Sheikdawud M. Mohamed Mustafa v Pendakwa Raya (B-05(M)-386 & 389-08/2018)

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. B-05(M)-386 & 389-08/2018 BETWEEN

1. SHEIKDAWUD M. MOHAMED MUSTAFA

2. RAJANGKAM CHEPP YUDAYAR … APPELLANTS AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … RESPONDENT (In the High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam Criminal Trial No: 45A-114-10/2015 Between Public Prosecutor And

1. Sheikdawud M. Mohamed Mustafa

2. Rajangkam Chepp Yudayar) CORAM: YAACOB HAJI MD SAM, JCA RHODZARIAH BUJANG, JCA RAVINTHRAN PARAMAGURU, JCA 2 JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Three Indian nationals, i.e. the appellants and one Muthukumaran Shanmugam (Muthukumaran) were charged as follows: Bahawa kamu, dengan secara niat bersama, pada 5 Disember 2014, jam lebih kurang 2.35 petang, di tempat letak kereta Kuil Batu Caves, di dalam Daerah Gombak, di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah memperedarkan dadah berbahaya, iaitu 762.7 gram methamphetamine, oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama, dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. At the end of the case for the defence, Muthukumaran was acquitted whereas the appellants were found guilty and sentenced to death. The appellants have appealed against the conviction and sentence. Case for prosecution [2] The appellants and Muthukumaran were arrested in a sting operation executed by the police. On 28.11.2014, PW 1 (ASP Saravanan a/l Siwanatong) received a tip from his informer that an Indian national by the name of Dawud (identified by PW 1 as the first appellant ) was selling drugs. PW 1 called the first appellant and arranged to meet him at 10 p.m. on 30.11.2014 at PJ Hilton parking area. At the meeting, PW 1 posed as 3 a drug buyer by the name of “Murali”. The first appellant told him that he was selling methamphetamine at the price of RM105,000.00 per kilogramme. PW 1 agreed to buy methamphetamine at that price but wanted to consult his “boss”. Sometime later at about 12.30 a.m. in the early hours of the following morning, PW 1 told the first appellant that his “boss” wanted to buy three kilogrammes of methamphetamine. They agreed to meet at 11 a.m. in the later part of the morning at PJ Hilton. As PJ Hilton was deemed an unsuitable place for surveillance by the police, PW 1 called the first appellant and changed the venue to a nearby restaurant called Restoran Suraya. [3] PW 1 and the first appellant met inside Restoran Suraya and sat down at a table. The first appellant asked PW 1 to wait for the arrival of his “right hand man” by the name of Raja. Inspector Luther who came with PW 1 waited in the car with the money to purchase the drugs. Half an hour later, the said Raja arrived but did not bring the drugs with him. PW 1 said that his boss wanted to purchase three kilogrammes of methamphetamine. He is willing to pay RM315,000.00. The first appellant requested PW 1 to follow him to Brickfields if he wanted the drugs urgently. PW 1 turned down the offer. The first appellant told him that he would call later. [4] On 4.12.2014, the first appellant called PW 1 and told him to come to the Batu Caves Temple compound in Gombak the following day between 1 p.m. to 2 p.m. to purchase the drugs. PW 3 (ASP Mohd Husni bin Manaf) who was the raiding officer, stationed his team members in the temple compound and its vicinity. PW 1 arrived at the said venue in a Mercedes Benz car. Inspector Luther was with him. He carried “flash money” of RM315,000.00 with him. PW 1 called the first appellant after 4 parking his car. About 10 minutes later, the first appellant came. He went to the backseat of Mercedes Benz of PW 1. He asked to be shown the money. Insp. Luther who was in the backseat of the car showed him the money. The first appellant then said that Raja would be there shortly with the drug consignment. He said the money must be given to Raja. The first appellant then got out of the car. About 15 minutes later, a KIA Sportage car was driven to the parking lot. PW 1 saw an Indian man carrying a black pouch bag entering the KIA Sportage car. About two or three minutes later, the said Indian man came out of the car and waited outside. Then, the said Raja whom PW 1 had met earlier in Restoran Suraya, came out the same car. He carried a plastic bag with him. PW 1 went out his car. Raja showed him the contents of the plastic bag. PW 1 suspected that it contained methamphetamine. He then gave the pre-arranged signal to the police raiding team members who had taken positions in the temple compound to move in. [5] The first appellant, the said Raja and the other Indian man were arrested. Dawud was identified by PW 1 as the first appellant (first accused at the High Court). Raja was identified as the second appellant (third accused at the High Court). The other Indian man arrested at the scene was identified as Muthukumaran Shanmugam (the second accused at the High Court). Findings of trial judge at end of prosecution case [6] The learned trial judge found that there was a prima facie case against the appellants and Muthukumaran and he called for their defence. His reasons are as follows. 5 [7] The learned trial judge firstly considered whether the substance that was found in the plastic bag that was carried by the second appellant was methamphetamine. He found that the plastic bag and its contents were properly marked and labelled by PW 3. A search list which listed the plastic bag and its contents was prepared by PW 3. PW 4 (the investigating officer) who received the plastic bag and its contents personally sent them to the government chemist (PW 2) for analysis. The learned trial judge found no break in the chain of evidence. PW 2 told the court that after analysis, she determined that the substance in question was methamphetamine with a net weight of 762.7 grammes. On the above evidence, the learned trial judge was satisfied the prosecution proved that the substance recovered from the second appellant was methamphetamine as stated in the charge. Next, he addressed the evidence in respect of the ingredient of “trafficking” as defined in section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. [8] As against the first appellant, he considered the following evidence. PW 1 told the court that he spoke to the first appellant on the phone several times. The first appellant answered to the name of Dawud and agreed to meet PW 1 to sell drugs to him. PW 1 had a face to face meeting at the parking lot of PJ Hilton with the first appellant on 28.11.2014. The first appellant told PW 1 that he was selling methamphetamine. The second face to face meeting of PW 1 with the first appellant was at Restoran Suraya. They sat at a table and discussed the terms of sale of methamphetamine. Pursuant to these discussions which concerned the sale of methamphetamine, the first appellant showed up at the appointed venue, i.e. the parking area of the Batu Caves Temple. For this reason, the learned trial judge inferred that the presence of first appellant at the venue was not coincidental. Furthermore, the first 6 appellant asked to see the money that PW 1 brought with him to buy the drugs. PW 1 said that only after the money was shown to him, the first appellant said that Raja (the second appellant) would bring the drugs. Raja showed up ten minutes later with the drugs. [9] The learned trial judge referred to the definition of trafficking in section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. It includes “selling”. The learned trial judge found that the preliminary negotiations at the parking lot of the PJ Hilton and Restoran Soraya between PW 1 and the first appellant about price and quantity of methamphetamine constitutes evidence that the first appellant was selling drugs. On the authority of the Federal Court case of PP v Saari bin Jusoh [2007] 2 CLJ 197, he rejected the argument that the element of “selling” was not satisfied because the money was not collected by first appellant. And on the authority of the Federal Court case of Wan Marzuki Wan Abdullah v PP [2013] 1 CLJ 177, he held that there need not be actual delivery to the buyer to satisfy the element of “selling”. [10] In respect of the second appellant, the learned trial judge considered the following evidence. The second appellant was present at Restoran Suraya when PW 1 and the first appellant sat down to negotiate the terms of the sale of the methamphetamine. The first appellant told PW 1 that the second appellant will arrange the delivery of the drugs. The second appellant was also present at the crime scene. He was arrested red handed as he showed a plastic bag that contained the drugs to PW 1. He showed the drugs to the PW 1 about ten minutes after the first appellant had seen the “flash money” which Inspector Luther was holding in the Mercedes Benz car. For the above reasons, the learned trial judge 7 found that the second appellant had common intention with the first appellant to sell the methamphetamine to PW 1. [11] As for Muthukumaran, the learned trial judge accepted the evidence that he was present at the Batu Caves Temple parking lot. He was seen holding a black pouch bag. He entered the KIA Sportage car after it arrived. Shortly after that, the second appellant emerged from the said car holding a plastic bag that contained the drugs in question. For this reason, the learned trial judge inferred that Muthukumaran had common intention with the first appellant to traffic in drugs. The defence [12] The appellants and Muthukumaran gave sworn evidence. The first appellant’s defence was as follows. He was a restaurant worker. He went to the Batu Caves Temple site on 5.12.2014 between 1.30 p.m. to 2.00 p.m. His purpose was to meet one Stephen David who was a so-called “passport agent” for Indian nationals. Stephen David is also known as Daud or Ghani. The first appellant wanted a “permit” to make a passport. He called Stephen David after arriving at the Batu Caves Temple compound. He was told to wait at the restaurant located in the temple compound. Stephen David called him a short while later. The first appellant could see Stephen David walking towards him. While still on the phone with the first appellant as he walked, Stephen David told him that he has to go the Immigration Department on Monday and Tuesday. Suddenly there was a sound of a car screeching in the parking lot area. Immediately, Stephen David ran out of the temple compound. The first appellant attempted to run after him but failed as Stephen David was ahead by about 25 metres. The first appellant tripped and fell down when 8 someone hit his head and kicked him from behind. He was then handcuffed and arrested. PW 1 said that at around 6 p.m. the same day, he met Stephen David at the Gombak Police Station where both were detained. The first appellant said that prior to his arrest, he never met or spoke to PW 1. His defence was that it was Stephen David who met and negotiated with PW 1 to sell drugs and not him. [13] The second appellant’s defence was as follows. He had been in Malaysia for 20 years. He works as a private car driver for Indian nationals. He said many manual workers from India knew his hand phone number. Stephen David asked him on the day in question to pick him up from a restaurant in Sentul and send him to the Batu Caves Temple compound. It was 1.30 p.m. when he picked up Stephen David. He noticed that Stephen David held a plastic bag in his hand. After they reached the temple compound, Stephen David told the second appellant that his friend would take half an hour to arrive. Stephen David told the second appellant that he had urgent business to attend. He asked the second appellant to pass the plastic bag to his friend on his behalf. He promised to pay the second appellant a higher fare later. [14] Stephen David called him ten minutes later and asked him to park the car right in front of the temple so that his friend can find him. A short while later, a man that he identified as Muthukumaran came to the side of his car. He asked the second appellant to go to the restaurant for a drink. The second appellant declined the request on the ground that he was waiting for someone. Stephen David called the second appellant and told him that his friend had arrived in a Mercedes Benz car. The second appellant got out his car. He approached the Mercedes Benz car and asked the person on the driver’s side whether he is “Murali”. He identified 9 “Murali” as PW 1. He told PW 1 that Stephen David had left and took the plastic bag to give to him. He was then arrested. He said at the Gombak Police Station, he was shown a photograph of Stephen David by the police. He later saw Stephen David at the same police station as he had also been arrested. The second appellant said he never met PW 1 prior to his arrest. [15] The defence of Muthukumaran was as follows. He arrived in the country two years earlier to work as a mover. On the day in question, he took the train to go the Batu Caves Temple to perform prayers. He carried a black pouch bag with him that contained a water bottle, his passport and a wallet. He saw the second appellant waiting in his car at the temple. He knew the second appellant. He went inside the car to chat with the second appellant and invited him to have a drink at the temple restaurant but the latter declined. He then walked towards the foothill area of the temple compound. A group of men accosted him soon after. He was arrested and taken to the Gombak Police Station. At the police station, he was shown a photograph of a person. Muthukumaran told the police that he was acquainted with said person but knew him as “Ghani” and not Stephen David. He also said he brought the police to Jalan Ipoh to point out “Ghani’s” house. Findings of trial judge at end of defence case [16] The learned trial judge rejected the defence of the appellants as an afterthought. He found it unreasonable that the first appellant went to the temple compound to meet Stephen David to arrange his permit and passport merely for the latter to tell him to be on standby to go the Immigration Department on Monday or Tuesday. The learned trial judge 10 questioned why PW 1 was not cross-examined about his alleged meeting with Stephen David at the restaurant in the temple compound. He also questioned why the police witnesses were not cross-examined about the screeching car sound or the manner in which the first appellant was arrested. In respect of the testimony of the second appellant who said that Stephen David had to leave the temple compound immediately as he could not wait for the arrival of his “friend”, the learned trial judge contrasted it with the evidence of the first appellant who said that he met Stephen David at the temple compound. He found this to be contradiction. He also found it improbable that Stephen David did not want to hand over the drugs personally to his “friend” as he had called him from the temple compound and asked him whether he had arrived. He found both appellants failed to raise a reasonable doubt on the case of the prosecution. He convicted and sentenced both appellants to death. [17] In respect of the defence of Muthukumaran, the learned trial judge noted that he never claimed to have met Stephen David. PW 1 also did not meet him during negotiations to buy drugs from the first appellant. The learned trial judge also considered the evidence of PW 1 who said that Muthukumaran came out of the KIA Sportage car and stood at the steps of the temple. This was what Muthukumaran told the court as well. Furthermore, the pouch bag carried by Muthukumaran did not contain any drugs. The learned trial judge found that Muthukumaran had raised a reasonable doubt on the case of the prosecution. He acquitted and discharged him. 11 The appeal [18] In the High Court, the appellants were represented by different counsel. Before us, senior counsel Mr. Hisyam Teh Poh Teik represented both appellants. The appellants raised several grounds in the petition of appeal. However, in his written submission, counsel for the appellants raised only two issues. The first issue is that there was no concluded sale of drugs and therefore section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 does not apply. The second issue was that the failure on the part of the prosecution to call Stephen David was fatal as he was an important witness. However, counsel for the appellants pursued only the second issue before us in respect of the appeals of both appellants. [19] The argument of counsel for the appellants in summary is as follows. Stephen David is a real person as there is evidence of his existence and his involvement in drug trafficking activities. The head of the raiding team (PW 3) agreed during cross-examination that one Stephen David was arrested on the same day and was charged for drug trafficking, albeit in another case. PW 3 also agreed that he arrested Stephen David in a shophouse in Sentul at 5.15 p.m. PW 1 was with PW 3 when Stephen David was arrested. It was also put to PW 3 that Stephen David was the real drug trafficker who negotiated with PW 1 to sell drugs and not the first appellant. [20] Counsel for appellants submitted that for the above reasons, Stephen David was an important witness. But he was not called by the prosecution as a witness. Counsel for appellant submitted the non-calling left a gap in the prosecution’s case. Stephen David’s cautioned statement was recorded. But it was not tendered by the prosecution. Stephen David 12 was not offered as a witness either to the defence. If he was called, counsel for the appellants submitted that he could have given evidence favourable to the defence of the appellants. The defence could also have challenged the creditworthiness of PW 1 who was an agent provocateur. For the above reason, counsel for the appellants urged this court to invoke the principle of adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 for the non-calling of Stephen David as a witness. He prayed that the appellants be acquitted on this ground alone. [21] The argument of the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor (DPP) in summary is as follows. He referred to the evidence of PW 1 who identified first appellant as the person that he met twice to negotiate the terms of the purchase of the methamphetamine. The meetings were preceded by telephone conversations between PW 1 and the first appellant. The second appellant was also present at the second meeting. He was introduced to PW 1 by the first appellant. PW 1 and PW 3 did not see Stephen David at the crime scene when both appellants were arrested. Although PW 3 agreed that he arrested Stephen David for a drug trafficking offence, it was in respect of a different case. The weight of methamphetamine in that case was 444.4 grammes. The arrest was made three hours later at a different location. For this reason, learned DPP submitted that Stephen David was not a material witness for the prosecution in this case. Finally, learned DPP said that if it was true that Stephen David had pretended to be the first appellant (Dawud), PW 1 would have come to know of that fact as he met the first appellant twice. 13 Our decision [22] The issue at hand is the non-calling of Stephen David as a witness by the prosecution. We shall first address the question whether the prosecution was obliged to call Stephen David whose name was put to PW 3 by the defence. [23] We shall start with first principles. In the oft quoted Privy Council case of Adel Muhammed El Dabbah v Attorney-General of Palestine [1944] AC 156 which is frequently cited by Malaysian courts on the question of the discretion of the prosecution as to what witnesses should be called, Lord Thankerton said as follows: ….the prosecutor has a discretion as to what witnesses should be called for the prosecution, and the court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion, unless, perhaps, it can be shown that the prosecutor has been influenced by some oblique motive. [24] In an earlier case, namely Seneviratne v R [1936] 3 All ER 36, the Privy Council also considered the question whether the prosecution must call all witnesses irrespective of their numbers and their reliability. The question was answered in the negative. Lord Roche said as follows: Their Lordships do not desire to lay down any rules to fetter discretion on a matter such as this which is so dependent on the particular circumstances of each case. Still less do they desire to discourage the utmost candour and fairness on the part of those conducting prosecutions; but at the same time they cannot, speaking generally, approve of an idea that a prosecution must call witnesses irrespective of considerations of number and of reliability, or that a prosecution ought to discharge the functions both of prosecution and defence. If it does so confusion is very apt to result, and never is it more likely 14 to result than if the prosecution calls witnesses and then proceeds almost automatically to discredit them by cross-examination. [25] Both the above-mentioned authorities were considered and applied a long time ago in the well-known local case of Khoon Chye Hin v PP (1961) 27 MLJ 105 by Thomson CJ. Although, the prosecution has discretion in the calling of its witnesses, it must necessarily consider the sufficiency of evidence. This point was addressed in Ti Chuee Hiang v PP [1995] 3 CLJ 1. In that case, Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ echoed the statement of Lord Roche in Seneviratne v R (supra) that the prosecution must call “witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution case is based”. Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ said as follows: Having said that, it is in our view clear law, that while the prosecution has a complete discretion as to the choice of witnesses to be called at the trial (see e.g. Adel Muhammed el Dabbah v. A-G (Palestine) [1994] AC 156 at 167-9) the most basic limitation upon prosecutorial discretion in the presentation of a case, is that it also has a duty to call all of the necessary witnesses to establish proof against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, and if, in the exercise of its discretion, it fails to fulfil this obligation which is nothing less a that a statutory duty - the accused must be acquitted. [26] In the more recent case of Jamaludin bin Md Kassim v PP [2010] 3 MLJ 221 which is a decision of this court, Ahmad Maarop JCA (later PCA) reviewed the major authorities on this subject and held that the non-calling of a witness who was not essential to the unfolding of the prosecution’s case did not result in procedural unfairness to the accused person. 15 [27] We shall now turn to the evidence in this case. We found that contrary to the suggestion of counsel for the appellants, there is not an iota of evidence to support the contention that Stephen David was a material witness in this case or that he was essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution’s case is based. PW 1 gave unshaken evidence before the learned trial judge that he negotiated on the phone and in person with the first appellant. He identified the first appellant as the person whom he met to negotiate the purchase of drugs. PW 1 also said that it was the first appellant who entered the Mercedes Benz to ascertain whether he brought money to purchase the drugs. PW 1 never said that Stephen David was involved in the negotiations to buy drugs. It is surely inconceivable that PW 1 cannot tell the difference between the first appellant and Stephen David. It must not be forgotten that PW 1 spent time negotiating the terms of the purchase of drugs with the first appellant on two occasions. Thus, there can be no possibility that PW 1 was confused about the identity of the first appellant or that he conflated the identities of the first appellant and that of Stephen David. The evidence of PW 1 is admissible although he was an agent provocateur under section 40 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. In fact, PW 1 and PW 3 did not even see Stephen David at the Batu Caves Temple compound at the time of the arrests of the appellants. The learned trial judge found PW 1 to be a credible witness. His finding on this point does not warrant appellate interference as there is nothing in the record to indicate that his credibility as a witness was seriously challenged and contradicted. [28] PW 3, the head of the raiding team and PW 4, the investigating officer agreed that Stephen David was arrested on the same day some three hours later. But both police officers emphatically stated that he was 16 arrested at a different time and in a different place. The quantity of methamphetamine seized in relation to his arrest was different as well. PW 4 agreed he investigated Stephen David but it was in respect of a different case that also led to seizure of methamphetamine. PW 3 also stated that Stephen David had nothing to do with the drug transaction in relation to the arrests that were made at the Batu Caves Temple compound. The trial judge found PW 3 and PW 4 to be credible witnesses. As their evidence was not challenged on material points, we see no reason to review the finding of the trial judge in respect of the credibility of these police officers who must be presumed to be disinterested witnesses. [29] The basis of the prosecution’s case is based on the evidence of PW 1 who acted as agent provocateur to lure the first appellant to sell drugs to him. Stephen David did not figure in the trap that was sprung on the first appellant by the police. In the premises, it cannot be said for any reason that the non-calling of Stephen David would leave a gap in the case of the prosecution. He was simply irrelevant to the case of the prosecution. [30] Learned counsel for the appellants also argued that the cautioned statement of Stephen David should have been tendered or that he should have been offered as a witness to the defence at the close of the case for the prosecution. We found no merit in this argument for the following reason. Although, the cautioned statement of Stephen David was recorded, it was recorded in relation to the investigation into another case and not the instant case. It was also in evidence that Stephen David was eventually charged for the offence of drug trafficking in relation to the other case. In the premises, we are of the view that there is no merit in the point taken. 17 [31] Finally, we shall address the submission that the appellants were not accorded a fair trial by the prosecution on account of their failure to call Stephen David as a witness. In Adel Muhammed El Dabbah v Attorney-General of Palestine (supra), Lord Thankerton said that the court will not interfere with the discretion of the prosecution in the calling of witnesses unless it can be shown that the prosecutor was influenced by oblique motive. In the instant case, the appellants completely failed to demonstrate that the prosecution was influenced by oblique motive as Stephen David was not arrested or questioned in relation to the instant case. For the same reason, we are of the view that there was no procedural unfairness or miscarriage of justice (see Jamaludin bin Md Kassim v PP (supra)). We are also of the view that there was no suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution. The appellants did not tender any evidence to prove that the prosecution prevented the defence from calling Stephen David to the witness stand. In the premises, there is no ground whatsoever to invoke adverse inference against the prosecution for not calling Stephen David to the witness stand. [32] The learned trial judge found that Stephen David has no connection to the instant case. He rejected the defence of the appellants that it was Stephen David who negotiated with PW 1 to sell the drugs which are the subject matter of the charge. For reasons that we gave earlier, we find no reason to interfere with the finding of fact of the trial judge that Stephen David has no connection whatever to the instant case. And if we may say so, the only apparent connection that the Stephen David had with the appellants but not the case is that fate brought them together on the day in question as they were locked up in the same police station. 18 [33] Before we conclude this judgment, for sake of completeness, we shall briefly address the first issue that was not pursued during oral argument. The argument is that the sale of the drugs was not completed as at the point of arrest, the goods were not in a deliverable state and money had not changed hands. It was argued that the goods were not in a deliverable state as PW 1 had negotiated for the purchase of three kilogrammes of methamphetamine but the gross weight of the methamphetamine that was seized was only about one kilogramme. Contract law authorities were cited in support of the said argument. In our view, this argument cannot be countenanced having regard to the definition of trafficking in section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. The definition refers to “selling” and not a sale that complies with the agreed terms. As stated by Abdul Aziz Mohd FCJ in his concurring judgment in PP v Saari bin Jusoh (supra), the ordinary dictionary meaning of “selling” should be preferred and it is of wide import. Having regard to all the evidence in this case, the methamphetamine was obviously brought by the appellants to the pre-arranged venue for the purpose of selling. Therefore, the act of the appellants falls within the ambit of the definition of trafficking regardless of the fact that they did not comply with the agreed conditions of sale. The other related argument is that the money was not collected by the first appellant or the second appellant at the time of arrest. However, we find that the learned trial judge correctly held on the authority of the same Federal Court case of PP v Saari bin Jusoh (supra) that the sale was completed upon transfer of the property in the goods even though the price has not been paid. 19 Conclusion [34] In conclusion, we found no merit in the only ground argued before us. We also did not find merit in the other ground addressed in the written submission. Having considered the grounds of the learned trial judge and the factual matrix of this case, we are of the view that the conviction of the appellants is safe. In the circumstances, we unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence by the High Court on both appellants. SGD (RAVINTHRAN PARAMAGURU) Judge Court of Appeal, Malaysia Dated: 23rd April 2020 Parties Appearing: For The Appellants: Hisyam Teh Poh Teik [Messrs. Teh Poh Teik & Co.] For The Respondent: Gan Chee Keong Deputy Public Prosecutor Attorney General’s Chambers