Ratha Krishnan v Tan Lay Eng (KA-22NCvC-5-02/2023)

RATNA KRISHNAN

RAMANATHAN A/L PERUMAL (NRIC NO.: 591017-02-5851) (Claiming as the personal representative of the estate of Ravendram a/l David Joseph, the Deceased)

VASUGI A/P DAVID JOSEPH

RAGAVAN A/L DAVID JOSEPH

VASANTHARA DEVI A/P DAVID JOSEPH

GHETALETCHIMI A/P DAVID JOSEPH (NRIC NO.:631130-02-5582) --- PLAINTIFFS AND TAN LAY ENG (NRIC NO.: 640901-02-5500) (sued as the administrator of the estate of Ragupathy a/l Joseph (NRIC No.:590810-02-5713, the Deceased) --- DEFENDANT 24/12/2025 23:51:02 KA-22NCvC-5-02/2023 Kand. 53 S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (After full trial) Introduction 1. This judgment concerns a familial dispute spanning seventeen years regarding the administration and subsequent transfer of the sole asset of an intestate estate, namely a piece of land in Alor Setar. Brief Facts of the Case 2. The Plaintiffs, all of whom are siblings (brothers and sisters) of the original deceased administrator, Ragupathy a/l Joseph (“the Deceased”), and are lawful children and beneficiaries of the estate of their late mother, Angamma a/p Marimuthu (“Angamma”), who died intestate on 31.07.1980.

The dispute centres on the estate of the Deceased and Angamma. The Defendant is the widow and administrator of the estate of the Deceased.

The core asset of Angamma's estate was a piece of land measuring approximately 0.5032 hectares, known as GM1968, Lot S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw 293 (“the Land”). A house was erected on the Land where Angamma, the Plaintiffs, and the Deceased resided.

Angamma had obtained a loan, originally RM15,000.00, from UAB Bank (later, Bank of Commerce) (“the Bank”) to renovate the house, which led to the Land being mortgaged. The 3rd and 5th Plaintiffs, along with the Deceased, served as joint guarantors, and the 3rd and 5th Plaintiffs partially serviced the loan.

In August 2000, the siblings decided to nominate the Deceased as the sole administrator of Angamma’s estate. The Plaintiffs signed the Surat Persetujuan Akta Pembahagian Harta Pusaka Kecil 1955, dated 06.08.2000 (“the Consent Letters”), to this effect, believing that the purpose was solely to appoint him as an administrator or trustee for the siblings.

The outstanding loan amount accumulated interest and amounted to RM60,877.08. The Bank subsequently initiated proceedings for the sale of the Land at a reserve price of RM65,000.00 on 03.04.1996. S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw

On 22.03.2001, the Deceased settled the outstanding liability for a lesser sum of RM36,300.00 to redeem the Land. Following this settlement, the Deceased applied to have the administratorship discharged and the Land transferred to him personally.

On 06.05.2002, the Kota Setar Land Administrator issued a transfer order (Borang T) (“the Transfer Order”) which cancelled the Deceased’s administratorship and transferred the entire 1/1 share of the Land to the Deceased, making him the sole registered owner.

On or about 02.09.2009, a portion of the Land (0.1594 hectares) was acquired by the government for the KTMB Double Track Project. Compensation amounting to RM774,836.10 was awarded and paid entirely to the Deceased.

The Plaintiffs were allegedly unaware that the Deceased had become the sole registered owner of the Land or that he had received the acquisition compensation. They only discovered the unauthorised transfer and the compensation payment after instructing their solicitors to conduct a land search following the Deceased's death on 03.01.2020. S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw

The Plaintiffs contended that the Deceased breached his trust and committed fraud by transferring the Land to himself and failing to share the compensation proceeds with the other lawful beneficiaries.

The Plaintiffs sought several reliefs from the court, primarily centring on reversing the Land transfer and distributing the remaining Land portion and the compensation money fairly.

The prayers, as articulated in the Plaintiffs' Statement of Claim (“SOC”) (Encl. 17), are as follows: a) an order for the Kota Setar Land Administrator to cancel the registration of the Deceased as the registered owner; b) An order that the Land be subsequently divided, and the Plaintiffs and the Defendant (as administrator of the Deceased's estate) be registered as administrators of the Deceased, each having a 1/7 share in the remaining Land; and c) An order concerning the distribution of the Land acquisition proceeds, whereby the total sum of RM774,836.10 received by the Deceased in 2019 is to be shared equally S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw among the Plaintiffs and the Defendant (as administrator of the Deceased's estate), after deducting the RM36,300.00 paid by the Deceased to Bumiputra Commerce Bank Berhad on 22.03.2001, to redeem the Land. The Plaintiffs’ Claim 15. The gist of the Plaintiffs' submissions is centred on proving that the Deceased committed a breach of trust and fraud by improperly converting the sole asset of their late mother's estate into his personal ownership, thereby denying the other siblings their rightful inheritance, especially the significant compensation money.

The gist of the defence is that the Land was lawfully acquired by the Deceased. The Defendant further asserted that the Land was no longer part of Angamma’s estate available for distribution to the Plaintiffs since the Deceased had lawfully purchased the Land following the Bank auction and hence settled the outstanding loan liability for RM36,300.00 in March 2001.

Crucially, the Defendant asserted that all six Plaintiffs had relinquished their rights on the Land by way of the Consent Letters, S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw clearly indicating they had agreed to relinquish their interests in the Land to him.

The Defendant contended that the Deceased had acquired an indefeasible title to the Land through a valid statutory sale process under the National Land Code prior to his death. Consequently, the estate now vested in the Defendant holds a valid title, free from the previous trust obligations, as the Deceased’s acquisition was a fresh purchase for value.

The Defence also mentioned that the Plaintiffs’ case was untenable and motivated by greed, as the Plaintiffs had failed to meet the high burden of proof required to substantiate allegations of fraud or breach of trust since no specific evidence demonstrating a trace of fraud was presented. The Trial 20. The Plaintiffs called four (4) witnesses to testify, including a subpoenaed witness from the Land Office and three of the Plaintiffs themselves: S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw a) the Chief Assistant Director, Jabatan Ketua Pengarah Tanah & Galian (Persekutuan) Negeri Kedah, Abd Shukor Bin Aziz (SP1); b) a Legal Executive Manager, Sandhiyah (SP2); c) the 1st Plaintiff, Ratha Krishnan (SP3); d) the 5th Plaintiff, Vasanthara Devi a/p David Joseph (SP4); and e) the 4th Plaintiff, Ragavan a/l David Joseph (SP5).

Meanwhile, the Defendant called only one witness to testify, the Defendant herself (SD1). Issues to be Determined by the Court 22. The core determination hinges on a few major legal questions debated during the trial: a) Whether the Consent Letters signed by the Plaintiffs were specifically intended only to support the application for the grant of Letters of Administration, or if they included the intention of the Plaintiffs to relinquish their rights and interests to the Deceased; S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw b) Whether the duplicate Consent Letters signed by the Plaintiffs were used by the Deceased to facilitate the transfer of the entire 1/1 share of the Land into his name; c) Whether the Deceased, on 06.05.2002, wrongly utilised the Consent Letters to execute the title transfer of the entire beneficial share of the Land to his name, thereby usurping the rights and interests of the Plaintiffs in the Land; d) Whether the Deceased committed fraud and deception against the Plaintiffs by using the Consent Letters to cause the transfer of the entire Land share to himself; e) Whether the Deceased received compensation totalling RM774,836.10 from KTMB for the land acquisition of approximately 0.1594 hectares (under Presentation No. 606/2009); f) Whether the Deceased used all the compensation money (RM774,836.10) for his personal benefit and thereby denied the Plaintiffs their lawful rights to the compensation money; g) Whether the Deceased used a portion of the compensation money to construct two houses on the Land only for the 2nd and 4th Plaintiffs, without informing or providing any contribution to the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 6th Plaintiffs; S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw h) Whether the Deceased held the sum of RM677,981.59 (representing the Plaintiffs' portion of the compensation money) as a trustee for the Plaintiffs; and i) Whether the Defendant, as the administrator of the Deceased’s estate, currently holds the remaining sum of RM677,981.59 and the Land as a trustee for the Plaintiffs. Decision and findings of the Court 23. Having appraised the evidence and the testimony of all witnesses put forward by all the parties and having considered the submissions by the learned counsels for both parties, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove that the Consent Letters were forged or falsified. The written documents clearly indicate that the Plaintiffs had agreed to surrender their rights, rendering their subsequent arguments about breach of trust and fraud unsubstantiated by credible evidence. Herein are my reasons. A. Findings on Preliminary and Procedural Issues 24. The Defendant contended that the Plaintiffs had fundamentally altered the legal foundation of their case between the filing of the SOC and the presentation of their written submissions. S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw

The Plaintiffs’ action was initially premised on allegations of fraud and breach of trust said to have been committed by the Deceased under the National Land Code (“NLC”). However, in their submissions, the Plaintiffs departed from this NLC-based framework and instead argued that the Deceased had contravened Section 60 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 (“PAA”).

In essence, the Plaintiffs’ newly introduced position was that the transfer order issued by the Land Administrator on 06.05.2002 was unlawful as it contravened Section 60 of the PAA and was therefore void ab initio. This contention was anchored on the assertion that the order was made in the Plaintiffs’ absence and that the Land Administrator had acted beyond his statutory authority.

The court further observed that the Plaintiffs introduced additional prayers in their final submissions, namely, declarations seeking the removal of the Deceased as registered proprietor and the division of the Land into seven equal shares, which were not part of the original reliefs pleaded in the SOC.

The Defendant submitted that this shift was inappropriate and unjust, for the legal approach relying on Section 60 of the PAA was S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw unexpected and took the Defendant by surprise. Since the issue was not pleaded, the defence was hindered in its ability to address it during the trial or call relevant witnesses.

The Defendant maintained that the entire trial was premised on allegations of fraud and breach of trust, and the PAA arguments were conspicuously absent until the submission stage, characterising the PAA claim as a purely afterthought following the Plaintiffs' failure to substantiate their fraud claims.

It is a trite legal principle that parties are bound by their pleadings, and the court ought not to entertain relief not pleaded. The purpose of particulars in pleadings is to prevent surprise and ensure both parties come to trial fully prepared.

I find the Defendant’s reliance on the case of Liew Jui Hua & Ors v Johor Property (M) Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLRH 144 of excellent guidance.

In Liew Jui Hua (supra), an affidavit was criticised as it pleaded insolvency to support the petition of winding-up, which ran counter to the petition itself, where the just and equitable rule was applied. S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw The respondent argued that insolvency was not pleaded in the petition and, consequently, this point should be ignored by the court. Abdul Malek Ishak J, (as he then was) held that the court is constrained to hold that the unpleaded matter was against the grain of the petition that was filed and described it as a radical departure that the court should not entertain (see also Anjallai Ammal & Anor v Abdul Kareem [1968] 1 MLRA 846).

The court agrees with the Defendant that the Plaintiffs' legal arguments presented during submissions constituted a radical departure from the cause of action pleaded in their SOC. Crucially, the Plaintiffs introduced arguments relying on Section 60 of the PAA only at the submission stage. The SOC made no mention whatsoever of the PAA. This late introduction of a new legal point is, in the court’s view, procedurally unfair to the Defendant, who was undeniably taken by surprise. Such a departure from proper pleading practice is not conducive to orderly trial proceedings. The Plaintiffs never made any attempt to amend their SOC to include any reliance on Section 60 of the PAA 1959, even up to the stage of submissions. Such an omission, in the court’s view, renders the late reliance on that provision obviously unfair to the Defendant. S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw

Ironically, near the close of the Defendant’s case, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs sought to make an oral amendment to introduce a prayer to set aside the Transfer Order made by the Kota Setar Land Administrator on 06.05.2002. This application, made only at the very end of the trial, was subsequently withdrawn after the court highlighted the procedural unfairness it would cause, including the potential need for a re-trial and the incurring of further costs. Even then, nothing had been done to amend the SOC and insert a new cause of action concerning Section 60 of the PAA!

In substance, the application was not a mere amendment but an attempt to introduce a new and substantive prayer for relief after all witnesses had been heard and after the Defendant had already closed its case.

During oral submissions, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs vigorously argued that reliance on Section 60 of the PAA is a matter of law that need not be pleaded. I am unable to agree. While the court takes judicial notice of the law, a claim that a specific statutory provision was violated constitutes a material fact and a distinct cause of action. It demands factual particulars—specifically S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw regarding the alleged lack of court sanction—to be pleaded so that the Defendant is not taken by surprise.

In these circumstances, the court is not prepared to entertain issues that have not been expressly pleaded. In any event, even if the court were to consider the point on its merits, the substantive findings set out below would still militate in favour of the Defendant. B. Analysis of Evidence and Substantive Claims i. The Purpose and Effect of the Consent Letters 38. The crux of the Plaintiffs’ argument is that the Consent Letters were meant solely to appoint the Deceased as the administrator/trustee, and that the Transfer Order was an unlawful result of fraud and breach of trust.

The Plaintiffs maintained that the Consent Letters, which were signed around 06.08.2000 by all siblings, were intended solely to appoint the Deceased as the administrator of their late mother, Angamma’s estate. In other words, the purpose was specifically so that the Deceased could act as a trustee of the Land for all the brothers and sisters. S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw

The Plaintiffs claimed that the Deceased confirmed and accepted his nomination to be the administrator in a letter dated 16.11.2000, addressed to the Kota Setar Land Administrator, where he stated that all siblings agreed to let him manage the assets (see Common Bundle, B1, p.39) [Encl.18].

The Plaintiffs argued that the Consent Letters were fraudulently used by the Deceased to affect a transfer of ownership that was never consented to by the Plaintiffs as the beneficiaries.

The Plaintiffs further contended that the Deceased, having been appointed administrator, committed a breach of trust when he transferred the entire 1/1 share of the Land to himself as a sole beneficiary.

The Plaintiffs testified that they did not consent to the cancellation of the Letter of Administration and the subsequent transfer of the Land to the Deceased as a sole beneficiary. They were also not notified of the Land Administrator's hearing regarding the transfer on 06.05.2002. S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw

In response, the Defendant countered these assertions convincingly by relying on the express wording of the relevant documents and contending that the transfer was lawful, consistent with the statutory process, and in fact supported by the Plaintiffs’ own conduct. This Court finds these arguments by the Defendant sound.

First, the Defendant's primary reply centred on contradicting the Plaintiffs’ subjective intent by emphasising the explicit legal effect of the documents they signed, the Consent Letters and the Transfer Order.

The Defendant argued that all six Plaintiffs executed the Consent Letters on or about 06.08.2000, and by doing so, they relinquished their respective rights and interests in the Land to the Deceased. The Defendant pointed specifically to the phrase contained within the documents, “menyerah hak saya kepada Ragupathy a/l Joseph".

It is to be noted that the said forms were filled out by the Plaintiffs' witness, SP2, who is the daughter-in law of the First Plaintiff. (PWS2/ Encl. 31, p.4, QA6) S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw

The Defendant submitted that because the Plaintiffs executed these documents containing the precise wording of relinquishment, they were estopped by law from later asserting that the Deceased was appointed solely as an administrator.

The Defendant established that the Land had been charged and was subject to an Order for Sale (Borang 16H) issued by the Land Administrator on 03.04.1996 (see Common Bundle, p.42) (Encl.18). This process was initiated at the request of the Bank due to loan arrears. The Order for Sale established that the Land was to be offered at a public auction at a reserve price of RM65,000.00.

The defence maintained that the Deceased bought the Land from the Bank for a lesser sum of RM36,300.00 on 22.03.2001, to settle the outstanding debt of Angamma’s (See Common Bundle, p.43) (Encl. 18). This transaction was conclusive proof that the Deceased bought the Land and was the new owner. The legal effect of the Order for Sale (Borang 16H) was to extinguish the previous partial ownership structure. When the Deceased settled the auction price, he was not merely 'redeeming' the land as a trustee; he was purchasing it as a new proprietor under Section 267 of the NLC. The burden is on the Plaintiffs, which they had S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw failed miserably, to establish their claim that the Deceased was merely advancing his money to redeem the Land in that instance. If at all there was such an advancement, it is against common sense that they only came forward to pay the same years later (through this suit) and after the land acquisition and after the demise of the Deceased.

Furthermore, the Defendant averred that the Transfer Order was issued by the Kota Setar Land Administrator on 06.05.2002 (See Common Bundle, p.38) (Encl. 18), which cancelled the Deceased as administrator and transferred the entire 1/1 share to him and was an instrument duly registered.

The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, relied on the Hearing Note to show that the Transfer Order was irregular based on the words “Waris lain tidak memberi surat penolakan”.

Again, the argument cannot stand as the accompanying Hearing Note from the Land Administrator confirmed as follows (see Common Bundle, B2, p.8) (Encl.29): S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw “…Kesimpulan. Batal surat kuasa pentadbir (LA) dan terus pada pemohon Ragupathy. Sebab hutang telah selesai. Dan dibeli oleh pihak baru”.

These contemporaneous records constitute the 'smoking gun' in this dispute. They demonstrate unequivocally that the Deceased had acquired the Land through a purchase arising from the settlement of the auction debt and by subsequent legal registration. It was therefore not an instance of breach of trust in his capacity as administrator, as alleged by the Plaintiffs. The Land Administrator proceeded to transfer the title not because of a succession of the estate, but because the legal character of the transaction had shifted. The settlement of the debt prevented the public auction, but legally constituted a private treaty sale sanctioned by the chargee bank. This severed the nexus between the Land and the original estate of Angamma, extinguishing the prior equitable interests of the beneficiaries. Furthermore, even if the Plaintiffs had pleaded Section 60 of the PAA, it would have failed on the merits. Section 60 restricts an administrator from voluntarily disposing of estate assets. Here, the sale was forced by the Chargee (Bank) through a statutory auction process under the NLC. The transfer was not an act of the Administrator exercising his discretion, but a S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw consequence of the Order for Sale (Borang 16H). Thus, the restrictions under the PAA do not supersede the indefeasibility conferred by a statutory sale under the NLC.

In fact, as established by the Defendant, the Deceased had purchased the same using his pension from the army (SD1’s testimony during cross-examination as per p. 55 of NOP). This is further supported by numerous documents tendered by the Defendant to prove that Ragupathy purchased the land by settling the debt, thereby validating the subsequent transfer of ownership into his name: a) Settlement Letter and Bank Draft dated 22.03.2001, from Ragupathy to Bumiputra Commerce Bank Berhad, attaching a Malayan Banking Draft for RM36,300.00 (See Common Bundle, pp.43 & 44) (Encl.18); b) Order for Sale (Borang 16H) dated 03.04.1996 issued by the Land Administrator to auction the land at the bank's request due to the existing charge (See Common Bundle, p.42) (Encl.18); S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw c) Order/Transfer (Borang T) dated 06.05.2002, which transferred the 1/1 portion of the land to Ragupathy A/L Joseph (See Common Bundle, p.38) (Encl.18); and d) The minutes of the hearing dated 06.05.2002, recorded by the Land Administrator, stating the conclusion "Batal surat kuasa pentadbir (LA) dan terus pada pemohon Ragupathy. Sebab hutang dah selesai. Dan dibeli oleh pihak baru. Waris lain tidak memberi surat penolakan" (See Common Bundle 2, p.8) (Encl.29).

The Plaintiffs contend that the transfer was void due to fraud and the absence of consent. However, once a duly registered transfer was shown, the burden shifted to the Plaintiffs to displace the presumption of regularity attaching to the Land Administrator’s approval. Moreover, in this case, with the allegation of fraud and irregularity, the burden rests heavily on the Plaintiffs to establish the same.

Notably, the Plaintiffs failed to subpoena the Land Administrator responsible for issuing the Transfer Order to clarify the Hearing Notes. This Land Administrator recorded that the debt had been S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw settled and that a new party had purchased the Land. This omission resulted in insufficient evidence to impugn the transfer's validity. The Plaintiffs' failure to call the Land Administrator is fatal to their contention. Where official records produced by the Registry of Titles are challenged, the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta (all things are presumed to be done in due form) applies. The burden lay on the Plaintiffs to rebut this presumption by calling the maker of the notes, which they failed to do.

Moreover, the Plaintiffs had expressly admitted the contents of the Transfer Order when the learned counsel agreed to include it in Part A of the Common Bundle. If the Plaintiffs intended to challenge the validity of the Transfer Order, it was incumbent upon them to call the Land Administrator involved in the issuance of the Transfer Order.

In the court’s view, these documents amount to an admission by the Plaintiffs themselves as to the events that transpired in 2002. The documentary evidence is sufficiently cogent and compelling that the court is bound to prefer and accept the Defendant’s version of the facts. S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw ii. Fraud, Breach of Trust, and Compensation Claims 60. The Plaintiffs asserted that the Deceased was appointed as the administrator of their mother's estate solely to act as a trustee of the Land for all the siblings. His subsequent act of applying for and receiving the entire 1/1 share of the Land transferred into his name on 06.05.2002 was characterised as a fundamental breach of trust.

The Plaintiffs alleged that the Deceased perpetrated fraud by utilising the Consent Letters meant only for administration to obtain sole proprietary rights.

The Plaintiffs specifically rejected the Defendant’s claim that the Deceased bought the Land from a bank auction. They argued that he did not buy the Land but merely settled the outstanding loan their mother had taken out to renovate the house, an action that reinforced his trustee role.

Undoubtedly, following the government acquisition of a portion of the Land for the KTMB Double Track Project in 2009, the Deceased received the full compensation sum of RM774,836.10. S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw

The Plaintiffs argued that since the Deceased obtained the title through fraud and breach of trust, he unlawfully received the entire sum without sharing the proceeds equally with the other beneficiaries.

Learned counsel for the Defendant rebutted the above and argued that since the Deceased was the sole legal owner of the Land, the compensation of RM774,836.10 awarded by the government/KTMB in 2009 for the acquired portion (0.1594 hectares) was correctly paid to him. The official document supports this: the Notice of Land Acquisition (Borang K) dated 02.09.2009, which lists Ragupathy a/l Joseph (the Deceased) as the proprietor of the 1/1 share (see Common Bundle, B1, p.16). Legally, the right to compensation is an accessory to the land ownership. Applying the maxim res accessoria sequitur rem principalem (the accessory follows the principal), once the court finds the Deceased's title to the Land to be indefeasible, the right to the acquisition proceeds vests solely in him. The Plaintiffs cannot claim the fruit (compensation) having lost their claim to the tree (the Land).

Besides, the Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Defendant (as the administrator of the Deceased's estate) was in breach of trust S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw for receiving the whole sum and that she should be ordered to distribute the amount of RM677,981.59 (the compensation minus the RM36,300.00 debt the Deceased settled) equally to the other beneficiaries.

The Defendant asserted that the transfer was not based on fraud or breach of trust, but was supported by the fact that the Deceased purchased the Land by settling the original outstanding bank loan of the mother's estate for RM36,300.00. Since the Land was bought by the Deceased, the claim of breach of trust regarding the compensation was moot.

The Defendant referred to Section 264 of the NLC as stating the procedure prior to any sale of a land subject to a charge. This section outlines the process for the sale of land by public auction through the Land Office.

By citing Section 264, the Defendant emphasised that the statutory provision itself supported the validity of the auction process that was undertaken with respect to the Land. S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw

This reference ties directly back to the Order for Sale (Borang 16H) issued by the Land Administrator on 03.04.1996, at the request of the Bank, due to loan arrears. The Defendant argued that the sale process followed the steps outlined in the NLC.

The Defendant noted that the Administrator had issued a Notice of Petition (Notice of Petition) (Borang D) and a Notice of Hearing and Further Application (Borang S) to all beneficiaries prior to the hearing. This procedure, necessary under Section 264, demonstrated that the Land Administrator fulfilled the legal steps required for the auction process. Therefore, the Deceased did not acquire the title merely as an administrator transmission, but as a purchaser for value. The consideration provided was the settlement of the substantial debt, which saved the Land from foreclosure. This critical distinction removes the Deceased from the category of a 'volunteer' holding on trust.

The Defendant also mentioned Section 263 of the NLC and Section 267 of the NLC to solidify the legality of the transfer further. The combined effect of these NLC sections was argued to validate the Deceased’s acquisition of the Land, concluding that the Plaintiffs, S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw as beneficiaries of the original estate, no longer had any interest in the land following the execution of the Order for Sale.

The Defendant further submitted that the Plaintiffs' suit was primarily motivated by the government compensation. The Defendant highlighted the significant delay in bringing the claim. The transfer occurred in 2002, the compensation was received by the Deceased in 2009, but the Plaintiffs waited until after the Deceased’s death in 2020 to file the civil suit in 2023. The Defendant rightly argued that this late challenge constitutes an afterthought. Equity aids the vigilant and not those who sleep on their rights (vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt). The delay of over a decade has severely prejudiced the defence, as the primary witness—the Deceased—is no longer available to explain his intent or the nature of the arrangement with his siblings.

During cross-examination, the Defendant's counsel exposed the inconsistencies in the Plaintiffs' claims of ignorance versus knowledge: The Plaintiffs claimed they were unaware of the Land acquisition by KTMB and the compensation payment. However, the Plaintiffs' own SOC alleged that the Deceased used the money to build two houses for the 2nd and 4th Plaintiffs and intentionally S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw excluded the remaining siblings from any contribution. The Defendant relies on this to argue that the Plaintiffs must have known about the compensation fund if they knew the houses were being built with it. This Court concurs on this.

The Plaintiffs’ true intent was revealed by the fact that the SOC contained no notice of demand to the Defendant regarding the claim on the Land or the compensation before the legal action was initiated.

The fact is that the Defendant is the administrator of the Deceased’s estate. While the Defendant herself is not a purchaser for value, she stands in the Deceased's shoes. The evidence establishes that the Deceased acquired the Land through a valid statutory sale following a default under the charge. Consequently, the Deceased acquired an indefeasible title under Section 340(1) of the NLC, which was 'good against the world', including the Plaintiffs. As the Plaintiffs failed to prove fraud by the Deceased during the 2002 acquisition process, the title currently vested in the Defendant as administrator remains indefeasible. S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw

I am again with the Defendant regarding this. It is the court’s finding that the Plaintiffs had failed to produce any oral testimony or specific evidence that could show a trace of fraud or breach of trust on the part of the Deceased. The high burden of proof required for fraud claims was not met. Allegations of fraud require a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or, at the very least, a standard higher than the ordinary balance of probabilities when serious moral turpitude is alleged. The Defendant submitted that the standard of proof for fraud is beyond a reasonable doubt. However, I must clarify that the Federal Court in Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 5 MLJ 1 has established that the correct standard of proof for fraud in civil proceedings is on the balance of probabilities. Yet, this does not imply a low threshold for evidence. As affirmed in Sinnaiyah, the evidence must still be sufficiently cogent to overcome the inherent improbability of fraud. Mere suspicion or 'grave suspicion' is insufficient to displace a registered title. Even applying this lower civil standard, I find that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove their case. The Plaintiffs offered only oral denials, which were contradicted by their own signatures on the Consent Letters and the contemporaneous Land Office records. Clearly, the Plaintiffs offered mere conjecture against the weight of contemporaneous statutory instruments. Consequently, S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw the allegation of fraud is bereft of cogent evidence, rendering the entire Plaintiffs’ case wholly unsustainable. Conclusion 78. The core of the court’s decision rested on two main pillars: the Plaintiffs' failure to plead their case adequately and the compelling nature of the documentary evidence supporting the Defendant's version of events.

The Court also finds it difficult to overlook that the Plaintiffs failed to plead, in their SOC, the critical legal point relating to their reliance on Section 60 of the PAA 1959, which constitutes a substantial procedural omission. Litigation by instalment or by ambush cannot be countenanced. The Defendant was entitled to meet a case squarely pleaded, not one shapeshifting between fraud under the NLC and statutory non-compliance under the PAA.

For the reasons adduced above, the Plaintiffs' claim is dismissed with costs of RM15,000.00 to be paid by the Plaintiffs to the Defendant. S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw Dated: 24th December, 2025 -------------------------------------------------------------------- DR. JOHN LEE KIEN HOW @ MOHD JOHAN LEE JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA ALOR SETAR Solicitors for the Plaintiffs : K.G Balakrishnan & Peter Miranda Messrs. K.G Balakrishnan & Co Solicitors for the Defendant : Amnach a/l EE Niam & Lim Yap Xen Messrs. Amnach & Co. Table of Authorities Cases Anjalai Ammal & Anor v Abdul Kareem [1968] 1 MLRA 846 Liew Jui Hua & Ors v Johor Property (M) Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLRH 144 Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 5 MLJ 1 Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 CLJ 269 Statutes Evidence Act 1950 National Land Code 1965 Probate & Administration Act 1959 S/N bzhO62gq70mJLFrhd57KRw