Selangor Industrial Corporation Sdn. Bhd. v Chin Kok Foong (WA-22NCC-428-07/2025)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) CIVIL SUIT NO.: (WA-22NCC-428-07/2025) BETWEEN

1. SELANGOR INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION SDN. BHD. [Company No.: 198101005851 (71965-K)]

2. GREAT VIEW ALUMINIUM SDN. BHD. [Company No.: 199901009837 (484737-H)]

3. ACE BUILDING MATERIALS SDN. BHD. [Company No.: 200901026460 (869562-U)]

4. WORLDWIDE ALUMINIUM BUILDER SDN. BHD. [Company No.: 201601011997 (1182928-W)]

5. CTSM GEOTECHNOLOGY SDN. BHD. [Company No.: 200101024739 (560497-D)]

6. SEN LENG TRADINGs [Company No.: 199703018629 (001093220-X)]

7. BESTECH BUILDERS SDN. BHD. [Company No.: 199501011839 (341041-A)] …PLAINTIFFS AND 11/05/2026 17:29:32 WA-22NCC-428-07/2025 Kand. 83 S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2

1. CHIN KOK FOONG (NRIC No.: 770122-08-6211)

2. LIEW KOK LEONG (NRIC No.: 730618-08-5777)

3. TAN TONG LANG (NRIC No.: 760908-12-5447)

4. ANDREW LUI MENG SAN (NRIC No.: 751229-07-5201) …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 22, 24 and 25) INTRODUCTION

1. When a Plaintiff alleges fraud and wrongdoing, is the claim to be shut out at the door because it draws, in part, from materials arising in liquidation proceedings, or must those issues be tested in the crucible of trial? That is the question being asked of the Court in the Defendants’ application to strike out the Plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC”) and/or under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.

2. In the matter before me, some of the Plaintiffs are trade creditors of LKD Trading Sdn Bhd (“LKD”) while others are creditors of Prinsiptek (M) Sdn Bhd (“Prinsiptek”). They plead that they had S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 supplied goods and/or carried out works for LKD and/or Prinsiptek (collectively termed as “Companies”). Allegedly, sums of payment due remain unpaid, and that both Companies were subsequently wound up.

3. The Plaintiffs’ claim presently is directed against the Defendants personally. The first two Defendants were, at the material time, the directors and controlling minds of the Companies. The 3rd and 4th Defendants are alleged to be persons directly involved with the first two Defendants in the fraud perpetrated against the Plaintiffs.

4. In substance, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants, as directors, officers and/or persons involved in the affairs of the Companies, engaged in acts of fraud, manipulation of corporate records, sham appointments, backdating of documents, concealment of material facts and transactions which depleted the assets of the Companies, thereby prejudicing the Plaintiffs as creditors.

5. In support of the Plaintiffs’ claim, they refer to liquidators’ reports made under Section 503 of the Companies Act 2016 (“the Act”) and matters arising from public examination proceedings. The Defendants’ object to this saying the Plaintiffs’ claim is impermissibly founded upon Section 503 materials. The Defendants say those materials are confined to a limited statutory purpose and cannot be used by creditors to sustain a civil action.

6. Having considered the pleadings, affidavits, submissions and authorities, I dismissed the Defendants’ applications in Enclosures 22, 23, 24 and 25 with costs. My reasons follow. S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 BACKGROUND FACTS AS PLEADED

7. The Plaintiffs are seven entities who plead that they had dealings with the Companies. The Companies were subsequently placed into liquidation.

8. The 1st Defendant and 2nd Defendant are pleaded to have been directors and/or controlling minds of the Companies at the material time. The 3rd and 4th Defendants are pleaded to have been directly involved with the 1st and 2nd Defendants in the alleged fraudulent scheme affecting the Plaintiffs, LKD and Prinsiptek.

9. The Plaintiffs plead that the Companies appointed them to carry out works for projects awarded to the Companies. The Plaintiffs further plead that they completed the works but were not paid. The Companies were subsequently wound up.

10. The Plaintiffs plead that, after filing their proofs of debt, they became aware that reports had been prepared under Section 503(1) of the Companies Act 2016 in respect of the Companies. The liquidators’ reports are said to have contained findings that fraud had been committed, material facts had been concealed, and the Defendants had failed to act honestly or diligently or had been guilty of impropriety or recklessness in relation to the affairs of the companies.

11. It is also not disputed that LKD was at all material times a wholly owned subsidiary of Prinsiptek. S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5

12. The Plaintiffs’ pleaded case is therefore not merely that reports exist. The pleaded case is that the Defendants’ acts caused or contributed to the depletion of the Companies’ assets, their eventual insolvency, and the Plaintiffs’ inability to recover their debts. THE DEFENDANTS’ CASE

13. The core submission of the Defendants is that the Plaintiffs’ claim is impermissibly anchored upon the liquidators’ reports and public examination materials under Section 503 of the Act. Section 503 report, according to the Defendants, has a singular statutory purpose, namely to enable the Court to consider whether to order public examination. They submit that the report is for the Court and the person ordered to be examined, and that there is no statutory provision permitting a creditor to access or rely upon the report in separate civil proceedings.

14. The Defendants further submit that the Plaintiffs have not explained how they obtained access to the reports.

15. In relation to public examination notes, the Defendants submit that Section 503(8) of the Act contains statutory preconditions. The notes must be reduced into writing, read over to or by and signed by the person examined. The Defendants say those conditions have not been satisfied.

16. The Defendants also submit that, even where Section 503(8)(c) of the Act permits such notes to be used in evidence, that use is limited to legal proceedings against the person examined, and further S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 limited to the purpose of contradiction in the event of inconsistent testimony. For this proposition, the Defendants rely on North Australian Territory Company v Goldsborough Mort and Company [1893] 2 Ch 381 and Ex parte Hall; In re Cooper [1882] 19 Ch D 580.

17. The Defendants then submit that the Plaintiffs’ reliance upon the reports and transcripts constitutes an abuse of process and cite Miller v Scorey [1996] 1 WLR 1122, Re Rothwells Ltd (No 2) [1989] 7 ACLC 576 and In re Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd [1992] Ch 208.

18. A further submission raised by the Defendants concerns reflective loss. They contend that the losses pleaded by the Plaintiffs are, in truth, losses suffered by the Companies, and that any claim arising from depletion of corporate assets should be brought by the Companies or their liquidators, not by individual creditors.

19. The Defendants also contend that the Plaintiffs have not properly pleaded fraudulent trading, prejudice to creditors, or a sustainable personal cause of action against the Defendants. THE PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE

20. The Plaintiffs resist the striking out applications on the basis that the law on striking out is stringent and that the Defendants have not shown that this is a plain and obvious case.

21. The Plaintiffs rely on Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 for the S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 proposition that striking out is a draconian jurisdiction and should only be exercised where the claim is obviously unsustainable. The Plaintiffs quote the well-known passage that the Court must not conduct a minutiae examination of documents and facts at the interlocutory stage, and that the mere weakness of a claim is no ground for striking it out.

22. The Plaintiffs submit that their suit is not a statutory claim under Section 503. Rather, Section 503 materials are relied upon as factual background to narrate the pleaded causes of action premised upon fraud, breach of duties, dishonest assistance and related wrongdoing.

23. The Plaintiffs further submit that there is no statutory prohibition in Section 503 preventing creditors from bringing civil claims based on facts discovered in the course of liquidation or public examination.

24. The Plaintiffs rely on Section 503(8) of the Act, which provides that notes of public examination may be used in evidence in legal proceedings against the person examined and are open to inspection by creditors or contributories at all reasonable times.

25. The Plaintiffs further submit that admissibility of documents, the manner in which documents were obtained, whether the notes were properly signed, and the scope of their evidential use are questions for trial. They submit that such questions do not render the entire cause of action obviously unsustainable at the threshold stage. S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8

26. The Plaintiffs also contend that the Defendants’ submissions sidestep the substantive pleaded allegations. These include sham appointments of individuals named as Jalal and Nasron as directors and shareholders, backdating and tampering of documents, transactions exceeding RM2 million without supporting documents, and concealment of records.

27. The Plaintiffs submit that those matters raise serious triable issues which require trial and cross-examination. THE LAW ON STRIKING OUT

28. Order 18 Rule 19(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 provides that the Court may strike out a pleading on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action, or is otherwise an abuse of process.

29. The power is draconian. It is only in plain and obvious cases that the summary jurisdiction should be invoked. In Bandar Builder, the Supreme Court held: “The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of Order 18 Rule 19(1) of the RHC are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule... and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it ‘obviously unsustainable’... It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case...” S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9

30. The same principle is reaffirmed in Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 1, where the Federal Court stated that the summary process is reserved for claims which are clearly and obviously unsustainable, and that the Court must not conduct a minutiae examination of documents and facts.

31. A further important distinction must be observed. Under Order 18 Rule 19(2) of the Rules of Court 2012, no evidence is admissible on an application under Rules 19(1)(a) Therefore, where the complaint is that the Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action, the Court is confined to the pleading. Affidavit evidence may be considered for the other limbs, but even then the Court must be careful not to convert the interlocutory application into a trial by affidavit.

32. The question at this stage is not whether the Plaintiffs will ultimately succeed. The question is whether the Statement of Claim discloses a recognisable cause of action or raises questions fit to be tried. ANALYSIS

33. I begin with the proper characterisation of the Plaintiffs’ pleaded case. The Defendants’ argument proceeds on the premise that the Plaintiffs’ claim is a claim “under Section 503”.

34. Let us look at Section 503. This is how it reads: 503 Power to order public examination of promoters, directors, etc. S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 1) A liquidator appointed in a winding up of a company may make a report to the Court stating that, in his opinion-a) a fraud has been committed; b) any material fact has been concealed by any person in the promotion or formation of the company or by any officer in relation to the company since its formation; or c) any officer of the company has failed to act honestly or diligently or has been guilty of any impropriety or recklessness in relation to the affairs of the company. 2) After considering the report under subsection (1), the Court may direct-a) the person or officer, or any other person who was previously an officer of the company, including any banker, advocate or auditor, or who is known or suspected to have in his possession any property of the company or is supposed to be indebted to the company; or b) any person whom the Court deems capable of giving information concerning the promotion, formation, trade dealings, affairs or property of the company, to appear before the Court on a date appointed and be publicly examined as to the promotion or formation or the conduct of the business of the company, or in the case of an officer or former officer, as to his conduct and dealings as an officer of the company. S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 3) The liquidator and any creditor or contributory may take part in the examination either personally or by an advocate. 4) The Court may put or allow to be put such questions to the person examined as the Court thinks fit. 5) The person examined shall be examined on oath and shall answer all such questions as the Court puts or allows to be put to him. 6) A person ordered to be examined under this section shall, before his examination, be furnished with a copy of the liquidator's report. 7) Where a person who is directed to attend before the Court under subsection (2) applies to the Court to be exculpated from any charges made or suggested against him, the liquidator shall appear on the hearing of the application and call the attention of the Court to any matters which appear to the liquidator to be relevant and if the Court, after hearing any evidence given or witnesses called by the liquidator, grants the application, the Court may allow the applicant such costs as it thinks fit. 8) Notes of the public examination-a) shall be reduced to writing; b) shall be read over to or by and signed by the person examined; S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 c) may thereafter be used in evidence in any legal proceedings against the person; and d) shall be open to the inspection of any creditor or contributory at all reasonable times. 9) The Court may, if it thinks fit, adjourn the public examination from time to time.

35. It will immediately be seen that Section 503 does not create a civil cause of action. It is a statutory machinery for public examination in a winding up. The Plaintiffs do not plead that Section 503 gives them a right to damages. They plead fraud and related wrongdoing. The Section 503 reports and public examination matters are pleaded as part of the factual narrative by which the Plaintiffs say the alleged wrongdoing was discovered or supported. So, the Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs’ claim is a claim “under Section 503” is, with respect, misplaced.

36. Why is the distinction important? It is because a pleading does not become unsustainable merely because it refers to material whose admissibility may later be disputed. The Court must distinguish between the existence of a pleaded cause of action and the admissibility or weight of the evidence by which that cause of action is to be proved.

37. The Defendants may well be entitled at trial to object to the admissibility of particular reports, transcripts or passages. They may contend that Section 503(8) of the Act has not been complied with. They may contend that the notes were not signed, or that they may S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 only be used against the person examined, or that they may only be used for contradiction. Those are forensic and evidential objections.

38. However, an evidential objection is not the same as saying that the cause of action is legally non-existent. The Plaintiffs plead that the Defendants were involved in sham appointments, backdating, concealment, asset dissipation and fraudulent conduct which prejudiced creditors. Those pleaded allegations are capable, if proved, of founding claims in fraud or related wrongdoing. Whether the Plaintiffs can prove them is a matter for trial.

39. I can do no better, in this regard, to refer to the decision in Yap Yin Hing (trading as Sunlite Electrical Engineering) v Hexatech Energy International Sdn Bhd [2020] CLJU 1563. The Court held, in substance, that issues relating to admissibility, including privilege, are matters to be determined at trial, and do not, in themselves, justify striking out a pleading at the interlocutory stage. The rationale is clear. To determine admissibility conclusively at the striking out stage would require the Court to embark upon a detailed examination of facts and surrounding circumstances, which is precisely what the authorities prohibit. Such an exercise would impermissibly convert the interlocutory application into a trial on affidavit. This approach accords with the broader procedural principle that evidential objections should, as far as possible, be adjudicated in the context of the full evidential record at trial, where witnesses may be examined and the evidential foundation properly tested. S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14

40. I therefore do not accept the Defendants’ submission that the Plaintiffs’ reference to Section 503 materials automatically renders the claim an abuse of process.

41. Again, if we hearken to the plain language in the employ of the Section 503, it will be seen that Parliament did not bar the use of the notes of public examination as how the Defendants wish to impress upon this Court. In fact, the converse is true as “Notes of the public examination may thereafter be used in evidence in any legal proceedings against the person…”.

42. In the course of oral arguments ex tempore, Learned Counsel for the Defendants was not able to refer to any parent or subsidiary legislation that outrightly barred the usage of the notes of public examination in the manner he sought to persuade me. Learned Counsel’s industry, however, expanded to common law jurisdiction which he contends sustains his objections to the reliance of the notes of public examination as done by the Plaintiffs.

43. I have perused the authorities relied upon by the Defendants on public examination. In my judgment, they do not establish a categorical rule that creditors are barred from commencing independent civil proceedings merely because part of their factual narrative is derived from liquidation materials.

44. The authorities relied upon by the Defendants fall broadly into two categories. The first, exemplified by North Australian Territory Company (supra) and Ex parte Hall (supra), concerns the limited evidential use of answers obtained in compulsory examination, in S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 particular that such answers may be used as admissions against the examinee but are not general evidence against third parties. These authorities regulate the forensic use of such materials at trial, and do not address whether a cause of action may be pleaded.

45. The second category, including Re Rothwells Ltd (No 2), In re Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd and Miller v Scorey, emphasises the court’s control over statutory or court processes and the need to prevent collateral or abusive use of such processes. However, these authorities are directed at the misuse of the process itself, and not at the subsequent reliance on information said to have emerged from such processes in properly pleaded civil claims.

46. Hence, I am not persuaded that the Defendants’ authorities establishes the proposition that a claim is liable to be struck out merely because it refers to materials arising from public examination or liquidation processes. At most, they give rise to questions of admissibility, scope of use and potential abuse. All of these are fact-sensitive matters to be determined at trial, and not grounds for summary disposal at the interlocutory stage.

47. Let me at once say, ex abundanti cautela, that I do not decide at this interlocutory stage the full evidential scope of Section 503(8)(c) of the Act. It is unnecessary to do so. It is sufficient to say that the existence of potential limitations on admissibility does not render the entire pleading obviously unsustainable. A claim may be proved in a myriad of approaches just as a cat may be skinned in more ways than one. S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16

48. I also do not accept that the Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to explain how they obtained the reports justifies striking out the claim. The question of how a document was obtained may bear upon admissibility, weight, confidentiality, privilege or case management. It does not, without more, extinguish a pleaded cause of action in fraud. If the Defendants’ argument in this regard is to be accepted, it would have the effect of precluding any litigant from pursuing a civil claim merely because relevant facts came to light through insolvency processes. There is no authority for such a sweeping proposition. Indeed, it would run counter to the fundamental principle that wrongdoing, if properly pleaded and proved, is justiciable irrespective of how the underlying facts came to light, subject always to the rules of admissibility and fairness.

49. The same analysis applies to the Defendants’ complaint that the reports cannot “sustain” the cause of action. If the Plaintiffs had pleaded nothing more than “the liquidator reported fraud, therefore the Defendants are liable”, the claim may well have been vulnerable. That is not the case here. The Statement of Claim pleads specific factual matters, namely, appointments, resignations, backdating, disposal of shares, concealment, transactions, and prejudice to creditors.

50. At the striking out stage, I am not required to decide whether those allegations are true. I am required to decide whether they are so plainly defective that the Plaintiffs should be shut out without trial. I am not so satisfied. S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17

51. For completeness, I will also address the issue on reflective loss. The doctrine of reflective loss is directed principally at preventing shareholders from recovering, in their personal capacity, loss which merely reflects loss suffered by the company. It is rooted in the principle that where the company has suffered a wrong, the company is the proper plaintiff.

52. The Plaintiffs here do not sue as shareholders. They sue as creditors. Their pleaded complaint is that they are owed unpaid debts and that the Defendants’ wrongful conduct caused or contributed to their inability to recover those debts. Whether that formulation ultimately succeeds is a matter for trial but it is not, on the pleaded case, plainly barred by reflective loss at this stage.

53. It may be that, at trial, the Defendants will argue that the real loss is suffered by the Companies, and that any recovery should be pursued by the liquidators. That issue may require close analysis of the pleaded duty, the alleged wrong, the identity of the claimant, the nature of the loss, and whether the Plaintiffs’ loss is direct or merely derivative. Those are not matters suitable for summary disposal on the present pleadings.

54. I also bear in mind the Federal Court’s discussion in Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 4 CLJ 821, on corporate personality and the circumstances in which the corporate veil may be pierced. The Federal Court recognised that Malaysian law has moved away from a broad “interests of justice” test and that actual fraud or unconscionable or inequitable conduct amounting to fraud in equity may justify intervention in appropriate cases. S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18

55. The present claim by the Plaintiffs is at the threshold stage. Fraud has been alleged but remains to be proven. Whether the veil of incorporation ought to be pierced is a question to be answered after evidence is presented at trial. It is too early in the day for a case to be summarily struck out just because the claim on the face of it ‘appears’ difficult to prove or unsustainable. Unless the pleading is so deficient that no recognisable cause of action survives, striking out remains a disproportionate course.

56. The Defendants’ submissions, I agree, raise serious points. That is precisely the point. The objections raised presently are not one I am prepared to put through a microscopic lens. Not at this stage. I must not. Some objections may be trial objections. Some may be evidential objections. Some may be issues for a preliminary determination if properly framed. These, however, do not make this a plain and obvious case.

57. I return to Bandar Builder. The Court there emphasised that where pleadings disclose some cause of action or raise some question fit to be tried, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed at trial is no ground for striking out. Applying that principle, I find that the Plaintiffs’ claim, though contested and perhaps not without difficulty, is not obviously unsustainable.

58. I make no finding at this stage that the Plaintiffs’ allegations are true. I make no finding that the Section 503 materials are admissible for every purpose for which the Plaintiffs may wish to rely upon them. I make no finding that the Defendants are liable. Those matters remain for trial. S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19

59. My finding is narrower but which I think is sufficient for present purposes. The Plaintiffs have pleaded arguable causes of action in fraud and related wrongdoing. The Defendants’ objections involve fact-sensitive and evidence-sensitive questions. The proper course, even on the Defendants’ own arguments, would be to allow the matter to proceed to trial, where the Court can rule definitively on admissibility, weight and the legal consequences of the evidence in its proper context.

60. In the round, the case is not suitable for summary termination. CONCLUSION

61. For the reasons given, the Defendants’ application fails. I dismissed the Defendants’ applications in Enclosures 22, 23, 24 and 25 with costs. Dated the 7th day of May 2026 -sgd- ……………………………………………………………………… MUHAMMAD ADAM @ EDWARD BIN ABDULLAH Judicial Commissioner (Commercial Division NCC 4) High Court of Malaya In the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Counsel for the Plaintiffs : Sachpreetraj Singh Sohanpal Messrs. Raj & Sach Counsel for the Defendants : Lim Yeong Quan for the 1st Defendant Messrs. Zen, Chyuan & Farliza Michael Chow Keat Thye for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants Messrs. Michael Chow CASE REFERENCE:

1. Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 2. Ex parte Hall; In re Cooper [1882] 19 Ch D 580 3. In re Barlow Clowes Gilt Managers Ltd [1992] Ch 208 4. Miller v Scorey [1996] 1 WLR 1122 5. North Australian Territory Company v Goldsborough Mort and Company [1893] 2 Ch 381 6. Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 4 CLJ 821 7. Re Rothwells Ltd (No 2) [1989] 7 ACLC 576 8. Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 1 9. Yap Yin Hing (trading as Sunlite Electrical Engineering) v Hexatech Energy International Sdn Bhd [2020] CLJU 1563 S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 LEGISLATION REFERENCE:

1. Section 503; Section 503(1); Section 503(8) of the Companies Act 2016 2. Order 18 Rule 19(1); Order 18 Rule 19(2) and of the Rules of Court 2012 S/N 5e07/yPkkkiofHduLAfyA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal