Subparagraph
(iv) Terra Kinetic Sdn Bhd (Perayu Keempat) Kesemua wang yang tersimpan dalam akaun Maybank Berhad No. 55620812365. [42] Peguambela terpelajar Perayu-Perayu berhujah bahawa Pegawai Penyiasat telah menyerahkan perintah pembekuan di bawah seksyen 44 Akta 613 kepada tiga puluh satu (31) orang yang terlibat, termasuklah Perayu-Perayu di sini, masing-masing pada 2.2.2015, 12.2.2015 dan 13.3.2015. Selanjutnya, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya telah mengeluarkan perintah penyitaan di bawah subseksyen 50(1) Akta 613 terhadap harta alih yang tersimpan dalam beberapa institusi kewangan. [43] Peguambela terpelajar Perayu-Perayu seterusnya berhujah bahawa perintah pembekuan dan penyitaan yang dikeluarkan itu telah terhenti berkuat kuasa kerana tempoh dua belas bulan dari tarikh pembekuan dan penyitaan telah tamat dan Perayu-Perayu telah tidak dipertuduhkan sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh seksyen 52A Akta 613. [44] Pihak pendakwaan juga tidak mengambil inisiatif untuk memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk mendapatkan suatu perintah pelucuthakan harta-harta itu sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh subseksyen 56(1) Akta 613. [45] Dalam keadaan demikian, dihujahkan bahawa penahanan berterusan oleh agensi penguat kuasa harta-harta berkenaan adalah menyalahi undang-undang dan harta-harta itu hendaklah dilepaskan kepada Perayu-Perayu berdasarkan subseksyen 56(3) Akta 613 dengan kadar yang segera. [46] Kami perhatikan bahawa hujahan yang sama telah dikemukakan oleh peguambela Perayu-Perayu di hadapan Mahkamah Rayuan. Walau bagaimanapun, hujahan tersebut telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah Rayuan. Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan di perenggan-perenggan [43] – [46] penghakiman: “[43] Setelah mempertimbangkan keseluruhan proses pendakwaan dan autoriti-autoriti yang dikemukakan di atas, kami berpandangan bahawa seseorang itu “dituduh” apabila prosiding jenayah atau pendakwaan “dimulakan” terhadapnya. Oleh itu, kami bersetuju dengan dapatan Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman bahawa Perayu-perayu dalam rayuan ini telah “dituduh” apabila mahkamah “take cognisance” kesalahan terhadap mereka melalui Izin Mendakwa yang dikemukakan oleh Responden ke mahkamah. [44] Kami juga mengambil pendekatan ini selaras dengan peruntukan subseksyen 56(1) AMLATFAPUA yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “56.(1) Subject to section 61, where in respect of any property seized under this Act there is no prosecution or conviction for an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence, the Public Prosecutor may, before the expiration of twelve months from the date of the seizure, or where there is a freezing order, twelve months from the date of the freezing, apply to a judge of the High Court for an order of forfeiture of that property if he is satisfied that such property is: [45] Frasa “no prosecution” yang digunakan dalam peruntukan di atas merujuk kepada prosiding jenayah yang dimulakan di bawah AMLATFAPUA yang tertakluk kepada izin Pendakwa Raya seperti yang dikehendaki oleh Seksyen 93. Penggunaan frasa ini menyokong dapatan kami bahawa di bawah Seksyen 52A seseorang itu “dituduh” apabila pendakwaan dimulakan terhadapnya dan bukan keadaan seseorang itu dikatakan “dituduh” iaitu keadaan apabila pertuduhan dibacakan terhadap seseorang itu dan pengakuannya diambil oleh mahkamah. [46] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan di atas, kami berpuas hati bahawa Perayu Pertama, Ke-2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 21, 26 dan 31 telah “dituduh” bagi maksud Seksyen 52A AMLATFAPUA setelah mahkamah “take cognisance” pertuduhan terhadap mereka melalui penerimaan Izin Mendakwa yang dikemukakan oleh Responden ke mahkamah. Perintah pembekuan dan perintah penyitaan yang telah dikeluarkan terhadap mereka masih berkuat kuasa walaupun tempoh dua belas bulan dari tarikh perintah-perintah tersebut telah tamat. Oleh itu, permohonan Perayu-perayu tersebut supaya perintah pembekuan dan perintah penyitaan yang dikeluarkan terhadap mereka dibatalkan adalah ditolak.” (penekanan ditambah).” [47] Perkataan “pertuduhan” pada kebiasaannya digunakan dalam prosedur jenayah di Malaysia sebagai kata nama generik (“generic noun”) untuk merujuk kepada satu penggubalan pengataan spesifik yang dibuat terhadap seseorang tertuduh di mana beliau berhak untuk mengetahui bentuknya pada peringkat awal (lihat Waroo v Emperor AIR 1948 Sind 40). Oleh itu, pertuduhan ialah satu notis kepada seseorang tertuduh mengenai perkara yang dia dipertuduhkan dan butir-butir pengataan di mana pihak pendakwaan berhasrat untuk membuktikan terhadapnya (lihat R v Mohammed Humayon Shah [1874] 21 WR 72). [48] Perkataan “pertuduhan” yang digunakan sebagai kata perbuatan, iaitu “dipertuduhkan” (“charged”), tidak didefinisikan dalam Kanun Prosedur Jenayah Malaysia (Akta 593). Berdasarkan kes-kes yang diputuskan, perkataan “dipertuduhkan” boleh ditafsirkan sama ada secara sempit iaitu merujuk kepada pembacaan suatu pertuduhan di mahkamah terhadap seseorang tertuduh dan dia dikehendaki membuat pengakuan (“plea”) atau pertuduhan didaftarkan di pejabat pendaftaran mahkamah, atau ia boleh juga ditafsirkan secara luas iaitu dengan merujuk kepada langkah-langkah yang diambil oleh pihak pendakwaan kearah mengemukakan pertuduhan terhadap seorang tertuduh seperti permohonan waran tangkap, pengeluaran sanksi untuk mendakwa atau apabila mahkamah telah mengambil perhatian tentang kesalahan itu (“the court takes cognisance of the offence”). [49] Pada hemat kami, adalah tidak bermanfaat untuk kami cuba merumuskan satu definisi yang boleh diterima secara universal terhadap satu perkataan yang samar-samar seperti perkataan “dipertuduhkan”. Kandungan dan makna perkataan itu hendaklah difahami dalam konteks di mana ia digunakan. [50] Dalam konteks pentadbiran undang-undang jenayah di Malaysia, Mohamed Azmi HMA dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311 berkata: “… the normal legal position was that once the court had taken cognisance of the offence and was seised with jurisdiction to try the case, the institution of the proceedings by the Public Prosecutor was complete, because not only had the Public Prosecutor successfully invited the court to take action, but also it was the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code that trial would follow cognisance and cognisance would be preceded by investigation. Criminal proceedings are in fact not instituted until the court has taken cognisance of the offence or offences under one or other of the clauses of subsection (1) of section 128 C.P.C (see Sohoni Criminal Procedure Code [18th Ed.] Vol.3 page 1885). Accordingly, once a court is seised with jurisdiction by taking cognisance of any offence under section 128 C.P.C, a host of judicial powers will flow to enable the court to proceed to trial and determine the dispute between the parties in accordance with law. In general, the court taking cognisance of the offence, is the dividing line between the sphere and domain of the executive and the judiciary, for cognisance by the court signals the submission of the executive to the jurisdiction of the Court and marks the completion of the exercise of executive power to “institute” the criminal proceedings. From then on, the whole conduct of the proceedings should be within the exclusive judicial power of the court until its conclusion.” [51] Pendekatan yang sama telah diambil oleh Mahkamah-Mahkamah dalam bidang kuasa Komenwel yang lain. Kes R v Kalanj [1989] 1 S.C.R 1594 telah membincangkan perkataan “dipertuduhkan” dalam konteks seksyen 11(b) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom yang memperuntukkan bahawa “any person charged with an offence has the right to be tried within a reasonable time”. Seksyen ini hanya merujuk kepada mereka yang dipertuduhkan (“charged”) dengan satu kesalahan. Persoalan yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Kanada ialah bilakah seseorang dikatakan dipertuduhkan dengan satu kesalahan (“charged with an offence”) dalam makna seksyen 11(b) tersebut? [52] Kami berpendapat adalah bermanfaat sekiranya penghakiman ini diperturunkan secara terperinci. Dalam penghakimannya, McIntyre J berkata: “This issue was considered by both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal. The trial judge seems to have concluded that “the appellants were only charged for the purposes of the Charter when some justice signed the information in January, 1983”. He concluded, however, that the pre-charge delay could be considered in deciding if an accused had been tried within a reasonable time under s.11 (b). The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, held that s.11 (b) is specifically and exclusively addressed to the delay between the actual charge, which is the laying of the information, and the date of the trial, and that s.11 (b) may not be invoked in response to a delay in laying a charge. It was argued before this Court that the Court of Appeal erred in its interpretation of s.11 (b). Counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants were charged within the meaning of s. 11 (b) at the time of their arrest and release and that, accordingly, the entire period from May 5, 1982 until the commencement of the trial on February 4, 1985 should be considered in deciding if the trial had taken place within a reasonable time. The word “charged” or “charge” is not one of fixed or unvarying meaning at law. It may be and is used in a variety of ways to describe a variety of events. A person is clearly charged with an offence when a charge is read out to him in court and he is called upon to plead. Many authorities support this view if authority is necessary: see R. v. Chabot, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 985, and the cases cited therein. A person could be considered in a general or popular sense to be charged with an offence when informed by one in authority that “you will be summoned to court” or upon an arrest when in answer to a demand to know what all this is about an officer replies: “You are arrested for murder”. There are many other occasions when in the popular mind a person may be said to be charged for, according to Professor Mewett in An Introduction to the Criminal Process in Canada (1988), the word “charge” has no precise meaning at law but merely means that steps are being taken which in the normal course will lead to a criminal prosecution. However, despite what may be termed the imprecision of the word “charge” or the phrase “a person charged”, the courts are faced with the task of developing a meaning of the word as used in s.11 of the Charter. In addressing this task, the courts have generally avoided the definite but restricted definition to be found in Chabot, supra, and have generally concluded that a person is charged with an offence within the meaning of s. 11 of the Charter when an information has been sworn which constitutes an initiating step in court proceedings. In R. v. Boron (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 25 (Ont. H.C.), Ewaschuk J. considered what he saw as three possible interpretations of the word “charged”, and he concluded, at p. 31, that: In conclusion, I adopt the more prevalent view that the word "charged" in s. 11 of the Charter refers to the laying of an information, or the preferment of a direct indictment where no information has been laid. In consequence, the time-frame to be considered in computing trial within a reasonable time only runs from the laying of a charge. This general rule may have certain exceptions which I deal with later. Accordingly, the trial judge erred in holding that the Charter guarantees the right of a person to have proceedings promptly instituted against a person charged with an offence. He had earlier said, at p. 28, referring to the old practice when a peace officer making an arrest would say: "I charge you in the name of the Queen with the murder of John Smith”: However, that interpretation of the word "charged" is somewhat antiquated in light of s. 10 (a) of the Charter which requires a peace officer on arrest or detention to inform the person arrested or detained of the reason (or reasons) therefor. By contrast, the Crown prosecutor is assumed to be the governmental official who decides the appropriate charge ... He also rejected the idea that one is charged only when one appears in court to answer the charge, in other words, the Chabot approach. On this basis, Ewaschuk J. concluded that the time period, which under s. 11 (b) of the Charter must be reasonable, is the period commencing with the swearing of the information or the preferring of a direct indictment when an information has not been sworn and concluding with the trial. In this approach, pre-information delay would not be a factor, but it will be observed that he allowed for an exception which in some cases would permit consideration of pre-charge time. The proposition that an accused person is charged only when the information is sworn has been accepted in a number of appellate court decisions. In R. v. Young (1984), 13 C.C.C. (3d) 1, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal referred to the date of the information as being “the time that the respondent was charged”. Dubin J.A., speaking for the court, said that in that case there was no delay between the time of the charge, by which he was referring to the time of the swearing of the information, and the time of the trial, and therefore, s. 11 (b) had no application. See also: R. v. Belton (1982), 3 C.C.C. (3d) 427 (Man.); R. v. Heaslip(1983), 9 C.C.C. (3d) 480 (Ont.); Re Kott and The Queen (1983), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 317 (Que.); and R. v. Devji(1985), 19 C.C.C. (3d) 310 (B.C.) This approach has also been adopted at the trial level: Re Gray and The Queen (1982), 70 C.C.C. (2d) 62 (Sask.); R. v. Belcourt (1982), 69 C.C.C. (2d) 286 (B.C.); and R. v. Davis(1988), 86 N.S.R. (2d) 284. I would note here that the Criminal Code in s. 455 , for indictable offences, and in ss. 723 and 724 , for summary conviction offences, speaks of the laying of an information and requires, as well, that an information be sworn. For the purposes of this judgment, the terms “laying an information” and “swearing an information”, having the same significance, are used interchangeably. [53] Selepas merujuk kepada kes-kes yang berkaitan, McIntyre J. membuat kesimpulan yang berikut: “I would therefore hold that a person is “charged with an offence” within the meaning of s.11 of the Charter when an information is sworn alleging an offence against him, or where a direct indictment is laid against him when no information is sworn. It would follow, then, that the reckoning of time in considering whether a person has been accorded a trial within a reasonable time under s.11 (b) will commence with the information or indictment, where no information has been laid, and will continue until the completion of the trial.” [54] Kami bersetuju dengan kesimpulan Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa bagi tujuan seksyen 52A Akta 613, seseorang itu dikatakan “dipertuduhkan” apabila Mahkamah telah mengambil perhatian terhadap kesalahan berkenaan. [55] Dari segi fakta, kami telah menyemak keterangan yang terdapat dalam rayuan ini, terutama afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan oleh pihak-pihak dan mendapati bahawa tiada waran tangkap telah dipohon dan tiada sanksi untuk mendakwa telah dikeluarkan terhadap Perayu-Perayu di sini. Oleh itu, pada pandangan kami, Perayu-Perayu telah tidak “dipertuduhkan” dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan dalam seksyen 52A Akta 613. Sanksi untuk mendakwa ialah suatu langkah penting yang perlu diambil oleh pihak pendakwaan ke arah mempertuduhkan Perayu-Perayu di Mahkamah. Dalam hal demikian, kami berpendapat perintah-perintah pembekuan dan penyitaan yang dikeluarkan terhadap Perayu-Perayu telah terhenti berkuat kuasa kerana tempoh dua belas bulan telah tamat tanpa apa-apa pertuduhan dikemukakan terhadap Perayu-Perayu. [56] Peguam Kanan Persekutuan berhujah bahawa walaupun Perayu-Perayu telah tidak dipertuduhkan dalam tempoh dua belas bulan dari tarikh harta-harta tersebut dikeluarkan perintah pembekuan dan penyitaan dan tiada sanksi pendakwaan dikemukakan, namun harta-harta yang telah disita dan dibekukan itu adalah merupakan hal perkara (“subject matter”) atau keterangan bagi kesalahan di bawah subseksyen 4(1) Akta 613 dan dengan itu Mahkamah Tinggi perlu membuat keputusan sama ada harta-harta itu akan dilucuthakan atau sebaliknya. Hujahan ini telah diterima oleh Mahkamah Rayuan apabila Mahkamah itu menyatakan: “[47] Bagi isu (b) pula, kami berpandangan bahawa Subseksyen 56(1) AMLATFAPUA dengan jelas tidak menghalang harta-harta yang telah disita untuk terus disita walaupun tempoh dua belas bulan tamat walaupun tiada pendakwaan atau sabitan dibuat di bawah Subseksyen 4(1) AMLATFAPUA. [48] Berdasarkan afidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Pegawai Penyiasat (jika berjaya dibuktikan), kes ini melibatkan pemindahan wang berjumlah RM36,911,565.00 secara salah ke dalam akaun Perayu-perayu. Jumlah ini terlalu besar dan boleh mendatangkan implikasi yang negatif terhadap sistem perbankan negara. Perayu-perayu juga telah mengambil kesempatan atas kelemahan sistem yang digunakan oleh institusi kewangan dengan memindahkan wang tersebut ke dalam akaun mereka walaupun mereka mengetahui wang yang diperoleh tersebut bukan hak mereka. [49] Selain itu, kami ingin membuat “judicial notice” di sini bahawa beban tugas pihak pendakwaan bagi kesalahan-kesalahan di bawah AMLATFAPUA adalah amat berat. Pegawai yang menyiasat perlu melihat dari kesemua sudut bagaimana kesalahan tersebut dilakukan lebih-lebih lagi bagi kesalahan yang melibatkan pemindahan wang secara dalam talian (“on-line”). Proses siasatan juga melibatkan banyak pihak seperti institusi kewangan, Bank Negara Malaysia, PDRM dan lain-lain. Tambahan pula, tempoh masa yang diberikan untuk menyelesaikan siasatan dan memulakan pendakwaan amat singkat.” (penekanan ditambah). [57] Dengan hormat, kami tidak bersetuju dengan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan mengenai perkara ini. Keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan adalah bertentangan dengan peruntukan jelas dan mandatori undang-undang. Inferen yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Rayuan bahawa “Perayu-Perayu juga telah mengambil kesempatan atas kelemahan sistem yang digunakan oleh institusi kewangan dengan memindahkan wang tersebut ke dalam akaun mereka” tidak berdasarkan kepada apa-apa keterangan yang telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah dan tampaknya Mahkamah Rayuan “indulged in fanciful surmise and conjecture” dalam perkara ini. [58] Kami tidak bersetuju bahawa beban tugas agensi penguat kuasa dan pihak pendakwaan adalah sesuatu yang boleh diambil pengiktirafan oleh Mahkamah dan boleh dijadikan alasan untuk mengenepikan kehendak mandatori subseksyen 56(1). Adalah menjadi undang-undang mantap bahawa fakta-fakta di mana mahkamah boleh membuat pengiktirafan kehakiman (“judicial notice”) telah disenaraikan dalam seksyen 57 Akta Keterangan menjadi pengetahuan awam dan kewujudan dan operasinya telah diterima oleh orang ramai tanpa apa-apa pertikaian. Dalam kes Lee Chow Meng v Public Prosecutor [1976] 1 MLJ 287, (MT) Abdul Hamid H (sebagaimana dia ketika itu) berkata di m.s. 288: “What matters constitute common and general knowledge may be gathered from Sarkar on Evidence, (12th Ed), where the learned author, speaking of common knowledge, at page 575, said – “The matter of which a court will take judicial notice must be a subject of common and general knowledge. In other words, judicial knowledge of facts is measured by general knowledge of the same facts. A fact is said to be generally recognised or known when its existence or operation is accepted by the public without qualification or contention. The test is whether sufficient notoriety attaches to the fact involved as to make it proper to assume its existence without proof.” In the light of the passage cited it is clear that the court may properly ask itself this question: is it not a fact well recognised that in Kuala Lumpur there has been of late, an increase in the commission of offences involving firearms? We are not concerned with absolute acceptance of the existence of certain knowledge. The rule of evidence speaks of general recognition and not total recognition in the sense that there is a general acceptance without qualification or contention as opposed to total acceptance.” [59] Dalam kes Johnson Tan Han Seng v Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 66 (MP), Raja Azlan Shah HMP (sebagaimana Baginda ketika itu) berkata di m.s. 78: “Judicial notice is the cognizance taken by the court itself of certain matters which are so notorious or clearly established that evidence of their existence is deemed unnecessary; see Phipson on Evidence, 11th Ed page 10. “With regard to the facts enumerated in section 57, if their existence comes into question, the parties who assert their existence or the contrary need not, in the first instance, produce any evidence in support of their assertions. They need only ask the judge to say whether these facts exist or not, and if the judge’s own knowledge will not help him, then he must look the matter up; further the judge can, if he thinks proper, call upon the parties to assist him. But in making his investigation the judge is emancipated from all the rules of evidence laid down for the investigation of facts in general. He may resort to any source of information which he finds handy, which he thinks help him”: see Woodroffe & Ameer Ali on Law of Evidence, 12th Ed, Vol 2, page 1143. [60] Berdasarkan kepada keadaan yang wujud dalam kes ini, kelewatan pihak pendakwaan untuk mengambil langkah-langkah ke arah mengemukakan pertuduhan terhadap Perayu-Perayu dan memohon kepada Mahkamah Tinggi di bawah subseksyen 56(1) Akta 613 adalah bercanggah dengan peruntukan undang-undang dan tidak dapat dipertahankan. Tiada apa-apa alasan dikemukakan dalam affidavit Responden-Responden yang menerangkan tentang kelewatan tersebut. Adalah tidak sesuai dan wajar bagi Mahkamah Rayuan menjustifikasikan kelewatan tersebut dengan membuat pengiktirafan kehakiman bahawa siasatan perlu dibuat dari ke semua sudut dan banyak pihak dan seterusnya mengenepikan kesan subseksyen 56(1). [61] Berhubung dengan kelewatan mengemukakan sanksi untuk mendakwa, dalam kes P.P v Mohd Shaifuldin Khairudin & Ors [2006] 5 CLJ 678, V.T Singham membuat pemerhatian yang berikut di m.s. 568: “The question still remains and which is troubling is that the physical appearance of the accused at the Magistrate's Court with respect would appear to be at the pleasure of the prosecution who will produce the consent ultimately months or years later and there appears to be no safeguard to the accused and this is grave injustice to the accused as it denies an accused person's right to a speedy trial and deny art. 5(1) of the Federal Constitution. (See Public Prosecutor v. Choo Chuan Wang [1992] 3 CLJ 329 (Rep); [1992] 2 CLJ 1242).” [62] Mengenai kewajipan agensi penguat kuasa untuk menjalankan suatu siasatan yang adil dan saksama, dalam kes Nirmal Singh Kahlon vs State of Punjab & Ors (Civil Appeal Nos. 6198 – 6199 Of 2008), Mahkamah Agung India berkata di m.s. 27: “Fair investigation and fair trial are concomitant to preservation of fundamental right of an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. But the State has a larger obligation i.e. to maintain law and order, public order and preservation of peace and harmony in the society. A victim of a crime, thus, is equally entitled to a fair investigation.” [63] Kami bersetuju dengan sentimen yang dizahirkan oleh kedua-dua kes di atas. Hak seseorang tertuduh untuk mendapatkan perbicaraan yang adil dalam tempoh yang munasabah adalah dijamin oleh Artikel 5(1) Perlembagaan Persekutuan (lihat kes P.P v Gan Boon Aun [2017] 3 MLJ 12). [64] Berhubung dengan kesan di sisi undang-undang sekiranya tiada pertuduhan dikemukakan selepas tamat tempoh dua belas bulan dari tarikh perintah pembekuan dan penyitaan dan tiada permohonan dibuat di bawah subseksyen 56(1), kami bersetuju dengan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Lim Hui Jin v CIMB Bank Bhd [2018] 8 CLJ 327, apabila Abdul Rahman Sebli HMR berkata di perenggan [33] – [39] di m.s. 340 – 341: [33] Section 56 speaks of forfeiture of “any property seized under this Act” where there is no prosecution or conviction for an offence under s.4(1) or a terrorism financing offence. The appellant’s account falls under this class of properties. However, before the provision is activated, there must first be an application by the Public Prosecutor for forfeiture of the seized property and the application must be made within 12 months from the date of seizure order, failing which sub-s. (3) mandates that the property must be returned to the person from whom it was seized. There was no such application by the Public Prosecutor in the present case. [34] At first blush, there appears to be a conflict between s. 55(1) and ss. 52A and 56(3) of the AMLATEPUA. Whilst both s.52A and s.56(3) envisage the release of the seized property if no criminal prosecution is instituted within 12 months from the date of the freezing or seizure order, s.55(1) on the other hand stipulates that where there is a prosecution for an offence under s.4(1) or a terrorism financing offence, the seized property must be forfeited if the requirements are met, that is, if the property is proved to be: