1. ) Ramlah Binti Mamat, Sebagai Cucu Yang Sah Dan Wakil Diri Kepada Ismail Bin Awang, Si Mati v 1. ) EZANI BIN MOHD YUSOF (DA-22NCvC-10-02/2018)

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KOTA BHARU DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO: DA-22NCvC-10-02/2018

Preamble

Menurut AS yang diikrarkan oleh peguam D3 dan D4, alasan utama ke atas permohonan mereka adalah di atas alasan peguam hanya menyedari kesilapan ke atas K88 ketika membuat persediaan perbicaraan kes di peringkat Defendan. Menurut peguam D3 dan D4 deraf Fakta Yang Dipersetujui yang dipersetujui oleh D3 dan D4 telah dikemukakan kepada peguam Plf melalui surat bertarikh 25/9/2019 namun yang difailkan bukanlah yang dipersetujui oleh peguam D3 dan D4. [7] Peguam Plf sebaliknya menyatakan bahawa Plf telah mengemukakan deraf Fakta Kes Yang Dipersetujui kepada peguam D3 dan D4 pada 20/8/2019. Namun tiada sebarang respons yang dikemukakan oleh peguam D3 dan D4 yang menyebabkan peguam Plf memfailkan K88 pada 25/9/2019 dan telah menyerahkan secara kendiri kepada peguam D3 dan D4 pada keesokannya iaitu pada 26/9/2019. Analisis dan dapatan Mahkamah [8] Mahkamah ingin menegaskan bahawa Fakta Kes Yang Dipersetujui adalah merupakan satu dokumen yang diperuntukkan di bawah K.34 A.2(j) KKM 2012 yang boleh diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah sebagaimana yang difikirkannya sesuai untuk menjamin penyelesaian tindakan atau prosiding itu dengan adil, cepat dan ekonomi. Ia secara amnya bagi membantu Mahkamah di dalam melaksanakan satu perbicaraan yang lebih efektif. [9] Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Christopher Bandi v. Tumbung Nakis & Anor; Jamil Sindi (Third Party) [2016] 4 CLJ 831 telah menyatakan: "As pointed out by the learned Chief Judge of Malaya, the Rules of Court 2012 now provides robust pre-trial case management by the courts before the trial is set down. The philosophy behind the new regime of civil procedure is simply to attend a "just, expeditious and economical" disposal of an action. Litigants through their respective counsel must understand that they must put their house in order before a case goes to trial and once the trial commenced courts will not tolerate any delay except in the most exceptional circumstance. Putting one's house in order simply means that parties and their counsel must be aware that they have a duty to frame their case fully in all their causes of action and defences prior to the start of trial. Conducting one's case by instalment must not be allowed in the context of the present regime of civil procedure. It is an undeniable fact that many cases had been stayed pending appeals to higher court on matters similar to the factual matrix in this case, which undoubtedly had delayed the disposal of these cases." [10] Manakala di dalam kes Item Industrial Engineering Sdn Bhd – Ors v. Bank Utama (Malaysia) Bhd [2015] 1 CLJ 933 Mahkamah Rayuan telah menegaskan: "[42] The introduction of O. 34 to the Rules of the High Court 1980 ("the Rules"), the Rules then in force, marks a change from the traditional position under which the progress of a case was largely left in the hands of the parties. Pursuant to O. 34, the court, not the parties, now dictate the progress of cases at the pre-trial stage to ensure that the practices and procedures applicable during the respective stages prescribed by the Rules are complied with. [43] The duty of an advocate and solicitor is to assist the court by presenting documentary evidence in the most convenient manner. In preparing for trial it was incumbent upon parties to prepare agreed and non-agreed bundles of documents. Bundles are made for the convenience of court and parties to facilitate a speedy trial. Documents crucial to the plaintiff's claim should be held out. If agreed, to set them out in a proper bundle and paged in order of date. If not agreed, then copies should be made available, bound and paged in another bundle." [11] Oleh itu, Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa adalah penting bagi D3 dan D4 di peringkat ini untuk menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa cadangan pindaan ke atas fakta Kes Yang Dipersetujui yang hendak difailkan tersebut adalah bagi maksud untuk mencapai pengendalian perbicaraan tindakan itu dengan adil, cepat dan ekonomi. Setelah menimbang afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan oleh D3 dan D4 bagi menyokong permohonan mereka, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa D3 dan D4 hanya menegaskan berkenaan peranan peguam Plf yang sepatutnya memfailkan dokumen yang telah dipersetujui oleh D3 dan D4. [12] Walaupun fakta berkaitan dokumen yang dipersetujui oleh peguam D3 dan D4 tersebut adalah tidak dinafikan, namun Mahkamah mendapati bahawa ianya hanya diterima oleh peguam Plf selepas K88 difailkan. Peguam D3 dan D4 langsung tidak menyatakan bahawa peguam D3 dan D4 turut bertanggungjawab untuk meneliti kandungan dokumen yang telah difailkan sebagai mewakili anakguamnya iaitu D3 dan D4. [13] Di dalam masa yang sama, Mahkamah tidak mendapati di dalam mana-mana keadaan peguam D3 dan D4 mengemukakan sebarang penjelasan mengapa peguam hanya menyedari perkara ini selepas 2 tahun dan 3 bulan K88 difailkan. Ketiadaan penjelasan ini mewarankan Mahkamah kini untuk membuat satu inferens bahawa ia tidak lain disebabkan kegagalan peguam untuk cakna atau berjaga-jaga di dalam pengendalian kes ini bagi pihak D3 dan D4. [14] Bagi Mahkamah kegagalan ini adalah bukan merupakan satu alasan yang boleh dipertimbangkan bagi maksud membenarkan permohonan ini. Mahkamah terpanggil untuk memetik kata-kata Hakim Siti Norma Yaacob HMR (pada ketika itu) di dalam kes Yeo Yoo Teik v. Jemaah Pengadilan Sewa Pulau Pinang & Anor [1996] 2 CLJ 628 seperti berikut: "The omission on the part of a solicitor to be vigilant can hardly be described as an acceptable explanation." [15] Di dalam masa yang sama, Mahkamah turut mendapati bahawa peguam D3 dan D4 turut tidak mengemukakan penjelasan di atas kelewatan ini. Di dalam kes Yamaha Motors Ltd v. Yamaha Malaysia [1983] CLJ Rep 428; [1983] 1 CLJ 191; [1983] 1 MLJ 2134 Mahkamah Rayuan telah menegaskan keperluan oleh pihak yang memohon pindaan ke atas pliding untuk menyatakan alasan yang munasabah di atas kelewatan memfailkan permohonan pindaan pliding. [16] Di dalam kes ini, alasan yang dikemukakan adalah peguam hanya terperasan perkara ini semasa membuat persedian kes di peringkat Defendan. Bagi Mahkamah alasan seperti ini tidak wajar diterima sebagai alasan. Sepatutnya peguam yang mengendalikan kes bagi pihak mana-mana litigan hendaklah meneliti dan cakna ke atas setiap pliding serta dokumen yang difailkan. Peguam tidak wajar meletakkan beban ini ke atas pihak lain bagi menutup kegagalannya. [17] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Chong Kueng Ying ors v. Lovis Lavagna [1972] 1 LNS 18; [1972] 1 MLJ yang telah memutuskan seperti berikut: "The ground on which special leave is asked is that the applicants' legal adviser has made a mistake. He was under the erroneous impression that under r. 7 it was not for him but for the Court to serve the notice of appeal on the respondent. When he realised that it was for him to serve it, he was out of time. In England the mistake of a legal adviser does not preclude a Court of Appeal from granting leave. That is the law since the amendment of the English RSC in 1909. Before 1909 the English Court of Appeal had no discretion to grant leave if the appellant was out of time owing to a mistake of his legal adviser. See Gatti v. Shoosmith [1939] 3 All ER 916. The law here, however, is the same as the pre-1909 English law: the mistake of a legal adviser is not a sufficient ground for granting leave, see Abdul Majeed v. Yeo Chng Tay [1964] 1 LNS 1; [1964] 1 MLRA 368; [1964] 1 MLJ 75." [18] Manakala di dalam kes Chin Hua Sawmill Co Sdn Bhd v. Tuan Yusoff Bin Tuan Mohamed [1973] 1 LNS 15; [1973] 1 MLRA 764; [1974] 1 MLJ 58 Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan: "It is necessary to consider whether special leave should be given in this case. The affidavit in support of the notice of motion is that of Mr Foo Say Ghee, the applicant's solicitor In para 16 Mr Foo Say Ghee said that from February 9, 1973 until March 26, 1973 he was not in a proper and normal state of mind to conduct his office work. This was because he was personally involved in matters which have nothing to do with the applicant's case. In such a state of mind, he said he inadvertently omitted to instruct his staff to serve the notice on the respondent or the respondent's solicitors. Here is a clear admission that the failure to serve the notice of the respondent or the respondent's solicitors. Needless to say that such mistake is not a ground for granting special leave. That must be so for the obvious reason that it is not possible to draw a dividing line between a mistake which can support the exercise of a discretionary power and that which cannot. A mistake is a mistake whatever may be the reason for it." [19] Akhirnya Mahkamah ingin menegaskan bahawa permohonan ini juga pada pandangan Mahkamah adalah tidak bersifat bona fide dan betentangan dengan apa yang dinyatakan di dalam kes Yamaha Motors Ltd (supra), di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menggariskan prinsip perundangan berkaitan pindaan pliding seperti berikut: "Under O. 20 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, which is equivalent to O. 28 Rules of Supreme Court, a Judge has a discretion to allow leave to amend pleadings. Like any other discretion, it must of course be exercised judicially [see KamHoy Trading v. Kam Fatt Tin Mine [1963] 1 LNS 51. The general principle is that the Court will allow such amendments as will cause no injustice to the other parties. Three basic questions should be considered to determine whether injustice would or would not result, (1) whether the application is bona fide; (2) whether prejudice caused to the other side can be compensated by costs and (3) whether the amendments would not in effect turn the suit from one character into a suit from one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character. (See Mallal's Supreme Court Practice p. 342). If the answers are in the affirmative, an application for amendment should be allowed at any stage of the proceedings particularly before trial, even if the effect of the amendment would be to add or substitute a new cause of action, provided the new cause of action arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as a cause of action in respect of which relief has already been claimed in the original statement of claim. [20] Pandangan Mahkamah ini berpremiskan kepada kedudukan kes ini di mana kedua-dua pihak telahpun menutup kes masing-masing. Perkara-perkara yang hendak dipinda di K88 tersebut telah menjadi sebahagian dari keterangan-keterangan yang telah dikemukakan dan sebahagian dari keterangan di Mahkamah. Oleh itu, ia sama sekali akan memprejudis Plf dan ia akan bertentangan dengan prinsip penyelesaian kes yang adil, cepat dan ekonomi. Kesimpulan [21] Di atas pertimbangan-pertimbangan ini, Mahkamah dengan ini menolak permohonan D3 dan D4 di K157 dengan kos sebanyak RM