1. ) Romle Bin Hassan v Muhammad Firdaus Bin Zulkefli (RA-23CY-1-04/2022)

ROMLE BIN HASSAN

KOPERASI GERAKAN DAYA WAWASAN KAMPUNG PAYA GURING PERLIS BERHAD (NO. PENDAFTARAN: R-5-0082) … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN MUHAMMAD FIRDAUS BIN ZULKEFLI (NO. K/P: 940215-09-5191) … DEFENDAN S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw

Tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif terhadap Defendan dalam tindakan ini adalah berkaitan dengan dakwaan dua pernyataan fitnah yang dibuat Defendan terhadap Plaintif-Plaintif dalam akaun media sosial Facebook Defendan bertarikh 2.11.2021 seperti yang berikut: “Hari tu aku balik orang tua ni pengecut tak berani keluar rumah, bayang pon tak nampak. Ajak jumpa di kampung kelahiran dia sendiri pon dia tak berani. PENGECUT Gunakan kapasiti pengerusi koperasi duit orang kampung untuk memuaskan agenda sendiri. Pihak keluarga kami dah berhubung dengan PEJABAT TANAH PERLIS, report polis DI BALAI POLIS ARAU pon tak dak sapa yang pantas untuk membela nasib warga emas 70an yang tanah dihadapan rumah hendak ditutup dengan helah dan 1001 cara, dimaki hamun itu sudah jadi kebiasaan. Jadi inilah nasib marhaen, tak ada sapa pon sudi nak tolong. Bukan depan rumah depa, depa tak peduli. Kepada Romley Hassan, jangan jadi pengecut. Harini orang tua dengan adik2 sdara yang kecik shj di kampung berani keluar rumah. So harini datang dan bermulalah binaan2 haram yang akan menutup jalan depan rumah tok kami di KAMPUNG PAYA GURING JALAN PADANG SIDING. ROMLEY ROMLEY, HATI KAU KERAS #PTGPerlis #SPRM #PDRM #syahidankassim”. S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw Dan; “Dia ni berduit, koperasi kampung paya guring ni duit dok turun. Semua dia guna untuk kepuasan peribadi dia. Beli kereta van semua simpan di rumah dan diguna oleh anak-beranak dia. Pengerusi dan ajk2 anak beranak sendiri, harap #SPRM tolonglah siasat. Tanah koperasi pon ada yang dah dipinda ka, sebab orang pejabat tanah yang mai pon last-last balik macam tu saja.”.

Plaintif-Plaintif mendakwa bahawa melalui pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut, Defendan telah memfitnah mereka dan oleh itu, Plaintif-Plaintif telah menuntut daripada Defendan, inter alia –

untuk membuat permohonan maaf kepada Plaintif-Plaintif;

untuk menarik balik dan memadam pernyataan-pernyataan fitnah tersebut dalam Facebook Defendan; dan

ganti rugi am, teladan, punitif dan melampau.

Setelah suatu perbicaraan penuh dijalankan dan setelah Mahkamah ini meneliti, menilai dan mempertimbangkan segala pliding, keterangan saksi-saksi, keterangan dokumentar, penghujahan dan nas undang-undang yang dikemukakan oleh kedua-dua pihak Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati dan mendapati bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini telah menolak keseluruhan tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif terhadap Defendan tersebut dengan kos sebanyak RM5,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw

Alasan Mahkamah ini membuat keputusan tersebut adalah seperti di bawah.

Berdasarkan undang-undang yang mantap di bawah seksyen 101 dan 102 Akta Keterangan 1950 [Akta 56] (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Akta Keterangan”), beban pembuktian adalah terletak pada pihak yang menghendaki Mahkamah untuk memberikan penghakiman kepadanya. Peruntukan tersebut berbunyi seperti yang berikut: “Burden of proof

(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.

When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. On whom burden of proof lies

The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

Prinsip undang-undang ini telahpun diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan (as executor to SL Alameloo Achi alias Sona Lena Alamelo Acho, deceased) & Anor v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 4 MLJ 697. Dalam penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Jeffrey Tan FCJ, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw “[49] The expression ‘onus of proof’ does not appear in the Evidence Act. Only the expression ‘burden of proof’ appears in ss 101-103 of the Evidence Act. But there is a difference between the sense of the expression ‘burden of proof’ in s 101 and the sense of that same expression in s 102. [50] In International Times & Ors v Leong Ho Yuen [1980] 2 MLJ 86, Salleh Abas FCJ (as he then was), delivering the judgment of the court, said that the first sense of the expression ‘burden of proof’ in s 101 is the burden to establish the case which rests throughout on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue, while the second sense of the expression ‘burden of proof’ in s 102 is the burden to adduce evidence: For the purpose of this appeal it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the two senses in which the expressions burden of proof and onus of proof are used (Nanji & Co v Jatashankar Dossa & Ors AIR 1961 SC 1474 1748 and Raghavamma v Chenchamma AIR 1964 SC 136-143). The first sense, signified by the expression burden of proof such as referred to in s 101 of the Evidence Act is the burden of establishing a case and this rests throughout the trial on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue. The appellants in the present appeal relied on justification and fair comment. Therefore, the burden of proving these defences rests entirely upon them (Gatley on Libel and Slander 7th Ed, paras 351 and 354). The second sense referred to as onus of proof, on the other hand, relates to the responsibility of adducing evidence in order to discharge the burden of proof. The onus as opposed to burden is not stable and constantly shifts during the trial from one side to the other according to the scale of evidence and other preponderates. Such shifting is one continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. According to ss 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act, if the party with whom this onus lies whether initially or subsequently as a result of its shifting does not give any or further evidence or gives evidence which is not sufficient, such party must fail. It is this onus that we are concerned with in the present appeal. S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw [51] ‘There is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof, burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts’ (Addagada Raghavamma And Anr v Addagada Chenchamma And Anr 1964 SCR (2) 933). [52] The ‘burden of proof’ in s 101 is the burden to establish a case which rests throughout on the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue. The ‘burden of proof’ in s 102 is the burden to adduce evidence, to make out or rebut the claim. The ‘burden of proof’ in s 102 shifts from one side to the other according to the weight of the evidence. To differentiate the sense used, the ‘burden of proof’ in s 101 is ‘burden of proof’, while the ‘burden of proof’ in ss 102 and 103 is dubbed ‘onus of proof’. In some jurisdictions, the s 101 ‘burden of proof’ is labelled ‘legal burden’ while the s 102 burden of proof’ is referred to as ‘evidential burden’. [53] In Ranchhodbhai Somabhai And Anr v Babubhai Bhailalbhai And Ors AIR 1982 Guj 308, P Desai and S Majmudar thus illustrated the ‘burden of proof’ to establish the case which never shifts and the shifting burden to adduce evidence in the context of ss 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act which are identical to ss 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act: It is also well to bear in mind that there is an essential distinction between ‘burden of proof’ and ‘onus of proof’; burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence (see Raghavamma v Chenchamma AIR 1964 SC 136). Burden of proof has two distinct meanings, namely, (i) the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleadings, and (ii) the burden of proof as a matter of adducing evidence. Section 101 of the Evidence Act deals with the former and Section 102 of the Evidence Act with the latter. The first remains constant but the second shifts. In a claim application, therefore, the burden of proof, in the first sense, certainly lies on the claimant. If he examines himself and his witness, if any, and if the evidence, tested in the light of the principles set out above, S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw is found to be acceptable, the onus shifts on the tortfeasor to prove those circumstances, if any, which dislodge the assertions of the claimants. If the tortfeasor fails to prove before the Court any fact or circumstance which tends to affect the evidence led by the claimant, the claimant would be entitled to ask the Court to hold that he has established the case and, on that basis, to make a just award it would thus appear, that though the legal burden — the burden as a matter of law and pleadings — remains constant on the claimant, the burden as a matter of adducing evidence changes often times as the trial of the claim petition progresses. [54] Section 101(1) provides that ‘Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist’. ‘Section 101 states that the initial burden of proving a prima facie case in his favour is cast on the plaintiff …’ (Woodroffe and Amir Ali, Law of Evidence (19th Ed Vol 3) at p 3194). Illustration (b) to s 101 puts it beyond doubt that the ‘burden of proof’ rests throughout on the plaintiff. Section 102 provides that ‘The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side’. ‘The initial onus of proving the case is always on the plaintiff’ (Sarkar Law of Evidence 16th Ed at p 1593). Illustration (a) to s 102 puts it beyond doubt that a plaintiff has the initial onus of proof. [55] But ‘when (the plaintiff) gives such evidence as will support a prima facie case, the onus shifts on to the defendant, to adduce rebutting evidence to meet the case made out by the plaintiff. As the case continues to develop, the onus may shift back again to the plaintiff. It is not easy to decide at what particular stage, in the course of the evidence, the onus shifts from one side to the other. When after the entire evidence has been adduced, the tribunal feels it cannot make up its mind as to which of the versions is true, it will hold that the party on whom the burden lies has not discharged the burden, but if it has, on the evidence, no difficulty arriving at a definite conclusion, then the burden of proof on the pleading recedes into the background’ (Woodroffe and Amir Ali, at p 3194; see also Abrath v The North Eastern Railway Company at p 452). ‘… the onus of proof may shift … but S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw the question must ultimately arise whether the person who is bound to prove the affirmative of the issue … has discharged … that burden’ (Jane Wakelin v The London and South Western Railway Company (1886) 12 App Cas 41 per Lord Halsbury LC) or proved ‘his case sufficiently to justify a judgment in his favour’ (Stoney v Eastbourne Rural District Council [1927] 1 Ch 367 at p 397 per Lord Hanworth MR). [56] Thus, a plaintiff has both the burden of proof as well as the initial onus of proof. In Britestone Pte Ltd v Smith & Associates Far East, Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 855, the Singapore Court of Appeal per VK Rajah JCA, delivering the judgment of the court, explained that at the start of the plaintiff’s case the burden of proof and the onus of proof coincide: … at the start of the plaintiff’s case, the legal burden of proving the existence of any relevant fact that the plaintiff must prove and the evidential burden of some (not inherently incredible) evidence of the existence of such fact coincide. Upon adduction of that evidence, the evidential burden shifts to the defendant, as the case may be, to adduce some evidence in rebuttal. If no evidence in rebuttal is adduced, the court may conclude from the evidence of the defendant. If, on the other hand, evidence in rebuttal is adduced, the evidential burden shifts back to the plaintiff. If, ultimately, the evidential burden comes to rest on the defendant, the legal burden of proof of the relevant fact would have been discharged by the plaintiff. The legal burden of proof — a permanent and enduring burden — does not shift. A party who has the legal burden of proof on any issue must discharge it throughout. Sometimes, the legal burden is spoken of, inaccurately, as ‘shifting’; but what is truly meant is that another issue has been engaged, on which the opposite party hears the legal burden of proof. [57] The rule is that ‘the onus of proof of any particular fact lies on the party who alleges it, not on him who denies it; et incumbit probation qui decit, non qui negat, Actori incibit probation … The plaintiff is bound in the first instance, to show a prima facie case, and if he leaves it imperfect, the court will not assist S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw him. Hence the maxim Potior est condition defendantis. A plaintiff cannot obviously advantage himself by the weakness of the defence. A plaintiff’s case must stand or fall upon the evidence adduced by him. When, however, the defendant, or either litigant party, instead of denying what is alleged against him, relies on some new matter which, if true, is an answer to it, the burden of proof changes sides; and he, in his turn, is bound to show a prima facie case at least and, if he leaves it imperfect, the court will not assist him. Reus excipendo fit actor’ (Woodroffe and Amir Ali, Vol 3 at pp 3190-3191).”. [Penekanan ditambah]

Selanjutnya, dalam kes Keruntum Sdn Bhd v The Director of Forests & Ors [2017] 3 MLJ 281, Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui penghakiman yang disampaikan oleh Hasan Lah FCJ telah memutuskan bahawa – “[76] Based on the evidence before the court, we agree with the High Court that the plaintiff had not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that the second defendant knew about the Ming Court affair before or at the time he made the decision to revoke the plaintiff’s licences so as to shift the onus of proof to the defence. On the other hand, there was clear evidence that there was a transfer of controlling interests in the plaintiff company without the consent of the Director of Forests and the plaintiff had clearly breached s 2(2)(b) of the Ordinance. [77] The plaintiff’s allegation that the revocation of its licence was done for a political or collateral purpose and the defendants had committed the tort of misfeasance in public office could only be proven if it was proved that the second defendant was aware of the Ming Court affair at the time the decision was made to revoke the plaintiff’s licence. The plaintiff’s failure to prove the second defendant’s knowledge of the Ming Court affair had resulted in its failure to prove its pleaded case that the revocation of the licence was done for a political or collateral purpose and the tort of misfeasance in public office against the defendants at the end of its case and as such the evidential burden had not been S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw shifted to the defence. As such there was no duty on the defendants, especially the second defendant, to refute the plaintiff’s allegation by way of oral evidence. [78] It is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party on whom the burden lies. Where a party on whom the burden of proof lies, has discharged it, then the evidential burden shifts to the other party (see UN Pandey v Hotel Marco Polo Pte Ltd [1980] 1 MLJ 4). When the burden shifts to the other party, it can be discharged by cross-examination of witnesses of the party on whom the burden of proof lies or by calling witnesses or by giving evidence himself or by a combination of the different methods. See Tan Kim Khuan v Tan Kee Kiat (M) Sdn Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 697. [79] The findings made by the learned trial judge are mainly findings of facts and he gave credible reasons for his findings. He had the benefit of hearing testimonies and observing the demeanour of the witnesses. Those findings of facts were affirmed by the Court of Appeal. It would need very clear and convincing reasoning to justify us to reverse what has already been decided. We have looked at those findings of facts by the learned trial judge and the detail reasons given by him and we are satisfied that, on the facts of the case, any reasonable tribunal would have made similar findings. [80] We find it unnecessary to answer the first question of law posed in this appeal because on the facts of this case there was no duty on the defendants to give evidence in their defence.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

Dalam kes Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 740, Mokhtar Sidin JCA yang menyampaikan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “The learned judge had the benefits of seeing and hearing the testimonies of the witnesses. His Lordship was of the view that the witnesses did not help the S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw appellant at all since they were not able to show and satisfy the court that respondent prior to 1 January 1990 knew of the withdrawal of the 20% discount given to it. He went on to say that under s. 101 of the Evidence Act 1950, that the onus is on the appellant to prove that they are entitled to the claim. The burden is on the appellant and it is his duty to prove its claim affirmatively. In this respect the learned judge found on the evidence adduced before him the appellant failed to prove its claim. ... As I have stated earlier this is a finding of fact. Appellant had not shown to us where the learned judge had erred in his finding or that the finding was not supported by or adverse of the evidence before him. As such there is no reason for me to disturb his finding and for that reason alone his decision should be confirmed and the appeal should be dismissed.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

Berdasarkan peruntukan dan nas-nas undang-undang di atas adalah jelas bahawa beban pembuktian dalam sesuatu kes sivil sentiasa terletak pada bahu pihak plaintif dan ia adalah atas imbangan kebarangkalian. Kegagalan plaintif berbuat demikian akan menyebabkan tuntutan plaintif terhadap defendan ditolak oleh Mahkamah.

Dalam kes ini, setelah Mahkamah ini meneliti, menilai dan mempertimbangkan segala pliding serta keterangan lisan dan dokumentar yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan. Oleh itu, beban pembuktian tersebut tidak berpindah kepada Defendan untuk menafikan dakwaan dan/atau tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif tersebut. S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw

Memandangkan Plaintif-Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan tuntutannya atas imbangan kebarangkalian terhadap Defendan, maka Mahkamah ini telah menolak tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif terhadap Defendan dengan kos sebanyak RM5,000.00.

Dalam menolak tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif tersebut, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dan menerima sepenuhnya hujahan peguam cara Defendan dan tidak berhasrat untuk mengulanginya satu persatu di sini. Apa yang ingin ditegaskan oleh Mahkamah ini adalah terhadap dua isu di bawah sahaja.

Pertama, berdasarkan fakta dan keterangan yang dikemukakan dalam perbicaraan kes ini, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati dan mendapati bahawa pernyataan-pernyataan yang dibuat oleh Defendan tersebut berjaya memenuhi elemen pembelaan komen berpatutan (fair comment) seperti mana yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 9 Akta Fitnah 1957 [Akta 286] dan yang diputuskan dalam kes J.B. Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334; [1984] 2 MLRH 122.

Sebagai rujukan, seksyen 9 Akta Fitnah 1957 memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “Fair comment

In an action for libel or slander in respect of words consisting partly of allegations of fact and partly of expression of opinion, a defence of fair comment shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every allegation of fact is not proved it the expression of opinion is fair comment having regard to such of the facts alleged or referred to in the words complained of as are proved.”. S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw

Ini kerana, pernyataan-pernyataan yang dibuat oleh Defendan tersebut –

adalah berkaitan dengan kepentingan dan hak laluan awam;

telah gagal dibuktikan mengandungi niat jahat (malice intention) terhadap Plaintif-Plaintif (lihat Manikavasagam a/l Sundaram v Sun Media Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] MLJU 217; Thong King Chai v Ho Khar Fun [2018] MLJU 357); dan

adalah berdasarkan kepercayaan dan fakta-fakta yang diketahui oleh Defendan dan ia telah gagal disangkal oleh Plaintif-Plaintif. Fakta-fakta tersebut, antara lain, adalah seperti yang berikut:

penutupan jalan utama di hadapan rumah nenek Defendan sememangnya berlaku;

(ii) penutupan jalan utama di hadapan rumah nenek Defendan tersebut telah dibuat oleh Plaintif Pertama atas kapasitinya sebagai Pengerusi Plaintif Kedua dan tiada sebarang notis rasmi dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif Kedua;

(iii) sebelum penutupan jalan utama di hadapan rumah nenek Defendan tersebut dibuat, Plaintif Pertama pernah membuat ugutan kepada nenek Defendan mengenai rancangan penutupan jalan utama tersebut dan pemotongan paip air di rumah nenek Defendan; S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw

(iv) sebelum pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut dibuat oleh Defendan, Defendan telah cuba untuk berjumpa dan berbincang dengan Plaintif Pertama mengenai pertikaian yang timbul tersebut tetapi Plaintif Pertama telah enggan dan/atau gagal untuk berjumpa dengan Defendan (rujuk mesej yang dihantar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif Pertama melalui aplikasi Whatsapp seperti dalam Ekshibit ID8);

stor yang dibina di atas jalan utama tersebut tidak mendapat kelulusan ahli-ahli jawatankuasa Plaintif Kedua, orang-orang yang terkesan hak laluannya dan pihak berkuasa yang sepatutnya;

(vi) jawatankuasa dalam Plaintif Kedua turut dianggotai oleh anak-beranak atau ahli keluarga Plaintif Pertama, iaitu Johari bin Hassan sebagai Bendahari dan Eddy Asrul bin Hassan sebagai Ahli Jawatankuasa; dan

(vii) Plaintif Pertama dan ahli keluarganya sememangnya telah menggunakan aset Plaintif Kedua untuk kepentingan peribadi mereka seperti menggunakan kenderaan milik Plaintif Kedua yang diletakkan dalam kawasan rumah Plaintif Pertama.

Berhubung dengan perkara ini, dalam kes Dato Seri Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin v Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd & Anor [2014] 4 MLJ 242; [2014] 3 MLRA 92, Mahkamah Rayuan melalui penghakiman S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw yang disampaikan oleh Abang Iskandar JCA (pada ketika itu) telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “DEFENCE OF FAIR COMMENT [50] The law on the defence of fair comment is that if a defendant can prove that the defamatory statement is an expression of opinion on a matter of public interest and not a statement of fact, he or she can rely on the defence of fair comment. The courts have said that whenever a matter is such as to affect people at large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on or what may happen to them or to others, then it is a matter of public interest on which everyone is entitled to make fair comment. [51] The comment must be based on true facts which are either contained in the publication or are sufficiently referred to. It is for the defendant to prove that the underlying facts are true. If he or she is unable to do so, then the defence will fail. As with justification, the defendant does not to have to prove the truth of every fact provided the comment was fair in relation to those facts which are proved. However, fair in this context, does not mean reasonable, but rather, it signifies the absence of malice. The views expressed can be exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced, provided they are honestly held. If the claimant can show that the publication was made maliciously, the defence of fair comment will not succeed.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

Oleh itu, berdasarkan alasan-alasan dan nas undang-undang di atas adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa –

tujuan Defendan membuat pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut adalah untuk meminta pihak berkuasa seperti Suruhanjaya S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia (SPRM), Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Perlis (PTG Perlis) dan Polis Diraja Malaysia (PDRM) menyiasat perbuatan dan tindakan Plaintif Pertama tersebut dan bukannya untuk memfitnah Plaintif-Plaintif;

Plaintif-Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan wujudnya elemen niat jahat dalam pernyataan-pernyataan Defendan tersebut;

perkataan “pengecut” yang digunakan oleh Defendan ke atas Plaintif Pertama adalah komen berpatutan kerana Plaintif Pertama telah enggan dan/atau gagal untuk bersemuka dengan Defendan; dan

perkataan “binaan haram” yang digunakan oleh Defendan bagi merujuk kepada stor yang dibina oleh Plaintif Pertama tersebut adalah komen berpatutan kerana tiada notis diberikan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif kepada nenek Defendan yang terkesan hak laluannya di atas jalan tersebut akibat daripada pembinaan stor tersebut dan tiada kelulusan diberikan oleh Kementerian Pelancongan, Seni dan Budaya Malaysia (MOTAC) bagi pembinaan stor tersebut; dan

pernyataan-pernyataan yang dibuat oleh Defendan tersebut merupakan komen berpatutan dan telah dibuat secara jujur dan bukan fitnah terhadap Plaintif-Plaintif.

Kedua, Plaintif-Plaintif dalam plidingnya mendakwa bahawa akibat daripada tindakan Defendan membuat pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut, S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw Plaintif-Plaintif telah disiasat oleh pihak polis, SPRM, MOTAC, PTG Perlis dan pihak berkuasa yang lain sehingga menyebabkan nama baik Plaintif Kedua tercemar dan Plaintif Pertama rasa tertekan. Sungguhpun begitu, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif telah gagal memanggil mana-mana wakil pihak berkuasa tersebut untuk membuktikan dakwaan Plaintif-Plaintif tersebut.

Kegagalan Plaintif-Plaintif memanggil mana-mana wakil pihak berkuasa tersebut untuk membuktikan dakwaan Plaintif-Plaintif tersebut menyebabkan Mahkamah ini membangkitkan anggapan inferens bertentangan (presumption of adverse inference) di bawah seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terhadap Plaintif-Plaintif kerana pihak Plaintif-Plaintif seolah-olah cuba untuk menyembunyikan suatu fakta yang jika dikemukakan, tidak akan memberi manfaat dan memihak kepada pihak Plaintif-Plaintif.

Sebagai rujukan, seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “Court may presume existence of certain fact

The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. ILLUSTRATIONS The court may presume — S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw …

that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it;”.

Mengenai tujuan dan skop pemakaian seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950, ia telah dijelaskan dalam beberapa kes undang-undang. Dalam kes Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492, Mahkamah Agung telah memberi panduan bahawa keterangan yang hendak disembunyikan di bawah seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 tersebut bukan sahaja mesti relevan tetapi juga penting dan material. Dalam menyampaikan keputusan Mahkamah Agung tersebut, Mohamed Azmi SCJ telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “… It is essential to appreciate the scope of section 114(g) lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party in its possession, or for non-production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to the case.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

Isu yang sama juga telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah dalam kes Murni bin Hj. Mohamed Taha v. Public Prosecutor [1986] 1 MLJ 260, Murugan v Lew Chu Cheong [1980] 2 MLJ 139, Sabah Shell Petroleum Co Ltd & Anor v The Owners of and/or Any Other Persons Interested in the Ship or Vessel the ‘Borcos Takdir’ [2012] 5 MLJ 515 dan Marappan a/l Muthusamy v R Sivam a/l Ramasamy [2014] 4 MLJ 428. S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw

Berdasarkan nas-nas undang-undang di atas, Mahkamah boleh menganggap kemungkinan wujudnya sesuatu fakta dalam sesuatu kes dan membangkitkan anggapan andaian bertentangan di bawah seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 sekiranya Mahkamah mendapati terdapat niat di suatu pihak untuk menahan (withholding) atau menyekat (suppression) sesuatu fakta penting dan material daripada dikemukakan dalam sesuatu perbicaraan di Mahkamah.

Dalam kes ini, memandangkan Plaintif-Plaintif telah gagal mengemukakan mana-mana wakil pihak berkuasa tersebut sebagai saksi pihak Plaintif-Plaintif bagi membuktikan dakwaan Plaintif-Plaintif bahawa nama baik Plaintif Kedua telah tercemar dan bahawa Plaintif Pertama telah rasa tertekan akibat daripada pernyataan-pernyataan Defendan tersebut, maka adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif telah cuba untuk menahan, menyekat dan menyembunyikan suatu fakta penting dan material daripada dikemukakan dalam perbicaraan kes ini, yang mana jika dikemukakan fakta tersebut, tidak akan memberi manfaat dan memihak kepada pihak Plaintif-Plaintif.

Sebagai kesimpulan, berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah ini telah menolak keseluruhan tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif terhadap Defendan dengan kos sebanyak RM5,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw Tarikh : 25 OKTOBER 2025 (DR. ARIK SANUSI BIN YEOP JOHARI) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya, Kangar Negeri Perlis S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw (NEGERI PERLIS) Peguam bagi pihak Plaintif-Plaintif: Puan Nashitoh Binti Kassim (bersama Puan Aisyah Binti Md Noor dan Puan Nurin Ayuni Nazira Binti Nazri) Tetuan Nashitoh Kassim & Associate Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara 22, Kolej Height Utara Commercial Square Bandar Darulaman 06000 Jitra Kedah Peguam bagi pihak Defendan: Encik Naziman Bin Mahmud (bersama Puan Intan Nasuha Binti Ahmad Razani) Tetuan Naziman & Co Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara No.76, Taman Sena Indah Persiaran Jubli Emas Jalan Kangar-Arau 01000 Kangar Perlis S/N wCvNGTkuoEW9nyxrE2Ftw