estate, the law provides appropriate remedies to any beneficiary who is able to demonstrate that judicial intervention is required.

Accordingly, the present decision should not be understood as preferring one beneficiary over another or as determining the beneficial entitlement of any person interested in the estate.

It determines only the narrower question of whether the Applicant should presently be appointed as an additional administrator.

For all the reasons set out above, this Court is satisfied that the Applicant has failed to establish sufficient grounds to justify the exercise of the Court's discretion under Order 71 rule 21 of the ROC 2012 and subsection 4(3) of the PAA 1959.

Accordingly, the Applicant's Notice of Application dated 8 February 2026 (Enclosure 19) is dismissed. The application for the grant of Letters of Administration shall proceed in the names of the Respondents, namely:

Nur Sharmila binti Shaheen Chugtai; and

Shahril Reza bin Shaheen Chugtai.

For the avoidance of doubt, the Applicant's rights and entitlement as a beneficiary of the estate remain entirely unaffected by this decision. As this matter concerns a dispute among members of the same family relating to the administration of the estate of the Deceased, the Court is of the view that it is appropriate for the costs of this application to be borne by the estate.

Enclosure 19 is therefore dismissed. Dated: 10th July 2026 ……………………………………………………………….. (YA PUAN MAHAZAN BINTI MAT TAIB) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Counsel for The Applicants : Zirwatul Hanan Messrs. Azaine & Fakhrul (Ampang) Advocates & Solicitors For The Respondent :