Oag Engineering Sdn. Bhd. v Ng Hoe Keong (WA-22IP-42-07/2020)

OAG ENGINEERING SDN BHD [No. Syarikat.: 199901027176 (502076-K)]

OAG OFFSHORE PIPELINE SERVICES SDN BHD [No. Syarikat.: 201301000809 (1030646-X)]

OAG INTERNATIONAL PIPELINE SERVICES LTD – ABU DHABI [No. Syarikat.: CN-1750397]

OAG INTERNATIONAL PIPELINE SERVICES LTD [No. Syarikat.: LPC00044]

SETIA OFFSHORE SERVICES SDN BHD [No. Syarikat.: 200301029388 (631808-U)] … PLAINTIFFS

NG HOE KEONG [No. K/P.: 631021-10-7431]

DEVANDRAN A/L ARUMUGAM [No. K/P.: 830809-02-5441]

SUN MARINE COATING (M) SDN BHD [No. Syarikat.: 201801016615 (1278631-D)]

SYAHIRAH BINTI SAHARUDIN [No. K/P.: 901228-14-5758]

THEVAGAR A/L GURUNATHAN [No. K/P.: 801011-10-6135] … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 708 – Defendants' application for leave to use documents and information) A.

This the Defendants' application vide Enclosure 708 for leave of this Court to use information and/or documents alleged to be protected by a Protective Order granted pursuant to the Ex-Parte Order dated 05.08.2020 and the Inter Parte Order dated 21.06.2023 ("the Protective Order"), for the purpose of making a report to the relevant authorities, including the Royal Malaysia Police ("PDRM"), in relation to alleged false statements contained in the Plaintiffs' affidavits affirmed by Jonathan Chong Teik Cheh ("Jonathan Chong") on 27.09.2024, 25.10.2024, 01.11.2024, 05.11.2024 and 18.04.2025.

The Plaintiffs opposed this application, contending that it is defective, unsustainable, an abuse of process, and constitutes harassment. The Defendants maintained that public interest considerations justify the disclosure of protected information to investigate alleged criminal conduct.

Having carefully considered the submissions of both parties, I dismissed Enclosure 708 with costs of RM 10,000. I now state the reasons for my decision. B.

On 29 July 2020, the Plaintiffs commenced Suit No. WA-22IP-42- 07/2020 against the Defendants, alleging that the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Defendants had breached fiduciary duties and duties of fidelity owed to the respective Plaintiffs, and that the Defendants had misused and unlawfully disclosed the Plaintiffs' Trade Secrets and Confidential Information (as defined in the Amended Statement of Claim dated 8 July 2025) for the benefit of the Defendants. The Plaintiffs' claims included breach of Confidentiality Agreements, breach of confidence, conspiracy to injure the Plaintiffs' trade and reputation by unlawful means, and unlawful interference with the Plaintiffs' trade and business.

On 30 July 2020, the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Application (Ex Parte) [Enclosure 7] against the Defendants for, inter alia, a protective order ("Protective Order") and an Anton Piller order ("Anton Piller Order" or "APO") for the purpose of preserving the confidentiality of the Plaintiffs' Trade Secrets and Confidential Information and entering the Defendants' premises to obtain relevant documents.

On 5 August 2020, His Lordship Mohd Radzi Bin Harun allowed Enclosure 7 ("Ex Parte Order" or "Enclosure 9"), granting an ex parte APO. The Anton Piller Order was continued through an Ad Interim order ("Ad Interim Order" or "Enclosure 77") on 25 August 2020, and subsequently through an Inter Partes order ("Inter Partes Order" or "Enclosure 453") on 21 June 2023.

7.

On 22 December 2022, the 3rd Defendant's office was raided by three (3) officers from the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission ("MACC" or "SPRM"). At that material time, the Defendants believed that the Plaintiffs, or one of the Plaintiffs, or Plaintiffs' director(s), or an individual caused by the Plaintiffs, had lodged a complaint against the Defendants to the MACC using APO Documents and Information which were not in the knowledge of the Plaintiffs before the execution of those orders. The Defendants' First Contempt Application (Enclosures 344 and 446)

On 1 August 2024, the Defendants obtained an ex parte order for leave to commence committal proceedings against the Plaintiffs, Jonathan Chong (director of the 1st to 4th Plaintiffs) and Sunida Binti Rahmatullah ("Sunida") (director of the 5th Plaintiff at that material time) [Enclosure 344]. His Lordship Mohd Radzi Bin Harun allowed Enclosure 344 on 1 August 2024.

Subsequently, on 8 August 2024, the Defendants filed a contempt application [Enclosure 446] ("the Defendants' 1st contempt application") over the alleged breach of the Plaintiffs' Undertaking, contending that the proposed contemnors had breached the Plaintiffs' Undertaking by lodging a report with the MACC using APO Documents and Information.

In response, the Plaintiffs and Jonathan Chong claimed that they did not lodge, or cause to be lodged, the MACC report, and that they had no knowledge of the nature of the report.

On 28 July 2025, Her Ladyship Adlin Binti Abdul Majid dismissed Enclosure 446. Dissatisfied with the decision, the Defendants filed an appeal against such dismissal on 4 August 2025. The Defendants have since withdrawn their appeal against the dismissal of Enclosure 446 in relation to Sunida.

On 10 December 2024, the Defendants filed an application for discovery against the MACC [Enclosure 514] ("the Defendants' application for discovery against SPRM"). In compliance with this Honourable Court's order dated 10 September 2025 allowing Enclosure 514, the MACC produced the following documents to the Defendants' solicitors: i. a letter dated 28 January 2025 [Exhibit "D-3" of the Defendants' Affidavit in Support dated 13 February 2026 (Enclosure 709) at page 369]; ii. a letter dated 6 March 2025 [Exhibit "D-3" of Enclosure 709 at page 370]; iii. "Laporan Kertas Penyiasatan Awal Nombor KPA: SEL/SPRM/KPA:133/12/2022/KLG" dated 22 January 2025 ("KPA Report") via an email dated 25 March 2025 [Exhibit "D- 3" of Enclosure 709 at pages 371–376]; and iv. an email dated 11 April 2025 [Exhibit "D-3" of Enclosure 709 at page 377].

The MACC confirmed that Hafizah Binti Abu Hassan ("Hafizah"), who was then the Human Resource Manager of the 1st Plaintiff as well as the OAG Group, and a director of the 5th Plaintiff at that material time, was the person who lodged the KPA Report [Exhibit "D-3" of Enclosure 709 at page 377].

Paragraph 5.6 of the KPA Report further stated that a police report was made against the 4th Defendant on 28 October 2022 by the Plaintiffs [Exhibit "D-3" of Enclosure 709 at page 375].

Upon receipt of the KPA Report, on 22 April 2025, the Defendants filed an application for discovery against the Royal Malaysia Police ("PDRM") to obtain a copy of the police report [Enclosure 514]. On 10 September 2025, Her Ladyship Adlin Binti Abdul Majid allowed Enclosure 514.

On 1 October 2025, PDRM provided a copy of police report number SRI MUDA/032442/22 dated 28 October 2022 ("Sri Muda Police Report"), which was lodged by Hafizah [Exhibit "D-4" of Enclosure 709 at pages 390–392]. The Defendants' Contempt Applications Against Hafizah and Jonathan Chong (Enclosures 593, 618, 625 and 650)

On 6 August 2025, the Defendants filed an Ex Parte Notice of Application for leave to apply for a contempt order against Hafizah [Enclosure 593]. On 10 September 2025, this Honourable Court allowed Enclosure 593.

On 19 September 2025, the Defendants filed contempt proceedings against Hafizah [Enclosure 618].

On 9 October 2025, the Defendants filed another Ex Parte Notice of Application for leave to apply for a contempt order against Jonathan Chong and Hafizah [Enclosure 625]. On 3 November 2025, this Honourable Court allowed Enclosure 625.

On 12 November 2025, the Defendants filed contempt proceedings against Jonathan Chong and Hafizah [Enclosure 650] ("the Defendants' 2nd contempt application").

However, upon receipt of Hafizah's Affidavit in Reply affirmed by her on 23 January 2026 [Enclosure 678] ("Hafizah's AIR"), the Defendants subsequently withdrew Enclosures 618 and 650 against Hafizah without any liberty to file afresh. Hafizah's AIR disclosed, inter alia, that she had been instructed by the Plaintiffs and Jonathan Chong to lodge the report with the MACC and that the Plaintiffs and Jonathan Chong were aware of the nature of the MACC raid [Exhibit "D-1" of Enclosure 709 at pages 37, 94 and 137].

The Defendants' present application [Enclosure 708] relies heavily on Hafizah's AIR (Enclosure 678) , which raises numerous allegations against the Plaintiffs.

The prayers sought in Enclosure 708, in essence, seek leave for the Defendants to: "menggunakan, dan/atau memperlihatkan, dan/atau memfailkan, dan/atau menzahirkan, dan/atau mendedahkan, dan/atau membuat rujukan kepada, maklumat dan/atau dokumen-dokumen yang dikatakan dilindungi di bawah

Perlindungan yang dikeluarkan di bawah Akta Rahsia Rasmi 1972 dan/atau Perintah Mahkamah, kepada pihak berkuasa yang berkaitan, termasuk tetapi tidak terhad kepada Polis DiRaja Malaysia (PDRM), bagi tujuan membuat laporan terhadap Plaintif-Plaintif dan/atau Jonathan Chong Teik Cheh berhubung kenyataan palsu yang terkandung dalam afidavit-afidavit Plaintif yang diperakui oleh Jonathan

Chong Teik Cheh pada 27.9.2024, 25.10.2024, 1.11.2024,

11.2024 dan 18.4.2025."

The Defendants' case is that:

The Plaintiffs and Jonathan Chong have made false statements in their affidavits, denying knowledge of and involvement in the MACC complaint and police report;

Hafizah's Affidavit in Reply (Enclosure 678) reveals that Jonathan Chong was the "mastermind" who instructed Hafizah to lodge the MACC complaint and police report, and that the Plaintiffs were aware of these actions at all material times;

The alleged false statements constitute offences under sections 193 and 199 of the Penal Code (deception and false evidence);

Public interest in the investigation and prosecution of these offences overrides the confidentiality protections; and

The application is filed as a "precautionary step" to avoid breaching the Protective Order when making reports to authorities.

The Plaintiffs opposed Enclosure 708 on four principal grounds:

The prayers in enclosure 708 are blanket, unspecified, and fail to identify the particular documents/information sought to be disclosed;

Enclosure 678 is disputed, contradictory, and unsupported by credible evidence;

The application is a tactical manoeuvre to delay proceedings and prevent finality; and

The application is another mechanism to oppress and exert undue pressure on the Plaintiffs. C. THE LAW

It is well established that a Protective Order, and the implied undertaking attaching to documents obtained under compulsion, is not absolute. The Court retains a supervisory discretion to release a party from such undertaking in appropriate circumstances.

In Ng Kim Fong v Menang Corporation (M) Berhad [2020] 1 LNS 1263, the Court of Appeal affirmed that disclosure of confidential information may be permitted where there is an overriding public interest, including in respect of the commission of criminal offences applying the principle in Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113 that "there is no confidence as to the disclosure of an iniquity," as extended in Initial Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396. In Ng Kim Fong , the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[137] The defence of public interest would involve, for example, the disclosure of evidence concerning the commission of criminal offences and other serious unlawful/antisocial conduct, e.g. tax evasion. This was established in the English case of Gartside v. Outram [1856], 26 LJ Ch 113, where Woods VC stated that: “There is no confidence as to the disclosure of an iniquity.” [138] In Initial Services Ltd v. Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396, [1967] 3 All ER 145, [1967] 3 WLR 1032, |. 2 KIR 863, 111 Sol Jo 541 Initial Services Ltd v. Puterill, Lord Denning MR extended the duty of disclosure and stated that the exception was not limited to frauds or misdeeds, but it extended to cover any such illegal behaviour or misconduct that ought to be disclosed to other parties. [139] Denning MR (p.405-406 QB) said: “...Initial Services Ltd sought to strike out several of the paragraphs in Mr Putterill's defence. The master (Master Diamond) and the judge (Cusack J) refused to strike them out. Initial Services Ltd appeal to this court. In support of the appeal, counsel for Initial Services Ltd said that in the employment of every servant there is implied an obligation that he will not, before or after his service, disclose information or documents which he has received in confidence. Now I quite agree that there is such an obligation. It is imposed by law. But it is subject to exceptions. Take a simple instance. Suppose a master tells his servant: “I am going to falsify these sale notes and deceive the customers. You are not to say anything about it to anyone.” If the master thereafter falsifies the sale notes, the servant is entitled to say: "I am not going to stay any longer in the service of a man who does such a thing. I will leave him and report it to the customers." It was so held in the case of Gartside v. Outram ([1856], 26 LJ Ch 113, see at p 114 and at p 116). Counsel suggested that this exception was confined to case where the master has been “guilty of a crime or fraud”; but I do not think that it is so limited. It extends to any misconduct of such a nature that it ought in the public interest to be disclosed to others. Wood, V-C, put it in a vivid phrase ([1856], 26 LJ Ch 113, see at p 114 and at p 116): “There is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity.” In Weld-Blundell v. Stephens ([1919] 1 KB 520 at p 527) Bankes LJ rather suggested that the exception was limited to the proposed or contemplated commission of a crime or a civil wrong; but I should have thought that that was too limited. The exception should extend to crimes, frauds and misdeeds, both those actually committed as well as those in contemplation, provided always-and this is essential-that the disclosure is justified in the public interest. The reason is because "no private obligations can dispense with that universal one which lies on every member of the society to discover every design which may be formed, contrary to the laws of the society, to destroy the public welfare." See Annesley v. Earl of Anglesed ([1743], 17 State Tr 1139 at pp 1223- 1246). The disclosure must, I should think, be to one who has a proper interest to receive the information. Thus it would be proper to disclose a crime to the police; or a breach of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, to the registrar. There may be cases where the misdeed is of such a character that the public interest may demand, or at least excuse, publication on a broader field, even to the press.” (Emphasis added)

It is also beneficial to refer to Order 31.22 of the UK Civil Procedure Rules, which governs the subsequent use of disclosed documents in proceedings. The rule provides that a party to whom a document has been disclosed may use the document only for the purpose of the proceedings in which it is disclosed, unless certain exceptions apply, including where the Court gives permission.

This provision recognises that although documents disclosed in proceedings are ordinarily subject to a restriction on collateral use, the Court retains the power to permit such use where the circumstances justify it.

The English authorities of Marlwood v Kozeny [2005] 1 W.L.R. and Omers Adminisiration Corp v Tesco Ple [2019] EWHC 109 (Ch) are of persuasive value, recognising that the public interest in the investigation of serious offences, and in the fair determination of civil claims on all relevant material, may displace the confidentiality of compelled documents.

The applicable principle requires the applicant to establish a proper evidential foundation before the Court will exercise its discretion to permit collateral use. The Court must balance the public interest in confidentiality and the integrity of the Protective Order against the competing public interest invoked. D.

In my view, the following issues arise for determination: a. Whether the prayers in Enclosure 708 are sufficiently particularised to be granted? b. Whether the "public interest" exception applies to justify disclosure of protected information? c. Whether Enclosure 708 constitutes an abuse of process or harassment? E. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Issue 1: Whether the Prayers are Sufficiently Particularised

The fundamental requirement for any application to this Court is that the relief sought must be clearly and precisely identified. This is not merely a matter of procedural nicety but goes to the heart of the Court's ability to exercise its supervisory function and to ensure that the scope of any order is properly circumscribed.

The Plaintiffs submit, and I accept, that the prayers in Enclosure 708 are framed in the broadest possible terms. The Defendants seek leave to use "maklumat dan/atau dokumen-dokumen yang dikatakan dilindungi" (information and/or documents which are purportedly protected). The use of the phrase "yang dikatakan" is significant it denotes uncertainty on the Defendants' own part as to whether the information and documents are in fact protected by the Protective Order.

More critically, the Defendants failed in Enclosure 708 itself to identify with any specificity: a) Which particular documents they sought to disclose; b) Which particular information within those documents; c) How such documents/information are protected by the Protective Order; and d) Whether any of the documents fall outside the Protective Order's scope.

The Defendants' attempt to particularise the documents in their Written Submission (at paragraph 32) and in their Written Submission in Reply (referring to paragraph 42 of Enclosure 709) does not cure this fundamental defect. As the Plaintiffs correctly submit, this attempt came too late the application itself must stand or fall on its own terms. The Court cannot grant leave in respect of documents that are not identified in the application itself, only to have the scope of the order clarified retrospectively in submissions.

The Defendants identified the following documents in paragraph 42 of Enclosure 709 and their submissions: a) The KPA Report; b) The Sri Muda Police Report; c) The Plaintiffs' affidavits (Enclosures 451, 461, 464, 465, 513); and d) Hafizah's Affidavit (Enclosure 678).

However, this identification does not appear in the prayers of Enclosure 708. The prayers remain couched in general, unlimited terms. The Court cannot grant a "blanket" or "carte blanche" leave that would permit the Defendants to use any information or documents that they subsequently deem to be relevant to their proposed report.

The purpose of a Protective Order is to preserve confidentiality while permitting necessary disclosure for the litigation at hand. If the Court were to grant leave in the terms sought, it would effectively eviscerate the protections afforded by the Protective Order, rendering the Plaintiffs' undertaking to the Court nugatory. The Court's role in supervising and balancing confidentiality against competing interests requires that any exception is strictly and precisely defined.

I therefore find that the prayers in Enclosure 708 are defective for want of particularisation. They are unsustainable in their present form and ought to be dismissed on this basis alone.

Even if the prayers were sufficiently particularised, the Defendants must establish a proper evidential foundation to justify the extraordinary step of permitting disclosure of court-protected information for the purpose of criminal investigation.

The Defendants allege that Jonathan Chong and the Plaintiffs committed: a) Section 193 Penal Code: Punishment for false evidence; and b) Section 199 Penal Code: False statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as evidence.

The foundation for this allegation rests substantially on Hafizah's Affidavit in Reply (Enclosure 678). The Defendants contend that this affidavit reveals that: a) Jonathan Chong prepared draft police reports; b) Hafizah acted on his instructions; c) The Plaintiffs and Jonathan Chong knew of the MACC complaint at all material times; and d) Their denials in subsequent affidavits were therefore false.

The Plaintiffs raise several compelling objections to this reliance:

First, the Plaintiffs dispute the contents of Enclosure 678 and contend that it is contradicted by Hafizah's own documentary exhibits. The Plaintiffs point out that Hafizah herself lodged the MACC Report and the Police Report, and that the MACC Report contains no reference implicating the Plaintiffs or Jonathan Chong.

Second, the Defendants' own hesitation in their submissions is telling. They use the qualified phrase "may have been made" when referring to the alleged false statements, indicating uncertainty rather than conviction. This linguistic choice is significant wherein it demonstrates that the Defendants themselves are not prepared to assert definitively that false statements were made.

Third, the Defendants withdrew their contempt applications against Hafizah (Enclosures 618 and 650) upon receiving Enclosure 678, accepting that she acted under Jonathan Chong's instructions. Yet the Defendants now seek to rely on this same affidavit to establish criminality on the part of Jonathan Chong and the Plaintiffs. This selective reliance is problematic.

Fourth, and most importantly, the Defendants have failed to establish any prima facie case that the alleged false statements, even if proven, constitute the offences under sections 193 and 199 of the Penal Code. The elements of these offences require: Section Essential Elements Section 193

Intentionally giving false evidence;

In any stage of a judicial proceeding;

Knowing or believing it to be false Section 199

Making a false statement;

In a declaration which is by law receivable as evidence;

Knowing or believing it to be false;

With intent that it shall be used as evidence

The Defendants have not demonstrated: a) Which specific statements in which specific affidavits are alleged to be false; b) The materiality of such statements to the proceedings in which they were made; c) The requisite mens rea (knowledge or belief of falsity) on the part of Jonathan Chong; or d) That the statements were made in circumstances attracting the statutory prohibitions.

The mere fact that Hafizah's account differs from Jonathan Chong's account does not, without more, establish the commission of criminal offences. Affidavit evidence is frequently disputed in civil litigation, and the resolution of such disputes is a matter for the trial Court. The Defendants' approach would criminalise ordinary civil disputes and permit the weaponisation of criminal process to gain tactical advantage.

In the absence of such evidential foundation, there is no basis to invoke the "public interest" exception to the Protective Order. Issue 2: Whether the Public Interest Exception Applies

I accept the legal principles articulated in these authorities as correctly stating the law. The Court of Appeal in Ng Kim Fong (supra) clearly established that "the defence of public interest would involve, for example, the disclosure of evidence concerning the commission of criminal offences and other serious unlawful/antisocial conduct, e.g. tax evasion." The exception is not limited to fraud or misdeeds but extends to "any such illegal behaviour or misconduct that ought to be disclosed to other parties."

However, the application of these principles requires a precondition: there must be credible evidence of the alleged criminal conduct or serious misconduct. The public interest exception does not operate on suspicion, surmise, or tactical advantage. As the Court of Appeal held in Ng Kim Fong, the public interest must be established on the facts of the particular case.

In the present case:

There is no public investigation or prosecution currently ongoing against the Plaintiffs or Jonathan Chong for any serious offence or fraud. The Defendants seek to initiate such investigation through their proposed report. The authorities cited by the Defendants concerned situations where investigations or prosecutions were already underway or where there was clear evidence of serious criminality.

The Defendants have failed to particularise the specific information and documents they seek to use, making it impossible for the Court to assess whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs the confidentiality interest.

The Defendants have failed to establish any prima facie case of criminal offences that would attract the public interest exception. The authorities relied upon by the Defendants all concerned situations where there was credible evidence of serious wrongdoing such as tax evasion, complex fraud, or other "iniquity" that ought to be disclosed. In the present case, the Defendants' own evidence does not rise to this threshold. Their use of the qualified phrase "may have been made" in respect of the alleged false statements demonstrates uncertainty rather than conviction, and their entire case rests on disputed affidavit evidence from Hafizah which the Plaintiffs have challenged as contradictory and unsupported.

Learned counsel for the Defendants had placed reliance on the case of Marlwood and Omers. In Marlwood it was held by the Court that a party who obtains documents through compulsory civil disclosure may not use them for a purpose outside those proceedings unless the court permits it, the document has been read or referred to in open court, or the relevant parties’ consent. This is the principle now reflected in UK CPR r 31.22. The purpose of the collateral-use rule as envisaged in that case is to encourage full and frank compliance with civil disclosure obligations. A party compelled to disclose documents should not ordinarily find those documents deployed for an unrelated collateral purpose. However, it was held that this rule is not absolute. The court retains a discretion to permit collateral use where the justice of the case so requires.

In Marlwood, the proposed collateral use was disclosure of documents to the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) for the purpose of a serious fraud investigation. The court weighed, on one side, the public interest in preserving the integrity of civil disclosure and preventing misuse of documents obtained compulsorily; and, on the other, the public interest in the investigation and prosecution of serious fraud. The latter may, in an appropriate case, outweigh the ordinary restriction on collateral use. Where the proposed collateral use concerns the investigation of serious fraud, the public interest in permitting use may be particularly strong. The court was prepared to allow use where the documents were potentially relevant to criminal investigation and there was no sufficient countervailing injustice. A key consideration is whether there is any special reason to fear injustice to the party who gave disclosure, or unfairness in the proceedings in which the documents may later be used. The absence of such prejudice supports permission.

The core principle derived from Marlwood is that the court may release a party from the implied undertaking or collateral-use restriction where there is a sufficiently strong public interest, especially in the investigation of serious fraud, provided the court is satisfied that such use will not occasion injustice or unfairness.

In Omers the Court explained that mere relevance does not automatically justify disclosure in breach of confidence. The court retains a discretion and must consider whether the documents are necessary or important for the fair disposal of the proceedings. It was held that where the documents are in the possession or control of a party to the proceedings, the starting point is that relevant documents should be disclosed. However, where the documents carry confidentiality or privacy concerns, the court must still balance those interests against the need for a fair trial.

I have considered the weight attached to both these cases. In my considered view, the Marlwood principle that public interest in investigation or prosecution of serious or complex fraud should take precedence is distinguishable. There is no ongoing public investigation or prosecution of the Plaintiffs or Jonathan Chong. The Defendants seek to initiate such investigation through their own report, using protected documents to do so. This is not a case where the authorities have already identified serious criminality and require access to compulsorily obtained documents to progress their inquiries.

The Omers principle that public interest in confidentiality must yield to the public interest in ensuring courts try civil claims on all relevant material is similarly inapposite. That principle concerns the fair resolution of civil claims before the court, not the collateral use of protected documents to initiate external criminal proceedings. In my considered view, the Defendants' application in the instant case would paradoxically undermine the very fairness it purports to serve by using disputed civil evidence as a springboard for criminal complaint.

I therefore find that the public interest exception does not apply based on the facts of this case. The Defendants have not established the necessary precondition of credible evidence of serious criminality that would justify overriding the confidentiality protections of the Protective Order. Issue 3: Whether Enclosure 708 Constitutes an Abuse of Process or Harassment

The Plaintiffs allege that Enclosure 708 is an abuse of process, constituting a tactical manoeuvre intended to delay proceedings and prevent finality, and a mechanism to harass, oppress, and exert undue pressure on them.

I find that the defects identified in Issues 1 and 2 are sufficient to dispose of Enclosure 708. I do not find it necessary to make a definitive determination on abuse of process for present purposes. F.

Having weighed the competing public interests, I find that the Defendants have not, at this juncture, established the necessary evidential foundation to displace the confidentiality afforded by the Protective Order. The factual basis for the alleged false statements remains in dispute and unsubstantiated, and there is presently no investigation or prosecution to which the public interest exception may attach.

The integrity of the Protective Order and the Court's supervisory function must be preserved, and leave to use protected material for collateral purposes ought not to be granted on a tentative or speculative basis.

Accordingly, Enclosure 708 is dismissed with costs RM 10,000.00. Dated this day of 30th June 2026. -Sgd-EDWIN PARAMJOTHY MICHAEL MUNIANDY JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER COMMERCIAL DIVISION (NCC 7) HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Counsel: For the Plaintiffs : Ling Hua Keong together with Chong Yue Thong Boey Kai Qi and Nurul Faqihah binti Zakaria (PIC) (Messrs. Ling & Mok) For the Defendants : Foong Cheng Leong together with Low Li Qun and Rachel Tan Li Ying (Messrs. Foong Cheng Leong & Co.)