1. Q&M Dental Group (S) Ltd. v 1. Dr. Hong An Liang (JA-22NCVC-116-05/2016 Encl. 167)

Q&M DENTAL GROUP (MALAYSIA) SDN. BHD. (No. Pendaftaran 921211-V)

Q&M DENTAL SURGERY (MOLEK) SDN. BHD. 15 (No. Pendaftaran 921211-V)

Q&M DENTAL SURGERY (AUSTIN) SDN. BHD. (No. Pendaftaran 985272-H) ...PLAINTIFF-PLAINTIFF 20

DR. HONG AN LIANG (No. K/P: 730702-01-5405)

CHONG LEE LEE (di dalam kapasiti peribadi dan berniaga 25 sebagai CT MANAGEMENT & SERVICES [No. Pendaftaran Perniagaan JM0723563-T])

SMILE ANGEL DENTAL GROUP SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat 1158585-D) ...DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 30 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Introduction 35 [1] Enclosure 167 is the 1st Defendant’s application dated 26-3-2018 for an order of committal against the 2nd to 4th Plaintiffs and one Foo Sien Loon (Alan), the General Manager of the 2nd Plaintiff (collectively referred to as the alleged contemnors). Ex parte leave was granted by this Court on 13-3-2018. 40 2 Background facts [2] The Plaintiffs had on 31-5-2016 filed an action against the 1st Defendant for alleged breaches of director’s duties and alleged breaches of several agreements between the parties. The prayers sought inter alia for an injuction to restrain the 1st Defendant from competing within a 5km 45 radius of the Q&M Johor Bahru clinics, for the 1st Defendant to account for secret profits made arising out of the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs and a declaration that the 1st Defendant had breached certain agreements. [3] The 2nd Plaintiff’s primary nature of business is investment holding 50 and the provision of management services to its subsidiaries. The 3rd Plaintiff operates 2 dental clinics namely Q&M Molek and Q&M Bestari. The 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs collectively own 70% of the equity shareholding in the 3rd Plaintiff and the 1st and 2nd Defendants collectively own the remaining 30%. The 4th Plaintiff operates 2 dental 55 clinics namely Q&M Austin and Q&M Bukit Indah. The 2nd Plaintiff owns 70% of the equity shareholding in the 4th Plaintiff and the 1st and 2nd Defendants collectively own the remaining 30%. All the Plaintiffs are part of the Q&M Dental Group of Companies (Q&M Group) specialising in dental healthcare. The 1st Defendant is Director of the 3rd and 4th 60 Plaintiffs and owns 15% of the equity shareholding in the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs. The 1st Defendant is a licensed Dental Practitioner. Anton Pilller Order dated 12-6-2016 (APO) [4] On 12-6-2016 an APO was obtained ex parte. The APO was 65 executed between 13-6-2016 to 15-6-2016 at the premises of Q&M (Molek), Q&M (Austin), Smile Dental Clinic at Taman Bukit Indah and CT Management & Services at Taman Molek. The APO can be seen in enclosure 161, exhibit HAL-2/148-167. 70 3 Complaint to Malaysian Dental Council (MDC) and the ensuing disciplinary proceedings [5] On 8-8-2016, Alan sent a complaint letter to the MDC against the 1st Defendant (enclosure 161, exhibit HAL-3/169). In that letter was stated that while carrying out the APO, evidence was discovered that 75 suggested the 1st and 2nd Defendant had been performing unapproved procedures which was evident from the patients’ treatment cards seized from Q&M (Molek) and photographs taken. These were enclosed along with the complaint. The Preliminary Investigation Committee (PIC) of the MDC held its inquiry on 5-4-2017, 8-5-2017 and 16-8-2017 (Disciplinary 80 Inquiry). Upon completion of the PIC, 2 charges were framed. The 1st Defendant was to state his defence before the PIC on 8-11-2017. The PIC then stayed the inquiry pending the disposal of the committal/this suit. 85 A. Committal i. Basis of the committal application [6] The basis of the committal application was premised on the alleged contemnors having used the patient treatment cards and photographs taken during the execution of the APO for the purpose of the complaint 90 resulting in the Disciplinary Inquiry. [7] These may be seen in Alan’s complaint to the MDC referred to earlier where the complaint stated that while carrying out the APO, he discovered evidence of the 1st Defendant performing unapproved 95 procedures as seen from the patient treatment cards seized from the Q&M (Molek) clinic and pictures taken during the APO. [8] According to the 1st Defendant, this was a breach of paragraph 7 of the APO, wherein there were also express ancilliary orders as per 100 paragraph 8. 4 ii. Alleged contemnors’ position [9] On the part of the alleged contemnors, the lodging of the complaint to MDC and the use of such information was consonant with and permissable pursuant to paragraph 9 of the APO. 105 iii. Analysis [10] The complaint to the MDC was sent on the letterhead of the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs and signed by Alan as the General Manager of the 2nd Plaintiff. From the complaint it was clear the alleged contemnors were 110 relying on the treatment cards seized and the photographs taken in the course of the APO. These were annexed as Annexure A and B to the complaint. Annexure A was titled “Patients’ treatment cards seized from the Molek Clinic” and Annexure B “Photos taken at the Molek Clinic”. 115 [11] It was not disputed what was obtained during the APO was used in the course of the Disciplinary Inquiry. There was the evidence of Alan who stated during the APO they also discovered some of the unapproved procedures being carried out in the dental clinic (enclosure 161 exhibit HAL-6/682). 120 [12] It was also not disputed by the alleged contemnors these treatment cards and photographs were referred to in the course of the Disciplinary Inquiry and marked as exhibits. Hence Annexure A which can be seen in enclosure 161 exhibit HAL-5/646-676 was marked as exhibit P18-P31 B 125 in the Disciplinary Inquiry while Annexure B seen in enclosure 161 exhibit HAL5-/628-644 was marked as exhibit P2B – P16. [13] The photographs in question were taken by one Foo Siew Juan the General Manager of the 1st Plantiff as per her evidence at the 130 Disciplinary Inquiry (enclosure 161 exhibit HAL-8/740). It was further her 5 evidence the photographs were taken during the execution of the APO (page 744). [14] It was thus clear the patient treatment cards and the photographs 135 taken, being obtained from the APO were used during the Disciplinary Inquiry. [15] Paragraph 7 of the APO which the 1st Defendant seeks to rely on to prove contempt states as follows- 140 “7. That the Plaintiffs shall not, without leave of Court, use affidavits, affirmations, informations, articels, materials, documents and/or any Listed Item herein obtained as a result of the carying out this Order for the purpose of these proceedings, other than in these proceedings and in pursuing claims against the 1st to 3rd Defendants or against third parties 145 implicated in the same wrongful acts or for purpose of protection of their rights and interest in the subject matter of this proceedings.” [Emphasis added]. [16] The terms of paragraph 7 where “the Plaintiffs shall not, without 150 leave of the Court” show that there is a strict prohibition on the use of documents obtained as a result of the APO. Such documents can only be used in “these proceedings” or “for purposes of protection of their rights and interests in the subject matter of these proceedings”. 155 [17] “These proceedings” can only mean the proceedings in this current civil suit. [18] For the meaning of “For purposes of protection of their rights and interests in the subject matter of these proceedings”, reference has also 160 to be made to paragraph 9 of the APO which states as follows- 6 “Ancillary Orders/Directions

That the Plaintiffs shall be at liberty to use any information, 165 documents or material obtained as a result of the carrying out this Order for the purpose of these proceedings, and only in other proceedings related to the Plaintiffs claims here by or against the 1st to 3rd Defendants or against third parties implicated in the same wrongful acts for purpose of protection of their rights and interest in the subject matter of this 170 proceedings.” [Emphasis added]. [19] The Disciplinary Inquiry is neither a “claim” by the Plaintiffs nor is it a “proceeding” as defined under the Rules of Court 2012. Under Order 1 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012, proceedings is defined as “ ... any 175 proceeding whether in open Court or in Chambers and includes an application at any stage of a proceeding which is deemed to have started when an action is filled.” The complaint lodged by Alan was received by the MDC under its regulatory powers stipulated under the Dental Act

These powers regulate the ethical conduct of dental practitioners 180 through a disciplinary process. [20] The subject matter of the Court proceedings is distinct from the Disciplinary Inquiry. The causes of action pleaded in the Court proceedings are breach of directors’ duties and breach of agreements. 185 [21] The case of Dr Koay Cheng Boon v. Majlis Perubatan Malaysia [2012] 4 CLJ 445 was relied on to state that disciplinary inquiries such as that of the MDC are a type of civil proceedings. In that case it was stated at page 473 that- 190 “In the instant appeal, the Act makes it clear that such was the intention of Parliament, viz, that there be no further appeal from the High Court. The proceedings before the council were not criminal proceedings. Disciplinary proceedings fall on the civil side. ...”. 195 7 [22] The context of that case was whether the Court of Appeal had unlimited jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a decision of the high court made pursuant to section 31(1) of the Medical Act 1971. It was not on whether a disciplinary proceeding is a “proceeding” for the purpose of an undertaking of such a nature as paragraph 7 read together with 200 paragraph 9 of the APO. [23] It was thus the Court’s finding the use of the documents obtained from the APO was not towards the protection of the rights and interests of the Plaintiffs in the subject matter of these Court proceedings. This is 205 because the Disciplinary Inquiry of the MDC is not proceedings by the Plaintiffs in this Court proceedings. The subject matter of the Disciplinary Inquiry is distinct and separate from this Court proceedings. [24] It was not relevant the 1st Defendant had denied the patient 210 treatment cards were his or that the photographs were not listed items under Schedule 2 to the APO, these documents nevertheless fell within the undertaking given by the Plaintiffs in paragraph 7. [25] Given that the terms of the APO and undertaking were drafted and 215 prepared by the Plaintiffs’ solicitors, the terms should be construed strictly against them. In Makonka Electronic Sdn Bhd v Electrical Industry Workers’ Union & Ors [1997] MLJU 93 it was stated- “..Furthermore, such order having been obtained ex-parte, then drawn up and perfected by the applicant, there is no excuse for any non-compliance 220 of its terms and undertakings made by the applicant..”. [26] In Sybron Corporation and Anor v Barclays Bank PLC [1985] Ch. 299 it was said of an undertaking at page 321 as follows- “... The purpose of the undertaking is to protect, so far as consistent with 225 the proper prosecution of the action, the confidentiality of the party’s 8 private documents and thereby to encourage the full and proper disclosure of documents that the proper administration of justice requires ...”. [27] At page 320 it was even stated that breach of the implied 230 undertaking is a contempt of court. [28] In Makonka Electrical Sdn Bhd (supra) it was stated as follows- “... the so-called Anton-Piller order is intrusive in nature, replete with conditions and undertakings by the applicant. Under it the respondent is 235 subject to entry search and seizure. It is an invasion of privacy. It is a form of order, obtained ex-parte which is easily capable of abuse by competitors in business or other activity where there is competition. It is a draconian order, granted by the Court upon the balance of undertakings by the applicant and upon specific terms and conditions. Those terms, 240 conditions and undertakings cannot be ignored or left for subsequent compliance at will. Compliance with the terms of the conditions and undertakings are necessary pre-conditions to the enforcement of the order. ... 245 The purpose of the safeguards is to ensure that the enforcement of the order could be carried out in a peaceful and orderly manner. For that purpose the order must be carried out strictly on its terms and the undertakings thereunder. Where there has been non-compliance, the order has become liable to set aside and such non-compliance cannot be 250 corrected by subsequent compliance. Such a strict approach is necessary to guarantee that Anton-Piller orders are carried out strictly according to its terms and no further.”. [29] Hence the express undertaking in paragraph 7 of the APO is to be 255 complied with and the breach of it exposes the Plaintiffs and Alan to contempt of the Court. In Wee Choo Keong v. MBF Holdings [1993] 3 CLJ 210 it was stated at page 211 that “Orders of Court must be treated with respect and require strict obedience.”. 260 9 [30] It was submitted the documents in questions obtained from the premises of the Q&M Molek and Q&M Bukit Indah were the dental clinics of the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs such that technically there was no need for the Plaintiffs to apply for the APO. Be that as it may, the APO was indeed applied for and obtained, which contained the undertaking in 265 paragraph 7. To further argue that the documents are proprietary to the Plaintiffs such that there is no issue of preserving privacy and protecting confidential information again belies the fact of the APO and the undertaking in paragraph 7. 270 Alan is bound by the terms of the APO [31] The terms and undertaking in the APO bind not only the Plaintiffs but anyone who has notice of the said terms and undertaking. Paragraph 10 of the APO states it would be “contempt of Court for any person notified of this Order knowingly to assist or permit a breach of this 275 Order.” The master servant principle does not absolve the servant but merely treats the master as being equally liable. Alan was and is at all material times the General Manager of the 2nd Plaintiff. It was clear he was the deponent of the Plaintiffs’ affidavit filed in support of the APO, had participated in the Anton Piller raid, and had referred to the APO in 280 the complaint to the MDC. Alan too has not denied that he is aware of the terms of the APO. Protection of interest [32] It was argued the complaint to the MDC was to protect the 285 Plaintiffs’ rights and interest in the clinics in view of the 1st Defendant’s action in performing unapproved procedures at the clinics. The 1st Defendant was not merely a dental practitioner at the clinics but was director and shareholder of the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs and the person in charge of Q&M Molek, Q&M Bukit Indah and Q&M Austin. The 3rd and 290 4th Plaintiffs would not be free from blame in the event an issue or 10 negligence suit arose in respect of the 1st Defendant performing such unapproved procedures. In this regard as earlier stated by the Court, the subject matter of this Court proceedings was the breach of directors’ duties and breach of certain agreements. It was thus a claim to protect 295 the private interest that the Plaintiffs claim to have in those agreements. The Disciplinary Inquiry did not constitute “this proceedings” and is separate and distinct from it. Public interest 300 [33] It was further contended it was in the public interest to protect the public from the 1st Defendant. This runs counter to the principle that one is innocent until proven otherwise. Here is a situation where the allegation of unapproved procedures remain at best, allegations. This cannot detract from the breach of the express undertaking 305 [34] Viewed against this backdrop, Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd. [1997] Q.B. 881 pages 896 and 912 state the following- “... The memorandum was obtained by compulsion. Compulsion is an invasion of a private right to keep one’s documents to oneself. The public 310 interest in privacy and confidence demands that this compulsion should not be pressed further than the course of justice requires. The courts should, therefore, not allow the other party – or anyone else – to use the documents for any ulterior or alien purpose. Otherwise the courts themselves would be doing injustice. ... In order to encourage openness 315 and fairness, the public interest requires that documents disclosed on discovery are not to be made use of except for the purpose of the action in which they are disclosed. They are not to be made a ground for comments in the newspapers, nor for bringing a libel action, or for any other alien purpose. The principle was stated in a work of the highest 320 authority 93 years ago by Bray J., Bray on Discovery, 1st ed. (1885), p.238: “A party who has obtained access to his adversary’s documents under an order for production has no right to make their contents 11 public or communicate them to any stranger to the suit: ... nor to use 325 them or copies of them for any collateral object ... if necessary an undertaking to that effect will be made a condition of granting an order: ...” Others 330 [35] There was no ambiguity or conflict in the terms of the APO that it ought to be resolved in fovour of the alleged contemnors. No such ambiguity of conflict was established here. Further the APO being ex parte was drawn up and perfected by the Plaintiffs and they ought not to benefit from any ambiguity or conflict caused by them. 335 [36] There was no inordinate delay in the filing and pursuing of the committal proceedings. Reference was made to Malaysian Bar v. Tan Sri Dato’ Abdul Hamid Omar [1989] 1 CLJ Rep 92 where an unexplained lapse of 9 months was held to be not reasonable. It was 340 stated at page 95- “Finally there has certainly been an inordinate delay in making the application. The resolution of the Malaysian Bar to institute proceedings for contempt was passed on 19 July 1988. The application for leave was field on 24 April 1989. There was no explanation for the delay in the 345 affidavit of the Secretary of the Bar. The allegations of the contempt is a serious matter and should be pursued within a reasonable tiem. The delay must be explained. In our view a lapse of nearly nine months unexplained in the affidavit is not reasonable.” 350 [37] Here it has been explained to the Court’s satisfaction that for the purpose of pursuing the proceedings here, the 1st Defendant would have needed to put the transcript of the Notes of Proceedings before the Court. This was only available on 13-9-2017 (Enclosure 164, paragraph 6). A notice to show cause was then issued on 30-10-2017 pursuant to 355 Order 52 Rule 2B of the RC 2012 and a response received on 15-11- 2017 (Enclosure 164 paragraph 7). The show cause notice is a 12 mandatory pre-requisite. It was only after 15-11-2017 that the 1st Defendant would have been in an evidential or procedural position to seek leave for the committal proceedings herein. At that juncture, the 1st 360 Defendant was represented by two different solicitors for the Disciplinary Inquiry and for these proceedings. Filing for leave for contempt, on 12-2- 2018, less than 3 months after the alleged contemnors’ response does not fall within the defination of ‘inordinate delay’. Certain steps had to be taken prior to the filing of these proceedings and the time taken, in 365 between was to comply with these steps. Finding [38] It was for the above reasons the order of committal was granted against the Plaintiffs and Alan. 370 Sentence [39] After hearing the plea of mitigation, a sentence of a fine of RM30,000 each, in default 4 months imprisonment, was imposed on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs and Alan. A fine was more appropriate than a 375 custodial sentence. This was for one charge of contempt and a custodial sentence should only be imposed only in the most serious cases. In Chung Onn v. Wee Tian Peng [1996] 5 MLJ 521 it was stated at page 525- “Altough our Courts have plenary powers to impose a custodial sentence 380 by way of imprisonment as a major sanction in a case of civil contempt such as the instant case, I am of the considered view that a custodial sentence is to be imposed only in the most serious cases. The seriousness will be judged by reference to the unrelenting interference with administration of justice and the unmitigated culpability of the 385 offender, with the latter perhaps being the key factor.”. [40] In JSC BTA Bank v. Solodchenko & Ors [2010] EWHC 2843 (Ch) a checklist of factors a judge should take into account for sentencing 13 purpose when dealing with contempt of court was given at pages 5 and 6 390 of 13 namely-Whether the claimant is prejudiced by virtue of the contempt and whether the prejudice is capable of remedy; The extent to which the contemnor has acted under pressure; Whether the breach of the order was deliberate or unintentional; 395 The degree of culpability; Whether the contemnor was placed in breach by reason of the conduct of others; Whether the contemnor appreciated the seriousness of the breach; Whether the contemnor has cooperated, and if so, at what stage and to 400 what extent; Whether the contemnor has admitted his contempt and has entered the equivalent of a guilty plea; and if so, what if any, reduction should be applied to the appropriate sentence; Whether the contemnor has made a sincere apology for his contempt; 405 The contemnor’s previous character and antecedents; and Any personal mitigation advanced on his behalf. [41] After due consideration to the factors as listed above, the Court was of the view that a RM30,000 fine was appropriate. The contemnors 410 were under the impression that what they did was in accordance with paragraph 9 of the APO and that the unapproved procedures being carried out at the clinics may have rendered the Plaintiffs liable for it too. They felt compelled to act to maintain the integrity of the Q&M Group as a dental healthcare provider in the dentistry practice. An unreserved 415 apology had also been made in open Court. B. Expungement [42] Prayer 2 of the application for committal sought the following- 14 “(2) An order for expungement of the complaint letter dated 8-8-2016 420 addressed to the Malaysia Dental Council (MDC) together with the record of proceedings in relation to the inquiry before the Preliminary Investigation Committee on 5-4-2017, 8-5-2017 and 16-8-2017 and all documents attached to the said complaint letter and/or tendered by the complaint during the said procedings.”. 425 [43] The Court declined to allow this prayer on the sole ground that the MDC was not a party to this application. It is to be noted the MDC is a body corporate established pursuant to section 3 of the Dental Act 1971 and has disciplinary jurisdiction over all persons registered under the said 430 Act such as the 1st Defendant. Part IV of the Dental Act 1971 sets out the disciplinary proceedings of the MDC and the procedure of such disciplinary proceedings is provided pursuant to Part IV of the Dental Regulations 1976. The MDC is the statutory prosecuting authority in respect of the professional conduct of dental practitioners in Malaysia 435 and given its legal personality and duties under the Dental Act 1971. If the 1st Defendant wishes to challenge the use of such evidence by the MDC pursuant to Q&M’s MDC complaint, then it is only proper for the 1st Defendant to include the MDC in the legal proceedings vis-á-vis the 1st Defendant’s application, for which it requires the compliance of the MDC. 440 [44] This position of not making an order affecting non parties is supported in law. In Wong Sew Yun & Ors v Chelingga Asuh [2012] 10 CLJ 180, it was stated at page 188- “It is also our judgment that there is a serious misdirection in the orders of 445 the learned trial judge for failing to consider or appreciate that prior to the commencement of the trial, the said land is registered in the name of a person, who is not a party to the proceedings or trial. The orders, in such circumstances are inappropriate as no notice or opportunity was ever given to this person for his right to be heard. It is our judgment that the 450 registered owner, Nguong Aik (Sarawak) Sdn Bhd cannot deprived of his 15 property without a hearing. This is not only trite law but such right is enshrined in arts. 8 and 13 of the Federal Constitution.”. [45] Similiarly, in Chia Saw Kee & Anor v. Huah Leong Holdings Sdn 455 Bhd & Anor [2003] 8 CLJ 124 it was stated at page 129- “... This is a sensible approach: first, as the court can take into account the interests of anyone who would be affected in reaching its decision as to whether or not to grant a declaration, it is only just that those who may be effected should be given an opportunity to present any argument which 460 they want the court to take into account; secondly, a declaration will only bind the parties to the proceedings ...”. [46] The rights, duties and interest of the MDC are affected as it is a regulatory authority of dental practitioners. 465 [47] It was submitted the court had previously ordered inferior tribunals to expunge documents where the tribunals were not a party to the proceedings. 470 [48] The three cases that were referred to by the 1st Defendant is not a direct authority on expungement of documents that were presented to the Council/Tribunal. They were all in relation to documents that were presented to the court for determination in which the court itself has jurisdiction over it. 475 a) Gideon Tan v Tey Por Yee and another appeal [2017] 1 MLJ 352 – in relation to expungement of certain paragraphs used in affidavit before the court for committal proceeding due to the reason that it is protected under solicitor-client privilege under section 126 of Evidence Act 1950. 480 b) Item Industrial Engineering Sdn Bhd & Ors v Bank Utama (M) Bhd [2015] 3 MLJ 254 four supplementary bundles of documents 16 were introduced at a later stage of trial and Court of Appeal held that the court should not have allowed the supplementary bundles to be admitted in court without prior leave. 485 c) Chandran G Nair & Ors v Affin Bank Bhd [2015] 1 MLJ 59 it was the issue of expungement of certificate of indebtedness that had wrongly been admitted in court. [49] Section 34 of Dental Act 1971 provides that the High Court has 490 appellate jurisdiction over any order or decision made by the MDC. The Court is yet to have supervisory power over the MDC when the MDC in this matter has not made any order and had stayed the Disciplinary Inquiry pending the disposal of this case. The cases referred to by the 1st Defendant of Demak Motor Corporation Sdn Bhd v Chung Ted 495 Fook [2016] MLJU 380 and Oxbridge Height Sdn Bhd v Rozila binti Razali [2010] MLJU 996 are both judicial review cases filed to the High Court for determination. [50] Both section 16Z Housing Development (Control And Licensing) 500 Act 1966 and section 33A Industrial Relations Act 1967 provide for reference to a Judge of the High Court on a question of law but there is no such similar provision under the Dental Act 1971. The issue of expungement of document is not one that is referred to this Court for determination by the MDC. Section 16Z Housing Development (Control 505 And Licensing) Act 1966 uses the wording “Before tribunal makes an award…” which means that Tribunal on its own motion makes a reference to High Court before making an award and section 33A Industrial Relations Act 1967 uses the wording “When the court has made an award…”. 510 17 [51] In the case of Merck KGaA v Leno Marketing (M) Sdn Bhd (Registrar of Trade Marks, interested party) [2018] 5 MLJ 1, the Federal Court held that High Court has an inherent supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts, 515 tribunals, or other bodies or persons who carry out quasi-judicial functions or who are charged with the performance of public acts and duties in relation to statutes of the third type i.e. statutes which do not expressly provide for any right of appeal to the court against the decision of the tribunal like the Consumer Protection Act 1999. At paragraph 30 it 520 was held that “For decisions made by tribunals under the third type of statutes, the recourse for the aggrieved party is to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court and challenge the decision of the tribunal by way of judicial review.” However, that is not the case here as section 34 of Dental Act 1971 does provide for recourse to the High Court against 525 the order or decision of the MDC and it is not ‘statute of the third type’ as per Merck KGaA. Conclusion [52] For the above reasons, prayer 1 for an order of committal for 530 contempt against the 2nd to 4th Plaintiffs and Alan was allowed, and prayer 2 for an expungement of the documents referred to, was dismissed. 535 Dated: 29th August 2019 See Mee Chun Hakim 540 Mahkamah Tinggi Johor Bahru 18 Counsel for the Applicant/ 1st Defendant 545 Ms Raja Eileen Soraya bte Raja Aman and Ms Amanda Loh Tetuan Raja, Darryl & Loh Kuala Lumpur 550 Counsel for the Contemnors