Based on all of the above, contrary to the facts in the Tajjul Ariffin Case wherein the negligence of the intended second defendant is not an issue involved in the claim that the Plaintiff has made in court, the facts that have been pleaded in the present action before this Honourable Court are substantially different wherein the Defendants named in the present action have unequivocally pleaded that the Proposed Intervener is the owner of the “House of Pakeeza” trademark which is the primary subject matter of dispute in the present action. [Emphasis added] Court’s analysis [26] I agree with the Proposed Intervener. The statement in Tajjul Ariffin at page 124 c reads as follows: Generally, in common law and chancery matters, a plaintiff who considers that he has a cause of action against a defendant is entitled to pursue his remedy against that defendant alone and he cannot be forced to pursue his remedy against other persons who he has no wish to sue. (See Per Wynn-Perry J in Dollfus Mieg) [27] This statement cannot be read in isolation and has to be read in the context of the facts in Tajjul Arifin. [28] As set out in the law report on Tajjul Ariffin at page 120 a collision had occurred involving motor cycle X on which the plaintiff was a pillion passenger, the rider being one Lim Ah Chooi, and motor cycle Y ridden by the defendant. The defendant applied that Lim Ah Chooi, the rider of motor cycle X and his alleged master or principal Lim Yu Hua, be added as second and third defendants, respectively, on the ground that the collision was caused or substantially contributed to by the negligence of Lim Ah Chooi. [29] Counsel for the plaintiff had no objection to this prayer, but he did object to the very next prayer, namely, prayer 3, which reads: That the plaintiff do make the necessary amendments to the statement of claim to plead negligence against the said Lim Ah Chooi, the intended second defendant, as the servant or agent of Lim Yu Hua, the intended third defendant. [30] It was based on these facts that Edgar Joseph Jr. SCJ stated at page 126 [f] why a plaintiff cannot be forced, upon the application of the sole defendant, to add and sue a second defendant: To sum up, therefore, we would answer the question posed at the outset of this judgment by saying that a plaintiff cannot be forced, upon the application of the defendant, to have a second defendant added, against whom he does not wish to proceed for the reason that the negligence of the intended second defendant is not an issue involved in the claim he has made [McCheane v. Gyles (ibid); Horwell v. London General Omnibus Co.;Re London Tramways Co. [1877] 2 Ex. D. 365; White v. Carrara Ceiling Co. (ibid)] and so he should be allowed to proceed against the defendant of his choice [Courtney v. Woods (ibid)]. There may be cogent reasons for his not wanting to proceed against the intended second defendant; for example, the intended second defendant, who is alleged by the defendant to have been wholly or partly at fault, may be a friend or next of kin of the plaintiff, or the joinder may result in unnecessary prolongation of the trial or in the plaintiff having to shoulder the burden of additional costs should he fail against both the defendants. There may, of course, be other reasons. [Emphasis added] [31] The facts in the case before me are completely different from the facts in Tajjul Arifin. Here the Proposed Intervener wants to intervene to dispute the plaintiffs’ suit against his tenant i.e. the 1st defendant on the ground that the 1st defendant has a license to use the trademark and/or the tradename “House of Pakeeza” owned by the Proposed Intervener. There is a live dispute between the Proposed Intervener and the plaintiffs as to who owns the trademark and/or the tradename “House of Pakeeza”. [32] I reject ground [1]. I now consider ground [2]. Ground 2 - The Proposed Intervener has no interest in the present action [33] As narrated above, there is a dispute between the Proposed Intervener and the plaintiffs as to who owns the trademark and/or the tradename “House of Pakeeza”. Based on Pegang Mining I hold that the Proposed Intervener has an interest in the present action and should be allowed to intervene to assert his interest. [34] The following cases support the Proposed Intervener’s application: i. In Arab Malaysia Merchant Bank Berhad v Dr Jamaludin Dato' Mohd Jarjis [1991] 1 MLJ 27 SC the Supreme Court held at page 28 E as follows: - “It was held by the Privy Council in the Pegang Mining Co Ltd case [1969] 2 MLJ 52 that one of the principal objects of O 16 r 11 of the former Rules of the Supreme Court 1957, is to enable the court to prevent injustice being done to a person whose rights will be affected by its judgment by proceeding to adjudicate upon the matter in dispute in the action without his being given an opportunity of being heard. It must be noted that the Privy Council in that case added that to achieve that object calls for a flexibility of approach which made it undesirable in that case, in which the facts are unique, to attempt to lay down any proposition which could be applicable to all cases”. ii. In NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co v PT Sampoerna JL Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 CLJ 946 HC Haidar Mohd Noor J said at page 951- “I do not think Dato’ Kandan can seriously dispute that the TDO has affected the alleged interests of SJL by STTC obtaining it without SJL being given the opportunity of being heard. It is not disputed that the TDO is an ex parte order. To prevent injustice being done it would appear that the Court should allow a person whose interests will be affected by the order, an opportunity of being heard.” iii. In Awesome Broadcasting Sdn Bhd v MYTV Broadcasting Sdn Bhd [2024] 5 MLRA 8 CA, S Nantha Balan JCA said: [50] The decision of the House of Lords in London Passenger Transport Board v. Moscrop [1942] AC 332 (HL) is also relevant and instructive in this regard. It was a case concerning declaratory relief. The principle that was enunciated therein is equally applicable to an application for equitable reliefs. At p 345 Viscount Maugham enunciated that save in very exceptional circumstances, declaratory relief will be refused if the relevant, necessary and affected parties are not before the Court. He said: I also think it desirable to mention the point as to parties in cases where a declaration is sought. The present appellants were not directly prejudiced by the declaration and it might even have been thought to be an advantage to them to submit to the declaration, but, on the other hand, the persons really interested were not before the court, for not a single member of the Transport Union was, nor was that union itself, joined as a defendant in the action. It is true that in their absence they were not strictly bound by the declaration, but the courts have always recognised that persons interested are or may be indirectly prejudiced by a declaration made by the court in their absence, and that, except in very special circumstances, all persons interested should be made parties, whether by representation orders or otherwise, before a declaration by its terms affecting their rights is made. In the Chancery Division, in which this case started, the rule would seem to be almost invariable, and the well-established practice in actions by shareholders and debenture holders may be mentioned as instances of the rule. With the greatest respect for the Court of Appeal, I think that the amended declaration pronounced by that court, even if the section were applicable, ought not to have been made. [Emphasis Added] [51] In Abdul Rahim Aki v. Krubong Industrial Park (Melaka) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 2 MLRA 63 Gopal Sri Ram JCA speaking for the Court of Appeal referred to the above-mentioned passage from the Moscrop case and said relevantly: “These words though spoken in the context of declaratory relief are of general application.” [35] In conclusion, I reject ground [2]. I now consider ground [3]. Ground 3 - there is no necessity for the Proposed Intervener to intervene [36] Ground [3] is rejected for the reasons set out above for Grounds [2] and [3].