1. ) Oyes Motor Sports Sdn. Bhd. v Su Hock Guan (JA-22NCvC-75-06/2025)

OYES MOTOR SPORTS SDN. BHD. [Company No: 202001003826 (1360146-V)]

YEONG KEE TECK [NRIC : 740902-01-7201] …PLAINTIFFS AND SU HOCK GUAN [NRIC: 750901-01-5289] …DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 30/10/2025 11:52:21

There are five applications before this Court, namely—

Plaintiff’s inter partes application for Mareva Injunction (Enclosure 3);

Plaintiff’s inter partes application for an Anton Piller Order (Enclosure 4);

Defendant’s application for leave to file an additional affidavit (Enclosure 25);

Defendant’s application to set aside the ex parte and ad interim Mareva Orders dated 5 June 2025 and 19 June 2025 (Enclosure 31); and

Defendant’s application for stay of the ex parte and interim Mareva injunction and Anton Piller order until the disposal of their application to set aside the said orders or the hearing of the inter partes injunction, or to vary the said orders (Enclosure 40).

Both parties had filed written submissions and authorities and submitted orally to the Court on 9 September 2025. The decision is fixed for 30 September 2025, and this is the Court's decision.

The Second Plaintiff and the Defendant are directors and equal shareholders of the First Plaintiff. The Plaintiffs’ case is that the Defendant, as Managing Director of the First Plaintiff, had abused his position and breached his fiduciary duties by misappropriating company funds and falsifying records.

It is alleged that the Defendant had utilised pre-signed cheques of the Second Plaintiff to transfer substantial sums, including RM453,000.00 and further payments exceeding RM2 million, into his personal account. The Defendant is further alleged to have recorded payments from third parties as if they were loans from him, thereby creating a false indebtedness of the company and securing wrongful repayments exceeding RM1.5 million.

According to the Plaintiffs, these acts were deliberate, resulted in losses exceeding RM7.5 million, and placed the First Plaintiff at risk of winding up.

The Plaintiffs accordingly applied ex parte for a Mareva Injunction pursuant to Order 29 and/or Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) to restrain the Defendant from dissipating or disposing of his assets in Malaysia. The orders sought included—

freezing the Defendant’s bank accounts, fixed deposits, shares, and real property, with specific reference to identified Public Bank Berhad accounts;

restraining solicitors from transferring the balance sale proceeds of the First Plaintiff’s business premises at Jalan Kebun Teh,

compelling the Defendant to disclose by affidavit full particulars of his assets and the status of 14 cheques totaling RM2,121,345.52 alleged to have been misappropriated.

Exemptions were allowed for withdrawals up to RM10,000.00 per month for living expenses and legal costs, while third parties including Public Bank Berhad and solicitors involved were bound by the order, with any knowing breach amounting to contempt of court.

The Plaintiffs contended that the Defendant had manipulated pre-signed cheques to divert funds into his personal accounts and falsified ledgers by recording payments from third parties as purported loans from him, thereby fabricating a false indebtedness.

Concurrently, the Plaintiffs applied ex parte for an Anton Piller order to preserve and secure critical evidence. The order sought to authorize entry into the Defendant’s premises, under the supervision of an independent solicitor, to search for and seize documents, cheque books, ledgers, and electronic devices evidencing the alleged misappropriation.

Plaintiffs’ application was premised on a strong prima facie case of dishonesty, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of trust, coupled with a real risk that the Defendant would destroy or conceal relevant documents if prior notice were given. Safeguards were incorporated, including the role of an independent supervising solicitor, limits on the scope of materials to be seized, and the Plaintiffs’ undertakings in damages.

On 5 June 2025, the Court allowed, both the ex parte Mareva Injunction and the Anton Piller Order. Thereafter, on 19 June 2025, the Court granted an ad interim injunction to remain in force until the disposal of the inter partes injunction hearing.

Pursuant to the above Court’s order, the Defendant filed affidavits in Enclosures 21 and 22 to disclose the documents directed to be produced.

The Defendant thereafter filed an Affidavit in Enclosure 23 in reply to the Plaintiffs’ Affidavit in support of the Mareva Injunction and the Anton Piller Order. Subsequently, on 30 June 2025, the Defendant filed a Notice of Application in Enclosure 25 seeking leave to file an additional Affidavit in respect of the Plaintiffs’ said applications.

On 7 July 2025, the Defendant filed a Notice of Application in Enclosure 31 to set aside the ex parte Mareva Injunction and Anton Piller order dated 5 June 2025 as well as the ad interim order dated 19 June 2025.

On 17 July 2025, the Plaintiffs filed an application in Enclosure 36 seeking leave to commence committal proceedings against the Defendant. The matter is fixed for hearing on 10 October 2025.

On 18 July 2025, the Defendant filed an application in Enclosure 40 for a stay of the ex parte and ad interim Mareva Injunction and Anton Piller order until the disposal of their application to set aside the said orders or the hearing of the inter partes injunction, or to vary the said orders.

As a matter of housekeeping, parties filed in various written submissions for all four applications as below—

inter partes Mareva Injunction and Anton Piller Order:

Plaintiff written submission in Enclosure 58;

(ii) Plaintiff bundle of authority in Enclosure 59;

(iii) Defendant written submission in Enclosure 74;

(iv) Defendant bundle of authority in Enclosure 75;

Defendant written submission in Enclosure 83; and

(vi) Defendant bundle of authority in Enclosure 84;

Defendant’s application for leave to file an additional Affidavit in respect of the inter partes Mareva Injunction and Anton Piller Order (enclosure 25)—

Defendant written submission in Enclosure 55;

(ii) Defendant bundle of authority in Enclosure 56;

(iii) Plaintiff written submission in Enclosure 58; and

(iv) Plaintiff bundle of authority in Enclosure 59;

Defendant’s application to set aside the ex parte Mareva Injunction and Anton Piller Order dated 5 June 2025 as well as the ad interim order dated 19 June 2025 (Enclosure 31)—

Plaintiff written submission in Enclosure 58;

(ii) Plaintiff bundle of authority in Enclosure 59;

(iii) Defendant written submission in Enclosure 66;

(iv) Defendant bundle of authority in Enclosure 67;

Plaintiff written submission in Enclosure 70; and

(vi) Plaintiff bundle of authority in Enclosure 71;

(vii) Plaintiff written submission in Enclosure 85; and

(viii) Plaintiff written submission in Enclosure 86;

Defendant’s application for a stay of the ex parte and ad interim Mareva Injunction and Anton Piller Order until the disposal of their application to set aside the said orders or the hearing of the inter partes injunction, or to vary the said orders (Enclosure 40)—

Defendant written submission in Enclosure 77;

(ii) Defendant bundle of authority in Enclosure 78;

(iii) Plaintiff written submission in Enclosure 79;

(iv) Plaintiff bundle of authority in Enclosure 80;

Defendant written submission in Enclosure 81; and

(vi) Defendant bundle of authority in Enclosure 82;

(vii) Plaintiff written submission in Enclosure 87; and

(viii) Plaintiff written submission in Enclosure 88;

Locus standi

The Defendant has raised a preliminary issue on locus standi. He argues that the alleged wrongs, which are misappropriation of funds and falsification of records, are wrongs against the First Plaintiff, a company. By virtue of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189, the company has the right to sue. The Defendant further submits that based on the Companies Act 2016 [Act 777], the proper procedure for a shareholder or director to bring proceedings on behalf of the company is by way of a statutory derivative action under section 347 of Act 777, which requires leave of the Court. The Defendant relies on authorities such as Faridah Mohamed v. Tan Huan Hing [2020] CLJU 1224 and Amir Shariffuddin Abd Raub & Anor v. Affin Bank Berhad [2020] 1 LNS 231.

In reply, the Plaintiffs contend that this is an exceptional case falling within the recognised exceptions to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. They argue that the Defendant, being the alleged wrongdoer in control of the First Plaintiff and holding a status as an equal co-shareholder with the Second Plaintiff, resulting the company to be in deadlocked. Therefore, in such circumstances, the doctrine of necessity applies to allow the Second Plaintiff to institute proceedings. The Plaintiff referred to the Privy Council decision in Cook v. Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554, where directors who diverted company opportunities were held accountable notwithstanding their control, and to Ng Heng Liat v. Takara Emas Sdn Bhd, which affirmed that minority shareholders may sue where the wrongdoers are in control and the company cannot act.

The Court views that the rule in Foss v. Harbottle is a derivative action. This was explained in Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064, that— “…the proper plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a company is, prima facie, the company itself”.

This principle reflects the doctrine of separate legal personality and ensures that individual shareholders cannot usurp the company’s right of action. The rule, however, has long been subject to recognised exceptions, including cases of fraud on the minority and situations where the wrongdoers are in control.

However, with the enactment of Act 777, Parliament codified the derivative action. Section 347 of Act 777 provides as follows— “Derivative proceedings

(1) A complainant may, with the leave of the Court initiate, intervene in or defend a proceeding on behalf of the company.

Proceedings brought under this section shall be brought in the company’s name.

The right of any person to bring, intervene in, defend or discontinue any proceedings on behalf of a company at common law is abrogated”.

Cases such as Faridah binti Mohamed and Amir Shariffuddin Abd Raub, affirm that the common law derivative action has been superseded and that leave under section 347 of Act 777 is a mandatory precondition. On this basis, the Second Plaintiff lacks locus standi, rendering the present action untenable.

The Plaintiffs, however, maintain that this is a case of necessity. They submit that the First Plaintiff is stymied by a 50-50 deadlock, and the Defendant, as the alleged wrongdoer in control, has disabled the company from acting in its own name.

This Court is mindful that locus standi is ultimately a substantive question, particularly in view of subsection 347(3) of Act 777, which expressly abrogates the common law derivative action. This restriction falls under the principle that the Court’s inherent powers cannot be invoked to defeat clear statutory provisions. The Federal Court in Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 explained this principle as follows— “It is trite law that the power to extend time must be a creature of statute and as long ago as 1960 in the well-known case of Lee Lee Cheng (f) v. Seow Peng Kwang [1960] MLJ 1 the Federation of Malaya Court of Appeal was concerned with the question of the effect of para 12 of the Second Schedule of the Courts Ordinance 1948 (in pari materia with para 8 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964). The point which concerns us was well captured by Rigby J, when he said: In my view the judgment of BarakbahJ was entirely correct in holding that item 12 in the Second Schedule of the Courts Ordinance 1948, is merely declaratory of the jurisdiction of the High Court to enlarge the time prescribed by any written law for doing any act or taking any proceeding, always providing there is express provision in the particular written law itself which enables such time to be so enlarged. Any other construction of the section would, in my view, simply nullify the purpose and effect of the law relatingto the limitation of actions”.

However, it is equally well established that at the interlocutory stage, the Court does not finally determine parties’ rights but is concerned with preserving the status quo and preventing injustice pending trial. (see: Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 21 Ors v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 97, S & F International Ltd v Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 62 and Lian Keow Sdn Bhd (in Liquidation) & Anor v Overseas Credit Finance (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 2 MLJ 449).

The issue of locus standi was raised as a preliminary objection by the Defendant. Having considered the competing arguments, this Court is mindful that subsection 347(3) of Act 777 abolishes the common law derivative action. However, at the interlocutory stage, the Court’s role is not to make a final pronouncement on locus standi but to determine whether interim relief should be preserved to prevent injustice.

To adopt a rigid view that no relief may be entertained until leave is obtained under section 347 of Act 777 would, in cases of deadlock and alleged misconduct by the controlling shareholder, effectively paralyse the company and render nugatory the very mischief that interim relief is designed to prevent. This approach is consistent with the principle that interlocutory relief may be granted to prevent injustice notwithstanding unresolved issues of standing (see Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 21 Ors v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor.

In light of the pleaded deadlock and the serious allegations of misconduct, this Court has determined that the Plaintiffs’ standing may be provisionally entertained at this interlocutory stage on grounds of necessity, without prejudice to the full determination of standing and the merits at trial. The Court therefore proceeds to examine the substantive applications, namely the Mareva Injunction and the Anton Piller Order, to assess whether the established conditions for such relief have been satisfied.

Mareva Injunction

For Mareva Injunction, this Court is guided by the condition articulated in S&F International Limited and Creative Furnishing Sdn Bhd v Wong Koi [1989] 2 CLJ 93; [1989] 2 MLJ 153. In summary, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in both cases distilled the following requirements—

the plaintiff must have a good arguable case against the defendant;

the defendant must have assets within the jurisdiction; and

there is a real risk that the assets will be dissipated or removed. First Requirement : the plaintiff must have a good arguable case against the defendant

The Federal Court in S&F International, relying on Ninemia Maritime Corpn v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG, The Niedersachen [1984] 1 All ER 398, explained that a “good arguable case” is— "…a case which is more than barely capable of serious argument, and yet not necessarily one which the judge believes to have a better than 50% chance of success".

The burden is upon the Plaintiff to establish such a case at prima facie. This principle was explained in Pacific Centre Sdn Bhd v United Engineers (M) Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 143, as follows— "(3) The onus was on the plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case for the grant of Mareva Injunction and if the court was so satisfied it had to consider the evidence adduced by the defendants to see if this prima facie case had been neutralised or displaced;"

In the application before this Court, Plaintiffs rely on Defendant’s alleged breach of fiduciary duties that are:

misuse of pre-signed cheques Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant used cheques, pre-signed by the Second Plaintiff to transfer funds into his personal account. The Defendant has exhibited a table of subsequent payments allegedly made to third parties. However, no documentary evidence has been produced to substantiate the purpose of these payments or to demonstrate any nexus between those third parties and the First Plaintiff. The absence of invoices, receipts, or agreements raises questions as to whether these payments were legitimately connected to the company’s business.

falsification of loan records The Plaintiffs allege that monies received from third parties were recorded in the company’s accounts as loans from the Defendant. The Defendant denied this but has not furnished documentary evidence, such as bank statements, transfer slips, or loan agreements, to support the accounting entries.

under-recording of repayments The Plaintiffs further contend that repayments made by the First Plaintiff to the Defendant were not fully reflected in the extended ledger, with the effect that the sums recorded did not correspond to the sums allegedly received. However, the Defendant did not produce any documents to reconcile the discrepancy.

Having considered the submission and course papers before this Court, the evidence suggests irregularities in the handling and recording of the First Plaintiff’s funds/accounts. While the Defendant has raised a denial, the absence of corroborating documentation lends weight to the Plaintiffs’ assertions. Accordingly, this Court finds that in the absence of corroborating documentation, the Defendant’s denial is insufficient to neutralise the Plaintiffs’ case at this stage. Therefore, these matters are sufficient to establish that the Plaintiffs have raised a prima facie good arguable case against the Defendant. Second Requirement : the defendant must have assets within the jurisdiction

As to whether the Defendant has assets within this jurisdiction, this Court refers to Lien Hoe Sawmill Co. Sdn. Bhd. v. Yap Sing Hock & Ors. [1992] 2 CLJ Rep 727, which opined that— "…what the plaintiff is required to do is to give some grounds for believing that the defendants have assets within jurisdiction.

Based on the affidavits and cause papers filed herein, it is not disputed that the Defendant is the Managing Director of the First Plaintiff and holds 50% of its shares. The Plaintiffs further aver that the Defendant diverted company funds into his personal account by using pre-signed cheques and falsifying records. This Court is of the view that, for the purpose of Mareva Injunction, these facts are sufficient at this interlocutory stage to satisfy the requirement of the second condition. Third Requirement : there is a real risk that the assets will be dissipated or removed

The Supreme Court in Aspatra Sdn Bhd explained the degree to prove the real risk that the assets will be dissipated or removed as below— "But the remedy is not of unlimited application. On the facts of the appeal before us, the respondent must satisfy the court firstly, that he had a good arguable case; secondly, that the appellant had assets within jurisdiction, and thirdly that there was a real risk of the assets being dissipated or removed before judgment in that there must be solid evidence to establish the risk. In our opinion, mere refusal to pay a disputed debt and issuing of a dishonoured personal cheque by a director of the second defendant (who was not a party in this appeal), as presented before the learned judge, fell far too short of the necessary evidence to establish real risk of dissipation of assets of the appellant before judgment". (Emphasis added)

In Robert Doran & Ors v. Kuan Pek Seng & Ors [2010] 6 CLJ 105 the Court guided as below— "[11] As in most cases, the most difficult area relates to the examination of the available evidence to ascertain whether there is a risk that the assets would be dissipated so as to justify the granting of the Mareva injunction. The difficulty arises because invariably a dishonest defendant will cover his/her tracks, making it difficult for the plaintiff to produce the necessary relevant evidence. It is for this reason that the courts have over a period of time pronounced that when determining the risk of dissipation, the court is entitled to draw inferences from the defendant's previous action which show that his probity is not to be relied upon or that the corporate structure of the defendant is not to be relied upon. Of course, in considering the probity of the defendant or the lack of it, the court should also examine closely the evidence raised by way of rebuttal by the defendant”. (Emphasis added)

In this case, the Plaintiffs rely on—

the use of pre-signed cheques to transfer company funds into the Defendant’s personal account;

the recording of third-party remittances as purported loans from the Defendant; and

discrepancies said to arise from the under-recording of repayments.

They submit that these matters, viewed cumulatively, show a willingness to deal with assets in a manner adverse to the First Plaintiff’s interests and support an inference that further dealings may place assets beyond reach.

The Defendant denies any impropriety and contends that the allegations relate to past transactions, not to any present intention to dissipate assets. However, the denials are not corroborated by documentation capable of addressing the specific irregularities identified.

At this interlocutory stage, and taking into account the pattern of unexplained transfers to a personal account and the absence of corroborating records to justify the impugned entries, although it relates to past transactions, this Court satisfied that the risk identified by the Plaintiffs is real rather than speculative. The danger is further underscored by the nature of the assets in question, which are readily amenable to swift movement.

Viewed cumulatively, the Defendant’s conduct in diverting funds, falsifying records, and failing to produce supporting documents demonstrates a willingness to deal with assets adversely to the First Plaintiff’s interests. The Court therefore, finds the risk of dissipation to be real, not speculative. In the premises, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have established the third condition.

Anton Piller Order

Anton Piller order is a court order that provides for the right to search premises without prior warning. This is used to prevent the destruction of incriminating evidence. The court in the case of N-Visio Sdn Bhd v. Horizon Multimedia Sdn Bhd & 5 Ors [2009] CLJU 1271 explains that due to the very nature of the order, which is to prevent the destruction or loss of material and relevant evidence, hence more often than not, the court will be moved discreetly and speedily for an ex parte order without the knowledge of the Defendant. It would come as a surprise to the Defendant. That is why, according to N-Visio Sdn Bhd, English cases over the years seem to recognize that after an ex parte Anton Piller Order has been granted, there is no necessity for the Plaintiff to bring it forward.

N-Visio Sdn Bhd also clarifies that the position under Malaysian law is as follows— “In Malaysia, however, we have codified this practice of giving an inter partes hearing after an ex parte order of an interim injunction is granted. As had been ruled by Steve Shim Lip Keong J in the case of GMX Associates Pte Ltd & Anor v. Lee Yew Pooi (Berniaga di bawah nama dan gaya Universal Trading Co, the 21 days rule is irrelevant in an Anton Piller order. However it would be prudent for the court to give a return date after an ex parte Anton Piller Order is granted”.

The conditions for the grant of an Anton Piller order are well established in Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55, from which it get names, and have been consistently applied in Malaysia. In Anton Piller KG, the conditions to apply for the Anton Piller Order are summarized as follows—

an extremely strong prima facie case;

a refusal by the court of an Anton Piller Order, would have a serious effect on the Plaintiff;

there must be clear evidence that the Defendant is in possession of incriminating documents and there is a real possibility that the defendant will destroy the same before trial of the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant; and

if the Anton Piller Order is made, it ought to contain the necessary undertakings and safeguards to be complied with upon its execution. Extremely strong prima facie case

Unlike the Mareva injunction, which requires only a “good arguable case,” an Anton Piller order demands an extremely strong prima facie case. This threshold has been affirmed in Arthur Anderson & Co v Interfood Sdn Bhd [2005] 1 MLRA 375 and TT Dotcom Sdn Bhd v Low Wey Heng & Ors [2020] MLJU 1512.

The term "extremely strong prima facie case referred in ESPL (M) Sdn Bhd v Harbert International Est Sdn Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 296 was referring to that— “… the applicant must satisfy the court that it has a strong prima facie case against the defendant ie there exists a claim of some substance, eg a breach of contract or a breach of undertaking or trust. The prima facie case requirement in an Anton Piller order refers to the base claim or cause of action a plaintiff has against a defendant”.

On the requirement of a strong prima facie case, the Court in Apparatech (M) Sdn Bhd explained the following— “The plaintiff must show, in order to obtain an Anton Piller order, that there is a “very strong prima facie case against the defendant”. To do this, the plaintiff must show that there is a valid cause of action and that judgment would be granted in favour of the plaintiff”.

In Silver Bird Group Berhad & Ors v Dato’ Tan Han Kook & Ors [2013] 1 LNS 1398, the Court explains a strong prima facie case as below— “…the fact the court has granted the Anton Piller Order and the Mareva Order dated 8.8.2012 on an ex parte basis shows that the Plaintiff have already demonstrated a strong prima facie case and/or good arguable case against the Defendants.”

On the matter before this Court, the Plaintiffs allege falsification of the company’s ledgers by recording third-party remittances as loans from the Defendant, diversion of RM453,000.00 and further payments exceeding RM2 million into the Defendant’s personal account by means of pre-signed cheques, and the creation of a false indebtedness which resulted in wrongful repayments of over RM1.5 million. These allegations are supported by affidavit evidence (Enclosure 8, Enclosure 58). This Court’s views that the cumulative effect of this material discloses a case that is far more than arguable; it is an extremely strong prima facie case of breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation.

a refusal by the court of an Anton Piller Order, would have serious effect on the Plaintiff

The alleged diversion of more than RM7.5 million and falsification of ledgers places the First Plaintiff at risk of winding up. Without preservation of the relevant records, the Plaintiffs’ ability to establish their claim and to protect the company’s assets would be gravely undermined. The potential prejudice is therefore substantial and irreparable if the order were withheld.

there must be clear evidence that the Defendant is in possession of incriminating documents and there is a real possibility that the Defendant will destroy the same before the trial of the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant

In Pentamaster Instrumentation Sdn Bhd v QAV Technologies Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] MLJU 1494, the Court explained the following— “It is trite law that for this Court to grant an inter partes APO, the Plaintiff has the legal onus to prove that there is a “real risk” or “real possibility” of destruction or concealment of evidence by the 1st Defendant - please see Arthur Anderson & Co, at sub-paragraph 31”. (see also: Yousif v Salaman [1980] 3 All ER 405; Lian Keow Sdn Bhd v C Paramiothi & Anor [1982] 1 MLJ 217; and Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor v Lorrain Osman & Ors [1985]

In this case, the Plaintiffs point to specific categories of documents under the Defendant’s control, including accounting ledgers, vouchers, invoices, bank statements, electronic records, and communication devices. They further rely on instances where the Defendant falsified the extended ledger and failed to produce vouchers or receipts to justify payments. This conduct strongly indicates that there is a real risk of evidence being tampered with or destroyed if notice were given.

Although there is no direct proof of intent to destroy documents, the Defendant’s prior falsifications and concealment of records support the inference that the risk is genuine. This Court therefore accepts that the third condition is met.

if the Anton Piller Order is made, it ought to contain the necessary undertakings and safeguards to be complied with upon its execution

This Court is mindful that an Anton Piller Order is an intrusive remedy that must not be oppressive or disproportionate. It is for this reason that the order must contain appropriate undertakings and safeguards to balance the interests of both parties. In this case, this Court is satisfy that the inclusion of an independent supervising solicitor, the restricted scope of inspection, and the usual undertaking in damages collectively provide adequate safeguards.

The Plaintiffs have also given the usual undertaking as to damages. Collectively, these measures provide assurance that the Defendant’s rights are not unduly prejudiced, while still preserving the integrity of the evidence that is critical to the Plaintiffs’ claim.

Given the intrusive nature of an Anton Piller Order, the Court must ensure that safeguards are in place to avoid oppression.

Having considered the totality of the evidence and submissions, the Court is satisfied that all four conditions for the grant of an Anton Piller Order are present. The Plaintiffs have established an extremely strong prima facie case of breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation. The potential damage to the Plaintiffs, in the absence of the order, is grave, given the scale of losses alleged and the risk of the company’s collapse. There is clear evidence that the Defendant has control over relevant documents and a real possibility that such records could be destroyed or concealed if prior notice were given. Finally, the order, as crafted, incorporates the necessary undertakings and safeguards to prevent abuse and to ensure that the relief remains proportionate. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the Anton Piller Order was granted correctly and should be maintained.

Based to the above said justitifications, this Court is satisfied that the objections raised by the Defendant on locus standi are provisionally entertained on grounds of necessity at this interlocutory stage, without prejudice to the final determination at trial.

On the Mareva injunction, the Plaintiffs have demonstrated a prima facie good arguable case, shown that the Defendant has assets within this jurisdiction, and adduced sufficient material from which this Court may infer a real risk of dissipation.

On the Anton Piller order, the Plaintiffs have satisfied the stringent conditions, that exists an extremely strong prima facie case, serious prejudice would be occasioned if the order were withheld, there is a real risk of destruction or concealment of incriminating documents, and the order as crafted contains adequate undertakings and safeguards to prevent oppression.

In the premises, this Court finds that—

the Mareva Injunction and the Anton Piller Order previously granted are affirmed to continue until the disposal of the action;

Enclosures 25, 31, and 40 have become academic and accordingly, they are dismissed; and

the costs of these applications shall be in the cause. Dated : 30 September 2025 Dr Noradura binti Hamzah Judicial Commissioner High Court Civil 2 Johor Bahru Peguamcara : Su Hock Guan Tetuan Dennis Nik & Wong Peguamcara : Oyes Motor Sports Sdn Bhd (P1) : Yeong Kee Teck (P2)