Alternatively, a declaration that the actions of the 1st respondent in applying for the Prohibition Order were unlawful. [18] The applicants also seek an order for a declaration that reg 9 or reg 10 of the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within Infected Local Areas) (National Recovery Plan) Regulations 2021 (“the Covid-19 Regulations”) do not prohibit gatherings or processions to express political views. [19] On 30.8.2022, this Court refused leave for the applicants to commence judicial review. Dissatisfied, the applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal against the refusal to grant leave. [20] On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal, granted leave for the applicants to commence this judicial review and remit the matter to this Court for it to be heard and deliberated at the substantive stage. [21] The application for judicial review is supported by the affidavits of the 1st applicant in Encl 3 (“AIS-3”). The 2nd applicant filed his affidavit in support in Encl 4 (“AIS-4”). [22] In response, the 1st respondent filed his affidavit in reply in Encl 24 (“AIR-24”). [23] There are further exchanges of affidavits between the parties, which will be referred to in this judgment as and when the need arises. The applicants’ case [24] Before me, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that this Court is seized with the jurisdiction to hear the judicial review application and grant reliefs to the applicants. [25] Learned counsel for the applicants contended that the existence of the alternative remedy in the form of s 98(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code (“CPC”) is not a bar to judicial review. For context, s 98(1) of the CPC empowers a Magistrate by a written order to direct any person to abstain from a certain act if the Magistrate considers that the direction is likely to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to any persons lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a riot or any affray. [26] Sub-section (4) provides as follows: Any Magistrate may rescind or alter any order made under this section by himself or his predecessor in office. Learned counsel for the applicants, citing the judgment of the Federal Court Lai Cheng Cheong v Sowarathnam [1983] 2 MLJ 113 FC, contended that an applicant for certiorari, as in this case, is not normally obliged to have exhausted his rights of appeal within the administrative hierarchy nor need he have exhausted his right of appeal to a court of law. [27] Further cases post Lai Cheng Cheong – according to learned counsel – seem to hold that it is not a rigid rule that whenever there is an appeal procedure available to the applicant, he should be denied judicial review. This proposition can be seen in judgments of the Federal Court in Government of Malaysia & Anor v Jagdis Singh [1987] 2 MLJ 185 FC and Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 CLJ 65 FC. [28] In any event, learned counsel for the applicants further submitted that the applicants were not the organisers of the Rally. They were there to exercise their constitutional rights to participate in the Rally. The applicants contended that the Prohibition Order was obtained a day before the Rally. Under the circumstances, neither the applicants nor the organisers had any reasonable opportunity to take any steps to set aside the Prohibition Order. [29] In their Statement made under O 53 r 3(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC”), which is in Encl 2, the applicants inter alia stated the Prohibition Order had infringed their right to freedom of movement under Art 9(2) and to peaceful assembly under Art 10(1) of the Federal Constitution. [30] In short, the applicants’ challenge is anchored on the grounds of illegality and constitutionality. Under the circumstances, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the proper forum to determine these issues would be the High Court exercising supervisory powers. As an authority to the said proposition, learned counsel referred me to the judgment of the Federal Court in Sundra Rajoo a/l Nadarajah v Menteri Luar Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 5 MLJ 209 FC. [31] In Sundra Rajoo, the Federal Court held that the decision of the Attorney General to charge a person is amenable to judicial review, notwithstanding the fact that there is an option to apply to the Criminal High Court to strike out the charge. Tengku Maimun CJ, in delivering the judgment of the apex court, held that where it is alleged that the charge is a nullity, the proper forum to decide the question is the High Court acting within its supervisory jurisdiction. [32] My attention was also drawn to the recent judgment of the Federal Court in Dhinesh a/l Tanaphll v Lembaga Pencegahan Jenayah & Ors [2022] 5 CLJ 1 FC. In that case, the detention against the appellant was ordered by the chairman of the Prevention of Crime Board (‘the Board’) pursuant to s 19A(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1959 (‘the POCA’). In support of his application, the appellant claimed, inter alia, that the magistrate who extended his initial 21- day remand (following his arrest) by another 38 days, purportedly pursuant to s 4(2) of the POCA did so without considering a statement from the Public Prosecutor as was required under that section. [33] The Federal Court held that there was non-compliance with s 4(2) of POCA, which was an irregularity. It was further held that there was no merit to the respondents’ contention that the appellant’s habeas corpus application had been rendered academic because the remand order under s 4(2) had been replaced by the detention order under s 19A(1). [34] Citing Dinesh as an authority, learned counsel for the applicants highlighted that even though the remand order under s 4(2) of POCA was not set aside under the CPC and had lapsed, the Federal Court nevertheless examined the said order and found it unlawful. [35] The extension of the argument is that in the instant case, even though there was no attempt made by either the applicants or the organisers to rescind the Prohibition Order, this Court is not precluded, in fact, seized with jurisdiction, to examine the order, declare it unlawful and issue an order of certiorari to quash the same. [36] In any event, learned counsel also attracted my attention that although s 98(4) of the CPC empowers the Magistrate to rescind or alter the Prohibition Order, it does empower him to grant damages. This is in contrast with O 53 r 5 of the ROC, which allows the High Court to award damages arising from the judicial review application; Wang Choon Yin lwn Dato’ Seri Mustafar bin Hj Ali, Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Kumpulan Sokongan (No. 1) dan lain-lain [2020] 5 MLJ 793 CA. The legality of the Prohibitory Order [37] The thrust of the applicant’s application is that the Prohibitory Order is illegal. The line of argument of learned counsel for the applicants is that the powers under s 98 of the CPC can only be exercised by the Magistrate as a measure of last resort. From this perspective, it is the contention of learned counsel for the applicants that the respondents have not adduced any evidence to show any obstruction, annoyance, injury, or even danger to human life caused by the Rally. [38] According to learned counsel, the IGP had other means to ensure that any risk of foreseeable harm could be addressed. [39] The long and short of the applicants’ argument is that there is no basis for the respondents to obtain the Prohibition Order on an ex parte basis. Learned counsel then submitted that the learned Magistrate had taken into consideration grounds which were either irrelevant or without legal basis when issuing the Prohibition Order. [40] In any event, learned counsel submitted that the 1st to 3rd respondents’ in blocking roads and public transport stations were ultra vires a plethora of statutory provisions, including: