Pendaftar Hakmilik Negeri Selangor v Ooh Tong Hai (P-01(NCvC)(W)-480-07/2022)

AND OOH TONG HAI

GOH HUI LI (NRIC NO.: 911003-07-5284) HEARD TOGETHER WITH IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA IN PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF PUTRAJAYA CIVIL APPEAL NO: P-01(NCvC)(W)-481-07/2022

LEE CHEE BOON

TANG SER CHIEW (NRIC NO.: 740311-01-5829) 04/11/2025 07:42:43

MESSRS. JOHN & ASSOCIATES

OOH TONG HAI

GOH HUI LI

10.

Between Ooh Tong Hai

Goh Hui Li (NRIC No. 911003-07-5284)

Lee Chee Boon

Hee Yang Chong (NRIC No.: 5302180195869)

Wan Zaiharatulhasra binti Hamid (NRIC No.: 870423-05-5302) (beramal di bawah firma guaman Hasra Hamid & Associates)

Pendaftar Hak Milik Negeri Selangor

Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Selangor

Sahila binti Mohamad Sajari

Ahmad Suaidi bin Abdul Rahim (in the Original Action)

And Lee Chee Boon

Tang Ser Chiew (NRIC No.: 740311-01-5829)

Pendaftar Hak Milik Negeri Selangor

Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Selangor

John Henry Louis

Tetuan John & Associates

Ooh Tong Hai

Goh Hui Li

Sahila binti Mohamad Sajari

Norazlia binti Ariffin

Nurul Ashikin binti Ahmad Isa

Seeta Nakisha binti Mohd Razali

13.

Ahmad Suadi bin Abdul Rahim (In the Counterclaim)

Ooh Tong Hai

Goh Hui Li And

Lee Chee Boon

Hee Yang Chong

Wan Zaiharatulhasra binti Hamid (NRIC No.: 870423-05-5302) (beramal di bawah firma guaman Hasra Hamid & Associates)

Pendaftar Hak Milik Negeri Selangor

Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Selangor

Sahila binti Mohamad Sajari

Ahmad Suaidi bin Abdul Rahim (in the Original Action)

Lee Chee Boon

Tang Ser Chiew (NRIC No.: 740311-01-5829)

Pendaftar Hak Milik Negeri Selangor

Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Selangor

John Henry Louis

Tetuan John & Associates

Ooh Tong Hai

Goh Hui Li

Sahila binti Mohamad Sajari

Norazlia binti Ariffin

Nurul Ashikin binti Ahmad Isa

Seeta Nakisha binti Mohd Razali

13.

Ahmad Suadi bin Abdul Rahim (In the Counterclaim) CORAM HASHIM BIN HAMZAH, JCA. LIM CHONG FONG, JCA. DR. HJ. ALWI BIN HJ. ABDUL WAHAB, JCA. GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] These appeals concern yet another of the many land scam cases. [2] The parties to the appeals are, and shall hereinafter be referred to, as follows for clarity and convenience: A. Civil Appeal No.: P-01(NCVC)(W)-480- ) No.

Reference 1st to 4th Appellants Land Registry & its Relevant

Respondents Ooh B. Civil Appeal No.: P-01(NCVC)(W)-481- ) No.

Reference 1st Appellant

2nd Appellant

3rd Appellant

4th Appellant

John & Associates 1st and 2nd Respondents

3rd Respondent

4th to 11th Respondents Land Registry & its [3] At the hearing of the appeal on 28th April 2025, we were informed that Tang had been adjudged a bankrupt on 18th March 2021 and remained an undischarged bankrupt at the time he lodged his notice of appeal. As he was incompetent to maintain the appeal, we accordingly struck out his appeal. We thereafter proceeded to hear both of the remaining complex appeals together, but reserved our decision to consider the arguments advanced by the parties. [4] Having now done so, we deliver our decision together with the supporting grounds. BACKGROUND [5] Hee is the original registered proprietor of the land held under Geran No. Hakmilik 47504, Lot No. 7645, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Ulu Langat, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan ( ). The issue document of title th August 2011, bearing Serial No. SDE0786827 ( ). This IDT v2 was in the possession of Hee at all material times. [6] Unknown to Hee, an imposter, purporting to be Hee, by a sale and purchase agreement dated 2nd December 2015, purportedly sold the Land to Ooh & Goh for a consideration of RM1.8 million. A solicitor, Wan Zaiharatulhasra binti Hamid ( ), acted for the imposter, who falsely represented himself to be Hee. [7] Pursuant thereto, on 2nd December 2015, Ooh & Goh paid a sum of RM1.5 million to the imposter towards the purchase price of the Land. They also lodged a private caveat over the Land pending completion of the transaction and the payment of the balance purchase price of RM300,000. For the said transaction, the imposter utilised an issue May 2014, bearing Serial No. SDE0583325 ( ). [8] Notwithstanding the foregoing, there had already been a purported sale of the Land by the imposter to one Lee for a sum of RM500,000 on or about 30th October 2015. [9] Consequent thereto, the solicitors acting for the imposter, Messrs John & Associates, procured the removal of the private caveat lodged by Ooh & Goh on 29th December 2015. [10] Following the removal of the private caveat, Lee was registered as the proprietor of the Land on 29th December 2015. The issue document of er Version 3, dated 29th December 2015, bearing Serial No. SDE0940496 ( possession. There also exists another issue document of title, the date and serial number of which remain unclear, which was utilised for the transfer of the Land to Lee ( ). [11] Upon discovery of the wrongful removal of their caveat, Ooh & Goh made enquiries with the Land Registry, but no response was forthcoming. They similarly wrote to and sought clarification from John & Associates but did not receive any reply. Thereafter, on 10th March 2016 and again on 24th March 2016, Ooh & Goh re-lodged their private caveat to safeguard their interest in the Land. [12] On 8th June 2016, Ooh & Goh commenced Penang High Court Suit No. PA-22NCVC-109-06/2016 ( ) against Lee and Hee. [13] By Orders of the High Court dated 16th February 2017 and 30th October 2018 respectively, Wan, the Land Registry, & its Relevant Officers were joined as Defendants to the Suit. IN THE HIGH COURT [14] Ooh & Goh claimed as follows in the Suit (in Bahasa Melayu): a) Satu deklarasi bahawa pemindahan hakmilik hartanah yang dipegang di bawah Geran No. Hakmilik 47504, Lot No. 7645, Mukim Kajang, Daerah Ulu Kedua kepada Defendan Pertama adalah terbatal dan tidak sah; aa) Satu perintah untuk perlaksanaan spesifik perjanjian jual beli bertulis bertarikh 2.12.2015 di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Kedua untuk jualan Hartanah tersebut oleh Defendan Kedua kepada Plaintif atau gantirugi sebagai ganti perlaksanaan spesifik; b) bahawa Defendan Pertama menyerahkan isu dokumen hakmilik Hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif-Plaintif dalam masa tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh penyampaian Perintah ini kepadanya; c) satu perintah deklarasi bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif adalah pemilik sah dan benefisial Hartanah tersebut; d) bahawa sekiranya Defendan Pertama gagal mematuhi perenggan (b) di atas, Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Selangor dibenarkan mengiisukan hakmilikan baru untuk Hartanah tersebut; e) bahawa Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Selangor meletakhak Hartanah tersebut kepada nama Plaintif-Plaintif sebagai pemilik berdaftar bersama dalam masa tempoh tujuh (7) hari dari tarikh penyampaian Perintah ini kepadanya; f) Pendaftar Hakimilik, Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Selangor dan pihakpihak berkuasa berkenaan mengambil segala langkah yang diperlukan untuk memberi kesan kepada perintah-perintah di atas; g) bahawa Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Pulau Pinang diberi kuasa untuk menandatangani semua dokumen yang berkaitan untuk memberi kesan kepada Perintah ini bagi mana-mana pihak sekiranya belia/dia gagal berbuat demikian dalam tempoh notis sebanyak tujuah (7) hari; h) secara alternatifnya, Defendan Kedua diperintah untuk mengembalikan wang dalam jumlah RM1,500,000.00 kepada Plaintif-Plaintif; hh) gantirugi untuk kecuaian terhadap Defendan Ketiga; hhh) gantirugi untuk kecuaian dan/atau pemecahan kewajipan statutory dan/atau kewajipan berhati-hati terhadap Defendan Keempat danKelima; i) gantirugi am terhadap kesemua Defendan-Defendan setelah ditaksir oleh Timbalan Pendaftar; j) gantirugi teladan terhadap kesemua Defendan-Defendan; k) satu perintah injunksi bahawa Defendan Pertama dan/atau ejennya dan/atau wakilnya dan/atau pengkhimatnya dilarang dari melupus dan/atau menjual dan/atau memindahmilik dan/atau berurus dengan Hartanah tersebut sehingga penyelesaian kes ini atau sehingga perintah selanjutnya oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini; l) Faedah terhadap kesemua Defendan-Defendan; m) Kos terhadap kesemua Defendan-Defendan; dan n) Lain-lain perintah atau relief selanjutnya yang difikirkan wajar dan patut oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini. [15] In retort, Hee counterclaimed as follows against, Lee, Tang, Land Registry & its Relevant Officers, John, John & Associates and Ooh & Goh as follows (in Bahasa Melayu):

48.1 Suatu deklarasi bahawa Hee adalah kekal sebagai tuan punya berdaftar sah Tanah tersebut yang dipegang di bawah Geran Hak milik No. 47504, );

48.2 Suatu deklarasi bahawa pemindahan Tanah tersebut daripada Hee kepada Lee vide No. Perserahan 138909/2015 pada 29.12.2015 adalah batal tidak sah;

48.3 Suatu Perintah bahawa Pendaftar tersebut membatalkan catatan-catatan dan memorial-memorial dalam daftar hak milik-hak milik bagi pihak Lee dan memulihkan Hee sebagai tuan punya berdaftar Tanah tersebut dalam tempoh lapan (8) hari daripada tarikh penerimaan Perintah tersebut;

48.4 Suatu Perintah bahawa Tang memotong kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkannya vide No. Perserahan 2567/2016 pada 20.1.2016 );

48.5 Suatu Perintah ganti rugi terhadap Tang bagi catatan Kaveat Persendirian yang tidak sah;

48.6 Ganti rugi untuk ditaksirkan oleh Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi;

48.7 Faedah ke atas jumlah ganti rugi yang diawadkan kepada Hee pada kadar dan masa yang difikirkan sesuai oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini;

48.8 Suatu Perintah bahawa Tang dihalang untuk memasukkan mana-mana dan/atau kaveat-kaveat persendirian lanjutan ke atas Tanah tersebut; Terhadap Pendaftar tersebut dan PTG tersebut

48.9 Ganti rugi untuk kecuaian dan/atau pelanggaran kewajipan statutori;

48.10 Ganti rugi teladan;

48.11 Ganti rugi keterlaluan;

48.12 Faedah ke atas jumlah ganti rugi yang diawadkan kepada Hee pada kadar dan masa yang difikirkan sesuai oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini; Terhadap Lee, Tang, John dan Tetuan John

48.13 Ganti rugi untuk frod dan/atau konspirasi;

48.14 Ganti rugi teladan;

48.15 Faedah ke atas jumlah ganti rugi yang diawadkan kepada Hee pada kadar dan masa yang difikirkan sesuai oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini; Terhadap Ooh dan Goh:

48.16 Suatu Perintah bahawa Pendaftar Hak milik memotong kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh Plaintiff Pertama vide No. Perserahan 12651/2016 ( );

48.17 Suatu Perintah bahawa Pendaftar Hak milik memotong kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh Plaintiff ke-2 vide No. Perserahan 15645/2016 ( - );

48.18 Suatu Perintah untuk ganti rugi terhadap Plaintif untuk catatan yang tidak sah ke atas Kaveat Plaintif Pertama dan Kaveat Plaintif ke-2;

48.19 Ganti rugi untuk ditaksirkan oleh Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi;

48.20 Faedah ke atas jumlah ganti rugi yang diawadkan kepada Defendan ke- 2 pada kadar dan masa yang difikirkan sesuai oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini;

48.21 Suatu Perintah bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif dihalang untuk memasukkan mana-mana dan/atau kaveat-kaveat persendirian lanjutan ke atas hartanah Defendan ke-2, iaitu Tanah tersebut yang dipegang di bawah Geran Hakmilik No. 47504, Lot No. 7645, Mukim of Kajang, District of Ulu Langat, Selangor. Terhadap Lee, Tang, Pendaftar tersebut, PTG tersebut, John, Tetuan John, Ooh dan Goh, dan semua Defendan-defendan yang lain (Melalui

48.22 Kos; dan 48.23 Semua dan relif-relif lanjutan yang difikirkan sesuai oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini. [16] During the course of the trial, there was an amicable resolution achieved between Ooh & Goh and Hee whereby Ooh & Goh withdrew their claim against Hee and consented to removal of their private caveats with no order as to costs ( ). [17] After the total of 17 days of trial, the learned High Court judge in His Ooh Tong Hai & Anor v. Lee Chee Boon & Ors [2024] MLRHU 1772 decided as follows ( ): IT IS ADJUDGED that:

The 1st Defendant in the Original Action i.e. Lee Chee Boon (No. K.P. 790825-07- Lee Ooh Tong Hai (No. K.P. 690430-08- Ooh 911003-07- Goh Plaintiffs sums:

1.1. Exemplary damages in the sum of RM375,000.00;

1.2. Interest at the rate of 4% per annum on the damages awarded in paragraph 1.1 above calculated from 29.12.2015 until the date of this Judgment; and 1.3.

1.3 Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the damages awarded in paragraph 1.1 above calculated from the date of this Judgment until the full and final settlement thereof.

The 4th and 5th Defendants in the Original Action i.e. Pendaftar Hak Milik Negeri Selangor ( ) and Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Selangor ( ) shall jointly and severally pay to the Plaintiffs the following sums:

2.1. Damages in the sum of RM1,500,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this Judgment;

2.2. Exemplary damages in the sum of RM375,000.00;

2.3. Interest at the rate of 4% per annum on the damages awarded in 2.4. paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 above calculated from 5.12.2015 until the date of this Judgment; and 2.5. Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the damages awarded in paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 above calculated from the date of this Judgment until full and final settlement thereof.

A declaration that Hee Yan Choong (NRIC No. 530218-10-5859) ( ) is and remains the legal and lawful registered proprietor of the land held under Geran Hakmilik No. 47504, Lot No. 7645, Mukim of Kajang, District of Ulu Langat, Selangor ( );

A declaration that the transfer of the Land from Hee to Lee vide Presentation No. 138909/2015 on 29.12.2015 is null and void;

An Order that the Pendaftar do cancel the entries or memorials in the register of titles in favour of Lee and restores Hee as the registered proprietor of the Land within eight (8) days from the date of receipt of this

An Order that Tang Ser Chiew (NRIC No. 740311-01- Tang remove the private caveat lodged by him vide Presentation No:2567/2016

An Order for damages against Tang for the wrongful entry of the Private

Damages to be assessed;

Interest on the amount of damages awarded to Hee pursuant to paragraph 8 above at such rate and for such time that the Honourable Court deems fit;

An Order that Tang be restrained from entering further and/or any private caveats on the Land;

The Pendaftar and the PTG shall jointly and severally pay to Hee the following sums:

11.1. Exemplary damages in the sum of RM375,000.00; and 11.2. Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the damages awarded in paragraph 11.1 above calculated from 29.12.2015 until the full and final settlement thereof.

John Messrs John

12.1. Exemplary damages in the sum of RM1,500,000.00; and 12.2. Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the damages awarded in paragraph 12.1 above calculated from 29.12.2015 until the full and final settlement thereof.

An Order that the Pendaftar do remove the private caveat lodged by Ooh vide Presentation No: 12651/2016;

An Order that the Pendaftar do remove the private caveat lodged by Goh vide Presentation No: 15645/2016;

An Order that the Lee, John and/or Messrs John contribute wholly and/or partly to the amount of damages and/or costs that shall be paid by the

An Order that the Pendaftar and the PTG are entitled to be indemnified by Lee, John and/or Messrs John against all amount of damages and/or costs that shall be paid by the Pendaftar and the PTG to Hee; IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that:

Lee shall pay the following costs:

17.1. Costs in the sum of RM100,000.00 to the Plaintiffs; and 17.2. Costs in the sum of RM100,000.00 to Hee.

The Pendaftar and the PTG shall jointly and severally pay the following costs:

18.1. Costs in the sum of RM100,000.00 to the Plaintiffs; and 18.2. Costs in the sum of RM100,000.00 to Hee;

John and Messrs John shall jointly and severally pay the costs of RM100,000.00 to Hee; and

[18] The Land Registry & its Relevant Officers are dissatisfied with the Judgment and hence lodged Appeal 480 to the Court of Appeal. [19] Likewise, Lee, Tang, John and John & Associates are dissatisfied with the Judgment and hence lodged Appeal 481 to the Court of Appeal. FINDINGS OF THIS COURT [20] This is an after-trial appeal; hence our function is merely review based on the record. We are guided by dicta of Steve Shim (CJ (Sabah & Sarawak)) in Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 (FC) on appellate intervention: "The Court of Appeal had clearly borne in mind the central feature of appellate intervention i.e., to determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/ or the established evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeal was perfectly entitled to examine the process of the evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. Clearly, the phrase "insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence" merely related to such a process." [21] Furthermore, in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of The Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 (FC), where Zabariah Mohd Yusof FCJ held as follows with emphasis added by us: at, due to a lack of judicial appreciation of evidence is plainly wrong. The Federal case of Gan Yook Ching (P) & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Tuck Seng & Ors call considerations as to what constitutes as the 'plainly wrong' test. [71] From the aforesaid authorities, there appears to be a difference in approach taken and applied by the UK Supreme Court and the approach taken by the Malaysian courts. Whilst Lord Reed in Henderson (supra) separated the four non-exhaustive identifiable errors of a trial judge from the plainly wrong test:

a material error of law;

(ii) a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence;

(iii) demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence; and

(iv) a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence; (all of which justifies appellate intervention of a trial judge's decision), this court in Gan Yook Chin (supra) effectively included them under what amount to the trial judge as being "plainly wrong". [72] The phrase "lack of judicial appreciation of evidence" used in Gan Yook Chin (supra) could very well encompass three out of four errors of a trial judge (other than the "material error of law") said to be identifiable by Lord Reed in Henderson (supra), namely:

critical factual finding which has no basis in evidence;

(ii) demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence; and

(iii) demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence. [73] Given that the issue at present is about identifying situations where the findings of fact by a trial court justify appellate intervention, the other identifiable error of "material error of law" listed by Lord Reed in Henderson (supra) can occur when a trial judge erroneously apply legal principles (eg rules of evidence) in the course of making a finding of fact, thus resulting in a lack of judicial appreciation of evidence. For example, when a trial judge erroneously placed a burden of proof on a party, that will lead the judge to misdirect himself when he attempts to interpret the factual matrix before him. The commission of material error of law by the trial judge in arriving at his conclusions (e.g., the requirement of proof of intention in constructive trust as opposed to express trust), also justifies an appellate court reversing such conclusions. [148] Given the aforesaid, we form the view that rather than adopting a rigid set of rules to demarcate the boundaries of appellate intervention insofar as findings of fact are concerned, the "plainly wrong" test as espoused in decisions of this court should be retained as a flexible guide for appellate courts. As long as the trial judge's conclusion can be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court feels like it might have decided differently is irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence is examined by the See also CIMB Bank Bhd v. Sebang Gemilnag Sdn Bhd & Anor [2018] 5 CLJ 129 (FC). [22] We have accordingly reviewed both Appeal 480 and Appeal 481 noting in particular the Settlement achieved between Ooh & Goh and Hee which prima facie connotes they are victims of a fraudulent scheme involving the Land. APPEAL 480 [23] The learned High Court Judge essentially held as follows against the Land Registry and its Officers, as reflected in the Judgment: The main thrust of the plaintiffs' claim is that the Selangor Land Office was negligent and had breached its statutory duties and/or duty of care towards the plaintiffs in allowing the security paper under their exclusive safekeeping, management, control, care and charge to be used to print the fake IDT V3, which fell into the hand of the Fraudster. This had enabled the Fraudster to perpetrate the land scam against the plaintiffs. By reason of the aforesaid breach, the Selangor Land Office has caused the plaintiffs loss and damage. It is also the plaintiffs' case that the Selangor Land Office was negligent and in breach of its statutory duty in registering the impugned Form 19G to remove the plaintiffs' Caveat. [46] The Selangor Land Office and its officers raised a common defence. They denied breaching their statutory duties and were negligent. They also claimed that they were only holding administrative role, and that the documents they registered were fit for registration. At para 19 of their defence, they admitted that IDT V3 is a fake title but claimed that it was wrongly created by an irresponsible party. a) Duties Owed by The Selangor Land Office [47] This Court observes that it is not the pleaded defence of the Selangor Land Office that it owed no duty of care to Ooh & Goh. At trial, counsel for the Selangor Land Office also did not put a challenge during cross examination to any of the plaintiffs' witnesses that the Selangor Land Office owed no duty of care to Ooh & Goh. [49] The duty on the part of the Selangor Land Office is two-fold. Firstly, there is the statutory duty under the NLC and secondly, a common law duty of care. This is set out clearly by the Federal Court in Pendaftar Hakmilik Pejabat Pendaftaran Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur & Anor v. Poh Yang Hong [2016] 6 MLRA 257 [50] The Selangor Land Office is entrusted with the following statutory duties under the NLC: a) to maintain the register of all lands caused to be registered at the Registry, and in particular to ensure that the information contained in the Register is correct, true and accurate and reflects the true and actual description of the title to the land as well as the true identity of the registered proprietor thereof. b) to comply strictly with the mandatory statutory provisions of s 5A and 14th Schedule of the NLC in operating the Computerised Land Registration System and the issuance of computerised title. (Low Kong Sheng v. Techna Moorithy Kolunda Veloo & Ors [2016] MLRHU 1764). c) to make enquiries, and require the production of evidence, oral or documentary, as the Registrar may consider necessary or desirable for the purpose of determining the fitness of any instrument for registration (s 302, NLC); d) to inform the proprietor of the land as soon as there is a private caveat entered on his/her land (s 324(3), NLC); e) to inform the proprietor of the land as soon as a private caveat entered on his/her land is withdrawn (s 325(2)(b), NLC); f) to follow the rules and guidelines set out in the circulars issued by the Ketua Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Persekutuan or Director General of Lands and Mines ("KPTGP"). Those guidelines and circulars are defined as subsidiary legislations. (United Allied Empire Sdn Bhd v. Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Selangor & Ors [2018] 4 MLRA 400; [2018] 1 MLJ 661; [2017] 8 CLJ 173; [2017] 5 AMR 555 (CA) at para 25) [51] It is the considered view of this Court that the Selangor Land Office owed the following duties to the plaintiffs: a) A duty to ensure that there is in place an effective system of safekeeping, control and supervision of the security papers and/or access, and usage of the same to prevent any unauthorised use. In this regard, there is a duty to comply strictly with the circular titled Pekeliling Ketua Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Persekutuan (Bilangan 1/2021) dated 12 January 2012 issued by the KPTGP, in particular paras 16 on Kertas Keselamatan Hakmilik. b) In respect of the registration of the impugned Form 19G:

a duty to check, with due diligence and with reasonable care, all particulars contained therein for the purpose of determining the fitness of the said instrument for registration;

(ii) a duty to check and detect anomalies and/or errors in the impugned Form 19G and to suspend and/or reject the instrument if it is not fit for registration; (Lim Chin Sim & Anor v. Ags Harta Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 2 MLRH 274 (HC) at paragraph 35)

The Selangor Land Office's Negligence and Breached of Duties Owed to Ooh & Goh

Breach of Duty and Negligence in Allowing the Creation of Fake IDT V3 [52] It is without any shadow of doubt that an IDT is an important document in every land matter. It is a proof of ownership to a land. It must be used for every registration of instrument of dealings (transfer, charges, lease and easement) under the NLC for the land concerned. [53] It goes without saying that an IDT is also the most important document in a sale and purchase transaction of property. Without the original IDT, the transaction will not go through. This was agreed by the Selangor Land Office's Registrar, (SD5-7(12)) Rosnizah Binti Sahrani ("Rosnizah"). [54] Therefore, the law and prudent administrative practices demand a strict and careful procedure in the safekeeping, handling and issuance of IDTs to safeguard the interest of landowners and the public. It starts with the papers that are used to print the IDTs called the security paper or "kertas keselamatan" and its safekeeping. Security Features of Security Papers [55] Every genuine and valid IDT is printed on a piece of security paper. Only the land offices possess the security paper. It is a special type of paper and has the following security features: a) it is thicker and heavier than any ordinary A4 paper; b) it has a watermark; and c) each has its own unique serial number. [56] This is confirmed by the evidence of the Selangor Land Office ie SD5-7(8) Norazila and SD5-7(11) Sahila. These security features are classified as government secret, according to SD5 -7(14) Sazali. Safekeeping of Security Papers [57] The KPTGP has issued a circular on the safekeeping of security papers under Pekeliling Ketua Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Persekutuan (Bilangan 1/2021) dated 12 January 2012. The relevant part is at s 16. From the testimony of the Selangor Land Office's witnesses, it can be summarised that: i. The security papers are stored in a strong room. ii. There is an officer in charge of the strong room. iii. The security papers are in reams and stored in boxes. Each ream has 250 sheets of security papers with serial numbers that are in sequence. iv. Upon the Registrars' requests, the officer in charge will send the security papers from the strong room to the Registrars. v. The Registrars usually retrieve 10 reams of security papers each time. vi. The Registrars must sign on a logbook that records the serial numbers of the security papers retrieved. vii. The Registrars have a duty to check and ensure that the serial numbers run in sequence and there are no missing sheets. viii. The Registrars are supposed to keep the security papers in a locked metal cabinet when they are not in use. Printing and Usage of Security Papers Exclusively by The Selangor Land Office [58] From the evidence of the Selangor Land Office, the security papers are accessible exclusively to the Registrars of Titles in the Selangor Land Office. Only they have the authority, knowledge and means to print and issue IDTs on security papers. This is gathered from the evidence of SD5-7(12) Rosnizah. Destruction of Old IDTs Upon Issuance of New IDTs [59] Under 14th Schedule, NLC, an old IDT must be destroyed upon issuance of a new IDT. It reads: "2. Mode of making an entry on a document of title under the Computerized Land Registration System For the purposes of this Act, whenever an entry is required to be made on the computer printed document of title by the Registrar under this Act, it shall be taken as a requirement that:

the Registrar makes the entry by use of a computer; and

the Registrar prepares a new computer document of title and cancels and destroys the previous version of the computer printed document of title." [60] This is to safeguard against any abuse and unauthorised use of an obsolete IDT. With 14th Schedule, NLC in place, ultimately there shall be only one (1) IDT that can exist and held by the last registered proprietor of a piece of land at a particular point of time. This is confirmed by the Selangor Land Office based on the evidence of SD5-7(8) Norazila, SD5-7(12) Rosnizah and SD5-7(14) Sazali. [61] Based on the facts established at trial the Selangor Land Office has the exclusive control, management, safekeeping and usage of security papers and the issuance and destruction of IDTs, whereby: i) IDTs are printed on security papers that are only accessible by its Registrars; ii) Each security paper contained security features that makes it special from ordinary papers ie different weight and thickness, watermark and unique serial number. iii) Only the Registrars have the authority, knowledge and means to print and issue IDTs on security papers; iv) Older version of an IDT must be surrendered to the Selangor Land Office for destruction before a new IDT is issued. Breach of Duty by The Creation of The Fake IDT V3 That Facilitated the Land Scam Perpetrated on The Plaintiffs [62] In this case, it has been established that at least three (3) original IDTs of the Land existed at the same point of time. They were all held by different parties: i) IDT V2 (SDE 0786827) (K, pp 9-11) which remains in Hee's possession; ii) IDT V3 (SDE 0583325) (C, pp 11-13) which was used by the Fraudster to scam Ooh & Goh. It remains in Ooh & Goh's possession; iii) IDT V4 (serial number unclear as it has been intentionally covered) (C, pp 4-5) which was used by Lee to transfer the Land. iv) Lee's Title, (C, pp 76-77) which is the latest version of the IDT of the Land, Version 3 dated 29 December 2015 bearing Serial Number SDE 0940496, currently being held by Lee. However, it was never produced at trial. [63] The Selangor Land Office claimed that IDT V3 is a fake title on the basis that its record did not show that IDT V3 was issued. Instead, from its record, IDT Version 3 was issued on 29 December 2015 and currently registered in the name of Lee. This is the latest version of the IDT to the Land. First, there was no denial by the Selangor Land Office in its defence and evidence that IDT V3 was printed on the security paper that was under its safekeeping, management, care, control and charge. Second, from the evidence of the Selangor Land Office, the security paper used to print IDT V3 is beyond doubt a genuine security paper bearing all the security features. During trial, the original IDT V3 and IDT V2 were produced for the inspection of its witnesses. They confirmed both IDTs were printed on genuine security papers. However, none of them could explain why there were more than one original IDT of the Land which were existing at the same time. [64] The sheer presence and definite co-existence of IDT V2, IDT V3, IDT V4 and Lee's Title itself magnifies the Selangor Land Office's blatant failure in carrying out their statutory duties. Third, IDT V3 was signed and sealed by a Land Administrator of the Selangor Land Office, Puan Asmah Binti Saian ("Asmah"). She also signed and sealed IDT V2 and IDT V4. This is confirmed by the Selangor Land Office's witnesses. [65] Section 12(4), NLC provides that the State Director, the Registrar and every Land Administrator shall each have a seal of office, and every instrument purporting to bear any such seal, and to have been signed by or on behalf of the officer in question shall, unless the contrary be proved, be deemed to have been sealed and signed by him or at his direction. [66] It is not the pleaded defence of the Selangor Land Office's that the signature and seal of Asmah on IDT V3 was forged. Notwithstanding that, in 2018 the Selangor State Legal Advisor sent IDT V3 to a government chemist, Juneiffa Quek (SD5-7 (13)) ("Government Chemist") to determine the authenticity of Asmah's signature. Two types of specimens were provided to the Government Chemist ie Type A specimen (5 specimen signatures) and Type B specimen (i.e. 1 specimen initial). [67] The Government Chemist concluded in her report that no opinion could be formed to ascertain the authorship of the signature appearing on IDT V3 because: i) Type A specimen signatures were different in structure hence they were not suitable for comparison; and ii) No effective comparison could be carried out with Type B specimen initial due to insufficient specimen initial provided (only 1 was provided). Although requests were made for at least 10 specimen initials, the requests were ignored by the Selangor State Legal Advisor's office. (Chemist Report dated 21 August 2018: Bundle E, p 1-2) [68] In short, there is no evidence that Asmah's signature on IDT V3 is forged. There was no attempt to call Asmah to explain why she signed and sealed IDT V3 (and IDT V4). Although Asmah has retired, Encik Sazali (SD5-7 (14)) admitted that the Selangor Land Office could still trace Asmah's whereabout based on her pension record and yet she was not called to give evidence. Fourth, the security paper SDE 0583325 that was used to print and issue IDT V3 was under the exclusive safekeeping, management, care and control by the Selangor Land Office at the material time. This was confirmed by Encik Sazali (SD5-7(14)), the Registrar who was tasked to investigate the fraudulent transfer from Hee to Lee. He tendered the Selangor Land Office's security paper logbook at the trial. That was the first time the logbook was made available to the parties and to this Honourable Court. (Buku Rekod Kertas Kesalamatan Bahagian Pendaftaran Hakmilik: Exhibit D-5 [69] The logbook revealed that security paper SDE 0583325 was kept in Box 292 under Ream 2334. Ream 2334 comprised of security papers SDE 0583251 to SDE 0583500. They were taken out on 20 March 2015 by one Darshan Singh A/L Jaswant Singh ("Darshan") allegedly from the Pejabat Tanah dan Daerah, Sepang. [70] Even though the logbook was accessible to him at all material times, Encik Sazali conceded that was the very first time he opened up the logbook to see who took out security paper SDE 0583325 from the Selangor Land Office. He also conceded that he did not investigate Darshan or pass this material information to the police. [71] Most significantly, Encik Sazali admitted at the trial that the security paper SDE 0583325 has been abused in this case and that the Selangor Land Office is wholly responsible for this. [72] In this case, there was no attempt by the Selangor Land Office to explain away or clarify the admission made by Encik Sazali. With this clear admission, we submit that the Selangor Land Office is estopped from arguing that they are not negligent and responsible for the misuse and abuse of security paper SDE

Their lack of care and negligence had opened the way and enabled the Fraudster to defraud Ooh & Goh with IDT V3. [73] Encik Sazali's testimony above also demonstrated a total lackadaisical and careless attitude of the Selangor Land Office in dealing with matters of serious natures ie fraudulent activities and transactions that emanated from their office. It does not appear that any police report was lodged or any internal investigation conducted to unearth the facts relating to this unfortunate episode of a stolen security paper that led to the issuance of this fake IDT V3, not to mention that IDT V3 was signed and sealed by its own Land Administrator. Their unconcerned attitude is quite appalling in the circumstances. The failure to carry out any form of investigation leads to the conclusion that there was negligence on their part. Fifth, there is no proper system in place to prevent abuse or misuse of the security papers. It is established at the trial that there is no system put in place to record which particular security paper with that particular unique serial number was used to print the IDT of a particular piece of land owned by a particular registered proprietor. [81] The veracity of her evidence was not challenged. In fact, she was not cross-examined by counsels for Hasra, Lee and the Selangor Land Office. There was also no other expert witness called to rebut her evidence. Hence, Ooh & Goh had on the balance of probabilities proven that the Form 19G is a forged instrument. Failure to Reject the Forged Form19G That Contained A Wrong Solicitor's Chop [82] It was highlighted at the trial that Tan's name chop on the impugned Form 19G read "TAN OHAI LOOI" and not her name "TAN CHAI LOOI". If the officers at the Selangor Land Office had been vigilant and performed their duties diligently and competently, they would have detected this discrepancy. With such discrepancy, the Selangor Land Office is duty bound to reject this impugned Form 19G under s 298, NLC. [83] When confronted during trial, the Selangor Land Office's officers who processed (Sahila) and registered (Rosnizah) the impugned Form 19G admitted that they have overlooked the discrepancy and the presentation should be rejected. Registration of A Rejected (DITOLAK) Instrument [84] Under s 298(2), NLC, the Registrar shall mark any instrument rejected with the word "Rejected", return it to the person or body by whom it was presented together with a note of the reasons therefore, and cause a note of the rejection to be made in the Presentation Book. [85] It is pertinent to point out that the word "DITOLAK' was actually stamped on the impugned Form 19G. yet the Selangor Land Office proceeded to register it. There was no explanation given why this had happened. [86] Hence, the Selangor Land Office was clearly negligent and has breached its duties in registering the impugned Form 19G. It failed to process the impugned Form 19G with due diligence and with reasonable care. Failure To Comply With The Mandatory Requirement Under Sections 324(3) And 325(2)(b), NLC [87] Under s 324(3), NLC, as soon as a private caveat is entered on a land, the Registrar is duty bound to serve a Form19A on the registered proprietor to notify him/her of the entry. Similarly, when a private caveat is removed, under s 325(2)(b), NLC the Registrar also has a duty to give notice of such withdrawal to the registered proprietor of the land. [88] In this case, the Selangor Land Office failed to serve any notice on Hee on the entry of Ooh & Goh's caveat on 2 December 2015, and the removal of the same on 29 December 2015. No such notice was produced at the trial to show otherwise. In fact, from the evidence, it appears that the Selangor Land Office's officers were not even aware of this mandatory requirement under the NLC. Its witnesses SD5-7(12) Rosnizah and SD5-7(14) Sazali also admitted of failure to serve those notices is a breach of the NLC. [89] In this regard, the Selangor Land Office has breached its duties and was negligent. If the notices were sent out to Hee upon the entry and the subsequent removal of Ooh & Goh's Caveat, it is not unforeseeable that Hee would have been alerted that someone was trying to sell his Land. Hee would then confront Ooh & Goh. In such scenario, it is also not unforeseeable that the land scam would be exposed and Ooh & Goh would stand a chance to act and prevent the loss suffered.

(ii) Selangor Land Office's Failure to Investigate Ooh & Goh's Complaint [90] s 302, NLC empowers the Registrar to make enquiries, and require the production of evidence, oral or documentary, as the Registrar may consider necessary or desirable for the purpose of determining the fitness of any instrument for registration. [91] Ooh & Goh's solicitors M/s May Chan had on 4 April 2016 (D, pp 13-14) sent a notice to the Selangor Land Office to complain and demand explanations on the following serious incidents: i) the fraudulent removal of Ooh & Goh's Caveat with a forged Form 19G; ii) the registration of the forged Form 19G despite it been stamped with the words "DITOLAK"; and iii) the fraudulent transfer of the Land to Lee despite M/s May Chan had in their possession the original IDT V3. [92] By that time, it was already known to the Selangor Land Office that at least two (2) original IDTs of the Land had existed at the same time ie IDT V3 which was in M/s May Chan's hand and IDT V4 that Lee used to effect the transfer. [93] Regretfully, no action whatsoever was taken by the Selangor Land Office despite receiving the said notice and having been alerted of the fraudulent transactions. It failed to contact Ooh & Goh and Tan for clarification. Neither did it initiate any investigation nor set up a formal enquiry under the NLC to determine how all these came about. It was established at the trial from the evidence of SD5-7(14) Sazali that nothing was done at all by the Selangor Land Office to trace and remedy the wrongs. [94] Based on the above, the Selangor Land Office's had committed negligence and breached of duties owed to Ooh & Goh with Ooh & Goh having on a balance of probabilities proven their case against the Selangor Land Office for negligence and breached of statutory duties. This renders the Selangor Land Office liable for the loss and damage suffered by Ooh & Goh, who were adversely affected by the Selangor Land Office's action, inaction or total indifference. [95] It is also pertinent to highlight here that counsel for the Selangor Land Office throughout the trial did not put to Ooh & Goh that the Selangor Land Office was not negligent and did not breach its duty of care. This failure to cross examine Ooh & Goh on this crucial part of its defence amounts an abandonment of their pleaded defence.

The Selangor Land Office's Negligence and Breach of Duty Were the Effective Cause of Ooh & Goh's Loss and Damage [96] In Chua Seng Sam Realty Sdn Bhd v. Say Chong Sdn Bhd & Ors and Other Appeals [2012] 6 MLRA 122; [2013] 2 MLJ 29; [2012] 7 CLJ 337 (CA), Hishamudin Mohd Yunus JCA (as he then was) at p 345 held that: "[32] It is trite law that in an action for negligence the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant's act was the effective cause of the injury suffered by the plaintiff. Without a causative link being established by the plaintiff, the claim cannot succeed. The passage found in para 2-01 of the text of Clerk & Lindsell on Tort (20th edn) states this basic principle in the following manner: In the majority of torts, the claimant must show that the defendant's wrongdoing caused him actual damage. In these torts, and indeed in torts actionable per se if substantial damages are sought, the claimant must establish that:

the defendant's conduct did in fact result in the damage of which he complains, and

the damage is not in law too remote a consequence of the defendant's wrongdoing." [97] This is generally known as the "but for" test. In this case, the fraud perpetrated against the plaintiffs could not have happened BUT FOR the Selangor Land Office's negligence and breach of statutory duties in allowing the security paper SDE 0583325 to be misused to issue IDT V3. This resulted in the Fraudster being able to deal with the Land by entering into the SPA dated 2 December 2015 with Ooh & Goh. [98] Ooh & Goh had relied and acted, to their detriment, on the fake IDT V3. It is Ooh & Goh's case that without the Fraudster being able to produce the original IDT V3, they would not have entered into the SPA dated 2 December 2015 with the Fraudster. [101] It is pertinent to emphasise that the above material evidence was not challenged by counsel for the Selangor Land Office. It was also not put to Ooh & Goh and their witnesses that the existence of IDT V3 did not cause their loss (See: Aik Meng and Wong Swee Chin).

Selangor Land Office Is Not Entitled To The Statutory Protection Under s 22, NLC [102] Section 22, NLC states that no officer appointed under Part Two-Administration shall be liable to be sued in any civil court for any act or matter done, or ordered to be done or omitted to be done, by him in good faith and in the intended exercise of any power, or performance of any duty, conferred or imposed on him by or under this Act. [103] However, the Selangor Land Office and its officers cannot rely on the statutory protection under s 22, NLC because in this case: i) they had fallen far short of the standard that is to be expected of a public authority and its officers; ii) they were grossly negligent and in breach of their statutory duties; iii) given what had transpired, they were hardly in a position to claim they had carried out their duties in good faith; iv) their actions and inactions had seriously undermined public trust and confidence in the land authority maintaining a credible and efficient registry. Uptown Properties Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2012] 2 MLRH 270; [2012] 8 MLJ 713; [2012] 3 CLJ 271; [2012] 2 AMR 653 (HC) at paras 26, 28-30

Damages and Relief Against the Selangor Land Office [104] As the Selangor Land Office was in breach of the statutory duties and was negligent, they have to account to Ooh & Goh for their loss and damage. The total sum paid by Ooh & Goh to the Fraudster is RM1.5 million. [107] Therefore, the plaintiffs have proven on a balance of probabilities that they have paid a total sum of RM1.5 million to the Fraudster. This is the amount of loss and damage suffered by them which the Selangor Land Office is liable to pay as damages to Ooh & Goh. [108] A plethora of authorities have decided how our courts have held the land offices accountable and liable to compensate unsuspecting purchasers that have suffered injuries and loss due to the negligence and breach of duties by the land offices. [116] The defence of contributory negligence was not pursued by the Selangor Land Office at the trial herein. There was no evidence that Ooh & Goh were negligent or had contributed to the loss and damage suffered. [117] From the cases cited above, it can be seen that the Selangor Land Office has been taken to courts numerous times and found liable for negligence and breach of statutory duties (See: Lim Chin Sim & Anor v. Ags Harta Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 2 MLRH 274 (HC), Lee Siew Ken & Anor v. Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian Negeri Selangor [2015] MLRHU 810, Low Poh Kim v. Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian Negeri Selangor & Ors [2014] 3 MLRH 309; [2015] 7 MLJ 287; [2014] 3 CLJ 897 (HC), Chong Kian Yong & Anor v. Lee Kim Cheng & Ors [2021] MLRHU 284 (HC), and Malayan Banking Berhad & Ors v. Tho Siew Wah & Anor And Another Appeal [2018] 1 MLRA 498; [2017] 2 MLJ 721; [2017] 7 CLJ 573; [2017] 2 AMR 525 (CA),). In spite of this, it appears that the Selangor Land Office did not learn from their mistakes. Neither did it take steps to address their administrative short comings nor undertake the necessary measures to strengthen their registry. As a result, Hee, Ooh & Goh had become the next [24] Generally, the learned High Court Judge has thoroughly and carefully assessed both the oral and documentary evidence, and properly applied the relevant statutory provisions and case law to the facts and circumstances before the court. [25] That said, with regard to the duties owed by the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers to the public in respect of land transactions, we observe that their defence was premised on the contention that they owed no duty of care, whether under statute or common law, to Ooh & Goh. In the alternative, they argued that even if such a duty existed, it was not breached. They further relied on the statutory immunity afforded by s. of the National Land Code 1965 ( ). We also note that the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers were treated collectively as appellants, without any distinction being made as to their individual roles or involvement. [26] Accordingly, the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers contended that the loss sustained by Ooh & Goh arose from a contract of sale of land, albeit concluded with an imposter of remedy lay solely in pursuing damages against the contract breaker or a tortfeasor, particularly for deceit and fraud. [27] In addition, the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers argued that IDT v3 (i) was never issued by them; thus, Ooh & Goh could not rely on that document of title to ground an action in negligence. They also maintained that there was no suggestion of any conspiracy between the er. Further, they contended that issue documents of title, including their serial numbers, are not recorded in the computerized system of the Land Registry because only land transactions are recorded therein. Consequently, the Land Registry should not be faulted when fake titles are used, as such forgeries cannot easily be detected. [28] the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers submitted that their role was purely administrative, acting upon receipt of the prescribed application instrument under the NLC. The caveat was removed because such an application had been submitted to the Land Registry, albeit by an imposter purporting to act on behalf of Ooh & Goh. On this premise, they contended that they owed no duty to notify Ooh & Goh. Moreover, they argued that it the stamp imprinted on the application instrument. In such circumstances, they maintained that negligence could not be attributed to them, relying on Supreme Tribute Sdn Yahya (didakwa sebagai pentadbir tanah Hulu Langat Selangor) [2018] MLJU 984 (CA) and Pentadbir Hakmilik, Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Negeri Selangor v. Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd [2016] 3 CLJ 851 (CA). [29] The Land Registry & its Relevant Officers ultimately submitted that they were not acquainted with any of the parties involved in the land transactions in question, and further that there was no proximity between them and the tortfeasors who perpetrated the deceit and fraud. [30] Upon our objective review, we find this to be a matter of grave concern, one which has surfaced repeatedly in numerous cases over the past 25 years since the infamous decision of Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v. Boonsom Boonyanit [2001] 1 MLRA 69. In many of these cases, innocent landowners lost their property to fraudsters. Such cases have largely been perpetuated by the lack of vigilance on the part of land registries in carrying out their statutory functions under the NLC. [31] In this regard, it is apt to echo the following postscript of Lee Swee Seng J (now FCJ) in Yew Foo Chun v. Wong Nye Keong & Ors [2014] MLRHU 141: What has happened will happen again partly because there is this egregious element in society that cannot be completed eliminated. However, what is lamentable is that whilst various police reports had been lodged by the Plaintiff who had lost her Land through no fault of her own, the police has not investigated the matter thoroughly and instead has passed the matter to the Land Office to investigate. No one has been charged in Court for cheating the Plaintiff of her Land, let alone convicted. The Land Office, from the evidence given by its past and present officers, have not identified who were the persons responsible for this fiasco. Such inaction can only lead to more bold and brazen actions on the part of those bent on taking every advantage of human frailty and exploiting human failings in the computerized system of land registration. No system can be better than the people that man it. The human interface is still the weakest link. Unless zero tolerance is shown for such dereliction of duty on the part of those responsible, innocent land owners will be in for another [32] On the facts of the present case, we first find it alarming that the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers took the initial position that they owed no duty of care whatsoever to Ooh & Goh. This is appalling, particularly when Zulkefli Ahmad Makinuddin CJ (Malaya) (later PCA) has already held unequivocally in Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Pendaftaran Wilayah Perserkutuan Kuala Lumpur & Anor v. Poh Yang Hong [2016] 6 MLRA 257 (FC) as follows: tate here that a common law duty of care can arise in the performance of a statutory function. In the instant case, the 2nd defendant had a strong statutory function to ensure that the records entered in the Register of Titles and maintained in the office of the 2nd defendant contained particulars which are accurate. A failure of that duty can give rise to the coexistence of statutory duty and common law duty of care (See the case of X [33] Second, we find that the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers, without any cogent or acceptable explanation, issued multiple issue documents of title, notably IDT v3(i) and IDT v3(ii). This multiple issuance undoubtedly facilitated the fraud perpetrated upon Ooh & Goh as well as Hee, which would otherwise not have materialised. In our view, this singular but significant dereliction of duty suffices to establish negligence if not also deceit on the part of the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers, rendering them liable to Ooh & Goh. Furthermore, we see no credible justification to exempt them from liability under s. 22 NLC, which provides:

Protection of officers. No officer appointed under this Part shall be liable to be sued in any civil court for any act or matter done, or ordered to be done or omitted to be done, by him in good faith and in the intended exercise of any power, or performance of any duty, conferred or imposed on him by or under this Act. The aforementioned actions of the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers were thus neither undertaken in good faith nor with reasonable care. While they have alluded to the culpability of the contract breakers and other tortfeasors involved in the fraud, we do not accept that this exonerates them from liability. Their statutory and common law duty of care remains independently actionable. It is no defence to argue that others deceived Ooh & Goh without their involvement when, in truth, the fraud was enabled by their negligence; see Lim Kar Bee v. Abdul Latif bin Ismail [1978] 1 MLJ 109 (FC) if not also their actions which lacked good faith. [34] Third, with respect to the removal of the private caveat lodged on 2nd December 2015 by Ooh & Goh, we find that the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers were plainly negligent in failing to detect discrepancies in the application instrument. These included the mismatch between the under a duty to scrutinise every application instrument thoroughly and carefully, yet no cogent or credible explanation has been offered to exonerate them from liability. The wrongful removal of the caveat ultimately enabled the transfer of the Land to Lee, thereby depriving Ooh & Goh of their rightful acquisition. [35] Fourth, we observe that the Land Registry and its Relevant Officers made no submissions before us on the losses suffered and claimed by Ooh & Goh. Nevertheless, we find that the learned High Court Judge fairly and reasonably awarded both general and exemplary damages in light of the specific circumstances of this case. [36] In the premises, we do not find that the learned High Court Judge misdirected himself in appreciating the evidence adduced, nor was he plainly wrong in interpreting and applying the relevant law so as to warrant appellate intervention. We concur with the learned High Court Judge that the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers exhibited a wholly lackadaisical and careless attitude in handling matters of grave importance involving fraudulent activities and transactions emanating from their office. APPEAL 481 [37] The learned High Court Judge held as follows against Lee, Tang, John and John & Associates, as set out in the Judgment:

Lee, John and John's Legal Firm's Pleaded Case [150] Lee's pleaded case as regards Hee's claim is as follows: a) Hee is indebted to Lee and to settle the debt, Hee offered to sell the Land to Lee for the sum of RM500,000.00; b) Lee agreed and entered into the SPA. In this regard, Hee went to John's Law Firm on 5 October 2015 and 30 October 2015 to execute the SPA and the MOT. Hee also handed his IC to John's Law Firm for the purpose of the Transfer; c) Lee also paid the balance purchase price of RM450,000.00 to Lee. Lee alleged that he has paid the full purchase consideration of RM500,000.00 to Hee; d) Lee informed Hee about the 2 private caveats on the Land and on 28 December 2015, Hee gave passed to John's Law Firm two (2) Removal of Caveat forms; and e) Lee contended that he is a bona fide purchase and the legal owner of the Land. [151] Lee's pleaded case against Hee's Counterclaim is as follows: a) Lee denied that he ever entered into any sale and purchase agreement with Tang; and b) Lee denied that he conspired to defraud Hee. [152] As for John and John's Law Firm, their pleaded case can be summed up as follows: i) Hee appeared at John's Law Firm on 5 October 2015 and 30 October 2015 to execute the SPA and the MOT respectively. On the latter date, Hee also passed the original title to John's Law Firm as well as his identity card to affect the transfer; ii) Although Hee wanted John and John's Law Firm to act for him, they only acted for Lee; iii) Prior to Hee executing the SPA, D5 explained the contents of the SPA to Hee. Hee confirmed that he has received the full purchase consideration from Lee; iv) Tang's Caveat was entered as a security for a loan of RM300,000.00 that Lee borrowed from Tang; and v) John and John's Law Firm denied that they conspired to defraud Hee. [153] Therefore, in order to discharge their respective evidential burdens, Lee and John (and John's Law Firm) have to establish the matters pleaded.

(ii) The Evidence Given by Lee And Peter (Low Ah Chai) On Behalf Of John And John's Law Firm [154] This Court finds that the evidence of these 2 witnesses are full of contradictions and inconsistencies and of no help to the defence raised by John and the firm. [155] In respect of credibility of witnesses, the often quoted Privy Council decision that was cited by amongst others, our Federal Court in Md Zainudin Raujan v. PP [2013] 3 MLRA 351; [2013] 3 MLJ 773; [2013] 4 CLJ 21; [2013] 3 AMR 480 at [33] - "...the real tests for either accepting, or rejecting the evidence of a witness are how consistent the story is with itself, how it stands the test of cross-examination, and how far it fits with the rest of the evidence and the circumstances of the case" [Emphasis Added]. [156] The inherent probability or improbability of a fact in issue must be the prime consideration.

(iii) John's Failure to Give Evidence [157] An adverse inference should be drawn against John and John's Law Firm for John's failure to appear as a witness in accordance with s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950. [158] In Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP [1986] 1 MLRA 292; [1987] 1 MLJ 492; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221, the Supreme Court held that s 114(g) is applicable not only to a party who withhold material documents but also material witness. [159] On this note, reference is made to the case of Sabah Shell Petroleum Co Ltd & Anor v. The Owners Of And/Or Any Other Persons Interested In The Ship Or Vessel The Borcos Takdir [2012] 4 MLRH 560; [2012] 5 MLJ 515, where it was stated by Nallini Pathmanathan J (now FCJ) at para 92, p 552: "This appears to be a fit and proper case for this court to draw an inference under s 114(g) because the master here could have been subpoenaed to give evidence by the defendant. As stated above, the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case whether by the application of res ipsa loquitur or by proving the basic elements of negligence. The master's evidence was not essential on these facts for Shell to establish a prima facie case. As such the onus shifted to the defendant to rebut the inference of negligence that had arisen. The person best placed to explain fully the events of the day would have been the master. Notwithstanding that the master could have been called, the defendant chose not do so, stating that he was unco-operative. Given the singular importance of his evidence and the failure of the defendant to subpoena him, the only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn is that the master's evidence, if produced, would affect the defendant adversely. Such an inference is accordingly drawn, (see also Subry Hamid v. Husaini Tan Sri Ikhwan & Anor [2006] 2 MLRA 210; [2006] 6 MLJ 229; [2006] 4 CLJ 50; [2006] 5 AMR 644)." [160] In reference to the case before this Court, reference is made to Marappan Muthusamy v. R Sivam Ramasamy [2015] 1 MLRA 318; [2014] 4 MLJ 428 ("Marappan"). In Marappan, the solicitor who prepared the impugned documents were not called although the court was informed that he would be appearing. At para [28], the Court of Appeal held: "The failure of the respondent to call the solicitor to testify on these documents despite informing the appellant in writing that he would be present to testify, in our view attract the invocation of s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the respondent. There was no explanation being offered by the respondent as to his failure to call this material witness despite notifying the appellant in writing that he would procure the attendance of Ti Chin Lee as witness at the trial. It would be imperative upon the respondent to call the material witnesses he had undertaken to do in writing, and the failure to do so without explanation could lead to an adverse inference against the respondent. In the circumstances we agree with learned counsel for the appellant that the legal inference under s 114(g) applies against the respondent. The solicitor, Ti Chin Lee, if he had been produced before the court at the trial would surely be able to explain the mystery of exh D3." [161] In this case, John is the 5th Defendant in the Counterclaim. John was listed as one of the witnesses that would be called. His Witness Statement was filed in Court. However, 10 September 2020, all parties were just informed by John's counsel that he would not be called as a witness. No explanation was given. [162] John is a material witness to the case. His evidence is crucial for the determination of the following issues which are crucial to the successfull defence of the suit: i) Whether he met Hee and took instructions from Hee which led to the preparation of the Warrant to Act and SPA; ii) Whether he in fact witnessed Hee's execution of the impugned documents ie the Warrant to Act, SPA and MOT; iii) Whether he had a hand in the advice given to Lee to use payment vouchers as proof of the loan; iv) Whether he was present when the loan to Hee was purportedly given by Lee; and v) Whether he drafted the agreement between Lee and Tang. [163] In the circumstances, applying Marrapan and Sabah Shell, the presumption of adverse inference should and must be invoked against John and John's Legal Firm. John's evidence, if he had appeared to give evidence would be unfavourable to John and John's Legal Firm and by extension to his co-conspirators. Hee Has Proven His Claim for Forgery, Fraud and Unlawful Acquisition Of The Land

Forgery Issue [164] With regards the evaluation of evidence in a case of such nature, the Court of Appeal decision of Boonsoom Boonyanit v. Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 MLRA 209; [1997] 2 MLJ 62; [1997] 3 CLJ 17; [1997] 2 AMR 1813 is of reference. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence given by Boonsom Boonyanit who denied that she executed the statutory declarations and the impugned memorandum of transfer was the only direct evidence as to whether the signature was hers or not. That coupled with the evidence that Boonsom Boonyanit was not in Malaysia at that alleged time of signing "constitutes powerful circumstantial evidence in support of her assertion that she never executed the relevant instrument of transfer'. Given that Boonsom Boonyanit's denial was not contradicted by the evidence from Adorna Properties' witnesses, Boonsom Boonyanit "had brought home the allegation of forgery to a high standard of conviction". (at pp 77-80) [165] In Ags Harta Sdn Bhd v. Liew Yok Yin [2009] 4 MLRA 381; [2010] 1 MLJ 309; [2010] 7 CLJ 142, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the sale documentations (ie the sale and purchase agreement, the transfer forms and valuation forms) did not bear the signature of the Liew Yok Yin as the trial judge did not only rely solely on Liew's evidence but the evidence of SD2, the solicitor who prepared the sale documentations who confirmed that the person who executed the sale documentations was not Liew (at p 316). [166] There was direct evidence given by Hee where he denied signing the Warrant to Act, the SPA, and most importantly, the MOT. The direct evidence of Hee coupled with the other evidence highlighted above, namely the person who appeared in John's Law Firm was clearly not the real Hee and this clearly lead to the "irresistible inference and conclusion" that Hee did not execute the Impugned PA, the 2nd SPA, the Withdrawal and the Transmission (Boonsom Boonyanit at pp 79-90 applied). The onus now has been shifted to Lee to rebut the contention that Hee did not sign the documents aforesaid, and in particular, the MOT. John, who attested Hee's signature has to be called. [167] In this regard, s 68 of the Evidence Act requires John (who attested Hee's signature) to be called. s 68 was considered by NH Chan J (later JCA) in Chiew Lip Seng v. Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd [1998] 3 MLRH 722; [1999] 1 MLJ 310; [1999] 5 CLJ 112; [1999] 1 AMR 789 where the plaintiff sought a declaration that a charge on his property to the defendant bank as security for banking facilities was not executed by him and that the signature on the charge document was forged. At the trial, the plaintiff gave evidence denying that the charge was executed by him. He also brought a government document examiner as an expert witness to give evidence that the signature on the charge document was not his. With that evidence, the learned judge held that that throws the onus on the defendant who has to prove that the charge was executed by the plaintiff on the basis of s 68. Thus, John has to give evidence to state otherwise. [168] In the circumstances, the failure to call John is fatal. Hee has proven the allegation of forgery and the MOT was clearly and void instrument as it was not executed by Hee.

(ii) Ultra vires Issue [169] Apart from the Forgery Issue, it is apparent that the Transfer was effected using the Fake IDT V4 Title. The Fake IDT V4 Title was and must have been unlawfully issued as the IDT V2 remains with Hee. Hence, Lee's title was unlawfully acquired through the exercise of any power or authority conferred by any law. As stated in Uptown Properties Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2012] 2 MLRH 270; [2012] 8 MLJ 713; [2012] 3 CLJ 271; [2012] 2 AMR 653 at [19]: "The issuing of a computerised title to the fourth defendants as a registered proprietor when the original title to the said land continued to be in the possession of the plaintiff was ultra vires as it contravened the provisions of the National Land Code (Amendment Act 1992 (Act 832 of 1992) s 5A and the 14th Schedule therein and the same was a contravention of s 340(2)(c) of the National Land Code. It follows therefore any instrument executed by the director of the fourth defendant would be void and insufficient per se (see s 340(2)(b) of the NLC)." [170] Thus, Lee's title is also liable to be set aside under s 340(2)(c) of the NLC. Based on the Forgery and the Ultra Vires issues, Lee's title is liable to be set aside.

(iv) Fraud Issue [171] Under s 340(2)(a), Hee has to prove actual fraud. The allegation of fraud must be brought home against the fraudster. [174] The onus of proof now is on the balance of probabilities (Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 5 MLRA 191; [2015] 5 MLJ 1; [2015] 7 CLJ 584; [2015] 5 AMR 497. In our present case, Hee has proven the allegation of fraud against Lee. From the totality of evidence, Hee has proven on the balance of probabilities that Lee perpetrated the fraud on Hee and deprived Hee of the Land. The evidence of such fraud can be gathered from these observations: i) At all material times, IDT V2 remains with Hee. ii) Hee did not take any loan from Lee. However, Lee concocted a story that Hee was indebted to him and sold the Land to him as a consequence to settle the loan; iii) To give credibility to the story, the "Payment Vouchers" and the SPA was created. These were fraudulent documents. The "Payment Vouchers" remain Part C documents of which the original was not produced at trial; iv) Lee did not pay any money to Hee; v) Hee did not sign the Warrant to Act, the SPA and the MOT. Apart from that, Lee procured the Fake IDT V4, a fake identity card purportedly belonging to Hee and used the fake title together with the MOT, which was also fraudulent to transfer the Land to himself. Likewise, Hee has proven his allegations of fraud against Lee.

Conspiracy Issue [175] Based on the evidence adduced at trial, this Court is of the considered opinion that Hee has made out the case of conspiracy, as pleaded in Counterclaim against Lee, Tang, John and John's Law Firm. In Renault Sa v. Inokom Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor And Other Applications [2008] 3 MLRA 504; [2010] 5 MLJ 394; [2010] 5 CLJ 32, at [32] the Court of Appeal laid out the elements required to be proven to establish a case for conspiracy and these elements are: "(a) an agreement between two or more persons (that is an agreement between Tan Chong and others);

an agreement for the purpose of injuring Inokom and Quasar;

that acts done in execution of that agreement resulted in damage to

damage is an essential element and where damage is not pleaded the statement of claim may be struck out." [176] In proving a claim for conspiracy, it is well-accepted rule that it may be established by evidence of circumstances from which an inference may be drawn. In Mgg Pillai v. Tan Sri Dato' Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Other Appeals [1995] 1 MLRA 322; [1995] 2 MLJ 493; [1995] 2 CLJ 912, at p 515, Gopal Sri Ram JCA held: "That, in my judgment, is a proper direction in law and upon the proved facts. Conspiracy is a tort that is not always capable of proof by direct evidence. Like so many other facts, an agreement to do an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means may be established by evidence of circumstances from which such an agreement may be inferred: Barindra Kumar Ghose & Ors v. The Emperor [1909] 14 CWN 1114 It is axiomatic that there must be proof and not mere conjecture. In the present case there was sufficient evidence from which a conspiracy could be properly inferred. The learned judge was therefore right in drawing the inferences he did. In this state of affairs, it is not surprising that the ground of appeal directed upon this point was not pursued." [177] Likewise, in Ranjit Singh Gurnam Singh v. Dato Goh Cheng Hong & Ors [2015] MLRHU 1128; [2015] 10 MLJ 269, Che Ruzima J (now JCA) cited R Balakrishna Pillai v. State [1996] CRi LJ 757 and adopted the passage therein at [302]: "... The essence of the conspiracy being bare agreement between the conspirators, the same has to be proved in the manner allowed by law. While accepting the materials that may be let in to prove the case of conspiracy the reality of the situation has to be taken into account. Conspiracy as a whole is brought about in secrecy and the proof of the same, by adoption of evidence direct; is really an impossible feat in most of the cases, though in the rarest of rare occasion; the possibility of obtaining such evidence is there. As such the conspiracy may be proved in most of the cases, by process of inference or induction from relevant facts and circumstances." [178] In the present case, a conspiracy was hatched and executed by Lee, Tang, John and John's Law Firm (with the assistance of Peter) in the following manner: a) Lee, Tang and John combined and agreed to do and in fact did the following: i) John and John's Law Firm manufactured the fake Warrant; ii) John and John's Law Firm then drafted the sham SPA; iii) Lee "entered" into the SPA with Hee; iv) Hee's false signatures on the Warrant, SPA and the Transfer were procured; v) Payment Vouchers were fabricated and purported to be the proof of payments when there was none; vi) They also procured the withdrawal of the Plaintiffs' caveats; vii) They then transferred the Land from Hee to Lee by relying on the Fake IDT V4 and the forged Transfer; and viii) To ensure that the Land would be out of Hee's reach and to take advantage of the provision of s 340(3) of the NLC, Lee and Tang then entered into an "agreement" so as to create an impression that Tang had an interest in the Land. [179] The aforesaid collusion/complicity was for the purpose of injuring Hee by stealing the Land from Hee without his knowledge and consent and as a result of which, Hee suffered loss and damage in that the Land was fraudulently transferred to Lee. [180] The glaring inconsistencies in Lee's and Peter's testimonies, coupled with their implausible evidence in the face of their own documents bring home the claim for conspiracy. In WT Development Sdn Bhd v. Chow Cho Tai & Ors [2019] MLRHU 1867, one Madam Chow's identity was stolen and used to effect a fraudulent transfer of a piece of land from a wound-up company to another company so as to put the assets out of the creditors' reach. In holding that Madam Chow has made out a claim for conspiracy, Faizah Jamaludin J held at [134]: "As Mdm Chow's cause of action against the Defendants is for the tort of "unlawful means conspiracy", it is sufficient that she proves that the Defendants' had conspired to commit an unlawful act and that she was injured as a result of the unlawful act. She does not have to prove which of the defendants had forged her signature or caused her signature to be forged on the various documents, agreements and trust deed in order achieve the unlawful act of transferring the Phase 3 Land to Jiwa Rakyat away from the hands of the Liquidators of Rimau Indah. She also does not have to prove that injuring her was their predominant intention. It is enough for her to show that they had committed an unlawful act and she was injured by it." [181] Hee has shown that he did not sign any of the documents produced by Lee, John and John's Law Firm. It is clear that they had combined and used unlawful means by utilising sham agreements and false signatures to deceive [38] Before us, Lee principally contended that since Ooh & Goh had withdrawn their claim against Hee, they could no longer pursue their claim against him for the unlawful removal of their private caveat lodged on 2nd December 2015. According to him, their claim was inextricably connected with their claim against Hee, which had been amicably resolved. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on Tg Choong Yuan Sdn Bhd v. Yeap Geok See Sdn Bhd [2016] 6 CLJ 786 and Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors v. Schmidt [1967] 1 LNS 67 (PC). [39] prove that Lee had defrauded him or committed any unlawful act. He relied on Tay Chye Huat v. Astral Supreme Bhd & Anor [2016] 1 LNS 1129 and Keruntum Sdn Bhd v. The Director of Forests & Ors [2017] 1 LNS 299. Lee maintained that he purchased the Land in good faith for valuable consideration of RM500,000.00, and was therefore the proper and lawful registered proprietor. [40] John and John & Associates further contended that they were Land from Hee to Lee. They submitted that they had faithfully carried out their professional duties in accordance with the law, and that Hee had failed to prove fraud or conspiracy against them. [41] Finally, Lee, John and John & Associates argued that, in any event, they were not liable to indemnify the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers, should the latter be found liable to Ooh & Goh and/or Hee. [42] Upon our objective review, we find was specifically directed against Lee for unlawfully removing their private caveat lodged on 2nd December 2015, thereby enabling the Land to be transferred to his benefit. The learned High Court Judge found that the removal of the private caveat was pursuant to fraud and conspiracy involving Lee, Tang, John and John & Associates. We see no reason to th documentary and testimonial evidence. The learned High Court Judge, moreover, enjoyed the audio-visual advantage of observing the witnesses, which we do not. His findings are also supported by circumstantial evidence: it is undisputed that Hee never sold the Land at any material time, and that staff member of John & Associates who handled the conveyancing. John, who attended to the imposter, offered no rebuttal or explanation since he elected not to testify at trial. Furthermore, the photographs exhibited in the identity cards of Hee and the imposter reveal stark differences: the former is clearly an elderly man, while the latter is visibly much younger. [43] unterclaim to recover the Land, it is evident from the evidence adduced and as rightly found by the learned High Court Judge that there was fraud and conspiracy perpetrated by Lee, Tang, John and John & Associates in relation to the purported sale of the Land. trite that where land is acquired through fraud, conspiracy, and forgery, the registered title is void and defeasible under s. 340(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the NLC, which provide:

Registration to confer indefeasible title or interest, except in certain circumstances.

The title or interest of any person or body for the time being registered as proprietor of any land, or in whose name any lease, charge or easement is for the time being registered, shall, subject to the following provisions of this section, be indefeasible.

The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible:

in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or

where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient or void instrument; or

where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written law.

Where the title or interest of any person or body is defeasible by reason of any of the circumstances specified in sub-section (2):

it shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body to whom it may subsequently be transferred; and

any interest subsequently granted thereout shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body in whom it is for the time being vested: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect any title or interest acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, or by any person or body claiming through or under such a purchaser.

Nothing in this section shall prejudice or prevent:

the exercise in respect of any land or interest of any power of forfeiture or sale conferred by this Act or any other written law for the time being in force, or any power of avoidance conferred by any such law; or

the determination of any title or interest by operation of law. See Tan Ying Hong v. Tan Sia San [2010] 2 MLJ 1 (FC). [44] Accordingly, it is immaterial whether Lee had in fact acted bona fide in purchasing the Land for RM500,000.00. His registered title must be re-vested in Hee, as the learned High Court Judge correctly ordered. [45] As regards John and John & Associates, the learned High Court Judge made an unassailable finding of fact that they conspired with Lee and Tang. Their attempt to defend themselves by asserting that they had merely acted faithfully as solicitors for their client is wholly untenable, if not absurd. [46] On the issue of indemnity, we find as a matter of principle that John and John & Associates must indemnify the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers. This is because they were the solicitors who knowingly presented forged application instruments to the Land Registry, thereby causing the Land to be transferred to Lee. In truth, they were the primary wrongdoers, whereas the Land Registry and its Relevant Officers were only secondary wrongdoers. It is trite that no one may benefit or take advantage of their own wrong; see Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat v. Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 777 (SC) and Sinnayah & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 CLJ 584 (FC). [47] Consequently, we again find no misdirection by the learned High Court Judge in appreciating the evidence adduced, nor was he plainly wrong in his interpretation and application of the law so as to warrant appellate intervention. CONCLUSION [48] For the foregoing reasons, we find there is no merit in both Appeal 480 as well as Appeal 481. [49] Therefore Appeal 480 is dismissed and the High Court Judgment is affirmed. The Land Registry & its Relevant Officers shall pay costs of RM 75,000.00 to Ooh and Goh. [50] Likewise, Appeal 481 is also dismissed and the High Court Judgment is affirmed. Lee, John and John & Associates jointly and severally shall pay cost of RM 75,000.00 to Ooh & Goh subject to allocator, RM 75,000.00 to Hee subject to allocator and RM 35,000.00 to the Land Registry & its Relevant Officers. Dated this 28th October 2025 Sgd. LIM CHONG FONG COURT OF APPEAL JUDGE LIST OF COUNSELS: Counsels for Land Registry & its Relevant Officers Solicitors for Land Registry & its Relevant Officers KAMAR PENASIHAT UNDANG-UNDANG Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan Tingkat 4, Podium Utara Bangunan Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah, 40512 Shah Alam Counsel for the Ooh & Goh Solicitors for Ooh & Goh MESSRS. SS THAM & CO. Advocates & Solicitors 7-02, Level 7, Wisma Penang Garden, 42, Jalan Sultan Ahmad Shah, 10050 Georgetown, Penang

Counsel for Hee

Razlan Hadri

Yeoh Cho Kheong Saw Wei Siang Solicitors for Hee MESSRS. NETHI & SAW, Advocates & Solicitors D3-5-11, Block D3, Solaris Dutamas No. 1 Jalan Dutamas 50480, Kuala Lumpur. Counsel for Lee, Tang, John

Che Muji Binti Che Noh

Nur Asnani Binti Basharuddin Solicitors for Lee, Tang, John & John Associates. MESSRS. DEIDRA SHARINA & CO. Advocates & Solicitors No. 3-1, Jalan PP Ixora 1, Pusat Perniagaan Ixora, Senawang, 70450 Seremban. STATUTE/LEGISLATION REFERRED TO: ss. 22 and 340(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the National Land Code. CASES REFERRED TO: Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309; Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of The Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1; CIMB Bank Bhd v. Sebang Gemilnag Sdn Bhd & Anor [2018] 5 CLJ 129; (didakwa sebagai pentadbir tanah Hulu Langat Selangor) [2018] MLJU 984; Pentadbir Hakmilik, Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Negeri Selangor v. Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd [2016] 3 CLJ 851; Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v. Boonsom Boonyanit [2001] 1 MLRA 69; Yew Foo Chun v. Wong Nye Keong & Ors [2014] MLRHU 141; Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Pendaftaran Wilayah Perserkutuan Kuala Lumpur & Anor v. Poh Yang Hong [2016] 6 MLRA 257; Lim Kar Bee v. Abdul Latif bin Ismail [1978] 1 MLJ 109; Tg Choong Yuan Sdn Bhd v. Yeap Geok See Sdn Bhd [2016] 6 CLJ 786; Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors v. Schmidt [1967] 1 LNS 67; Tay Chye Huat v. Astral Supreme Bhd & Anor [2016] 1 LNS 1129; Keruntum Sdn Bhd v. The Director of Forests & Ors [2017] 1 LNS 299; Tan Ying Hong v. Tan Sia San [2010] 2 MLJ 1; Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat v. Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 777; Sinnayah & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 CLJ 584.