Pamir Development Sdn Bhd (“Pamir”) 5 [7] The Defendant had been paying the Plaintiff for the supply of the RMC of over RM4 million for there was no dispute on the quantity and price. It was when cracks began to appear in the structural works of the development projects of their related companies that the Defendant stopped making payments. Pleadings [8] The Plaintiff claimed against the Defendant for the balance of RMC supplied to the Defendant for the sum of RM6,468,766.60. They contended that the supply of RMC had complied with the specifications as per Appendix 1 to the Eco Tropics LOA and EBP1 LOA for both the development Projects. [9] Most of the RMC supplied under the Eco Tropics LOA and EBP1 LOA is of Grade G25 and that represented the subject matter of the dispute here. By Grade G25 is meant that the minimum strength of the RMC is 25 N/mm2. The Plaintiff further argued that the RMC supplied had undergone successfully the Slump Test and Cube Tests as referred to contractually in the LOAs. [10] On the other hand the Defendant contended that when cracks were discovered between February and May 2016 in the Eco Tropics Project and EBP1 Project, Core Tests were conducted on the insitu core samples and arising from the Core Tests, the Defendant claimed that: a) the Core test did not correspond to the Cube Test results; b) that the Plaintiff did not conform to the condition or specifications under Eco Tropics LOA and EBP1 LOA; c) that the RMC supplied was not RMC of G25 and not what the 6 Defendant had bargained for; and d) were not fit for the purpose for which it was required and/or of merchantable quality. [11] The Defendant argued that the LOAs had referred in the Appendix to the relevant British Standard BS 8110 which incorporated Core Test into the specifications stipulated. [12] The Defendant further pleaded that the Plaintiff had swapped the Sample Cubes of the actual sample with the purported Sample Cubes sent to laboratories for compressive strength tests. They further alleged that the Plaintiff had tampered with and/or interfered, inter-meddled and/or otherwise manipulated the entire process of the Cube Test. [13] The Plaintiff replied that the Cube Test was following the prescribed procedure of random sampling as prescribed and practised and the tests were done by independent laboratories of the Defendant’s choice, which results were not objected to by the Defendant until the cracks appeared. [14] The Plaintiff vigorously denied any form of deceit or fraud committed by them with respect to the Cube Test results and further argued that the Core Test, which they are said to have failed, had nothing to do with the supply of the RMC which had met the requirements of the contract. The Plaintiff argued that there are elements of workmanship that may affect the structural strength of the RMC such as the human intervention of the construction workers working on the process of laying, concreting and curing the RMC on the formworks prepared, all of which processes are outside of the hands of the Plaintiff as supplier of the RMC. 7 Preliminaries [15] Parties agreed that the Court should hear this claim first in the 2016 Suit and in the event that the Plaintiff is found liable for the cracks in contractually supplying the RMC not in accordance with the specifications stipulated, then this Court will proceed to hear another related suit filed in Suit No. WA-22C-47-03/2017 (“the 2017 Suit”). [16] The 2016 Suit is linked to the 2017 Suit in that parties agreed that if the Court should decide the 2016 Suit in favour of PA Konkrit’s claim for the price of the balance RMC delivered then the claims of Eco Tropics Development Sdn Bhd and Eco Business Park 1 Development Sdn Bhd and 5 other Contractors against PA Konkrit in the 2017 Suit would be dismissed. [17] Conversely if the Court were to dismiss the PA Konkrit’s claim here than correspondingly Eco Tropics Development Sdn Bhd and Eco Business Park 1 Development Sdn Bhd and 5 other Contractors in the 2017 Suit would still have to be proved because there is there a claim for negligence and the tort of deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation but that the evidence in this case would be used in that 2017 Suit and proceedings. [18] In this 2016 Suit the Plaintiff called the following as their witnesses a. Chew Fatt Kin, the General Manager of the Plaintiff was called as the first witness [PW1]; b. Hong Mun Fatt, the Operations Manager of the Plaintiff in charge of the batching plant [PW2]; c. Chew Kok Hu, the site supervisor of the Plaintiff in the batching plant [PW3]; d. Ng Kong Choo, the site supervisor of the Plaintiff in the 8 batching plant [PW4]; e. Foo Kee Ken, the civil engineer with laboratory, Big I Sdn Bhd [PW5]; f. Koo Kean Siang, the civil engineer with laboratory, Geolab (M) Sdn Bhd [PW6]; g. Dr Tan Kuang Leong, an independent expert called to testify and give his opinion on the RMC produced by Plaintiff [PW7]. [19] The Defendant called the following as their witnesses: a. Ling Tien Heng, the Defendant’s General Manager from South Region called as the first witness [DW1]; b. Lee Wei Sheng, the civil structural engineer from Jurutera JRK Sdn Bhd, EBPI Project [DW2]; c. Jerry Chua Kuo Shing, the civil structural engineer from KH Goh & Associates Sdn Bhd, Eco Tropics Tropics Project [DW3]; d. Koh Chun Min, the civil structural engineer from TLK Sdn Bhd, Eco Tropics Project [DW4]; e. Thum Yee Kun, the Project Director from Hwa Hin Sdn Bhd, EBP1 Project [DW5]; f. Victor Oh Guan Chong, the Senior Project Manager, Pamir Development Sdn Bhd, Eco Tropics and EBP1 Project [DW6]; g. Cheng Leok, Managing Director of Kalsari Sdn Bhd, Eco Tropics Project [DW7]; h. Dr Kribanandan Gurusamy Naidu, Expert Witness called by the Defendant [DW8]; i. Kong Jung Sing, Managing Director of Geamin Construction, 9 Eco Tropics Project [DW9]; and j. Kassim Bin Yaakub, Associate Director Cum Test Engineer in Test Sdn Bhd [DW10]. [20] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff cautioned that it is not the Defendant’s case in this 2016 Suit that there is negligence on the part of the Plaintiff. [21] The Defendant is not alleging that the Plaintiff had failed to exercise due and reasonable care and was negligent in preparing Cube Samples and sending them for Cube Tests. [22] As can be seen from the Defence filed, the Defendant’s case was that there was a deliberate act on the part of the Plaintiff in manipulating, tampering and/or swapping the Cube Samples; fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation as the case may be of the Cube Test results. [23] At the end of the day two versions stare at the Court for its determination. One is whether the Plaintiff had indeed supplied RMC of Grade G25 according to the specifications with Cube Test results of a low Standard Deviation (“SD”) which though “challenging to achieve but practically possible”, independently tested by certified laboratories of the Defendant’s choice. That would be consistent with the Plaintiff’s version that the subsequent cracks in the structures are due to external factors not within the Plaintiff’s control including but not limited to the contractor’s workmanship. [24] Two is the Defendant’s version that the Plaintiff concocted the Cube Test results by sending cube samples pre-prepared in a controlled environment to the independent laboratories to be tested. This explains the “practically impossible” low SD as tested by the independent labs. This is 10 done purely to meet the Cube Test. The Plaintiff then supplied RMC of an inferior quality to the Defendant not of Grade G25 which resulted in cracks appearing and all the Core Tests to fail. [25] In the light of the evidence presented this Court had to decide which of the 2 versions is more probable. Whether the Plaintiff had proved the balance sum outstanding of RM6,468,766.60 for the RMC supplied and delivered to the Defendant [26] The Plaintiff had pleaded and claimed in Amended Statement of Claim for a sum of RM6,468,766.60 only being the agreed price for the RMC supplied and delivered to the Defendant from the months of December 2015 to May 2016. [27] The Defendant has raised a dispute as to the quantum of the Plaintiff’s Claim in its Written Submissions and that based on the Plaintiff’s tax invoices and delivery orders as produced, the Plaintiff’s claim must only be confined to the sum of RM3,625,216.23. The Defendant had also claimed that the Plaintiff has not led any evidence on the Statement of Accounts in Bundle C20. [28] Perhaps after 24 days of trial, learned counsel for the Defendant might have forgotten that he had agreed during the cross-examination of DW 1 by the Plaintiff that Parties had agreed that there was no issue on the quantity of RMC supplied and delivered and hence no dispute on the price and balance sum outstanding. [29] The only issue was the quality of the RMC supplied and delivered. It was whether the RMC had met the specifications stipulated and whether the Defendant had a complete Defence of set-off in that the RMC supplied 11 had failed the Core Test and that the cracks in the buildings could be attributed to the Plaintiff’s RMC. [30] The interchange between Counsel and the Court in the NOE dated 4.1.2018 at pg 40-41 is reproduced below to refresh memory: “LEU … So my question to you is that, there’s no dispute on the quantity supplied and/or the prices. You agree? You’re merely disputing because of the quality, that’s what you mentioned in here. You – is that correct? That’s the agreed facts, isn’t it. You know, you agreed what. Sorry? There’s no problem on quantity and prices. Ya, that’s not the issue, we’re only talking about quality. LEU Quality, ya. But it was referred to one of the cross because you refer to one invoice, remember? I can put here parties agreed. That is a separate matter of course. But we don’t take the issue of quantity or pricing. Parties agreed. No dispute on quantity or pricing, only quality. LEU Yes. No, sorry. Don’t dispute on quantity or pricing, only quality. Ya. So forget about the question. It’s part of agreed facts. ” (emphasis added) 12 N.B. LEU - counsel for Plaintiff - counsel for Defendant - Judge [31] Having agreed that the balance outstanding is part of agreed facts learned counsel for the Defendant cannot now raise in their submissions that the Plaintiff’s invoices could only add up to RM3,625,216.23. [32] The Defendant had not through any of their witnesses disputed the amount of the Plaintiff’s claim nor deny receiving the Plaintiff’s Statement of Accounts in C20. What the Defendant had disputed was the quality of the RMC and that of course would have to be considered below. In fact the whole trial was conducted with the focus on the quality and the results of the relevant tests and not on the quantity or the agreed price for the quantities. That was the whole thrust and tenor of the Defendant’s Defence and conduct of it. [33] At paragraph 4 of the Defendant’s Main submission it was placed and positioned the Defendant’s premise as follows: “4. At the conclusion of Trial, it was mutually agreed that the main issue for determination in this Trial is the question of whether the concrete failure encountered in the EBP1 and Eco Tropic Projects was caused by defective concrete supplied by the Plaintiff or by the workmanship of the contractors engaged for the construction and development of EBP1 and Eco Tropics.” [34] The Defendant is now estopped from resurrecting as an issue a matter that had already been agreed upon. In any event a general denial for a claim for goods sold and delivered is never sufficient and the Defendant must descend to specifics as to whether it was quantity or 13 quality as in not in compliance with specifications that is in dispute. See Huo Heng Oil Co. (E.M.) Sdn Bhd v Tang Tiew Yong [1987] 1 MLJ 139. Here the Defendant was seeking to negative the debt not on the ground of the quantity not delivered but on the ground of defective quality and not according to the specifications which arose way after supply and delivery. [35] Silence and the absence of protestations would also raise an inference that where quantity and price are concerned there was nothing wrong. In Poratha Corporation v Technofit Sdn Bhd [2018] MLJU 470 it was observed as follows: “[25] The need for contemporaneous protests if the contents of the invoices for work done are being disputed during the period of subsistence of the contract in question have been raised in a number of cases. Failure to detail the sum disputed and the reasons there for may give rise to estoppel against the party that had by design or default chosen to placidly hold its peace. [26] In the case of Besteel Berhad v Pembangunan Ladang Hassan Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 LNS 923, the High Court held as follows at page 32 to 34: “The Defendant must realize that if it is of the view that there is dispute as to the works executed by the plaintiff, it must express its displeasure or protest at the earliest opportunity. Silence in this case is definitely not golden…” [36] The observation of the Court of Appeal in David Wong Hon Leong v Noorazman bin Adnan [1995] 4 CLJ 155 at 159 below holds true: “During argument, we registered our surprise at the learned Judge’s reluctance to enter judgment for this sum of RM100,000.00. After all, 14 the appellant had failed to respond to the letter of 17 December. If there had never been an agreement as alleged, it is reasonable to expect a prompt and vigorous denial. But, as we have pointed out, there was no response whatsoever from the appellant. In this context, we recall to mind the following passage in the judgment of Edgar Joseph Jr. J in Tan Cheng Hock v Chan Thean Soo [1986] 1 LNS 42; [1987] 2 MLJ 479: In Wiedemann v Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534, 537 an action for breach of promise of marriage, it was held, that the mere fact that the defendant did not answer letters written to him by the plaintiff in which she stated that he had promised to marry her, was no evidence corroborating the plaintiff’s testimony in support of such promise. Lord Esher MR, in his judgment, remarked, Here, we have only to see whether the mere fact of not answering the letters, with nothing else for us to consider is any evidence in corroboration of the promise (Emphasis added). Earlier, in his judgment, he said, ‘Now there are cases – business and mercantile cases in which the Courts have taken notice that, in the ordinary course of business, if one man of business states in a letter to another that he has agreed to do certain things, the person who receives that letter must answer it if he means to dispute the fact that he did so agree. (The emphasis is ours.)” 15 [37] The Statement of Accounts bears the following alert: “Any discrepancy in this statement must be reported to us in writing within 10 days.” [38] There was no such discrepancy reported or dispute as to the Statement of Account reported. The Plaintiff further relied on the case of Syarikat Tan Thian Song Sdn Bhd v Syarikat Siaw Teck Hwa Realty & Development Sdn Bhd [1983] CLJ (Rep) 878 which observed as follows: “[5] The defendant has filed a statement of defence and took out a counterclaim in respect of certain amounts which they claim they are entitled for the hire of vibrator compactors and the overcharging for the hire of certain vehicles. [6] I think there is a short answer to this dispute. In effect the terms of the contract between the parties called for there to be an account-stated between the parties every month, the account-stated to come about by the plaintiff delivering a statement of account, the defendant having 2 weeks within which to query the accounts. The law is that in the event of non-query an account-stated came into existence which creates an estoppel against the defendant from querying the accounts thereafter. There are situations, for example if there is fraud, when a query may be permitted but on the facts of this case, in my opinion, no such situation exists. Particularly as the defendants were on notice in October of the lorries not being loaded to the specific capacity and they thereafter continuing with the system of issuing of delivery receipts acknowledging even the quantum of earth, I think that the defendants have waived any right to complain that they may have had and cannot now be heard to rake up 16 what was settled by way of the account-stated.” (emphasis added) [39] In fact a reading of paragraph 7(a) and (b) of the Defence will show that the Defendant had prevaricated when they pleaded that out of the RM6,468,766.60 that is allegedly due to the Plaintiff, RM4,715,581.72 had come from the Eco Tropics Project and the remaining sum of RM1,753,184.88 can only be due to RMC supplied and delivered for the EBP1 Project. [40] PW 1 had also stated in Q&A 11 of his Witness Statement marked PW1-WS that “the statement of accounts were also raised and sent to the defendant” referencing to pages 1-21 of Bundle C20. This fact however was not cross examined by the Defendant. Failure to cross examine PW1 on this can only be deemed as an admission as to the amounts owed to the Plaintiff. See the case of Wong Swee Chin v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 212 at 213. [41] I agree that the Defendant is now estopped from disputing the actual sum owed to the Plaintiff where the quantity and price are concerned but are at liberty to lead evidence on the Defence of the RMC not complying with specification or that the relevant test results had been manipulated and that the RMC was not of the requisite compressive strength resulting in cracks appearing in the slabs, structures or walls. [42] I find that the Plaintiff had proved on a balance of probabilities the balance sum outstanding of RM6,468,766.60 for the RMC supplied and delivered where quantity and pricing is concerned. 17 Whether the Plaintiff had supplied and delivered RMC in accordance with the specifications as stated in the respective Letters of Acceptance (“LOAs”) [43] The EBP1 LOA provided for the supply and delivery of RMC including the setting up a batching plant at the construction site. The key conditions for the supply and delivery of RMC are in Clauses 9 and 21 of the EBP1 LOA as follows: