1. ) Ravinderjeet Kaur A/P Harbans Singh v 1. ) Bhoopindar Singh A/L Harbans Singh (BA-22NCvC-249-06/2024)

RAVINDERJEET KAUR A/P HARBANS SINGH

DILBIR KAUR A/P HARBANS SINGH

AMRIT BINTI ABDULLAH

MOHSEN MANINDER BIN ABDULLAH (NO. K/P: 5002208-71-5445) …PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF

BHOOPINDAR SINGH A/L HARBANS SINGH (NO. K/P: 490116-71-5249) (sebagai Pentadbir bagi harta pusaka Harbans Singh a/l Indar Singh, Si mati)

NUR DIYANAH INDER BINTI ABDULLAH (INDERJEET KAUR A/P HARBANS SINGH) (NO. K/P: 580415-08-5506) …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 27/10/2025 09:07:03 BA-22NCvC-249-06/2024 Kand. 89 S/N y5GwRhK7EaQrlienQmcDw (sebagai Pentadbir bagi harta pusaka Harbans Singh a/l Indar Singh, Si mati)

On 2-10-2025, this Court entered Judgment for the Plaintiffs after considering the pleadings, evidence, notes of proceedings and written submissions before the Court. This Court found that the Defendants had breached their fiduciary duties as Administrators of the estate of the Harbans Singh a/l Indar Singh (“Deceased”) and removed them as Administrators. The Defendants have appealed to the Court of Appeal. Background facts

The background facts are set out in this Court’s earlier Grounds of Judgment on the dismissal of an application under Order 14A and/or Order 33 Rule 2 or 3 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“O14A Application”). Briefly stated, the Plaintiffs are four (4) living beneficiaries of the Deceased’s estate suing the Defendants as Administrators under Letters of Administration granted 23 years ago on 18-11-2003.

The pleaded case is that the Defendants have still not completed the administration of the estate and have further failed to fully comply with two (2) prior consent orders dated 2-12-2013 and 5- S/N y5GwRhK7EaQrlienQmcDw 2-2016 recorded against them in earlier Court proceedings (“Consent Orders”). The pleaded Defence is a bare denial, and this Court had on 13-11-2024 struck out the Defendant’s counterclaim as it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. Analysis and findings

The principal issue in the appeal is expected to revolve around the fact that the Defendants were present in Court and unrepresented on both dates fixed for trial on 3-9-2025 and 4-9- 2025, and their request to postpone was refused. The substantive matters in the action relate to the power to revoke a Grant of Letters of Administration under section 34 of the Probate & Administration Act 1959 (“PAA”) for sufficient cause. Procedural matters

As highlighted, the Defendants had moved the Court on 16-4- 2025, to have questions of law determined without a trial under the O14A Application filed on their behalf. It was dismissed on 9- 7-2025, and the trial was directed to proceed as scheduled.

The Defendants’ solicitors then applied to discharge themselves on 11-8-2025. The application was heard and allowed on 21-8- 2025 in the presence of the Defendants in Court, though they did not oppose the application. This came as no surprise as: S/N y5GwRhK7EaQrlienQmcDw a) The solicitors had given notice on 6-8-2025 to terminate their engagement; and b) On the same date, the 1st Defendant replied, intimating that he was already preparing to terminate the solicitors’ services.

This was a second set of solicitors for the Defendants being discharged. By a letter that the Defendants e-filed on 4-12-2024, they notified the Court that they had discharged their previous solicitors and lodged a police report against the Plaintiffs’ solicitors, accusing them of: “pursuing an ill-conceived agenda, and abetting their clients in making false allegations and statements against us, in documents filed in Court.” The Defendants also threatened to file complaints against the lawyers, including his own.

The solicitors who took over had applied to discharge themselves under similar circumstances. It was submitted that the Defendants had acted against their advice by lodging police reports against opposing counsel and sent e-mails casting unwarranted doubt on the professionalism and integrity of the firm.

In allowing the discharge of the Defendants’ solicitors on 21-8- 2025, this Court reiterated that the trial on 3-9-2025 and 4-9-2025 S/N y5GwRhK7EaQrlienQmcDw would proceed as scheduled. Thus, when the Defendants wrote on 29-8-2025 to request a postponement to appoint new solicitors, the request was rejected.

To recap, the following were part of the Court’s considerations in exercise of its discretion:

The parties to the action are aged individuals and the subject matter concerned a protracted administration of estate;

The complaints and allegations were not new, purely factual and personal to the Defendants.

The trial dates had been set since 24-2-2025 and it was repeatedly impressed upon parties that trial would proceed as scheduled;

The Defendants had sufficient time to engage new solicitors since they were planning to terminate their current solicitors even before 6-8-2025; and

There was a pattern of conduct in raising unspecified grievances with the Plaintiffs and their solicitors that two (2) sets of their own solicitors have taken issue with.

The case was called up on 3-9-2025, and the same request to postpone was rejected. However, the Court allowed the trial to start on 4-9-2025 to allow the Defendants time to peruse the S/N y5GwRhK7EaQrlienQmcDw Plaintiff’s witness statements. The Plaintiffs’ case opened and concluded on 4-9-2025 without any challenge.

The Defendants declined the invitation of the Court to either question the Plaintiffs’ witnesses or give their own statements under oath on the stand. The Defendants also had the opportunity to have solicitors on board to address any questions of law as they were directed to file post-trial submissions on 26- 9-2025 and asked if they needed more time. The Defendants declined and did not file written submissions. Substantive matters

Factually, this Court found the unchallenged evidence given by the Plaintiffs to be consistent with the pleaded case and not inherently improbable. Applying Takako Sakao v Ng Pek Yuan & Anor [2010] 1 CLJ 381, the evidence was accordingly presumed to be true. After 23 years and two (2) prior litigation that concluded with Consent Orders that allowed them to remain in office, the Defendants: a) failed to complete the distribution of the estate as agreed in the Consent Orders; b) retained undistributed trust assets; and c) failed to provide proper accounts. S/N y5GwRhK7EaQrlienQmcDw

This Court further finds that evidence of the Defendants’ recalcitrance and persistent inaction in carrying out their duties as Administrators and fiduciaries, amounted to breach of fiduciary duties sufficient as cause to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction under section 34 of the PAA to remove them as Administrators (Re Khoo Boo Gong, decd Khoo Teng Seong v Teoh Chooi Ghim & Ors [1981] 2 MLJ 68).

As for the questions of law raised in the O14A Application, the conclusion of the trial has not brought up any new facts to change the preliminary determinations made in dismissing that application. Indeed, the Defendants remained under a continuing legal and equitable duty until administration is completed or until they are replaced (Tetuan Khana & Co (sued as a firm) v Saling bin Lau Bee Chiang & Ors and other appeals [2019] 3 MLJ 189).

The Plaintiffs’ claims are allowed and the operative orders against the Defendants are as follows: a) The Defendants be removed as Administrators of the Deceased’s estate; b) The 1st and 4th Plaintiffs be substituted as Administrators of the Deceased’s estate; S/N y5GwRhK7EaQrlienQmcDw c) The Defendants furnish the new Administrators with a true and complete inventory and account of all assets in the estate within 14 days from the date of the Judgment; d) The Defendants jointly and/or severally do personally pay the costs of this action in the sum RM30,000.00 subject to allocator. Bertarikh : 27 Oktober 2026 SGD ELAINE YAP CHIN GAIK PESURUHJAYA KEHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA SHAH ALAM Peguam bagi pihak Plaintif-Plaintif: Lim Kon Keen (bersamanya Muhammad Yassir Rabani bin Ramlan) (Tetuan Seow & Megat) Peguam bagi pihak Defendan-Defendan: Hadir sendiri dan tidak diwakili S/N y5GwRhK7EaQrlienQmcDw