1. ) Sanco Electrical Sdn Bhd v Norismadi Bin Abdul Manap (BA-11B-33-08/2024)

SANCO ELECTRICAL SDN BHD [NO. SYARIKAT: 200501030832 / 712969-V]

MOHD AZHAR BIN MOHAMED [NO. K/P: 710404-01-5783] …PERAYU-PERAYU DAN NORISMADI BIN ABDUL MANAP [NO. K/P: 790805-06-5039] …RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Majistret Di Petaling Jaya Dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia Guaman No. BB-A73KJ-903-12/2023 Antara Norismadi Bin Abdul Manap [No. K/P: 790805-06-5039] …Plaintif Dan S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA

Sanco Electrical Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 200501030832 / 712969-V]

Mohd Azhar Bin Mohamed [No. K/P: 710404-01-5783] …Defendan-Defendan JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This appeal arises from the decision of the Magistrates Court on both liability and quantum, challenged by the Appellants/Defendants. The Respondent/Plaintiff, in turn, has filed a cross-appeal, contesting the quantum awarded. [2] At first glance, the monetary value of the dispute may seem modest, but the legal questions it presents are far from trivial. [3] These questions, though arising from a seemingly routine dispute, bear wider implications for personal injury litigation and the evidentiary thresholds required in such claims. The Essential Issues [4] Three pivotal issues emerge for determination in this appeal:

Appealability – Is the decision of the Magistrates Court subject to appeal? S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA

Liability – Whether the Respondent/Plaintiff has established negligence on a balance of probabilities.

Proof of Special Damages – Can special damages be established solely through documentary evidence? [5] These issues, though specific to the present case, carry significance beyond it, shaping how similar claims may be adjudicated in the future. Background Facts [6] The Respondent/Plaintiff’s claim arose from a motor vehicle accident alleged to have occurred between two cars bearing registration numbers WSF 303 and VBT 2983 along Jalan PJS 2/7 on 9 September. 2020 at approximately 11.30 p.m. [7] The owner of the vehicle bearing registration number WSF 303, being the Respondent/Plaintiff, has commenced a claim against the driver (Second Appellant/Defendant) and the owner (First Appellant/Defendant) of the vehicle bearing registration number VBT 2983 in the Magistrates Court. [8] As a result of the said accident, the Respondent/Plaintiff alleged that his vehicle sustained damage, causing him to suffer loss and damage, and has accordingly brought this action against the Appellants/Defendants. S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA [9] It is noteworthy that the Respondent/Plaintiff did not testify in the trial. Instead, the witnesses that testified on behalf of the Respondent/Plaintiff were SP-1, the Investigating Officer and SP-2, the Adjuster. [10] Equally notable are the facts that the Appellants/Defendants did not file any witness statement nor call any witnesses and had made a submission of no case to answer at the end of the Respondent/Plaintiff’s case. The Decision of the Magistrates Court [11] The learned Magistrate found in favour of the Respondent/Plaintiff on the issue of liability but held that the Respondent/Plaintiff was contributorily negligent to the extent of 10%. [12] On quantum, the Respondent/Plaintiff’s total claim amounted to RM32,669.40, comprising RM28,753.40 for vehicle repair costs, RM796.00 for the adjuster’s fees, RM2,100.00 for loss of use of the vehicle, and RM1,020.00 for miscellaneous claims. [13] The learned Magistrate allowed the claim for the adjuster’s fees and awarded RM40.00 for loss of use, while dismissing the claim for miscellaneous expenses. With regard to the repair costs, the sum claimed was not allowed in full; instead, the Magistrate awarded nominal damages of RM8,000.00. S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA [14] This brought the total judgment sum to RM8,836.00, which was computed on the basis of 100% liability before taking into account contributory negligence. The Appellants/Defendants’ Contentions [15] On the issue of appealability and the application of section 28(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, the Appellants/Defendants argued that the threshold of RM10,000.00 in section 28(1)(a) of the said Act has been met, thereby rendering the requirement to establish the existence of a question of law as unnecessary. [16] On this preliminary point regarding the interpretation and applicability of section 28(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 to the present appeal, the Appellants/Defendants have referred this Court to the following authorities, namely, Yai Yen Hon v Teng Ah Kok & Sim Huat Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 2 CLJ 68 (“Yai Yen Hon”), Harcharan Singh Sohan Singh v Ranjit Kaur S Gean Singh [2011] 3 CLJ 593 (“Harcharan Singh”), Badan Pengurusan Bersama Kompleks Pandan Safari Lagoon v Tam Cheng Meng [2018] 8 CLJ 361 (“Tam Cheng Meng”) and Tan Yang Liang v Tong Swee Ying [2022] 1 LNS 1783 (“Tan Yang Liang”). [17] Alternatively, the Appellants/Defendants contended that there exists a question of law in this appeal, with the question of law being: Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta-fakta apabila membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap isu liabiliti dan kuantum walaupun Plaintif tidak pernah dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan. S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA [18] On the issue of liability, it was contended by the Appellants/Defendants that the Respondent/Plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden of proof under section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950. [19] The Appellants/Defendants challenged the decision of the learned Magistrate on the following grounds:

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta-fakta apabila membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap isu liabiliti dan kuantum walaupun Plaintif tidak pernah dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dengan tidak mengambil kira keterangan Pegawai Penyiasat bahawa Plaintif telah meletekkan motorkarnya secara tidak sah di lokasi berkenaan dan membentuk halangan kepada motorkar

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dengan membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif walaupun Plaintif tidak menghadirkan diri untuk memberi keterangan untuk membuktikan versi yang diplidkan dalam

Puan Majistret yang bijak sana telah terkhilaf dalam membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif atas isu kuantum walaupun Plaintif tidak mengemukakan sebarang resit bayaran; S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dalam membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif atas isu kuantum walaupun Plaintif dan wakil bengkel tidak pernah dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan berkenaan kos pembaikan motorkar;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf apabila mendapati bahawa Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan versi yang diplidkan melalui Pernyataannya terhadap Defendan;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dalam membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif atas isu kuantum walaupun Saksi Penyelaras memberi keterangan bahawa laporan beliau adalah hanya andaian beliau;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dalam membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap isu kuantum walaupun Penyelaras gagal mengemukakan sebarang bukti berkenaan sumber anggaran harga dan kos pembaikan;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta-fakta apabila gagal mengambil kira bahawa Plaintif dan wakil bengkel telah gagal hadir untuk memberikan keterangan;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta-fakta apabila Plaintif gagal memberikan bukti sokongan mengenai kos pembaikian dan juga bayaran pembaikian yang dikatakan telah dilunaskan oleh pihak Plaintif; S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta-fakta apabila gagal mengambil kira bahawa kos pembaikian di dalam laporan Penyelaras adalah anggaran semata-mata;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta-fakta apabila telah menyalahtafsir bukti-bukti yang dikemukan oleh Plaintif;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta-fakta apabila tidak mengambil kira hujahan-hujahan pihak Defendan-Defendan;

Keputusan Puan Majistret adalah bertentangan dengan kesemua bukti yang berada di hadapan Mahkamah Majistret;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta-fakta dengan membuat penilaian yang salah dalam memutuskan kesemua fakta-fakta yang terdapat dihadapannya dan dengan itu membuat keputusan yang "perverse" dan bercanggah;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkilaf apabila menggunapakai dan bergantung terhadap dokumen yang tidak ditandakan sebagai Ekshibit;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf apabila menggunapakai dan bergantung terhadap dokumen yang tidak membentuk keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah; S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf apabila menerima keterangan "Hearsay" Pegawai Penyiasat;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf apabila membenarkan tuntutan ganti rugi khas Plaintif walapun mendapati bahawa Plaintif gagal membuktikan tuntutannya;

Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf apabila membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif walaupun pihak Plaintif gagal membuktikan bahawa wujudnya Plaintif untuk memulakan tuntutan terhadap Defendan. [20] Several of the grounds advanced are repetitive and overlapping. Frankly, this Court is dismayed by the lack of clarity in some of the grounds relied upon by the Appellants/Defendants. In particular, Grounds 19 and 20 are difficult to comprehend. The Case for the Respondent/Plaintiff [21] The Respondent/Plaintiff argued that, as the judgment sum awarded by the learned Magistrate amounted to RM8,836.00, the decision is not appealable pursuant to section 28(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. [22] The Respondent/Plaintiff further contended that the Appellants/Defendants had failed to raise any question of law that would render the present appeal competent within the meaning of the said provision. S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA [23] In relation to these contentions, the Respondent/Plaintiff relied on the recent decision of the High Court in Kerajaan Malaysia v Mohd Sazali bin Salamat & Anor [2023] AMEJ 2617; [2024] 2 CLJ 448; [2023] MLJU 3214; [2024] 2 MLRH 453 (“Mohd Sazali bin Salamat”), in addition to cases such as Mohammad Safuan bin Wasidin v Mohd Ridhuan bin Ahmad [1994] 1 LNS 186; [1994] 2 MLJ 187; [1994] 4 MLRH 432, Zain Azahari bin Zainal Abidin lwn Wearne Brothers (1983) Sdn Bhd [1997] 2 CLJ 594; [1997] 5 MLJ 39; [1997] 2 MLRH 697, Tiang Kwong Ee v Ing Kai Hong (S) Sdn Bhd [2000] AMEJ 0245; [2000] 1 LNS 227; [2000] 5 MLJ 756; [2000] 5 MLRH 624, KC Chan Brothers Development Sdn Bhd v Tan Kon Seng & Ors [2001] 4 AMR 4533; [2001] 4 CLJ 659; [2001] 6 MLJ 636; [2001] 2 MLRH 267 and Chin Tet Seng @ Chin Tek Sik v Chong Foo Yoong [2001] 6 CLJ 293; [2001] MLJU 146; [2001] 2 MLRH 580. [24] On the issue of liability, it was argued by the Respondent/Plaintiff that:

Defendan telah gagal Tanggungan Menjaga/Duty of care

Rajah Kasar IO SP1- mengesahkan kesalahan/kecuaian

Keputusan IO SP1- mengesahkan kesalahan/kecuaian

DOKUMEN AWAM Laporan Polis Plaintif satu DOKUMEN AWAM di bawah S74 sehingga S90 Akta Keterangan 1950 kandungan boleh dimasukkan/admitted bahawa Plaintif S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA dilanggar belakang oleh Defenden Tiada Keperluan Plaintif hadir memberi keterangan

Akuan Kesalahan Defenden - dalam laporan polis Defenden Dokumen Awam - bahawa Defenden melanggar belakang Plaintif dan Defenden membuat bayaran kompoun.

Laporan Polis & Kertas Siasatan (IP) Telah Diterima Masuk Sebagai Keterangan – Tiada petak Parkir tidak semesti parkir tidak sah cadangan Defendan sahaja - Negligent driving of Defendan kehilangan kawal Defendan – Rule 10

Plaintif telah dengan keterangan Pegawai Penyiasat IO berjaya membuat pembuktian liabiliti terhadap Defenden. Seterusnya dibawah S102 Ata Ketrangan 1950 Defenden Gagal memberi pembukti kesnya (S102 AK) dan gagal membawa sebarang saksi – 114g Akta Keterangan. [25] In the cross-appeal, the Respondent/Plaintiff contended that special damages had been both pleaded and proven, and that the learned Magistrate erred in awarding only nominal damages for the cost of repairs to the vehicle. The Decision of this Court [26] This Court shall now address and decide on each of the three essential issues raised in this appeal. S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA Appealability – The Threshold Sum [27] As noted, it is not in dispute that the Respondent/Plaintiff filed a claim amounting to RM32,669.40, comprising RM28,753.40 for the cost of repairs, RM796.00 for the adjuster’s fees, RM2,100.00 for loss of use of the vehicle, and RM1,020.00 for other miscellaneous claims and the learned Magistrate awarded a judgment sum of RM8,836.00. [28] This gives rise to the issue of whether the monetary threshold of RM10,000.00, as prescribed under section 28(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, has been satisfied. [29] If the answer is in the negative, the next question is whether this appeal involves a question of law warranting the Court’s consideration. [30] The Appellants/Defendants relied on the cases of Yai Yen Hon, Harcharan Singh, Tam Cheng Meng, and Tan Yang Liang in support of their contention that the threshold requirement has in fact been met. Of these, Yai Yen Hon and Harcharan Singh are decisions of the apex court, while Tan Yang Liang was decided by the Court of Appeal. [31] In Yai Yen Hon, Chong CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) opined: … In my view no leave of Court was required for this particular appeal. Section 68 (1)(a) of the Act used the phrase “amount or value of the subject-matter of the claim”. The phrase must be read as a whole. In the instant case under appeal, the subject-matter is the road traffic accident and the claim of the 1st plaintiff/appellant is for an amount far in excess S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA of RM100,000. That being so, the amount adjudged at the trial assumes little or no significance. [32] Similarly, in Harcharan Singh, the Federal Court held: [13] This appeal therefore hinges on the value of the disputed property. The phrase “amount or value of the subject matter of the claim.” Section 68(1)(a) of the Act was considered by the Supreme Court in Yai Yen Hon v. Teng Ah Kok & Sim Huat Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 2 CLJ 68 where it was held that it must be read as the amount or value of the claim filed in the civil suit and not the judgment amount granted against. That would be the determinant factor in deciding whether leave was necessary. [33] With the exception of Tam Cheng Meng, all the authorities cited and relied upon by the Appellants/Defendants are binding on this Court. [34] However, save for Tam Cheng Meng, all the aforementioned cases considered section 68(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, whereas the present appeal turns on section 28(1)(a) of the same Act. [35] For completeness, the relevant provisions of sections 28(1)(a) and 68(1)(a) are set out below: Civil appeals from subordinate courts

(1) No appeal shall lie to the High Court in any of the following cases: S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA

subject to any other written law, from a decision of a subordinate court in any civil cause or matter where the amount in dispute or the value of the subject matter is ten thousand ringgit or less except on a question of law; Non-appealable matters

(1) No appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in any of the following cases:

when the amount or value of the subject matter of the claim (exclusive of interest) is less than two hundred and fifty thousand ringgit, except with the leave of the Court of Appeal; [36] This preliminary point, on the interpretation and applicability of section 28(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, was thoroughly discussed and analysed by the High Court in Mohd Sazali bin Salamat. [37] A careful reading of the provisions in sections 28(1)(a) and 68(1)(a), and this has been highlighted by the courts that have considered these provisions, will reveal a fundamental difference between section 28(1)(a) and section 68(1)(a), that is, that the word “claim” in section 68(1)(a) is not present in section 28(1)(a). Instead, the word “decision” is adopted in section 28(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. [38] This Court is in agreement with the authorities that have discussed the provision in section 28(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA which held that “the amount in dispute or the value of the subject-matter” in section 28(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 refers to the adjudged sum of the subordinate court and not to the sum claimed by a plaintiff. [39] As the adjudged sum by the Magistrates Court in this appeal was RM8,836.00, no appeal against that decision of the Magistrates Court shall lie to this Court “except on a question of law”. Appealability – The Question of Law [40] Since the threshold sum has not been met, the critical issue before this Court is whether the Appellants/Defendants have put forward a question of law. [41] The Appellants/Defendants averred that the question of law before this Court in this appeal is: Puan Majistret yang bijaksana telah terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta-fakta apabila membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap isu liabiliti dan kuantum walaupun Plaintif tidak pernah dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan. [42] A question of law refers to an issue brought before the appellate court that does not revolve around questions of fact or the application of law to particular facts. Rather, it must concern a point of legal principle. [43] It is instructive to refer to the decision of the High Court in Mohd Sazali bin Salamat, which aptly summarised the position as follows: S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA [46] To summarise, what constitutes ‘a question of law’ may be distilled from the decided cases as follows:

Questions of law are those involving legal principles of general application across varied circumstances, and are not limited to specific factual scenarios;

Examples include: Does the presumption of advancement apply in Malaysia? Can a political party sue for defamation in Malaysia?

Issues involving the application of legal principles to facts, the evaluation of evidence, or inferences drawn from factual findings do not constitute questions of law;

Simply labelling a ground of appeal as a question of law does not transform a factual issue into one of law. It is the substance that matters, not the form. [44] The purported question of law raised by the Appellants/Defendants in this appeal is, in truth, no more than a ground of appeal confined to the particular facts of this case. [45] In light of the above, this appeal is dismissed on the basis that the Appellants/Defendants have failed to satisfy the requirements under section 28(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA Liability [46] The Appellants/Defendants and the Respondent/Plaintiff have advanced opposing arguments challenging and supporting, respectively, the learned Magistrate’s finding that liability was established on a balance of probabilities. [47] This Court has meticulously scrutinised each and every argument advanced by the respective parties in this appeal. [48] Upon a careful examination of the statutory provisions and judicial authorities cited by the parties, this Court is unable to agree with the submissions of the Appellants/Defendants that the learned Magistrate had erred in law and/or fact in her findings on liability. [49] The learned Magistrate reached her conclusion on liability based on the standard of a balance of probabilities, having duly considered the totality of the evidence presented. This included the police report, the sketch plan, the testimony of the Investigating Officer, as well as the compound payment made by the Second Appellant/Defendant pursuant to a summons issued under Regulation 10 of the Road Traffic Rules 1959 [LN 166/59]. [50] With respect to the Respondent/Plaintiff’s failure to testify, the Court of Appeal in Raja Lob Sharuddin bin Raja Ahmad Terzali & Ors v Sri Seltra Sdn Bhd [2008] 2 AMR 357; [2008] 2 CLJ 284; [2008] 2 MLJ 87; [2007] 3 MLRA 224 observed, at paragraph [4], as follows: S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA “... In a civil action, it is not uncommon for other persons to give evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, without the plaintiff himself taking the stand.” [51] It is acknowledged that in the cited case, the “other persons” who testified were co-plaintiffs, whereas in the present case, there was no co-plaintiff. [52] Be that as it may, this Court is of the view that the Respondent/Plaintiff was entitled to elect whether or not to testify at trial, and to accept the attendant risks and consequences arising from that decision. Quantum [53] The issue of quantum arises in both the main and the cross-appeal. [54] In relation to the main appeal, the Appellants/Defendants have alluded to the lack of evidence to support the Respondent/Plaintiff’s claim for special damages (see grounds Nos 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 in the Memorandum of Appeal). [55] The principle governing special damages was laid down in Ong Ah long v Dr S Underwood [1983] CLJ (Rep) 300; [1983] 2 MLJ 324; [1983] 1 MLRA 154. In that case, the Federal Court held as follows: It is well established principle that special damages in contrast to general damages, have to be specifically pleaded and strictly proven. S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA [56] In this present appeal, the special damages have been specifically pleaded. [57] The question remains as to whether they have been proven. [58] In response to the submissions advanced by the Appellants/Defendants, reference may appropriately be made to the observations of this Court in K Pamneer Selvam a/l Krishnan & Anor v Aminah Simbolon binti Rizal [2024] AMEJ 2882; [2024] CLJU 2966; [2024] MLJU 3421, where this Court remarked as follows: [25] Mahkamah bersetuju bahawa keterangan oleh pihak Bengkel adalah tidak material dan sebaliknya jika dipanggil sebagai saksi, ia berkemungkinan akan memprejudis kes Perayu/Defendan. Ini adalah kerana pihak Bengkel mempunyai kepentingan sendiri yang mana kos pembaikan yang berlebihan/tinggi akan menguntungkan pihak Bengkel. [26] Sebenarnya pihak Responden/Plaintif telah memberi keterangan melalui SP1 dan Mahkamah Majistret telah tepat dan betul memutuskan bahawa Responden/Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Perayu/Defendan manakala pihak Perayu/Defendan telah gagal mengemukakan sebarang keterangan/pembuktian saksi untuk menyangkalkan, menafikan keterangan/pembuktian oleh pihak Responden/Plaintif. [27] Mahkamah berpendapat Penyelaras adalah seorang saksi profesional dan berpendirian bebas dan Mahkamah Magistrate dalam rayuan ini tidak terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang dan/atau fakta untuk bergantung kepada keterangan Penyelaras. S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA [59] This Court would also like to draw the parties’ attention to cases such as Qi Qiaoxian (Claiming as the Mother and Dependent of Qi Xiangqing, Deceased) & Anor v Sunway Putra Hotel Sdn Bhd [2024] AMEJ 0723; [2024] 5 CLJ 734; [2024] 4 MLRA 49 (“Qi Qiaoxian”) and Vasantha Kumari Supramaniam & Anor v Dr Pakirisamy Baskaran & Ors [2024] AMEJ 2831; [2024] CLJU 2891; [2024] MLJU 3357; [2025] MLRH 736 (“Vasantha Kumari”). [60] In Qi Qiaoxian, the issue before the Court of Appeal was whether claims for special damages could only be proven by documentary evidence. The Court of Appeal answered the question raised as follows: P. Whether Claim For Special Damages Can Only Be Proven By Documentary Evidence [59] The defendant’s learned counsel had contended that the plaintiffs’ claim for special damages should be dismissed because such a claim was not supported by documentary evidence. This submission found favour with the learned Sessions Court and High Court Judges. [60] With respect to the Sessions Court and the High Court, we are of the view that a claimant can claim for special damages based solely on the credible testimony of a witness. This decision is premised on the following reasons:

there is nothing in the EA which has provided, either expressly or by necessary implication, that special damages can only be proven by way of documentary evidence. In fact, s. 134 of the EA has stated that no particular number of S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact;

(ii) in the High Court case of Nurul Husna Muhammad Hafiz & Anor v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2015] 1 CLJ 825, at [39] and [40], Vazeer Alam Mydin Meera JC (as he then was) has decided as follows: [39] Counsel for the defendants whilst agreeing that Nurul Husna may need to be fed special food, vitamins and nutritional supplements, argues that without proper documentary evidence of payment receipts for such purchases, a sum of RM200 per month would be more appropriate. [40] I allowed the sum of RM44,500 as claimed by the plaintiffs as the amount claimed is not farfetched in today’s prices and it would be too much to expect Nurul Husna’s parents to keep documentary proof of expenses incurred for these expenses since her birth. In this regard, I accept the submissions of counsel for the plaintiffs that the evidence was clear that the irreversible injuries and disabilities suffered by Nurul Husna had and continue to have an overwhelming and debilitating effect on her parents and carers. Their resources were centred on first saving her life and next caring for her. In such circumstances it is unreasonable to expect Nurul Husna’s parents to collect bills and receipts and filing them away with a view to bringing a claim especially when the defendants had hidden their culpability in the S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA treatment and management provided to Nurul Husna. (See Overseas Investment Pte Ltd v. Anthony William O’Brien & Anor [1988] 2 CLJ 238; [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep) 82; [1988] 3 MLJ 332). Indeed, if the defendants had candidly acknowledged their negligence earlier, than Nurul Husna’s parents could have taken legal advice much earlier and kept copies of their bills and receipts to support their claim. In this regard, I accept that it would be unrealistic to expect Nurul Husna’s parents have copies of bills and receipts for all of the expenses. (emphasis added); and

(iii) in the Singapore High Court case of STU v. The Comptroller Of Income Tax [1962] CLJU 179; [1962] 1 LNS 179; [1962] 1 MLJ 220, at 221, Tan Ah Tah J gave the following judgment: In this case certain explanations given by the appellant to the officers of the Income Tax Department were rejected on the ground that there was no documentary evidence to support them. No doubt documentary evidence can in many cases be very cogent and convincing. The lack of it however, should not invariably be a reason for rejecting an explanation. Not every transaction is accompanied or supported by documentary evidence. Much depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, but if the person who is giving the explanation appears to be worthy of credit does not reveal any inconsistency and there is nothing improbable in the explanation, it can, in my view, be accepted. (emphasis added) S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA [61] As explained in the above para. 60, the learned Sessions Court and High Court Judges had committed an error of law when they rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for special damages solely on the ground that the plaintiffs had adduced no document in support of such a claim … . [61] In Vasantha Kumari, the High Court addressed the question on special damages in the following terms: Special damages for customary Hindu [funeral] rites [17] According to the grounds of judgment prepared by the learned DR (Encl 113), the reason the learned DR disallowed this claim for RM5,000.00 was because there were no receipts or any documentation produced to prove the expenses. [18] In our mixed cultural nation, it is a well-known norm that different modes of funeral rites would be undertaken in accordance with the religious belief and culture of the deceased and that of his or her family. In this case, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs are Hindus. Thus, I take judicial notice that they would have undertaken a customary Hindu funeral rites for their deceased baby boy. Section 56 of the Evidence Act 1950 provides as follows: "56. Fact judicially noticeable need not be proved No fact of which the court will take judicial notice need be proved." [19] As for the lack of documentary evidence to support the claim for RM5,000.00, His Lordship Quay Chew Soon J in Hasniyati bt Hassan & S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA Anor v. Kerajaan Malaysia [2022] 7 CLJ 565; [2022] 10 MLJ 469; [2022] 3 AMR 726; [2022] 5 MLRH 675 (HC), an authority cited and relied upon by both the parties, at paras 51, 52 and 53 said: "[51] D complains that no documentary evidence was produced to substantiate this claim. But the parents did not and cannot be expected to keep bills and receipts for such expenses. P1 was not in the proper mental state and her husband had to focus on caring for P2 and the rest of the family. P1 testified that she had kept most of the receipts but her maid had disposed of them inadvertently. [52] I accept that a claimant is not expected to behave like a bookkeeper in compiling bills and receipts. The evidence regarding past expenses may be given through documents or the oral testimony of witness. In Rohgetana, the Court of Appeal said (at p 109 (MLJ)): [16] ... the defendants persisted before us that only such expenses incurred as could be supported by receipts (documentary proof) ought to be allowed. We however did not find that the learned judge had misdirected himself on the law when he held that special damages, so long as they were pleaded and particularised, could be proved by oral or documentary evidence... Such claims were to be allowed so long they were within a reasonable sum and justifiable in the circumstances." [53] I am satisfied that the sum pleaded is reasonable and justifiable. There is no need to achieve arithmetical accuracy when calculating the travel and incidental expenses incurred during the S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA special damages period. I therefore allow the pleaded sum of RM14,300 for this item of damages." [20] There is no need to act like a bookkeeper especially when one is suffering from depression over the loss of a baby, and bearing in mind the cultural local context in Malaysia that both the appellants are Hindus, it is more probable than not that they would have undergone such customary rites. Further, with the lapse of time of 23 years between the filing of the Writ in 2001 and the assessment of damages in 2024, it would not be reasonable to expect the appellants to have these pieces of evidence save for a recollection of the same. A refusal of this reasonable claim warrants appellate intervention and for an award for this claim to be made. [62] While it is acknowledged that the documentary evidence adduced in support of the special damages claims in Qiaoxian and Vasantha Kumari differs from that required in the present appeal, the underlying principle remains that there is no absolute rule requiring special damages to be proved solely through documentary evidence. [63] This Court is satisfied that, in respect of the cross-appeal by the Respondent/Plaintiff, the questions of law have been clearly and adequately formulated, in accordance with section 28(1)(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. [64] The questions of law, as framed by the Respondent/Plaintiff were as follows:

Bahawa terdapat persoalan undang-undang sama ada Mahkamah Majistret ada kuasa dalam mengubah ganti rugi khas S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA kos atas pembaikan motorkar Plaintif sebanyak RM28,753-40 yang telah terplid dan terbukti kepada RM8,000-00; dan

Bahawa terdapat persoalan undang-undang sama ada Mahkamah Majistret boleh mencabar taksiran kuantum kerosakan motorkar Plaintif yang sepatutnya dicabar oleh saksi pentaksir adjuster Defendan yang setanding. [65] Having considered the submissions and the relevant authorities in respect of the cross-appeal, this Court finds that the learned Magistrate erred in disallowing the Respondent/Plaintiff’s claim of RM28,753.40 for the cost of repairs and in awarding nominal damages of RM8,000.00 in its place. [66] The Respondent/Plaintiff’s claim of RM28,753.40 for vehicle repair costs is therefore allowed. [67] The decision of the Magistrates’ Court in respect of the remaining heads of claim is affirmed. [68] Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the cross-appeal is allowed. [69] The costs awarded by the Magistrates’ Court are hereby maintained. [70] The Appellants/Defendants are to pay costs of RM5,000.00 to the Respondent/Plaintiff in respect of this appeal. S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA Dated: 5 May, 2025 sgd [CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsel: Samreet Singh Sagoo for the Appellants (Messrs. Lovelace & Hastings) Patricia Ho Chan Fung and Nur Liyana binti Zulkifli for the Respondent (Messrs. C F Ho & Co.) S/N mWopw2vZxEi4CcuwvRneA