Pembinaan Lercast Sdn. Bhd v Chek Sam Binti Salleh (P-02(NCvC)(W)-1311-08/2024)

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA IN PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF PUTRAJAYA CIVIL APPEAL NO: P-02(NCvC)(W)-1311-08/2024 BETWEEN

1. PEMBINAAN LERCAST SDN BHD (COMPANY NO.: 201501026317 [115164-P])

2. LERCAST ALDEWAY SDN BHD (COMPANY NO.: 201001015603 [899844-A]) AND CHEK SAM BINTI SALLEH (NRIC NO.: 471117-07-5032/2047231) In the High Court of Malaya at Pulau Pinang, Civil Suit No. PA-22NCVC-125-09/2022 Check Sam binti Salleh (NRIC No.: 471117-07- And

1. Pembinaan Lercast Sdn Bhd (Company No.: 201501026317 [115164-P]) First Defendant

2. Lercast Aldeway Sdn Bhd (Company No. 201001015603 [899844-A]) Second Defendant

3. Tetuan Syafiq Kader & Shah CORAM SUPANG LIAN, JCA. LIM CHONG FONG, JCA. ALWI BIN HJ. ABDUL WAHAB, JCA. 11/02/2026 07:55:34 P-02(NCvC)(W)-1311-08/2024 Kand. 63 **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] This appeal concerns the termination of a joint venture agreement entered into for the development of a parcel of land that was occupied by squatters. [2] The Appellants are private limited companies and were respectively the first and second defendants in the High Court. [3] The Respondent is an individual and was the plaintiff in the High Court. [4] We heard the appeal on 7th July 2025 and thereafter curia advisari vult our decision. [5] After having duly so deliberated, we hereby give our decision below together with the supporting grounds. BACKGROUND [6] The Respondent is an elderly lady with limited formal education, and is the registered proprietor of a parcel of land known as GM 670 Lot 1369, Mukim 9 Teluk Kumbar, Daerah Barat Daya, Negeri Pulau Pinang ( ). [7] At the material time, the Land was occupied by numerous squatters, on the Land in 2006. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [8] ( ), the Chairman of Masjid Maqbul, Teluk Kumbar, of her intention to endow (waqf advised against the proposed endowment on the ground that it would not benefit the mosque while the Land remained occupied by squatters, and instead proposed that the Land be developed. The Respondent accordin of undertaking and facilitating the proposed development of the Land ( ). [9] Appellant, which expressed interest in undertaking the Project. Subsequently, several meetings were held between the Respondent and following documents:

(ii) Power of attorney dated 28th July 2015 granted by the Respondent to the First Appellant ( );

(iii) Consultant Agreement dated 18th September 2015 between the First Appellant and Second Appellant ( ) and

(iv) Manager Agreement dated 9th December 2016 between the Respondent and Second Appellant ( ). [10] In essence, the JVA governed the development of the Project, while funds intended for the acquisition of substitute land to relocate the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 squatters occupying the Land, as contemplated under the JVA and the CA. [11] After more than two years had elapsed without any meaningful solicitors wrote to the First Appellant seeking an update. No response was received. [12] th July 2017, the Respondent terminated the JVA and the MA. [13] Thereafter, the parties engaged in discussions to resolve the dispute, which culminated in the execution of a Supplemental Agreement dated 10 October 2018 ( the Land was subsequently withdrawn on 24th April 2019. [14] Due to the continued lack of progress thereafter, the Respondent once again October 2021. [15] The Respondent subsequently commenced proceedings in the Penang High Court under Suit No. PA-22NCVC-125-09/2022 ( ) against the Appellants, as the first and second defendants respectively, and Tetuan Shafiq Kader & Shah as the third defendant. IN THE HIGH COURT [16] The Respondent claimed as follows in the Suit (in Bahasa Melayu): **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Oleh hal yang demikian, tuntutan Plaintiff terhadap Defendan-defendan secara bersama dan/atau berasingan adalah untuk: -

44.1. Plaintif dibenarkan memfailkan tindakan guaman ini;

44.2. -07-2015 (selepas ini disebut akibat kegagalan Defendan Pertama untuk melunaskan dan/atau melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya sebagai Pemaju dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Usahasama tersebut;

44.3. Deklarasi bahawa Perjanjian Usahasama tersebut akibat salah nyata/misprepresentasi oleh Defendan Pertama mengenai keupayaannya dan pengalamannya sebagai Pemaju dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat yang dinyatakan di dalam Perjanjian Usahasama tersebut;

44.4. Deklarasi bahawa Surat Kuasa Wakil bertarikh 28-07-2015 ( -07-2015 kepada Defendan Pertama ditamatkan akibat kegagalan Defendan Pertama yang tidak melunaskan dan/atau melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Usahasama tersebut;

44.5. bertarikh 28-07- -07-2015 (selepas ini d kepada Defendan Pertama ditamatkan akibat salah nyata/misrepresentasi oleh Defendan Pertama mengenai keupayaannya dan pengalamannya dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat yang dinyatakan di dalam Perjanjian Usahasama tersebut;

44.6. -12-2016 (selepas ini disebut Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua ditamatkan akibat kegagalan Defendan Pertama yang tidak melunaskan dan/atau melaksanakan tanggunjawabnya dalam memenuhi **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 terma-terma dan syarat-syarat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Usahasama tersebut;

44.7. Agreeme -12-2016 (selepas ini disebut Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua ditamatkan akibat salah nyata /misrepresentasi oleh Defendan Pertama mengenai keupayaannya dan pengalamannya dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Usahasama tersebut;

44.8. -10-2018 (selepas ini disebut itamatkan akibat kegagalan Defendan Pertama yang tidak melunaskan dan/atau melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Tambahan tersebut;

44.9. ementary -10-2018 (selepas ini disebut salah nyata/misrepresentasi oleh Defendan Pertama mengenai keupayaannya dan pengalamannya dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Tambahan tersebut;

44.10. Plaintif menuntut Defendan Ketiga mengembalikan geran asal hartanah Plaintif iaitu GM670 Lot 1369 MUKIM 9 TEMPAT TELUK KUMBAR DAERAH BARAT DAYA NEGERI PULAU PINANG (selepas ini disebut sebagai yang dipegang oleh Defendan Ketiga tersebut dalam masa TIGA (3) HARI dari tarikh penghakiman ini;

44.11. Plaintif menuntut Defendan Pertama mengeluarkan kaveat persendiriannya yang dimasukkan ke atas Hartanah tersebut melalui No. Perserahan 0705B2021000743 (selepas ini TUJUH (7) HARI daripada tarikh penghakiman ini;

44.12. Satu perintah untuk injunksi yang menghalang Defendan Pertama, Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga daripada **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 memasuki apa-apa perjanjian lanjutan yang berkaitan dengan Hartanah ini sehingga kes selesai diputuskan;

44.13. Satu perintah untuk injunksi terhadap Defendan Ketiga untuk menghalang daripada menyerahkan geran asal Hartanah kepada mana-mana pihak sehingga kes ini selesai diputuskan;

44.14. Satu perintah injunksi terhadap Defendan Ketiga untuk tidak melepaskan wang deposit boleh dikembalikan (refundable deposit) yang telah dibayar Defendan Pertama menurut Klausa 3.1 Perjanjian Usahasama tersebut dan Klausa 9 Perjanjian Tambahan tersebut;

44.15. Satu perintah injunksi terhadap Defendan Pertama dan/atau Defendan Kedua dan/atau mana-mana wakilnya daripada melakukan kacau ganggu terhadap Plaintif;

44.16. Gantirugi am yang ditafsirkan Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini akibat kegagalan Defendan Pertama untuk melunaskan dan/atau melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Usahama tersebut;

44.17. Gantirugi khas/teladan yang ditafsirkan Mahkamah Yang Mulai ini akibat kegagalan Defendan Pertama untuk melunaskan dan/atau melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Pernjanjian Usahama tersebut;

44.18. Gantirugi am yang ditaksirkan Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini akibat salah nyata/misrepresentasi oleh Defendan Pertama mengenai keupayaannya dan pengalamannya dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Usahama tersebut;

44.19. Gantirugi khas/teladan yang ditaksirkan Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini akibat salah nyata/misrepresentasi oleh Defendan Pertama mengenai keupayaannya dan pengalamannya dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat yang dinyatakan di dalam Perjanjian Usahasama tersebut; **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8

44.20. Kadar faedah pada 5% setahun untuk jumlah gantirugi yang diberi oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini di atas dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga penyelesaian penuh;

44.21. Kos bagi tindakan ini; dan

44.22. Lain-lain relif yang difikirkan patut dan suaimanfaat oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini. [17] The claim against Tetuan Shafiq Kader & Shah was discontinued on 28th March 2023. [18] After 5 days of trial, the learned judge decided in favour of the Respondent and ordered as follows ( ) (in Bahasa Melayu): ADALAH DIHAKIMKAN PADA HARI INI bahawa:

(1) Deklarasi bahawa Perjanjian Usahama (Joint Venture Agreement) bertarikh 28 Julai 2015 di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama ditamatkan akibat kegagalan Defendan Pertama untuk melunaskan dan/atau melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya sebagai Pemaju dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Usahama tersebut;

(2) Deklarasi bahawa Surat Kuasa Wakil (Power of Attorney) bertarikh 28 Julai 2015 yang diberi kepada Defendan Pertama ditamatkan akibat kegagalan Defendan Pertama untuk melunaskan dan/atau melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya sebagai Pemaju dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Usahama tersebut;

(3) Deklarasi bahawa Perjanjian Perlantikan Pengurus (Manager Agreement) bertarikh 9 Disember 2016 di antara Plaintif, Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua ditamatkan akibat kegagalan Defendan Pertama untuk melunaskan dan/atau melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya sebagai Pemaju dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Usahama tersebut;

(4) Deklarasi bahawa Perjanjian Tambahan (Supplementary Agreement) bertarikh 10 Oktober 2018 di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 ditamatkan akibat kegagalan Defendan Pertama untuk melunaskan dan/atau melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya sebagai Pemaju dalam memenuhi terma-terma dan syarat-syarat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Usahama tersebut;

(5) Tiada sebarang salah nyata/misrepresentasi oleh Defendan Pertama terhadap Plaintif;

(6) Defendan Pertama diperintahkan untuk mengembalikan semula geran asal hartanah Plaintif iaitu GM 670 Lot 1369 Mukim 9 Tempat Teluk dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Penghakiman ini;

(7) Defendan Pertama diperintahkan untuk mengeluarkan kaveat persendiriannya yang dimasukkan ke atas Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Penghakiman ini;

(8) Deposit yang boleh dikembalikan (Refundable deposit) berjumlah RM 12,203.70 dan segala faedah terakru yang dipegang oleh Peguamcara Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua sebagai pemegang taruhan (stakeholder) dikembalikan semula kepada Plaintif dalam tempoh tujuh

(7) hari dari tarikh Penghakiman ini;

(9) Tiada awad gantirugi kepada Plaintif; dan

(10) Kos tindakan ini berjumlah RM 30,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua kepada Plaintif. [19] The learned judge lucidly held as follows in the grounds of judgment reported in [2024] MLRHU 1441, relevant excerpts of which are reproduced: It is my finding that P is entitled to terminate the contracts, owing to the Defendants' breach of the contracts. Specifically, the Defendants' failure to develop the land and complete the project. Here are my reasons. The Defendants Have Breached The Contracts [25] Being inexperienced in construction and housing development matters, P relied primarily on the Defendants to run the project. After all, the Defendants held themselves out as experts in that field. Recital 3 of the JV Agreement states that: **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 "3. The Developer has the expertise, knowledge, experience and know - how in the filed of planning, designing, building and construction of various structures and buildings and also undertaking project development." [26] Prior to the execution of the JV Agreement, the main terms and conditions were proposed by D1's CEO (Fahmy), via the letter dated 1 July 2015. Some of them were incorporated into the JV Agreement, the Manager Agreement and the Consultant Agreement. [27] The framework of the JV Agreement is straightforward. P will provide the land. In turn, D1 will provide "funds, material and labour for the development of the said Project". In other words, P merely provides the land. D1 is responsible for everything else that is necessary to develop the land. [28] This is reinforced in cl 2.1 of the JV Agreement, which reads: "The Developer's Undertaking 2.1 The Developer hereby gives its undertaking to the Landowner that they shall do all things and acts as are hereinafter provided necessary for the development of the said Land and for the construction of all roads, driveways, drains, culverts, septic tanks, sewerage mains, sewerage treatment plants, TNB sub - station, surau and all infrastructure as may be required by the Appropriate Authorities to serve the said Project." [29] In amplification of the foregoing, cl 3 of the JV Agreement sets out various covenants imposed on D1. I find that D1 had breached various of those covenants. In particular:

(vii) of the JV Agreement). [30] Despite being granted the Power of Attorney, D1 failed to apply for and obtain the necessary approvals to carry out the project. The bottom line is that D1 did not "do all things and acts as are hereinafter provided necessary for the development of the land", as per the developer's undertaking in cl 2.1 of the JV Agreement. In reality, the project has not taken off at all. That remains the case for the last 9 years, since the JV Agreement was entered into in the year 2015. [31] The Defendants themselves have admitted that by virtue of the Power of Attorney, D1 was given absolute authority to act as the developer of the project. Paragraph 7 of the Statement of Defence states: "7. The First and Second Defendant plead that the Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 28 July 2019 is still valid to this day since the Plaintiff has given absolute authority to the First Defendant who also acts as a Developer in the said Project Development." [32] In respect of the Supplemental Agreement, D1 had breached various clauses of the same. Namely:

(1) When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract." [58] Indeed, time is of the essence in the present case. Clause 20 of the JV Agreement reads: "20. Time Essence of Contract Time whenever mentioned shall be of essence of the contract in all respects." [59] In Sime Hok Sdn Bhd v. Soh Poh Sheng [2013] 2 MLRA 636; [2013] 2 MLJ 149; [2013] 2 CLJ 615; [2013] 2 AMR 325 at 641, 651, the Federal Court held: "[7]... "Where a party undertakes by contract to do an act, the performance of which depends entirely on himself, and the contract is silent as to the time of performance, the law will imply a term that the act should be performed within a reasonable time: see Chitty on Contracts, 29th edn, para 21 - 020. Such a term will be implied because it represents the unexpressed intention of the parties or is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract" (National Car Parks Ltd v. Baird (Valuation Officer) and Another [2004] EWCA Civ 967 per Sir Andrew Morritt V-C). That common law principle finds codification in s 47 of the Act, which reads: **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 "Where, by the contract, a promisor is to perform his promise without application by the promisee, and no time for performance is specified, the engagement must be performed within a reasonable time. Explanation - The question 'what is a reasonable time' is, in each particular case, a question of fact." ... [27] But such notice is not necessary to crystallise the antecedent breach of the party in default. Section 47 of the Act provides that "Where, by the contract, a promisor is to perform his promise without application by the promisee, and no time for performance is specified, the engagement must be performed within a reasonable time". The promise is discharged if the engagement is performed within a time which is reasonable under the existing circumstances (Hick v. Raymond and Reid [1893] AC 22). If the promise is not performed within a reasonable time, then there is default. It is as straightforward as that." [60] The time for completion of the project is stated to be 4 years from the commencement of the works. The works are supposed to commence within 5 months upon approval of the building plans for the project. Admittedly, that is subject to the land being vacant. This issue will be addressed next when discussing the issue. [61] Nevertheless, the point remains that the Defendants must perform their obligation to develop the land within a reasonable time. Failure to do so is tantamount to a breach or default. [62] In the present case, the Defendants have not completed the project in the last 9 years, since the execution of the JV Agreement in the year 2015. It is plain that the Defendants have breached their obligations under the contracts. The basic covenants imposed on D1 to make the necessary applications and obtain approvals from the relevant authorities, have not been accomplished. The Responsibility To Clear The Squatters [63] The Defendants allege that there is no delay on their part in carrying out the project. Any delay is attributable to P. The primary reason for the delay is the failure of P to secure vacant possession of the land. [64] The Defendants argue that the responsibility to clear the squatters and deliver vacant possession of the land lies on P. Because P has not done that, the Defendants proffer the excuse that they are unable to continue with the project. I disagree. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [65] The condition of the land and the existence of the squatters were made known to the Defendants even before the JV Agreement was executed. P has given the Power of Attorney in favour of D1. Pursuant thereto, the Defendants are empowered to act on behalf of P with regard to the issue. [66] I recognise that cl 4.4 of the JV Agreement obliges P to deliver vacant possession of the land. It reads: "4.4 Vacant possession of the said land The landowner shall deliver vacant possession of the said Land and grants the Developer right(s) to enter upon said Land or any part thereof with its contractors, surveyors, architects, workmen or agents to carry out survey or inspection as the Developer shall consider necessary for or in connection with the development of the said Land in such manner as the Developer shall at its sole discretion decide." [67] Nevertheless, the obligation to procure vacant possesion of the land does not fall solely on P. This can be seen from cl 3.1(vii) of the JV Agreement, which reads: "3. The Developer's Covenant 3.1 The Developer hereby agrees and covenants with the Landowner as follows: ...

(vii) the Developer on behalf of the Landowner shall be responsible at its own cost and expense to pay for the appointment and engagement a company, Lercast Aldeway Sdn Bhd or its nominee as a Consultant (hereinafter referred to as The Consultant) to liaise with Developer the Landowner to assist and to negotiate for the terms and conditions of the re - settlements of all squatters of the said Land prior to the commencement of the construction of the said Project which shall not be more than six (6) months from the date of the appointment of the Consultant by the Landowner;" [68] Further, cl 1 of the Power of Attorney provides: "In consideration of the premises mentioned in the said Agreement and in further consideration that the Attorney shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law, indemnify, defend and hold the Donor... harmless from any and all claims, liabilities, demands, suits, losses and damages and costs (including, without limitation, any legal fees on solicitors and client basis) which may arise out of or be related to the Attorney exercising the powers herein granted, we, the Donor do hereby irrevocably appoint the Developer (hereinafter referred to as "the Attorney") to be our true and lawful attorney for us and in our name and on our behalf to do and **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 execute any of the following acts and things concerning the said Land into the Project Development, that is to say: ...

2. Consideration In consideration for the Works, the Developer shall pay the following amount in the manner and times as follows:

3. In the event the Consultant shall fail in carrying out its responsibility as mentioned in cl 1 above, the Developer shall be entitled to complete the Works at the cost of the Consultant. The said cost shall be deducted from the Units' Entitlement as mentioned in cl 2(c) above." [71] The Defendants themselves have admitted that D2 was appointed to assist D1 in the relocation of the squatters from the land. Paragraph 5 of the Statement of Defence states: "5. The First and Second Defendant plead that pursuant to cl 3.1 (vii) of the Joint Venture Agreement dated 28 July 2015, the First Defendant **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 has appointed the Second Defendant as a consultant to help the First Defendant negotiate the terms and conditions of the relocation of all squatters in the land / project area." [72] The fact that vacant possession of the land is to be secured by D1 is evidenced in a letter of instruction dated 28 September 2018 from D1 to its then solicitors, the 3rd Defendant. The salient paragraphs of the letter reads: "9. Further upon depositing RM144,999.00 with your goodselves we shall further deposit RM700,000.00 at or within 14 days thereof to you as settlement sums for the squatters. Your goodselves are then to disburse the said sums to the squatters accordingly when amicable settlements are agreed upon;

10. We understand and agree that your goodselves will only proceed to call for a meeting to meet all squatters upon us depositing the entire sum of RM700.0. 00 to your goodselves; ...

13. That you are to negotiate with the squatters to procure vacant possession of the said Property. You are hereby given the following mandate to negotiate settlement with the squatters: Option A Cash payment: RM15,000.00 to be disbursed to each squatter upon signing of the settlement agreement to vacate its premise; For those squatters who take up this option of settlement, they are also entitled to a medium costs unit valued at RM75,000.00; No payment is required by us for the said units; OR Option B Each squatter to be offered an affordable home unit valued at RM300.0. 00 (for approved buyers) or RM360,000.00 (for non approved buyers) for only RM200,000.00. No cash settlement for this option and squatters taking up this option are required to finance their own purchase; OR **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Option C Each squatter is to be offered a settlement sum of RM35,000.00 in cash with no offer of any units. ...

15. In the event any of the squatter refusing any option of the settlement, your goodselves are authorised to commence eviction proceedings in the civil courts in order to secure vacant possession." [73] The contents of the aforementioned letter were later incorporated in the Supplemental Agreement. Clause 16 of the Supplemental Agreement stipulates a definitive time and steps, leading to the recovery of vacant possession of the land. It reads: "The Developer further agrees that the Developer's solicitors will only proceed to call for a meeting to meet all squatters of the said land of the JV Agreement upon the Developer depositing the entire sum of RM700,000.00 to the Developer's Solicitors;" [74] If obtaining vacant possession of the land is the sole obligation of P, cl 17 of the Supplemental Agreement would not have provided as follows: "Parties mutually agree that the Developer must initiate steps for settlement and or eviction at or within 3 months from the date of execution of the said Supplementary Agreement and further agree that the Developer must obtain vacant possession of the Property at or within 12 months from the date of this Supplementary Agreement. Any further extension of time to be discussed and agreed upon between both Parties;" [75] Clause 17 of the Supplemental Agreement states that D1 must "initiate steps for settlement or eviction of the squatters". Additionally, it specifies that D1 "must obtain vacant possession". This leaves no room for doubt as to who must take the necessary steps, and ultimately secure vacant possession of the land. To be clear, the Defendants (D1 having appointed D2 as a consultant to assist in the resettlement of the squatters). Further, a definite timeline was specified. To wit, D1 must obtain vacant possession of the land within 12 months from the date of the Supplemental Agreement. [76] The fact of the matter is that the Defendants have failed to secure vacant possession of the land. The Defendants cannot rely on cl 4.4 of the JV Agreement, which speaks of the landowner (ie P) delivering vacant possession of the land. That has been superseded by the Supplemental Agreement. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 [77] This is by virtue of cl 27 of the Supplemental Agreement, which reads: "27. Where there is any conflict between the provisions of this Supplementary Agreement and those of the Joint Venture Agreement, the provisions of this Supplementary Agreement will prevail [20] The Appellants are dissatisfied with the Judgment and have on 29th July 2024 appealed to the Court of Appeal. FINDINGS OF THIS COURT [21] Our appellate function here is plainly that of review. The undertaking of the review has been made abundantly clear by Steve Shim CJ (Sabah and Sarawak) as follows in Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 (FC) with emphasis added by us: In gist, the pivotal question raised by the appellants was whether the term "insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence" used by the Court of Appeal constituted a new test for appellate intervention. We think it is important to examine this proposition in the light of what the Court of Appeal had said in its judgment beginning from para. 27 which we have reproduced earlier but repeated herein for the purpose of emphasis. It states: Suffice to say that we re-affirm the proposition that an appellate court will not, generally speaking, intervene unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its conclusion. But appellate interference will take place in cases where there has been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence. It is, we think, appropriate that we say what judicial appreciation of evidence involves. And the Court of Appeal went on to explain in para. 28 as follows: A judge who is required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. He must, when deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness test it against **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 relevant criteria. He must also test the evidence of a particular witness against the probabilities of the case. In making the observations above, the Court of Appeal cited the following cases: Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v. Tinjar Co. [1979] 1 LNS 119; [1979] 2 MLJ 229; Muniandy & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor [1966] 1 LNS 110; [1966] 1 MLJ 257; Dr. Shanmuganathan v. Periasamy s/o Sithambaram Pillai [1997] 2 CLJ 153, Yusoff bin Kassim v. Public Prosecutor [1992] 3 CLJ 1535; [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 376; Rex v. Low Toh Cheng [1941] MLJ 1; Tengku Mahmood v. Public Prosecutor [1974] 1 LNS 176; [1974] 1 MLJ 110; Choo Kok Beng v. Choo Kok Hoe & Ors [1984] 1 LNS 40; [1984] 2 MLJ 165; Armagas Ltd v. Mundogas SA ("The Ocean Frost") [1985] 1 L1 R 1; State of Rajasthan v. Hanuman (AIR) [2001] SC 282, 284; Tek Chand v. Dile Ram (AIR) [2001] SC 905. In our view, the Court of Appeal in citing these cases had clearly borne in mind the central feature of appellate intervention ie, to determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeal was perfectly entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. Clearly, the phrase "insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence" merely related to such a process. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal's restatement that a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. The Court of Appeal further reiterated the principle central to appellate intervention ie, that a decision arrived at by a trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence might be set aside on appeal. This is consistent with the established plainly wrong test. In the circumstances and for the reasons stated, there is no merit in the appellants' contention that the Court of Appeal had adopted a new test for appellate intervention. In our view, what the Court of Appeal had done was merely to accentuate the established plainly wrong test consistently applied by the appellate courts in this country. See also Conlay Construction Sdn bhd v. Perembun (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 1 MLJ 80 (FC) and Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Pheng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 (FC). **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 [22] Before us, the Appellants submitted that the alleged defaults pleaded by the Respondent were unfounded, in particular because the learned judge failed to adequately consider the reasons why the Appellants (especially the First Appellant) were unable to perform their obligations under the JVA and the MA. [23] In this regard, the Appellants contended that the Respondent only delivered the registered document of title on 8th November 2018, and that this was done removed. Further, the squatters could not be cleared due to and/or directions of the Respondent or her agent. [24] The Appellants furt termination was unreasonably issued during the period of the Movement Control Order ( ), at a time when no work could lawfully be carried out. It was also submitted that the learned judge had erred in finding that there had been no progress for a period of nine years, whereas the actual period was only six (6) years and three (3) months. [25] contentions, maintaining that the obligation to develop the Land lay squarely on the Appellants, and that they had failed to perform their obligations as promised up to the point of termination of the JVA and the making available the Land, while the Appellants were obliged to undertake all necessary steps to complete the Project within the stipulated timeframe. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [26] sympathise with her predicament, particularly in light of her advanced age and lack of familiarity with matters relating to property development. [27] Nonetheless, the dispute before us arises from contractual arrangements voluntarily entered into between the parties and must therefore be determined in accordance with the governing contractual terms, based on the pleadings and the evidence adduced. [28] the JVA and MA was the alleged failure of the Appellants to complete the Project within time, or at all. It is plain, however, that under clause 10.1 of the JVA, the stipulated period for completion of the Project was four years from the issuance of an order for commencement of works by the relevant authority and subject to the Land being vacant. This timeline was subsequently modified by clause 20 of the SA, which provides that the four-year period would run from the date of approval of the layout plans, building plans and all relevant development approvals for the Project. [29] There is, however, no ascertainable completion date, as the relevant trigger date for the commencement of the four-year period had not materialised even at the time of termination of the JVA. This is because the necessary approvals had yet to be obtained. Consequently, the date for completion of the Project remained at large, and it cannot be said that the Appellants were in delay or in breach for failure to complete the Project within the stipulated timeframe. [30] The Appellants contended that the requisite approvals could not be obtained because of interference by the Respondent, who repeatedly **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 changed her position concerning the acquisition of land for the resettlement of squatters. In particular, the Respondent had instructed the Second Appellant to purchase Lot 735, Mukim 9, Tempat Teluk Kumbar, Bayan Lepas, Pulau Pinang for relocation purposes, but later reversed that instruction and directed that the purchase should not proceed. In effect, the Appellants did not have a free hand to manage the squatters, resulting in substantial delays. The design of the Project and the submission of applications for planning permission and building plan approvals could not be undertaken without vacant possession of the Land, in accordance with the requirements of Majlis Bandaraya Pulau Pinang. Likewise, applications for a Land remained subsisting for a considerable period through no fault of the Appellants. [31] This impasse in relocating the squatters had a cascading effect on termination of the JVA and MA on 12th July 2017. That termination was later set aside when the parties entered into the SA, which, inter alia, prescribed revised mechanisms and procedures for the removal of the squatters and the obtaining of vacant possession of the Land. [32] The Respondent thereafter alleged that the Appellants had defaulted by failing to make the security payment stipulated under clause 18 of the SA and by failing to take the necessary steps to evict the squatters as contemplated under clauses 15 to 17 thereof. [33] Nevertheless, albeit the aforementioned security payment was not paid, the evidence shows that the parties were still actively attempting to **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 resolve the issue of squatters as late as 27th November 2020, when fresh for the Appellants to identify and purchase another parcel of land for the purpose of resettling the squatters. This effectively derailed the compensation arrangement earlier negotiated between the Second Appellant and the squatters after prolonged discussions following the execution of the SA. [34] We also take judicial notice that the MCO was imposed in March 2020, which effectively halted activities relating to the Project, with normalcy resuming only towards the latter part of 2020. [35] Notwithstanding this, the Respondent proceeded to terminate the JVA and MA once again on 28th October 2021. [36] In the circumstances, we are unable to identify any single act or omission on the part of the Appellants that amounts to a fundamental or repudiatory breach justifying the termination of the JVA and MA. The difficulties that impeded the progress of the Project, particularly in relation to the eviction and relocation of the squatters, were in our view contributed to by both parties and cannot be laid solely at the feet of the Appellants. We also bear in mind that the development process is inherently sequential: vacant possession of the Land must first be obtained, followed by project design, applications for planning permission and building plan construction works, and finally completion and handover. In this context, the Appellants cannot be faulted for failing to perform subsequent obligations before vacant possession was secured. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [37] That said, we must also have regard to clauses 1 and 27 of the SA, ide as follows: rescinding and/or terminating the Joint Venture Agreement dated 28.7.2015, Power of Attorney dated 28.7.2015, Consultancy Agreement dated 18.9 2015 and the Appointment of Manager Agreement dated 9.12.2016 and have undertaken to maintain and bound by all the clause in the above said Agreement and any termination shall only be due upon the agreement of both parties. and

27. Where there is any conflict between the provisions of this Supplementary Agreement and those of the Joint Venture Agreement, the provisions of this Supplementary Agreement will prevail. In light of these provisions, the JVA and MA could only be terminated by mutual agreement, and not unilaterally as was done by the Respondent. This is particularly so in the absence of any pleaded or proven vitiating factors such as duress, misrepresentation, mistake or the like in the ination of the JVA and MA on 28th October 2021 was wrongful. [38] Consequently, we find that the learned judge failed to properly appreciate the totality of the evidence and misconstrued the contractual g that the delay was inordinate and inexcusable, thereby entitling the Respondent to terminate the agreements, cannot be sustained. Appellate intervention is therefore warranted. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 CONCLUSION [39] For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal. However, having inability to continue working together towards the completion of the Project, we are of the view that the Project is no longer viable. Accordingly, pursuant to our wide powers under s. 69(4) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, we order that the JVA, the SA, the MA and the Power of Attorney be terminated forthwith, and we so declare. The judgment of the High Court is varied to the extent as follows: ADALAH DIHAKIMKAN PADA HARI INI bahawa:

(1) Deklarasi bahawa Perjanjian Usahama (Joint Venture Agreement) bertarikh 28 Julai 2015 di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama ditamatkan;

(2) Deklarasi bahawa Surat Kuasa Wakil (Power of Attorney) bertarikh 28 Julai 2015 yang diberi kepada Defendan Pertama ditamatkan;

(3) Deklarasi bahawa Perjanjian Perlantikan Pengurus (Manager Agreement) bertarikh 9 Disember 2016 di antara Plaintif, Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua ditamatkan;

(4) Deklarasi bahawa Perjanjian Tambahan (Supplementary Agreement) bertarikh 10 Oktober 2018 di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama ditamatkan;

(5) Tiada sebarang salah nyata/misrepresentasi oleh Defendan Pertama terhadap Plaintif;

(6) Defendan Pertama diperintahkan untuk mengembalikan semula geran asal hartanah Plaintif iaitu GM 670 Lot 1369 Mukim 9 Tempat Teluk Kumbar Daerah Barat Daya Negeri Pulau Pinang ( dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Penghakiman ini; **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32

(7) Defendan Pertama diperintahkan untuk mengeluarkan kaveat persendiriannya yang dimasukkan ke atas Hartanah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh Penghakiman ini;

(8) Deposit yang boleh dikembalikan (Refundable deposit) berjumlah RM 500,000.00 dikembalikan semula kepada Defendan Pertama dan Kedua dalam tempoh tiga puluh (30) hari dari tarikh Penghakiman ini

(9) Tiada awad gantirugi kepada Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan; dan

(10) Tiada awad gantirugi kepada Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan. [40] We direct the parties to bear their own costs here and below. Dated this 13th January 2026 Sgd. LIM CHONG FONG COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 LIST OF COUNSELS: Counsels for the Appellants Solicitors for the Appellants MESSRS. PRESGRAVE & MATTHEWS Advocates & Solicitors, 1st Floor, 2 Beach Street 10300, Georgetown, Penang. presmat@presmat.com;sa@presmat.co Counsel for the Respondent

1. Izzat Bin Hj. Othman

2. Shahidah Binti Nailul Morad

3. Noor Hashimah Binti Hamzah

4. Ahmad Syateer Bin Izzat Solicitors for Respondent MESSRS. SHAHIDAH HASHIMAH & CO. Advocates & Solicitors, No.34, 1st Floor, Jalan Permatang Rawa, Kawasan Perniagaan Permatang Rawa, 14000 Bukit Mertajam, Penang. shnco.penang@gmail.com STATUTE/LEGISLATION REFERRED TO: s. 69(4) Courts of Judicature Act 1964. CASES REFERRED TO: Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 (FC); Conlay Construction Sdn bhd v. Perembun (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 1 MLJ 80 (FC); and Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Pheng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 (FC). **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal