1. ) PWC Corporation Sdn Bhd v 1. ) Ireka Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd (WA-24C-118-07/2017 (No. 3))

Due to the failure of PWC to complete the Sandakan Contract on time, Ireka had suffered loss and damage from the Employer’s deduction of main contract’s LAD in the sum of RM4,490,500.00 against Ireka as stated in the Statement of Final Account as certified by the Architect on 27.11.2013.

(ii) Therefore, Ireka claimed by way of set off/cross claim/counter claim for LAD amounting to RM3,723,000.00 for the delay in completion of the Sandakan Contract’s works against PWC.

(iii) Ireka also claimed by way of set off/cross claim/counter claim for overpayment amounting to RM17,790.45 for Certificate of Payment No. 16 dated 18.04.2016 against Certificate of Payment No. 17 dated 01.12.2016 from KL Sentral Contract.

(iv) Ireka’s claim for set off and/or cross claim against the amount claimed by PWC in these adjudication proceedings clearly showed that Ireka’s claim for set off/cross claim exceeds PWC’s claim.

Based on the foregoing, there was no amount due and payable to PWC as it is extinguished by Ireka’s claim for set off, cross claim and/or counter claim as elaborated above. Conversely, PWC is owing the Plaintiff the balance sum of RM3,678,211.56. 8 [16] On 10.04.2017, PWC had served its Adjudication Reply on Ireka. [17] On 13.06.2017, the Adjudicator handed down her Adjudication Decision in which she ruled that Ireka shall pay PWC the sum of RM62,578.89 together with interest. Prayers [18] The grounds on which Ireka applied to set aside the Adjudication Decision are as follows:

the Adjudicator had acted in excess of her jurisdiction; and

the Adjudicator had breached natural justice. [19] With respect to excess of jurisdiction Ireka contended that it admitted the Claimant’s Payment Claim and had raised a contractual set off allowed in its contract with the Claimant with respect to LAD Claim in another project called the Sandakan Project and an overpayment with respect to yet another project called the KL Sentral Project. Ireka argued that there was no “dispute” for the Adjudicator to proceed with the Adjudication and to deliver the Adjudication Decision. [20] It was further argued by Ireka that the Adjudicator had breached natural justice when she wrongly declined jurisdiction to consider the 9 contractual set off it raised with respect to 2 separate contracts in the Sandakan Project and the KL Sentral Project. [21] PWC refuted the allegation of excess of jurisdiction with respect to there being no “dispute” by arguing that by refusing payment with respect to the Payment Claim on account of Ireka’s alleged set off in the 2 separate contracts, there is invariably a “dispute” that had arisen and more so when there is no payment accompanying the so-called admission of the Payment Claim. [22] PWC also contended that under the CIPAA, unless the parties had consented, there cannot be raised a Defence of set off in another contract when that had been raised in Adjudications involving those contracts and that generally the Adjudication under the CIPAA is with respect to a single contract. PWC contended that the Adjudicator had rightly declined jurisdiction and had not acted by so doing in breach of natural justice. [23] The parties shall be referred to as Claimant and Respondent as they were so referred to in the Adjudication or sometimes as PWC and Ireka respectively. Principles [24] Section 15 of the CIPAA provides for setting aside of an Adjudication Decision on the limited grounds set out as follows: 10 “Improperly Procured Adjudication Decision An aggrieved party may apply to the High Court to set aside an adjudication decision on one or more of the following grounds:

The adjudication decision was improperly procured through fraud or bribery;

There has been a denial of natural justice;

The adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially; or

The adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction” (emphasis added) Whether the Adjudicator had acted in excess of her jurisdiction in proceeding with the Adjudication when the Respondent had admitted the Payment Claim [25] Ireka had in paragraph 27.2 of its Setting Aside Application Affidavit in Support averred that the amount claimed by PWC in its Payment Claim was completely undisputed. Hence, it followed that there was no dispute at all to refer to adjudication or to confer jurisdiction to the Adjudicator pursuant to sections 7(1) or 27(1) of the CIPAA. [26] Learned counsel for Ireka referred to the case of Halki Shipping Corporation v Sopex Oils Ltd [1997] EWCA Civ 3062 which she said 11 became the benchmark legal precedent for the statutory adjudication proceedings in the United Kingdom when they were at their infancy. The case further held at page [5] that: "…the established rule that [even] unliquidated claims must be the subject of a cross-action and cannot be used to create a `dispute'…” [27] She further submitted that the strict requirement of a dispute also applies under our Arbitration Act 2005, especially in Section 10(1) and Section 27(b), whereby the courts shall resume their jurisdiction to conduct litigation proceedings without a stay in the absence of a dispute and a party which has defaulted in a response shall not be treated as an admission of liability because a dispute is required. [28] Learned counsel for Ireka further referred to the English case of Beck Peppiatt Ltd v Norwest Holst Construction Ltd [2003] EWHC 822 (TCC); paragraph [4], which followed the findings of the Halki’s case, where it was held that ‘dispute' is an ordinary English word which should be given its ordinary English meaning. This means that there will be many types of situation which could be said to amount to a dispute. [29] She concluded that in this instance, there was simply no requirement whatsoever to establish or to go through the hurdle of whether there was 12 any crystallized, real or genuine dispute since Ireka had expressly stated there was no dispute in PWC’s payment claim. [30] This submission attracted the ire of the learned counsel for the Claimant PWC who, with respect, castigated it as bordering on absurdity. [31] It must be noted that Halki Shipping Corporation (supra) was with respect to a Stay Application of proceedings in Court pending reference to arbitration and at the same time there was a summary judgment application already filed with the Court there. The argument there was whether or not there was a dispute that merits proceeding to arbitration or whether the Court should give summary judgment if there were no disputes. [32] It is not a proposition that could be extended by analogy or application to Statutory Adjudication under our CIPAA where the meaning of a “dispute” is clearly set out in the circumstances referred to in section 6 of the CIPAA. [33] Learned counsel for the Claimant argued that it would be a glaring lacuna in the CIPAA and one which would completely defeat the very intent and purpose of the Act if such a defence could be raised! It would lead to a lamentable case where all that is required for the non-paying party (later Respondent in the Adjudication Proceedings) to defeat the very intent and object of the Act will be just to admit on the face of its Payment Response 13 that amount is due but to still refuse to make payment. Taking the matter to its logical conclusion, any decision of the Adjudicator who subsequently makes a decision is liable to be set aside on ground of lacking in jurisdiction or having acted in excess of jurisdiction. That, it was submitted, cannot be the legislative intent of the Act. [34] I would agree. To accede to such an argument by Ireka, the Respondent, would be tantamount to permitting a non-paying party to persist obstinately in its willful non-payment, despite having admitted to the Payment Claim completely in its Payment Response, such that no dispute could be referred to Adjudication and with that no Adjudication Decision could be made and no enforcement could proceed. [35] Learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that this ground resorted to is at its core, factually flawed. I would agree with the Claimant’s stand. No legal gymnastics can be employed to explain away that fact that in this case, PWC’s Payment Claim was in fact disputed in Ireka’s Payment Response. If indeed Ireka did not dispute the Payment Claim then the expected course of action under the CIPAA is to accompany the service of the Payment Response with the payment for the amount claimed in the Payment Claim. Section 6(1) and (2) of the CIPAA could not be clearer for it reads: “6. Payment Response 14

A non-paying party who admits to the payment claim served on him shall serve a payment response on the unpaid party together with the whole amount claimed or any amount as admitted by him.

A non-paying party who disputes the amount claimed in the payment claim, either wholly or partly, shall serve a payment response in writing on the unpaid party stating the amount disputed and the reason for the dispute.” (emphasis added) [36] However the Respondent may want to argue as the non-paying party, its action in admitting the amount claimed by the unpaid party in the Payment Response served but refusing to accompany the payment of the sum claimed in the Payment Claimed, is not a dispute to the Payment Claim within the meaning of section 6(1) of the CIPAA. [37] Such a Payment Response is not in compliance with section 6(1) of the CIPAA for failure to enclose the payment of the amount claimed in the Payment Claim and the non-paying party is deemed to have disputed the entire Payment Claim as provided for in section 6(4) of the CIPAA which reads as follows: “(4) A non-paying party who fails to respond to a payment claim in the manner provided under this section is deemed to have disputed the entire payment claim.” (emphasis added) 15 [38] The Adjudicator would thus have the jurisdiction to proceed to decide and adjudicate on the dispute. Otherwise any non-paying party would be able to skirt and scuttle and indeed stop any Adjudication before it could start by simply admitting the Payment Claim but refusing to accompany payment with the service of the Payment Response. [39] To admit the Payment Claim but refusing to accompany payment and then to audaciously assert that there is no “dispute” over which the Adjudicator has jurisdiction to proceed with Adjudication, would be to denude the CIPAA of its bite and reduce it to a mere bark. It would be to defeat the purpose of the CIPAA altogether. [40] The fact is that Ireka had raised numerous set-offs and counterclaims, inter alia overpayment as well as LAD claims, both of which arose from unrelated projects and construction contracts. This can be seen in Ireka’s Payment Response attached as Exhibit “NYS-3” in pages 76 and 77 of Ireka’s Setting Aside Affidavit in Support. This therefore amounts to indisputably and irrefutably, a “dispute” for which, jurisdiction was rightly conferred on the Adjudicator to proceed to a decision. [41] I agree with the Claimant that the wording of section 6(1) of the CIPAA is such that any admitted amount in the Payment Response must be immediately and simultaneously followed with payment of the sum 16 admitted. In the present case, there was no payment by Ireka of the monies admitted in its Payment Response. [42] In effect by giving reasons for not paying the Respondent is in reality disputing the Payment Claim and therefore the Adjudicator clearly had jurisdiction to proceed to hear the dispute and to deliver the Adjudication Decision. [43] There is no room for the Respondent to argue that the Adjudicator had acted in excess of her jurisdiction. Whether there was a breach of natural justice when the Adjudicator declined to consider the contractual set offs raised with respect to other contracts which are the subject of other Adjudications [44] Ireka had averred in paragraphs 28 to 31 of its Setting Aside Application Affidavit in Support that the Adjudicator had breached natural justice when she failed to consider the merits of the Sandakan Contract and KL Sentral Contract and the clear set off provision in the respective Contracts. [45] I agree with learned counsel for the Claimant that Ireka cannot have its cake and eat it when, on the one hand, it argued that the Adjudicator has had no jurisdiction, and then turned around and said that the 17 Adjudicator had breached natural justice by limiting or refusing jurisdiction over matters referred in the Payment Claim and Payment Response. [46] This would be self-contradictory. However as I had already dismissed the argument of excess of jurisdiction as stated above, I would nevertheless proceed to consider if there are any merits with respect to this ground of breach of natural justice. [47] It is true that the construction contract in this present case does contain a set-off clause providing for set-offs from other construction contracts between PWC and Ireka. The parties could certainly raise this in the Arbitration that Ireka might be minded to commence to include disputes in all the Contracts between the parties i.e. this Contract, the Sandakan Contract and the KL Sentral Contract. [48] However where this Adjudication is concerned, the Adjudicator had given her cogent and considered reasons for not considering the set-offs raised with respect to the Sandakan Contract and the KL Sentral Project. [49] The Adjudicator’s reasons are set out in paragraphs 87 to 94 of the Adjudication Decision in Exhibit “NYS-8”, pages 701 to 703 of Ireka’s Setting Aside Application Affidavit in Support. Learned counsel for the Claimant had summarized it as follows: 18

the repeated use of the singular article “a” to refer to construction contract in sections 4, 5(1), 5(2), and 6(2) of the CIPAA indicates that each adjudication can arise from only one

construction contract;

Parliament has not made any provision in the CIPAA to allow set-offs from entirely different and distinct contracts; and

Using the maxim “unius est exclusion alterius” as a statutory aid for the interpretation of the CIPAA, issues or set-offs arising from separate and distinct construction contracts cannot be considered in light of the wording of the CIPAA. [50] I would agree that generally an Adjudication under the CIPAA is for a matter arising under a construction contract. If it is sought to be heard together two or more Adjudications in respect of the same subject matter under the same construction contract in one Adjudication then the parties must expressly consent to it. I take this approach from the strict requirements for consolidation of proceedings. Section 14 of the CIPAA on “Consolidation of Adjudication Proceedings” reads: “If two or more adjudication proceedings in respect of the same subject matter are being adjudicated before the same adjudicator, the adjudicator may, with the consent of all the parties to the 19 adjudication proceedings, consolidate and adjudicate the matters in the same proceedings.” [51] Looking at the above requirements for consolidation, the Adjudicators in the separate Adjudication Proceedings must be the same and the subject matter must be the same and furthermore all the parties must have consented to the consolidation. [52] In the present case the subject matters are different as they were proceedings from 3 separate contracts between the same parties i.e. the current Contract, the KL Sentral Contract and the Sandakan Contract. Moreover the Adjudicators are different and consolidation would not be possible. There is also a need for all the parties to consent to the consolidation and here there has not been any consent. Even if all 3 conditions are met, the Adjudicator would still have a discretion to decide whether or not to consolidate and regard must be heard to whether the consolidation would save time to adjudicate the dispute and to avoid duplicity of proceedings and whether the time frame for delivering the Decision would be unduly too short having regard to the deadline to deliver the Decision unless the parties have agreed to extend time for the delivery of the Adjudication Decisions. [53] As it transpired, the Adjudication Decision with respect to the Sandakan Contract was given on 5.06.2017 in favour of the Claimant with 20 the Adjudicator disallowing the set off raised there with respect to the LAD Claim of RM3,723,000.00 and the overpayment Claim of RM17,790.45 in the KL Sentral Contract. The present Adjudication Decision was given on 13.06.2017. [54] There was also another Adjudication between the same parties involving the Mont Kiara Contract where the same Defence of set offs has been raised with respect to the Sandakan Contract and the KL Sentral Contract and those Defences had been rejected as well in earlier Decision of a different Adjudicator given earlier on 18.05.2017. [55] Clearly as the same set off or issues raised by the Respondent was also raised in the separate Adjudications involving those other contracts, there would be clear duplicity of proceedings if the Adjudicator here were to venture into and encroach upon what should be properly heard in those other proceedings which were already afoot. [56] It would also avoid the embarrassment of 2 separate Adjudicators coming up with 2 different and conflicting findings as to whether the set off should be allowed and if so for how much. Once decided the Defence of res judicata would be available to the Claimant as in one Adjudication vis-a-vis another Adjudication though not so with the Arbitrator or the Judge hearing the matter de novo in a concurrent or separate proceeding. 21 [57] There is also the danger that as the same set-off or counterclaim had been raised in at least 3 different contracts and 3 different Adjudications that this Court has been appraised of, there may be double-payment or excessive awards where they overlap. [58] I would agree with learned counsel for the Claimant that reference to the “same subject matter” in section 14 of the CIPAA allowing consolidation of adjudication proceedings, but only if the adjudication proceedings arise from the same subject matter and before the same adjudicator should be interpreted to mean the same construction contract or project between the same parties. [59] In the event that there are separate contracts involving the same parties, raised in the same Adjudication, then the Adjudicator has a discretion to decide after getting the express written consent of the parties as to whether it is expedient for him to proceed to hear the matters raised especially when, as in here, the same set offs had been raised in other Adjudications afoot before separate Adjudicators. [60] That is a matter that comes within his powers under section 25(a) and

of the CIPAA which provides that: “The adjudicator shall have the powers to— 22

Establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings including limiting the submission of documents by the parties; .....

Issue any direction as may be necessary or expedient;” [61] In the present case, this Court takes judicial notice that there was already the set-off issue of LAD raised by Ireka in relation to the Sandakan Contract and Project raised in originating summons nos. WA-24C-107- 06/2017 and WA-24C-117-07/2017 heard on 26.09.2017. This Court had ruled in favour of PWC and enforced the Decision of the Adjudicator in the Sandakan Contract. [62] Even if there has been an error of mixed finding of fact and law, which this Court has not so found, this is not a denial of natural justice requiring the Adjudication Decision be set aside. It comes more particularly under the broad exercise of her discretion with respect to the procedure of the Adjudication Proceedings and more so when these same set offs have been raised in Adjudication Proceedings involving those contracts. [63] In Witney Town Council v Beam Construction (Cheltenham) Ltd [2011] 139 ConLR 1 at 18; paragraph [38], Akenhead J provides guidance 23 in respect of “dispute” and whether an Adjudicator should proceed to decide on 2 separate and distinct disputes as follows: “[38] Drawing all these threads together, I draw the following conclusions:

A dispute arises generally when and in circumstances in which a claim or assertion is made by one party and expressly or implicitly challenged or not accepted.

(ii) A dispute in existence at one time can in time metamorphose in to something different to that which it was originally.

(iii) A dispute can comprise a single issue or any number of issues within it. However, a dispute between parties does not necessarily comprise everything which is in issue between them at the time that one party initiates adjudication; put another way, everything in issue at that time does not necessarily comprise one dispute, although it may do so.

(iv) What a dispute in any given case is will be a question of fact albeit that the facts may require to be interpreted. Courts should not adopt an over-legalistic analysis of what the dispute between the parties is, bearing in mind that almost every construction contract is a commercial transaction and parties 24 cannot broadly have contemplated that every issue between the parties would necessarily have to attract a separate reference to adjudication.

The notice of adjudication and the referral notice are not necessarily determinative of what the true dispute is or as to whether there is more than one dispute. One looks at them but also at the background facts.

(vi) Where on a proper analysis, there are two separate and distinct disputes, only one can be referred to one adjudicator unless the parties agree otherwise. An adjudicator who has two disputes referred to him or her does not have jurisdiction to deal with the two disputes.

(vii) Whether there are one or more disputes again involves a consideration of the facts. It may well be that, if there is a clear link between two or more arguably separate claims or assertions, that may well point to there being one dispute. A useful if not invariable rule of thumb is that, if disputed claim no 1 cannot be decided without deciding all or parts of disputed claim no 2, that establishes such a clear link and points to there being only one dispute.” (emphasis added) 25 [64] In BM City Realty & Construction Sdn Bhd v. Merger Insight (M) Sdn Bhd and Another Case [2016] 1 LNS 1096 it was observed as follows: “[62] I agree… even if there was a failure to take into account of payment made to the NSCs, it is merely an error of findings of facts/law. Such an error does not require the Adjudication Decision to be set aside. There will not be a denial of natural justice if the Adjudicator had addressed all the right issues even in the wrong way. The adjudicator’s decision will nevertheless be temporary binding. It is only when the adjudicator has answered the wrong issues that his decision will be a nullity…” [65] Learned counsel for the Respondent cited the case of Pilon Limited v Breyer Group Plc [2010] EWHC 837 (TCC); where at paragraph [17], Coulson J addressed the issue of declining jurisdiction with respect to the defence of set off raised as follows: “5. ISSUE 2; DID THE ADJUDICATOR TAKE AN ERRONEOUSLY RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF HIS OWN JURISDICTION AND, IF SO, WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES?

5.1 The Law 26

An adjudicator can make an inadvertent mistake when answering the question put to him, and that mistake will not ordinarily affect the enforcement of his decision: see Bouygues (UK) Ltd v Dahl-Jensen (UK) Ltd [2000] BLR 49. If, on the other hand, he considers and purports to decide an issue which is outside his jurisdiction, then his decision will not be enforced: see the discussion in Sindall Ltd v Solland [2001] 3 TCLR 712. But there is a third category, which is where the adjudicator takes an erroneously restrictive view of his own jurisdiction, with the result that he decides not to consider an important element of the dispute that has been referred to him. This failure is usually categorised as a breach of natural justice. Cases in this category include:

17.1 Ballast Plc v The Burrell Company (Construction Management)Limited [2001] BLR 529, where the adjudicator failed to address the valuation dispute referred to him because the parties had departed from the terms of the written contract. Lord Reid concluded that the adjudicator’s decision - to the effect that, as a matter of jurisdiction, he could not take into consideration even the possibility that the parties might depart from the written terms of the contract - 27 was wrong in law. The adjudicator had misconstrued his powers and failed to exercise his jurisdiction to determine the dispute. His decision was therefore ruled a nullity.

17.2 Broadwell v k3D [2006] ADJ CS 04/21, in which HHJ Raynor QC refused to enforce an adjudicator’s decision because he had failed to address the responding party’s counterclaim. This was on the erroneous basis that there had been no mention of the counterclaim in the notice of adjudication, leading the adjudicator to conclude that he did not have the jurisdiction to consider it. The judge held that this fundamental error meant that the adjudicator had failed to have regard to the responding party’s legitimate defence, and had therefore not conducted the adjudication in accordance with the rules of natural justice.

17.3 Thermal Energy Construction Limited v AE and E Lentjes Uk Limited [2009] EWHC 408 (TCC), where HHJ Stephen Davies refused to enforce an adjudicator’s decision in circumstances where the adjudicator had again wholly failed to address the set-off and counterclaim raised by the defending party ...” [66] Justice Coulson J stated that when an adjudicator erroneously takes a restrictive view of his own jurisdiction, it is tantamount to a breach of 28 natural justice. Justice Coulson J distilled the various situations in this regard as follows: “22. As a matter of principle, therefore, it seems to me that the law on this topic can be summarized as follows:

22.1 The adjudicator must attempt to answer the question referred to him. The question may consist of a number of separate sub-issues. If the adjudicator has endeavoured generally to address those issues in order to answer the question then, whether right or wrong, his decision is enforceable: see Carillion v Devonport.

22.2 If the adjudicator fails to address the question referred to him because he has taken an erroneously restrictive view of his jurisdiction (and has, for example, failed even to consider the defence to the claim or some fundamental element of it), then that may make his decision unenforceable, either on grounds of jurisdiction or natural justice: see Ballast, Broadwell, and Thermal Energy.

22.3 However, for that result to obtain, the adjudicator’s failure must be deliberate. If there has simply been an inadvertent failure to consider one of a number of issues embraced by the single dispute that the adjudicator has to decide, then such a failure will not 29 ordinarily render the Decision unenforceable: see Bouygues and Amec v TWUL.

22.4 It goes without saying that any such failure must also be material: see Cantillon v Urvasco and CJP Builders Limited v William Verry Limited [2008] EWHC 2025 (TCC). In other words, the error must be shown to have had a potentially significant effect on the overall result of the adjudication: see Keir Regional Ltd v City and General (Holborn) Ltd [2006] EWHC 848 (TCC). (emphasis added) [67] Pilon’s case (supra) can be distinguished from the facts in the present case for in the present case the Adjudicator had given her cogent reasons for not considering the set off raised by the Respondent with respect to other contracts which are already raised in the Adjudications involving those other contracts. Hence the declining of jurisdiction here is for a valid reason and not falling within the category of taking an “erroneously restricted view of his own jurisdiction.” [68] In the case of Thermal Energy Construction Limited v AE & E Lentjes UK Limited [2009] EWHC 408 (TCC) (High Court), His Lordship Davies J, at paragraphs 16, 26 & 37, observed as follows: “16. ... What Mr. Furst has submitted is that this is a case where the Defendant, having raised the defence of set-off and counterclaim, 30 was entitled to have the Adjudicator consider that question, and the Adjudicator was indeed obliged to consider that question as being one of the matters raised by the Defendant in its defence. He submits that by failing to do so, that failure being evidenced by an absence of any reasons given in relation to that element of the defence, the Adjudicator failed to comply with his obligations under the contractual adjudication scheme. ...

It seems to me that in those circumstances, the position is that the Adjudicator has not, evidently, dealt with this issue at all, and he has not given any reasons which would indicate that he has dealt with this issue. That this is therefore one of those cases, one envisages rare, where the Adjudicator has failed to comply with his obligations. ...

For all these reasons I have reached the conclusion that this is one of those relatively rare cases where the Court must decline to enforce the decision of the Adjudicator.” (emphasis added) 31 [69] Again the present case is different for the Adjudicator had considered the defence of set-off raised and held that it should be properly considered in those Adjudications involving the contracts from which the set-offs had arisen and which indeed had been raised in those separate Adjudications before separate Adjudicators. [70] In the case of PC Harrington Contractors Limited v Tyroddy Construction Limited [2011] EWHC 813 (TCC) (High Court), His Lordship Akenhead J, in paragraphs [21(e) & (g)], decided that: “(e) It seems to me, therefore, that, by wrongly deciding that this was a matter outside his jurisdiction, he put himself in the position whereby he did not consider the final account evidence and argument in any detail or indeed really at all. He has, therefore, put himself in a comparably similar position to the adjudicators in the CJP v William Verry and the Humes Building Contractors cases in that, by ruling on his jurisdiction in such a way that he has denied himself the opportunity to consider the merits of the exercise which Harrington had asked him to determine, he has committed a breach of natural justice. (emphasis added) ... 32

These points are material and certainly more than peripheral breaches of the rules of natural justice. ... The consequence of the above is that on this ground the decisions of the Adjudicator should not be enforced.” (emphasis added) [71] As stated, in the present case there is no breach of natural justice as the set-off was raised and considered in the other Adjudications involving the Contracts from which the set-off had arisen and these set-offs were considered there and dismissed. [72] I cannot agree with the Respondent that the present Adjudicator had come to a rather narrow and restrictive view of her jurisdiction resulting in her unfairly and erroneously declining to give any due consideration over the set off issue. Whilst it is true that there was a clear set off provision expressly stated in the Contracts between the parties, that set-off has to be properly raised in the particular Adjudication arising from the construction contract and indeed the set offs had been raised. As it had been so raised and dismissed by the Adjudicators in those separate Adjudications, this Court would not interfere with those decisions other than when it comes before the Court under a Setting Aside Application. The Sandakan Contract Adjudication Decision has come before this Court under such an application and I had dismissed the said Setting Aside Application for the reasons given in that judgment written. 33 Pronouncement [73] I had therefore dismissed the Setting Aside Application and allowed the Enforcement Application with a single cost of RM10,000.00. Dated: 13 February 2018 Signed YA LEE SWEE SENG Construction Court High Court Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff in : WA-24C-118-07/2017 : C.K Oon and Daniel Lau And for the Defendant in : (Messrs CK Oon & Co.) WA-24C-127-07/2017 : For the Defendant in : WA-24C-118-07/2017 : S. Y Lim And for the Plaintiff in : (Messrs Azman Davidson & Co) WA-24C-127-07/2017 :