(M) Sdn Bhd (223507-A) and Permintex JSK Resources Sdn Bhd (888262-A). And In the Matter of the Adjudication Decision dated 15.7.2016 made by Mr Shannon Rajan And In the Matter of Section 28 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And In the Matter of Order 7, Order 28 and Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN FOLLITILE (M) SDN BHD ... PLAINTIFF (COMPANY NO: 223507-A) AND PERMINTEX JSK RESOURCES SDN BHD ... DEFENDANT (COMPANY NO: 888262-A) 3 THE JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] This is an application by Permintex JSK Resources Sdn Bhd ("Permintex") to set aside an Adjudication Decision given on 15.7.2016. There was also a corresponding application by Follitile (M) Sdn Bhd (“Follitile”) to enforce the Adjudication Decision as if it is a judgment of the Court. [2] Permintex was the non-paying party in the Adjudication brought by Follitile as the unpaid party under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”). In August 2015 Permintex had appointed Follitile as its subcontractor to supply labour to install aero foil inclusive of all necessary framing, sub-frames in respect of a construction project known as "Projek Mass Rapid Transit Lembah Kelang: Jajaran Sungai Buloh-Kajang Package S3; Construction and Completion of Elevated Stations and Other Associated Works at the Curve, One Utama and Taman Tun Dr Ismail." [3] Follitile said they were not paid for the works done and so demanded for payment. On 26.1.2016 Permintex made part payment of RM50,000.00. Follitile then proceeded to serve a Payment Claim on the Permintex pursuant to section 5 CIPAA on 8.3.2016 for the balance sum of RM379,510.83. There was no Payment Response served by Permintex 4 on the Claimant pursuant to section 6 CIPAA. Neither was there an Adjudication Response filed by Permintex. Their request for an extension of time to file the Adjudication Response was rejected by the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator had awarded a sum of RM262,018.62 (inclusive of GST) to the Claimant based on Permintex's admission of debt contained in its letter dated 1.4.2016. He also awarded interest and costs in favour of the Claimant. [4] The parties shall be referred to by their names or sometimes by their designation in the Adjudication as Claimant for Follitile and Respondent for Permintex. By consent both applications were heard together as the substratum of facts are the same for both the applications and in the event that the Adjudication Decision is not set aside, it will generally be enforced. Prayers [5] The Respondent in the Adjudication had applied to set aside the Adjudication Decision under section 15 (b) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA") on ground of denial of natural justice and also under section 15(d) CIPAA on ground that the Adjudicator had not acted independently or impartially. 5 Principles [6] As there was no Payment Response served on the unpaid party, Follitile, the non-paying party is deemed under section 6(4) CIPAA to have disputed the entire Payment Claim. Follitile then as Claimant initiated the adjudication proceedings by serving a written notice of adjudication dated 25.03.2016 on the Respondent, Permintex, containing the requisite documents pursuant to section 8(1) CIPAA. [7] Section 8(2) CIPAA provides that upon receipt of the Respondent of the notice of adjudication, an adjudicator shall be appointed in the manner prescribed in section 21. At paragraph 7 of the said Notice of Adjudication the Claimant had proposed the name of an Adjudicator and further had stated as follows: "Please indicate your agreement on the proposed person to be appointed as adjudicator, or any other suitable person of your choice for our consideration. If we do not receive any response from you by 01.04.2016, we will proceed to make a request to the Director of the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration to appoint an adjudicator pursuant to section 21(b)(i) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012." 6 [8] As there was no response from the Respondent on the proposed named Adjudicator, the Claimant wrote to the KLRCA by their letter of 19.04.2016 requesting their assistance to appoint an Adjudicator pursuant to section 21(b)(i) of CIPAA. The whole of section 21 CIPAA is reproduced below to show that under the circumstances of this case, section 21(b) (i) is the applicable subsection to apply: "21. Appointment of Adjudicator An adjudicator may be appointed in the following manner: a) By agreement of the parties in dispute within ten working days from the service of the notice of adjudication by the claimant; or b) By the Director of the KLRCA-i) Upon the request of either party in dispute if there is no agreement of the parties under paragraph (a); or ii) Upon the request of the parties in dispute." [9] On 24.04.2016 the KLRCA wrote to the Mr Shannon Rajan to inform him of his appointment as an Adjudicator for the dispute. The said Adjudicator then wrote to the parties by his letter of 25.04.2016 and stated as follows: 7 "3. Pursuant to section 23(2) of CIPAA, I am required to propose and negotiate my terms of appointment including fees chargeable with the parties. I hereby enclose my proposed standard terms of appointment for your perusal.” [10] The said Adjudicator also requested for the parties' response by 6.5.2016 as he would have to revert back to KLRCA by 9.5.2016. On 5.5.2016 the Claimant reverted and accepted the proposed terms. The Respondent did not revert at all. However that does not prevent the Adjudication from proceeding as Rule 6 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Rules 2014 provides as follows: "6. KLRCA’s standard fees for services and expenses of adjudicator The KLRCA’s standard fees for the services and expenses of an adjudicator as specified in the Schedule shall apply if the parties in dispute and the adjudicator fail to agree on the terms of appointment and the fees of the adjudicator." [11] Likewise in section 19(2) CIPAA it is provided as follows: "If the parties and the adjudicator fail to agree on the terms of appointment and the fees of the adjudicator, the KLRCA's standard terms of appointment and fees for Adjudicator's shall apply." 8 [12] The said Adjudicator by his letter of 9.5.2016 to both the Claimant and Respondent, sent by both email, registered post and fax, accepted his appointment as Adjudicator by enclosing a copy of Form 6 of the Notice of Acceptance of the Appointment to Act as Adjudicator as provided for in the KLRCA Adjudication Rules & Procedure. At paragraph 2 of the said Notice is a declaration by the said Adjudicator that he accepted the appointment to act as Adjudicator as per the KLRCA's standard terms of appointment and fees for the services of an Adjudicator in force as of the date of the said letter and a copy of said standard terms was attached. [13] The said Adjudicator also made the requisite declaration under section 24 CIPAA at paragraph 4 of the said Notice. He also at paragraph 6 of the said Notice set out the Adjudicator's fees payable and the KLRCA Administrative Fees as well as the 6% GST payment. He further gave directions for both parties to contribute and make deposit with KLRCA for the Adjudicator's fees and expenses and the KLRCA's administrative fees and any taxes in equal share as security in advance within 10 working days from the date of receipt of the said Notice. [14] On 16.5.2016 Permintex's solicitors wrote to the KLRCA stating that they are not agreeable to the matter being referred to this adjudication proceeding and this matter be referred to the civil court for litigation and 9 that they would not be paying the deposit requested. Another letter with the same contents was also sent to the solicitors for the Claimant. [15] In Harlow & Milner Ltd v Mrs Linda Teasdale [2006] EWHC 1708 at para 16 it was held that "any party who was on the receiving end of the adjudicator's decision could, if they wanted to avoid the result, commence arbitration proceedings against the successful party, and then argue that the adjudicator's decision should abide the eventual outcome of that arbitration. It was precisely to avoid such delaying tactics that the statutory adjudication process was created in the first place..." [16] It must be stated here that CIPAA gives a Claimant the right to proceed with Adjudication for a Payment Claim and "payment" is defined in section 4 CIPAA as "a payment for work done or services rendered under the express terms of a construction contract." Once the process of Adjudication has been properly activated with the service of a Notice of Adjudication under section 8(1) CIPAA on the Respondent, the Respondent cannot skirt or stall the Adjudication proceedings by saying that they do not agree to submit to Adjudication. To allow them to do so would be to stymied the implementation of the CIPAA which in its long title is stated its avowed aim to "facilitate regular and timely payment, to provide a mechanism for speedy dispute resolution through adjudication, 10 to provide remedies for the recovery of payment in the construction industry." [17] Such a statutory right to an unpaid Party cannot be denied or denuded by the non-paying party refusing to participate in the Adjudication. A party like the non-paying party would naturally prefer to delay the matter as long as possible for Adjudication is a speedy process whereby it is meant to yield a result of interim finality which is enforceable as if it is a judgment of the Court. [18] Parliament had anticipated this obstacle that may be thrown at the unpaid party so as to derail Adjudication and so under section 37 CIPAA it is provided as follows: "37. Relationship Between Adjudication and Other Dispute Resolution Process 1) A dispute in respect of payment under a construction contract may be referred concurrently to adjudication, arbitration or the court. 2) Subject to subsection (3), a reference to arbitration or the court in respect of a dispute which is being adjudicated shall not bring the adjudication proceedings to an end nor affect the adjudication proceedings. 11 3) An adjudication proceeding is terminated if the dispute being adjudicated is settled by agreement in writing between the parties or decided by arbitration or the court." (emphasis added) [19] Whilst there is nothing preventing the Respondent from proceeding with litigation, there is equally nothing that would prevent the Claimant from proceeding with Adjudication. Surely a Claimant's reference of the dispute to Adjudication cannot be dependent on whether the Respondent is agreeable to Adjudication. To give the Respondent such a choice would be to allow the Respondent to paralyze the purpose of CIPAA and to render it a toothless piece of legislation. [20] The KLRCA replied the Respondent's solicitors by its letter of 19.5.2016 stating that any issues relating to the dispute should be raised with the appointed Adjudicator and the said letter was copied to both the Adjudicator and the solicitors for the Claimant. [21] The Adjudicator wrote to the Claimant's solicitors as well as the Respondent's solicitors via his letter dated 23.5.2016, inviting the parties to make further submissions with regard the matters raised “by the end of the business day tomorrow i.e. 24.5.2016”. [22] The matters raised were with respect to the Respondent's solicitors' letter to KLRCA stating that the Respondent was not agreeable to the 12 matter being referred to Adjudication and that the matter should be litigated in the civil courts. [23] The Claimant's solicitors replied by their letter of 24.5.2016 stating that their client was exercising their statutory right under section 7 CIPAA and that the answer to the Respondent's objection can be found in section 37 CIPAA that allows for concurrent proceedings in Adjudication as well as in Adjudication. [24] The Respondent's solicitors, Messrs Patrick Dass & Co, on the other hand, replied via letter dated 23.5.2016 to the Adjudicator’s letter dated 23.5.2016 stating that they could not comply with the deadline which they submitted was ridiculously short, as their Mr. Dass had a trial in Temerloh court from 24.5.2016 to 26.5.2016. [25] By the same letter the Respondent's solicitors had requested for the evidence of Mr. Shannon Raj’s appointment as the Adjudicator and also asked under what authority he had requested for submissions to be made. The relevant paragraphs of the said letter reads: "In any event, our client instructs us that they have not consented to refer the matter for adjudication or your appointment as adjudicator. Kindly let us have evidence of the same." [26] The Adjudicator in his letter dated 25.5.2016 replied as follows: 13 “I have considered the submissions and arguments from both parties and I have reached the conclusion that this adjudication proceeding has been validly instituted by the Claimant and that I have been properly appointed as an adjudicator by the KLRCA pursuant to the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPAA). I direct the parties to comply with the procedures and timelines set out under CIPAA”. [27] Apparently learned counsel for the Respondent was not satisfied that the said Adjudicator had been duly appointed by KLRCA and insisted that he must produce evidence of his appointment. The KLRCA had earlier written to the said Adjudicator on his appointment by their letter of 25.4.2016 which letter was copied to both the solicitors for the Claimant as well as to Permintex by both fax, email as well as by courier. The KLRCA had also attached to the said letter the Letter of Acceptance of the said Adjudicator. That is sufficient compliance with section 23(1) by the Director of KLRCA. Section 23(1) CIPAA reads: "The Director of the KLRCA shall appoint an adjudicator under paragraph 21(b) within five working days upon receipt of a request and shall notify the parties and the adjudicator in writing." [28] If the Respondent's solicitors was under the preconceived notion that their consent is necessary for the appointment of the said 14 Adjudicator, then such a notion is misconceived. This was a clear case where the parties could not agree on the appointment of an Adjudicator and what more when the Respondent would not even agree to Adjudication and would have no participation in its proceedings as they insisted that the matter should proceed to litigation. [29] Even with respect to arbitration, the Respondent had not proceeded to issue any Notice to Arbitrate on the Claimant. [30] As for the authority to ask for submission that comes under the vast powers given to an Adjudicator under section 25 CIPAA. He has the power, under section 25(a), to establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings including limiting the submission of documents by the parties. Under section 25(j) he shall have the powers to issue any direction as may be necessary or expedient. [31] Since the reason given by the Respondent for not submitting to Adjudication was merely that they have not consented to it, there was no necessity for the Adjudicator to reply more than what he had done. There is also no basis for the Respondent to then conclude that by so responding in the Adjudicator's reply, the Adjudicator had demonstrated his biasness in favour of the Claimant. To be fair to the Adjudicator he did not completely shut off the Respondent for in his Order for Direction No.2 dated 25.5.2016 at paragraph 4 thereof he wrote: 15 "4. The Respondent is at liberty to raise further submissions in respect of its position contained in its letters dated 16.05.2196 and 23.05.2016 in the Adjudication Response for my consideration." [32] Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that under section 19(1) CIPAA the parties and the Adjudicator shall be free to agree on the terms of appointment of the adjudicator and the fees to be paid to the adjudicator. The submission is that the Respondent had never agreed to the Adjudicator’s appointment and the fees to be paid to him. The Respondent alleged that the requirement of this section appeared to have been bypassed by the Adjudicator. [33] As pointed out the consent of the Respondent to the Adjudication is not necessary, for otherwise all that a non-paying party needs to do is to refuse to consent and the whole scheme of statutory adjudication under CIPAA would be frustrated. As for the non-agreement on fees, section 19(2) CIPAA provides that if the parties and the Adjudicator fail to agree on the terms of appointment and the fees of the Adjudicator, the KLRCA's standard terms of appointment and fees for Adjudicators shall apply. [34] It makes tremendous sense for the KLRCA, as the Adjudication Authority under CIPAA as provided for in section 32 thereof to be responsible under section 32(b) for the determination of the standard terms of appointment of an Adjudicator and fees for the services of an 16 Adjudicator. This the KLRCA had done with the Schedule under Regulation 6 of the Construction Industry Payment & Adjudication Regulations 2014 which is the KLRCA's Standard Fees for Services and Expenses of Adjudicator. [35] The KLRCA Standard Terms of Appointment is found in Schedule II of the KLRCA Adjudication Rules & Procedure. [36] It does away with the hassle of haggling over terms of appointment and fees and the abuse that may come with it in the non-paying party's reluctance to participate in the Adjudication proceedings by refusing to agree on the terms of appointment of the Adjudicator or his fees or both. Bearing in mind that the Adjudicator appointed by KLRCA has only 10 working days to indicate his acceptance and terms of his appointment, the default Standard Terms of Appointment and Standard Fees make a lot of sense, saving time and energy as in a protracted negotiation over terms and fees of the Adjudicator, not to mention the possible embarrassment that may ensue when a decision maker has to be involved in negotiating his fees with the parties. There is thus absolutely no merits in the allegations of learned counsel for the Respondent that there was a breach of section 23(2) CIPAA in that there was no negotiation on his terms of appointment nor his fees. 17 [37] Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that section 19(4) CIPAA has not been complied with by the said Adjudicator in that the Respondent has not received any direction from the Adjudicator on how much fees they should deposit with KLRCA. Again that is not just contradictory to the stand that they have taken but also that the evidence show otherwise. The Notice of Acceptance of the Appointment to Act as Adjudicator was sent by the Adjudicator to the Respondent by registered post, fax and email and paragraph 6 and 7 read as follows: "6. The fees will be based on KLRCA's Standard Fees for Sercices and Expenses of Adjudicator which is set out below: Adjudicator's fees. : RM11,995.72 KLRCA Administrative Fees : RM2,399.14 Total. : RM14,394.86 Add 6% GST. : RM863.69 Total Fees RM15,258.55 7. I further direct the parties to contribute and deposit with the Director of the KLRCA a sum of RM15,258.55 representing a reasonable proportion of the adjudicator's fees and expenses, the KLRCA's administrative fee and any taxes as may be imposed by the Government, in equal share as security in advance within 10 working days from the date of receipt of this notice." 18 [38] Thereafter KLRCA had written to both the Claimant and the Respondent with its invoice seeking the payment of RM7,629.28 from each of the, by its letter of 11.5.2016 pursuant to section 19(4) CIPAA. [39] The Respondent cannot now feign ignorance. Perhaps it was a case of forgetfulness, floundering on fickleness, for the Respondent had, by their letter of 16.5.2016 taken the stand that they would not agree to the Adjudication and neither would they be depositing the fees requested by KLRCA. [40] Likewise the Respondent's allegation that section 24 CIPAA had not been complied with by the said Adjudicator is also not borne out by the evidence. Section 24 states that the Adjudicator shall at the time of the acceptance of appointment as an Adjudicator make a declaration in writing that there is no conflict of interest in respect of his appointment, that he shall act independently, impartially and in a timely manner and avoid incurring unnecessary expense, that he shall comply with the principles of natural justice and there are no circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to the Adjudicator’s impartiality and independence. The said Adjudicator had declared this in the Form 6 which he had sent to the Respondent by his letter dated 9.5.2016 by way of registered post, fax and email. Perhaps it is a case where the 19 Respondent had not handed over to their solicitors all the documents that they had received from both the Adjudicator and KLRCA. [41] The Respondent took umbrage with the said Adjudicator over his letter to the Claimant's solicitors, Messrs Mar & Co, dated 7.6.2016, when the Adjudicator wrote directing that the Claimant do pay on the Respondent's behalf the remaining portion of the advance security deposit of RM7,692.29 to the Director of KLRCA. [42] Learned counsel for the Respondent, Mr Patrick Dass, alleged quite audaciously, that this request that the Claimant do pay the full security deposit (which substantially is the Adjudicator’s fee) and the Claimant gladly paying it on 13.6.2016 gives rise to the probability of the Adjudicator being biased in favor of the Claimant, bearing in mind that the Respondent was, after all, still disputing the Adjudicator's authority to act as adjudicator. This, it was argued by learned counsel, put the said Adjudicator in a position of conflict of interest! [43] I must be forgiven for not been able to follow the flow of argument of learned counsel for the Respondent. [44] Rule 9(4) of the KLRCA Adjudication Rules & Procedure states as follows: 20 “If any parties fails to make payment within the time ordered by the adjudicator, the adjudicator shall within seven (7) days thereafter issue such direction as he thinks fit including inviting another party or parties to make such payment and notify the Director of the KLRCA accordingly”. [45] The Adjudicator's said letter to Messrs Mar & Co dated 7.6.2016 was copied to the Director of KLRCA and Messrs Patrick Dass & Co by hand, post and fax. [46] Rule 9(4) both empowers and enjoins the Adjudicator to so proceed when there is default in one party to pay its portion of the fees and expenses of the Adjudicator and of the Adjudication. Otherwise a party who is not interested to participate in the Adjudication can simply and surreptitiously stall the Adjudication by refusing to pay the costs of Adjudication. I can neither understand nor appreciate how an Adjudicator in exercising his powers as allowed under Rule 9(4) can be said to be bias in favour of the party that has complied with his directions! [47] Even if it be true that such a payment by the Claimant of the Respondent's portion of its fees would inspire biasness on the part of the Adjudicator in favour of the Claimant , the Respondent can avoid that fear of biasness, by paying his portion of the fees and charges as required under section 19(4) CIPAA. 21 [48] The Respondent's argument becomes more ludicrous when its learned counsel took the view that Rule 9(4) contravenes section 19(4) CIPAA which states that both parties shall contribute and deposit with the Director of KLRCA a reasonable proportion of the fees in equal shares. In effect learned counsel is taking the position that if the Respondent does not pay its portion of the fees then the Adjudicator should not proceed with the Adjudication. It is rather illogical for the Respondent to assert that it must be allowed to pay its portion of the fees and then in the next breath assert that if it does not so pay, the Adjudicator has no right to call on the Claimant to pay. [49] To allow that to happen would be to allow the purpose of CIPAA to be frustrated by defaulting non-paying parties who have every reason to stall an Adjudication so as not to have to make payment of an Adjudicated sum, knowing full well that arbitration or litigation would take time. [50] Little wonder that learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that the said Adjudicator had no right to proceed with the Adjudication proceedings until the issue of his appointment and payment of his fees are determined according to the rules of natural justice. [51] It cannot be said that the Claimant gladly paid the Respondent's portion of his contribution to the fees. No one would want to be out of 22 pocket more than is necessary. The Claimant had no choice for if it does not pay then Rule 9(5) would apply for it reads: "In the event full payment of the fees and expenses, including the KLRCA’s administrative fee and any taxes as may be imposed by the Government, are not deposited with the Director of the KLRCA under Section 19(5) of the Act, the adjudicator shall not release the adjudication decision to the parties." [52] If there is any comfort it is that at the end of the day there is some hope of recouping the fees so advanced if the Claimant should succeed in its Payment Claim. Section 18(1) CIPAA provides as follows: "The adjudicator in making the adjudication decision in relation to costs of the adjudication proceedings shall order the costs to follow the event and shall fix the quantum of costs to be paid." [53] It is not correct to say that the Adjudicator must resolve the issue of his appointment before he could proceed with the Adjudication. Where a challenge to the appointment of an Adjudicator is concerned, section 29(3) CIPAA expressly authorised the Adjudicator to proceed and complete the Adjudication. It reads: "Notwithstanding a jurisdictional challenge, the adjudicator may in his discretion proceed and complete the adjudication proceedings 23 without prejudice to the rights of any party to apply to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 or to oppose the application to enforce the adjudication decision under subsection 28(1)." [54] On 16.6.2016, the Respondent's solicitors wrote to the said Adjudicator requesting for an extension of time to put in the Respondent's Adjudication Response. The application was made pursuant to section 25 CIPAA . Under section 25(p) the Adjudicator has the power to extend any time limit imposed on the parties under CIPAA as may be reasonably required. The Claimant objected to the request by their letter of 17.6.2016. The Claimant pointed out that the last day to file the Adjudication Response was 6.6.2016, i.e. 10 working days from 23.5.2016, the date the Claimant's Adjudication Claim was received by the Respondent. The Claimant's solicitors further stated at paragraph 19 of their letter of 17.6.2016 as follows: "19. The Respondent's request for an extension of time (EOT) today 17.6.2016 (after 11 days from 06.06.2016) will not only prejudice the Claimant's interest and fairness under CIPAA as the Claimant had at all material times, complied with the procedures, timelines, directions as requested by CIPAA and the Adjudicator but also delay the Adjudication Decision on this matter, pursuant to section 12(2)(b) of CIPAA." 24 [55] Section 12(2)(b) CIPAA provides as follows: "Subject to subsection 19(5), the adjudicator shall decide the dispute and deliver the adjudication decision within — ... b) Forty-five working days from the expiry of the period prescribed for the service of the adjudication response if no adjudication response is received; ..." [56] On the next day, via his letter dated 17.6.2016, the Respondent's learned counsel said that the Adjudicator promptly and flatly rejected the request, without asking parties to submit further on the law. [57] Learned counsel for the Respondent further argued that even in a court of law, the Respondent would be allowed to make submissions, but the said Adjudicator chose to give a decision without hearing submissions on law. He argued that there was no prejudice to the proceedings or to the Claimant by granting an extension of time. It was argued that there was still ample time to adjudicate and deliver his decision. Learned counsel for the Respondent castigated the Adjudicator's decision as having deprived the Respondent of the opportunity to be heard and to present their case. It was further submitted that his decision given without 25 hearing the Respondent on arguments of law showed that he was biased in favor of the Claimant. [58] I agree with learned counsel for the Claimant, Mr Nandakumar, that the Adjudicator was perfectly entitled to dismiss the Respondent's application under section 25 CIPAA as the application was made only after the deadline for filing the Adjudication Response had expired and that ample time had been given for them to so file their Adjudication Response. The only reason given was that the Respondent was still looking for certain documents required to respond to the claim. [59] I cannot fault the exercise of discretion on the part of the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator had given cogent reasons for dismissing the application for an extension of time to file the Adjudication Response in its letter of 17.6.2016 to parties' respective solicitors as follows: "4. I am of the view that there was ample time given for the Respondent to examine the Adjudication Claim and prepare its Adjudication Response within the prescribed time under CIPAA or at the very least make its EOT Application before the expiry of the time limited under CIPAA to file the Adjudication Response or within a reasonable time thereafter. I note that the EOT Application was only made after a lapse of 7 working days from the filing deadline of 26 the Adjudication Response. This delay is significant under the framework of CIPAA.