1. ) Siti Zabedah Binti Kasim v 1. ) Mohd Fadzle Bin Salim (WA-21NCvC-104-06/2021)

ANIS NUR IZZATY BINTI RUSLAN (NO K/P:941201-02-5840) ... PLAINTIFFS

KERAJAAN MALAYSIA ... DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

Heroism in captivity. That would be the appropriate headline for what happened to the Plaintiffs. That frustrated feeling when you are prevented from providing your legal services as your client's advocate, helpless in confinement, unable to shield your vulnerable client from the claws of power. Those unjustified incidents prompted the lawyer ("Siti") and her 24-year-old client ("Anis") to bring this suit against 30 defendants, including police officers, Hospital Kajang, its director, senior government officials, and the federal Government. The Plaintiffs will be referred to by their first names, while the Defendants will be referred to by their numerical order in this action, e.g., the First Defendant as "D1" and so forth.

Three incidents from 21-24.6.2018 are the basis of the claim. In the first, Anis attended the Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor (JAIS) Office in Shah Alam for questioning, but was instead asked about her relationship with her mother. As she tried to leave, D1-D13, who were police officers, threatened to detain her, dragged her into a lift despite her resistance, and transported her to Hospital Kajang against her will. There, her identity card and phones were seized, she was denied access to her lawyer, and she was forced to undergo blood, urine, and brain scan tests while being physically restrained by officers. Siti arrived and eventually secured Anis's release around 5 pm. Anis then lodged a police report and took refuge at Siti's residence.

In the second incident on 23.6.2018, officers raided Siti's residence at night, broke through the grill, front door, bedroom door, and bathroom door, found Anis hiding in the toilet, and took her to the police headquarters (IPD Kajang) despite her protests that she was staying there voluntarily.

The third incident followed suit after midnight, when Siti went to IPD Kajang demanding to see her client. She was refused access, then arrested around 12.30 am on allegations of kidnapping and obstructing police. She was held in the Semenyih lock-up and brought to court the next morning in handcuffs, but the Magistrate denied the remand application. She was only released by late afternoon. Anis was taken to Hospital Kajang again and released around 5.30 am.

The Plaintiffs claim false imprisonment, breach of Article 5 of the Federal Constitution constitutional rights, misfeasance of public office, battery/assault, trespass, and negligence, seeking aggravated and exemplary damages. D30 is named to be vicariously liable.

The Defendants argue that D5 and the Royal Malaysian Police ("PDRM") lack legal capacity to be sued and should be struck out. They contend that all actions were lawful under s 11 of the Mental Health Act 2001 (Act 615) ("MHA 2001"), which permits the police to detain and bring a person for psychiatric examination where there is a reasonable belief that the person has a mental disorder. The basis was a police report (Presint 7/5630/18) lodged by Anis's parents on 10 June 2018, alleging that she had a mental disorder and posed a danger to herself.

Regarding the first incident, the Defendants contend that D1-D9 went to the JAIS Office at 10 am on 21.6.2018, acting on this police report, and brought Anis to Hospital Kajang for psychiatric examination. They claim Anis resisted but was calmed. The medical examinations, conducted at the police's request and the parents' behest, were not harmful and did not require Anis's consent under the Act. The Defendants further allege that Siti forced her way into the hospital ward, caused a disturbance, and removed Anis without the consent of the parents, the hospital, or the police.

The second incident was refuted by the Defendants, and they claimed that they acted on a police report, Kajang No. 23052/18, under s 363 of the Penal Code ("PC"), which is kidnapping from lawful guardianship. After 15 minutes of calling out without cooperation, they broke into the residence and found Anis. They maintain that no warrant was needed as they were acting under the Criminal Procedure Code ("CPC") and the Police Act 1967 ("PA 1967").

As for the third incident, the Defendants contend that Siti came to IPD Kajang, became confrontational, and was lawfully arrested under ss 186 (obstructing public servants) and 363 PC. Anis was again brought to Hospital Kajang for psychiatric assessment under s 11 MHA 2001; after examination, she was given a follow-up date and allowed to leave.

The Defendants assert all actions were protected under s 7 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 ("GPA 1956"), the CPC, the PA 1967, and the MHA 2001, where they seek a dismissal of the suit with costs.

For purposes of ease of reference, the contentious incidents are:

The detention of Anis under s 11 MHA 1967 and medical tests at Hospital Kajang on 21.06.2018;

The police break in into Siti's residence on 23.06.2018; and

The arrest and overnight detention of Siti on 23- 24.06.2018. (hereinafter referred to as "the 3 Incidents"). B. SUMMARY OF WITNESS TESTIMONIES

Anis (SP1) testified to suffering physical and emotional abuse from her mother since childhood. She left home in January 2018 and stayed at a WAO shelter for approximately four months. She made three police reports; the first was a "cover report" mentioning only controlling behaviour, while the latter reports explicitly described physical and emotional abuse. On 21.6.2018, while giving a statement at JAIS, police forcibly took her to Hospital Kajang for psychiatric examination without her consent. At the hospital, her identity card (IC) and handphone were confiscated, and she was subjected to blood tests, urine tests, and a CT scan without consent, with police officers flanking her bed. Siti removed her before the examination was completed. Anis never sought medical evidence for her injuries and has no documentary proof of nervous shock. She acknowledged sending suicidal messages to her mother but maintained these were expressions of anger, not evidence of mental illness. She currently has no contact with either parent.

Siti (SP2) was contacted by Anis via Facebook Messenger on 31.12.2017 and provided pro bono legal assistance. She organised volunteers to help Anis leave home; after a first attempt failed, Anis reached WAO independently. On 21.6.2018, Siti went to Hospital Kajang after learning Anis had been taken there from JAIS, found Anis on a bed with drips, and took her out, believing the detention was illegal under the Mental Health Act. On 23.6.2018, police raided Siti's Segambut house by breaking the gate, front door, bedroom door, and bathroom door. They took Anis to IPD Kajang. Siti was denied access to Anis at the station, arrested twice (initially for kidnapping and obstruction, then for obstruction only after the kidnapping charge was dropped), handcuffed, and held at Semenyih lock-up. She was brought to Kajang Magistrate's Court in PDRM remand clothing without undergarments; the remand application was rejected. She disputed the Enforcement Agency Integrity Commission (EAIC) report as biased toward police and maintained that Anis showed no signs of mental illness.

Soh (SP3) volunteered after seeing Siti Kasim's Facebook post about Anis's case. He had no personal knowledge of events at the university. He went to Hospital Kajang after seeing Siti's Facebook Live and found Anis on a bed, but did not witness any commotion.

Shareena (SP4) accompanied Siti to her house on 23.6.2018 and saw the broken front door. At IPD Kajang, she saw Anis confined in a room behind a door. She was present when police stated their intention to handcuff Siti, but did not witness the actual handcuffing.

Lai (SP5) was never physically present at any detention site. All her testimony was based on indirect information from conversations with Anis via WhatsApp, phone calls, or occasional meetings.

Suriani (SP6) testified from the US, where she confirmed the videos she recorded at IPD Kajang showing Anis confined in a room with a police officer physically blocking the door. She witnessed a police officer shouting at Siti, but did not see Siti being handcuffed.

Nazreen (SP7) is the Executive Director of Women Aid Organisation (WAO), where she joined WAO after the 3 Incidents. SP7 confirmed from case files that Anis entered the WAO shelter twice (January and June 2018) for domestic violence support. The social workers who handled Anis's case had since left WAO. WAO sent a complaint letter to PDRM about police harassment of its social workers; EAIC acknowledged receipt but never followed up.

Gurprit (SP8) never met Anis in person and was never present at the hospital or police station. All information came from WhatsApp or phone calls.

Shafiq (SP9) accompanied Anis to JAIS on 21.6.2018. Witnessed police officers carrying a straitjacket through the JAIS office toward Anis's room, though it was not used. Anis was visibly distressed and grabbed his coat, pleading for help. At Hospital Kajang, he found Anis on a bed with an IV drip site and at least one police officer positioned near her bed. He did not know whether Anis's examination was still incomplete when Siti took her out.

Mohamad Suffian (SD1) is the sergeant of the D9 Unit where he was part of the raid team at Siti's house on 23.6.2018. The raid team acted on the orders of Inspector Hazrani (SD3), who confirmed that he had not made any independent decisions during the raid. SD1 could not recall many details: whether SD3 called out to the occupant before entry, how the grill or door was broken open, who spoke with Anis, or how Anis was brought out. SD1 confirmed the house was locked (with the grill and wooden door). He admitted to being at the back of the team and not seeing or hearing Anis when found in the bathroom. He did not take notes, diary entries, or photographs. He also did not know there were occupants inside before entry. No female officer initially accompanied the team, but he later corrected that one female officer was present.

At IPD Kajang, SD1 was in an inner room doing paperwork throughout the confrontation with Siti. SD1 heard Anis shout "dia tak kidnap I" (that Siti didn't kidnap her) from behind a door. When asked whether he personally believed Siti kidnapped Anis, SD1 said no. SD1 did not witness Siti Kasim's arrest. Nonetheless, he attributed memory gaps to the event being 7 years ago.

SD2, Sahbudin bin Taharudin is a former Sergeant at Balai Polis Presint 7, Putrajaya. SD2 received orders from Insp. Fadzle to help bring Anis from JAIS to Hospital Kajang for a mental health examination. At JAIS, he did not go upstairs; instead, he waited in the car. As such, he was unsure whether Anis's parents were at JAIS, but he confirmed they were at Hospital Kajang. At the hospital, he stayed at a distance; he neither saw nor heard Anis's examination or any conversation with her. When Siti Kasim took Anis out, he could not say it looked like a kidnapping and said he "didn't see it that way." His police report did not use the words "kidnap" or "larikan" (absconded) regarding Siti. He had directed that the statement under s 112 CPC be taken by ASP Mohd Nor Nikman (SD4), but he could not recall its contents. He confirmed making his report within approximately one hour of returning from the hospital, and he admitted having no prior experience with mental health cases.

SD3 was the raid team leader, who led the raid team at Siti Kasim's Segambut house on 23.6.2018. He received orders from ASP Noor Irwan to assist in a kidnapping rescue under s 363 CPC. He was coming from a separate operation in Negeri Sembilan and therefore did not read any police reports before the raid. He did not know why the police suspected Siti of kidnapping Anis, as he simply followed orders. He said ASP Yusof (the D8 technical team) was on site and gave the command to break in. He narrated the raid sequence as knocked/called at grill $ \rightarrow $ no response $ \rightarrow $ broke grill (on ASP Yusof's order) $ \rightarrow $ knocked wooden door $ \rightarrow $ no response $ \rightarrow $ broke door $ \rightarrow $ searched house $ \rightarrow $ found one locked bedroom $ \rightarrow $ broke bedroom door $ \rightarrow $ found locked bathroom $ \rightarrow $ knocked $ \rightarrow $ no response $ \rightarrow $ broke bathroom door $ \rightarrow $ found Anis inside. He then introduced himself as a police officer. The female officer interacted with Anis, who confirmed his identity via a Mobile Card Acceptance Device (MCAD) check, and then brought Him to IPD Kajang in a police car.

SD3 did not ask Anis if she had been kidnapped. Neither did he take photos (as he said, photos are not taken during rescue raids). He did not call Siti or Anis before the raid, and he acknowledged that it could have been done, but was not ordered to. He agreed he could see through the house windows that there was movement inside. He was the one who filled out the "Persons of Unsound Mind Found Wandering" form with all fields, i.e. substance abuse, self-harm risk, danger) checked as negative/nil.

At IPD Kajang, SD3 heard Anis shout, "dia tak kidnap I !!" He confirmed Siti was arrested and there was an order to handcuff her. When asked if he had any evidence that Siti Kasim kidnapped Anis, he answered none. He admitted that no standard operating procedure (SOP) for the raid was referenced and that he was unsure whether a written SOP exists for s. 363 CPC cases.

SD4 was the IO on the night of 21.6.2018. He acknowledged that none of the police reports used the words "kidnap" or "absconded," and that the doctor's report stated Anis voluntarily wanted to leave with her lawyer. He could not recall whether he had read Anis's own police reports before the briefing, or whether he had called Anis or Siti before ordering the raid. After Anis was examined on 24.6.2018 and found to have no mental disorder, he concluded that s 363 CPC did not apply. However, he maintained charges under ss 186 (obstruction), 447 (trespass), and 290 (nuisance) against Siti were made without considering that Anis voluntarily followed Siti or that Siti was Anis's lawyer. He did not bring the investigation diary or the s 112 CPC statements to court.

SD5, Kpl. Mageshwary a/p Kumarasamay of Balai Polis Presint 7 was the female officer who escorted Anis from JAIS to Hospital Kajang. SD5 said Anis appeared calm initially but became anxious upon seeing the police. After Anis refused to go to the hospital, SD5 and another officer held Anis's hands and brought her to the car, on Insp. Fadzle's orders. The orders were to bring Anis from JAIS to Hospital Kajang for mental examination, based on a report by Anis's parents claiming a mental disorder. She denied that the police brought a straitjacket. At the hospital, she stayed outside the treatment room and did not know if Anis consented to the medical tests. She agreed that Anis left with Siti voluntarily and confirmed Siti did not kidnap Anis. When asked about the sole basis for detaining Anis, she said it was Anis's parents' request. She also stated police would detain anyone based solely on a parent's mental health report. SD5 confirmed that the police did not ask Anis about her mental health status but only asked if she'd come willingly. No assessment of mental state was done before taking her.

The POL-57 Form contained unverified claims that Anis was uncooperative and had assaulted her mother. Under "dangerous" stated "enggan bekerjasama semasa ditahan." Under "crimes" stated "pernah memukul dan menolak ibu sehingga cedera." SD5 could not confirm any evidence for either claim. She admitted there was no evidence that Anis was dangerous to herself or others. Referred to police SOP guidelines (Perintah Tetap KPN, D1). Initially, it was said to fall under category 1 (persons found wandering), then it was changed to category 3 (suspected unsound mind, not in proper care). SD5 acknowledged that Anis was not found wandering. SD5 did not know whether the required report to a Magistrate under category 3 had been made. Under the guideline, police duty ends once the person is handed to a medical officer and hospital treatment decisions are not the police's responsibility.

ASP Mohd Mazuri bin Mohd Nazir (SD6) was the arresting officer for Siti. SD6 testified that he arrived at IPD Kajang on 23.6.2018 and found Siti already there. He admitted he had never read any of the police reports and that all his information came from IO Nikman's verbal briefing. He received two phone calls from ASP Ganesan ordering him to arrest and handcuff Siti, on instructions from Tuan Fadhil, the Head of the Criminal Division of Selangor. SD6 arrested Siti for the suspected offence under ss 363/186 PC, but denied having handcuffed her. He later amended the arrest report at 4:59 AM to drop the offence under s 363 CPC after the psychiatric assessment confirmed that Anis was mentally sound.

Dr. Jacyntha Aruna a/p A. Anthony (SD7) is the psychiatric medical officer attached to Hospital Kajang. SD7 was on-call on 21.6.2018. The blood tests, urine test, and CT scan were ordered by the medical officers in the Emergency Department (ED), not by her. Her assessment of Anis lasted about 20-30 minutes, during which SD7 found Anis to be calm, coherent, and appropriately affected, although with some paranoid ideas that were not delusional. SD7's assessment was interrupted and remained incomplete, so she could not form any conclusion about Anis's mental state and could not say that Anis was mentally unwell or incapable of making her own decisions. She confirmed in her police report that Anis voluntarily stated she wanted to leave with her lawyer (i.e. Siti). SD7 could not comment on whether consent was obtained for the medical tests, as she was not present during that time.

Lastly, Dr Sharifah Suziah binti Syed Mokhtar (SD8), the consultant psychiatrist of Hospital Kajang, testified that she, as SD7's superior, never formally assessed Anis in person; SD8's report was based on SD7's and Dr Najmi's notes. She could not comment on whether Anis's consent was obtained for the medical tests. She acknowledged that behavioural changes described by the mother could suggest a mood disorder, but agreed that personality changes alone do not mean the person poses a risk. She agreed that suicidal thoughts from three months prior would not necessarily persist and that it would have been fair to simply call Anis first. Based on two incomplete assessments, she was unable to reach any psychiatric diagnosis. Anis never returned to the hospital, and the police never brought her back.

It is noted that two of the Defendants' witnesses did not testify, namely, Insp. Fadzle, who was reportedly very ill, and D3, who has since deceased. I had declined the Defendants' request to call Anis's father as their additional witness, as it was made at the 11th hour, after their last witness had concluded her evidence in court.

Before me, the issues put forward by the Plaintiffs are false imprisonment; violation of constitutional rights; misfeasance in public office; battery; trespass; and the vicarious liability of D30.

It is trite that the Plaintiffs must prove false imprisonment with their proof of the fact of such imprisonment; and the absence of lawful authority, and that once imprisonment is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify its lawfulness (see: Sri Sanjeevan Ramakrishnan v ASP Poonnam E Keling & Ors [2025] 5 CLJ 509 FC). The burden of proving a lawful arrest rests entirely on the arresting officer and never shifts back to the plaintiff. This principle is fundamental to natural justice, as it is for the state to justify the deprivation of liberty of the citizen and not for the citizen to prove its unlawfulness (see: Zulkiflee bin SM Anwar Ulhaque & Anor v Arikrishna Apparau & Ors [2014] 3 MLJ 553 CA).

In Zulkiflee, the test is twofold, whereby the subjective element requires the arresting officer to have formed a genuine belief at the time of arrest that the person was committing an offence. While the objective element requires the officer to demonstrate reasonable grounds for forming such a belief. Both must be satisfied. In this case, the Defendants do not dispute that both Plaintiffs were detained. Accordingly, the legal burden falls on them to prove lawful justification, and this court is to assess whether that burden has been discharged.

The relevant S 11(1) MHA 2001 at the time of the incident states: "(1) Any police officer or social welfare officer may apprehend any person whom he has reason to believe is mentally disordered and is, because of mental disorder, dangerous to himself or to other persons or property.

The police officer or social welfare officer who has apprehended a person under subsection (1) shall as soon as practicable, but not later than twenty-four hours after the apprehension, bring the person to a medical officer in a government psychiatric hospital or a registered medical practitioner in a gazetted private psychiatric hospital for examination."

The said s 11 MHA 2001 is the now deleted and substituted with the amendments via the Mental Health (Amendment) Act 2023 which came into force on 10.09.2025. The s 11 MHA 2001 now reads: "Apprehension of mentally disordered person, etc.

(1) Any crisis intervention officer may apprehend— ( a ) any person whom he has reason to believe is mentally disordered and is, because of mental disorder, dangerous to himself or to other persons or property; or > (b) any person who attempts to commit suicide.

A crisis intervention officer shall have the power to enter any premises whenever necessary to do so for the purposes of apprehension under this section.

The crisis intervention officer may, when exercising the power under subsection (2)— ( a ) break open any outer or inner door or window of any premises and enter into, or otherwise forcibly enter the premises and any part of the premises; or

remove by force any obstruction to such entry.

The crisis intervention officer who has apprehended the person under subsection (1) shall, as soon as practicable, but not later than twenty-four hours after the apprehension, bring the person to a medical officer in a government psychiatric hospital or a registered medical practitioner in a gazetted private psychiatric hospital for examination.

For the purposes of this section, "crisis intervention officer" means any— > (a) police officer;

officer of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency with the same meaning as assigned to it in the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004 [Act 633];

Fire Officer and Auxiliary Fire Officer with the same meaning as assigned to it in the Fire Services Act 1988 [Act 341] and Voluntary Fire Officer appointed under section 4a of the Fire Services Act 1988; > (d) member of the Malaysia Civil Defence Force established under the Malaysia Civil Defence Force Act 1951 [Act 221]; and > (e) social welfare officer."

The amendment came pursuant to the ripples in the law, where the cases upheld the proportionality test that recognises decisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). For instance, there had been constitutional challenges to the right to life as enshrined in Article 5(1) FC. The Federal Court in Lee Kwan Woh v PP [2009] 5 MLJ 301 FC guarantees that deprivation of life or personal liberty must be fair "both in point of procedure and substance."

Granting forcible entry and apprehension powers to non-law enforcement personnel arguably fails the substantive fairness requirement. These officers lack training in rights-protective procedures, raising the concern echoed in Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia [2010] 2 MLJ 333 FC that "in accordance with law" in Article 5(1) FC demands law that is "fair and just and not merely any enacted law, however unjust."

In Muhamad Juzaili bin Mohd Khamis v State Government of Negeri Sembilan [2015] 3 MLJ 513 CA, the Court of Appeal held that Article 5(1) FC encompasses the right to live with dignity, and that laws which "build insecurity and vulnerability" into the lives of affected persons violate this right.

The minted s 11(4) MHA 2001 requires the apprehended person to be brought to a medical officer "not later than twenty-four hours after the apprehension." While this mirrors Article 5(4) FC on the 24-hour production requirement, a critical distinction exists: the person is brought before a medical officer rather than before the Magistrate.

Article 5(3) FC guarantees the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest and to consult lawyer. Both the old and new S 11 MHA 2001 make no provision for either. The lacunae of s. 11 MHA 2001 on this point do not exclude the constitutional requirement; Article 5 FC provisions are simply "read into" the statute (see: Assa Singh v Mentri Besar, Johore [1969] 2 MLJ 30 FC). Regrettably, the practical reality of crisis apprehension by fire officers or civil defence personnel makes meaningful compliance unlikely, rendering Article 5(3) FC rights "ineffective or illusory" (as per Mohamad Ezambin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 4 MLJ 449 FC).

In echoing Her Rt Hon. CJ in CCH & Anor (on behalf of themselves and as litigation representatives of one CYM, a child) v Pendaftar Besar bagi Kelahiran dan Kematian, Malaysia [2022] 1 MLJ 71 FC where she said: [49] We believe that the answer to the question has been discussed an innumerable amount of times with the most recent being CTEB. The starting point is the understanding that fundamental rights and provisions must be construed as broadly as possible. Next, provisions which limit those rights must be construed as narrowly as possible. Finally, judicial precedent must play a lesser part when construing constitutional provisions. One cannot afford to be pedantic or cling helplessly to tabulated legalism." In St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1998] 3 WLR 936 ("NHS Trust") the words of Judge LJ must be observed, at p.950: "Even when used by well-intentioned individuals for what they believe to be genuine and powerful reasons, perhaps shared by a large section of the community, unless the individual case falls within the prescribed conditions the Act cannot be used to justify detention for mental disorder: "no adult citizen of the United Kingdom is liable to be confined in any institution against his will, save by the authority of the law. That is a fundamental constitutional principle, traceable back to chapter 29 of Magna Carta 1297 (25 Edw. 1, c. 1), and before that to chapter 39 of Magna Carta 1215 (9 Hen. 3)...Powers therefore exist to ensure that those who suffer from mental illness may, in appropriate circumstances, be involuntarily admitted to mental hospitals and detained. But, and it is a very important but, the circumstances in which the mentally ill may be detained are very carefully prescribed by statute:" per Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. in In re S.-C. (Mental Patient: Habeas Corpus) [1996] Q.B. 599, 603."

While it is appreciated that the old s 11 MHA 2001 is fully revamped, what remains etched is that it has not served any greater justice to what transpired in the facts of this case.

The PDRM SOP PTPKPN D 214 produced by the Defendants codified the guideline for the apprehension of mentally disordered persons under the previous Mental Health Ordinance 1952 ("MHO SOP"). The MHO SOP, in fact, recognises that an apprehension is necessary only where the person poses a danger to the public. The police officer is required to have a reason to believe a person is mentally disordered, and that, because of that mental disorder, the person is dangerous to himself or to other persons or property.

A police officer may apprehend any person who attempts to commit suicide. Applying the doctrine of proportionality housed in Article 8(1) FC, the powers above must only be used where necessary. If there are any other less intrusive means available, those means should be used first.

It is clear that the Defendants' own MHO SOP accepts that an arrest can only be made where the suspect is loitering in public. A police SOP is important because the court must scrutinise it to determine whether there has been a breach of the law. In Datuk Seri Khalid bin Abu Bakar & Ors v N Indra a/p P Nallathamby (the administrator of the estate and dependent of Kugan a/I Ananthan, deceased) and another appeal [2015] 1 MLJ 353 CA, His Lordship David Wong JCA (later PCA) said: "The police force is a public professional body and as in other professional bodies there exist duties of care in their discharge of their powers. In the context of the police force, it is their standard operating procedure ('SOP') and that should be subject to scrutiny by the court of law."

Any police officer or social welfare officer may apprehend any person whom he has reason to believe is mentally disordered and is dangerous to himself or to other persons or property. Two cumulative requirements must be satisfied, namely - (i) the reason to believe a mental disorder exists; and (ii) the reason to believe the disorder renders the person dangerous.

The phrase "reason to believe" imports an objective standard. As emphasised in Zulkiflee, it requires more than mere suspicion where the arresting officer must point to concrete grounds justifying the belief at the material time. The belief must be both genuinely held (subjective) and reasonably founded (objective).

I believe that the proper interpretation and application of s 11 MHA 2001 engages questions of considerable jurisprudential significance that extend beyond this individual case. In the recent Singapore decision of Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General [2024] 5 SLR 1180, Jeyaretnam J. interpreted a comparable statutory provision and observed that the dual purpose of mental health legislation is both "to ensure public safety and the personal safety of the apprehended person, and to protect the liberty of the apprehended person within proper legal limits". I echo the same views that the power to apprehend under the old s 11 MHA 2001 must be exercised with due regard to both the statute's safety objectives and the individual's liberty interests.

Academic commentary has further illuminated the nature of this statutory threshold. Every apprehension regime requires the officer to make an assessment that the person appears to have a mental disorder and poses a danger. This assessment requirement creates what Teplin and Pruett (1992) characterised as the police officer acting as a "street-corner psychiatrist", a lay person called upon to make clinical judgments without clinical training. As Chan (2025) has observed, police officers are not medical experts; the assessment threshold must accordingly be applied with rigour to ensure that the power is not exercised on the basis of bare third-party complaints without independent verification.

The significance of an independent verification is underscored by comparative empirical research, including that of Karystianis et al. (2026), where their findings challenge the assumption that a complaint about a mental disorder necessarily indicates dangerousness, and reinforce the necessity for officers to conduct their own contemporaneous assessment before exercising the power of apprehension.

Coming back to the instant case here, the Defendants rely on the police report by Anis's mother dated 10.06.2018; the WhatsApp messages from January-March 2018 containing expressions of suicidal ideation; and the argument that they were duty-bound to act on complaints received. The Defendants contend they had no ulterior motive and merely performed public duties; failure to act would expose them to criticism for dereliction of duty.

The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that: D1, who formed the operative belief, was not called to testify; no investigation diary or papers were produced; no assessment of Anis's mental state as at 21.06.2018 was conducted; the WhatsApp messages were stale by 3-4 months; and the MHA 3001 SOP requiring "loitering" was not followed.

In cases of detention, the evidence of the arresting officer is of paramount importance. Referring back to Zulkiflee, it is the arresting officer who "must form an opinion to satisfy himself or herself that there is evidence for him or her to reasonably suspect" the relevant circumstances exist. Without this officer's testimony, neither the subjective nor objective elements of the test can be assessed.

Here, D1, the officer who formed the belief triggering the arrest was not called to testify due to medical reasons. His investigation diary and papers were not produced. This is a fatal gap. I was unable to assess whether he genuinely believed Anis was mentally disordered and dangerous, nor whether such a belief was objectively reasonable, without his evidence.

The Defendants' reliance on the WhatsApp messages from January-March 2018, where Anis expressed distress and mentioned suicide. The arrest occurred on 21.06.2018, which was about 3-4 months later. Mental health assessment is time-sensitive; a person's condition can fluctuate significantly over the course of months. Evidence of distress in January 2018 cannot, without more, justify an arrest in June of the same year.

This principle finds support in the expert psychiatric evidence adduced in this case. SD8, the consultant psychiatrist, agreed during cross-examination that suicidal thoughts from three months prior would not necessarily persist at the time of the arrest. The time sensitivity of mental health assessment is well recognised. Yang (2025) has observed, in the context of legal epidemiology, that mental health assessment is inherently temporal, and the lawfulness of an apprehension must be judged by reference to the person's condition at the material time, not to historical indicators that may no longer be operative.

D5 (SD5) admitted during cross-examination that she had never seen Anis's police reports stating that Anis had left home voluntarily and that her parents were "a threat to my personal safety." SD5 also admitted the arrest was made solely at the mother's request with no independent verification of SP1's mental state at the material time.

Critically, the POL-57 Form completed by the Defendants themselves recorded that Anis was not suffering from mental illness. This is a contemporaneous document created by the Defendants which directly contradicts their assertion that they had reason to believe Anis was mentally disordered. The said POL-57 Form are reproduced below:

S 11 MHA 2001 requires not merely a mental disorder, but a mental disorder "dangerous to himself or to other persons or property." There was no evidence before this Court that Anis posed any danger at the time of arrest. The Defendants have not pointed to any contemporaneous conduct suggesting dangerousness. The "dangerousness" requirement in s 11 MHA 2001 has been the subject of significant comparative judicial and academic analysis. In Mah Kiat Seng, "dangerous" is interpreted as requiring imminence with such behaviour likely to occur within hours rather than days. While this Court is not bound by the Singapore decision, the reasoning is persuasive: the requirement of danger must import a temporal dimension. A person who expressed distress months earlier but is conducting herself normally at the time of the encounter cannot, without more, be said to be "dangerous" within the meaning of the statute.

The dangerousness frame itself has been questioned by comparative scholarship. Empirical research by Karystianis et al. (2026) and Heffernan et al. (2024) demonstrates that force was used in only 4-5% of police encounters with mentally disordered persons, and that the overwhelming majority of such encounters involve welfare concerns rather than violent behaviour. The United Kingdom's alternative statutory formulation, which frames the threshold as a person "in immediate need of care or control" rather than "dangerous", has been identified by Chan (2025) as better reflecting the empirical reality of these encounters. While this Court applies the Malaysian statute as enacted, the evidence in this case is consistent with the empirical picture: Anis was not violent, was not threatening anyone, and was conducting herself at her workplace. The dangerousness threshold was plainly not met.

The Defendants argue that failure to act on complaints would expose them to criticism. This argument misunderstands the law. Police officers must indeed investigate complaints, but s 11 MHA 2001 requires a reason to believe, not mere compliance with parental requests. A police officer acting on a complaint without independently assessing whether the statutory threshold is met acts unlawfully. The existence of a complaint does not create legal authority for arrest.

This point is reinforced by Chan's (2025) analysis of the structural distinction between duty-based and power-based apprehension regimes. Under the power-based regime, s 11 MHA 2001 uses permissive language, namely "may apprehend", whereby the officer retains discretion to decide whether apprehension is warranted, and must exercise that discretion on the basis of an independent assessment. The Defendants' argument that they were compelled to act on a parental complaint effectively converts a discretionary power into a mandatory duty triggered by any third-party request, which is contrary to the statutory scheme. As SD5 candidly admitted under cross-examination, the sole basis for detaining Anis was upon the request from her parents, which is a concession that demonstrates the Defendants exercised no independent judgment whatsoever.

Even if the decision to apprehend had been lawfully authorised, which this Court has found it was not, the manner in which the apprehension was conducted raises independent concerns. Diab and Sanderson (2022), writing on the doctrine of reasonable apprehension under mental health laws, argue that the legality of a mental health apprehension must be assessed not merely by reference to whether the officer was authorised to apprehend, but also by whether the apprehension was carried out in a reasonable manner. Drawing on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Rv Le (2019) 2SCR 692, they propose that an apprehension must satisfy minimum conditions of proportionate force, dignity, notice, and privacy. The ratio decidendi below is informative: The prohibition of arbitrary detention in s.9 of the Charter is meant to protect individual liberty against unjustified state interference. It limits the state's ability to impose intimidating and coercive pressure on citizens without adequate justification. Not every police-citizen interaction is a detention within the meaning of s.9; a detention requires significant physical or psychological restraint. Psychological detention by the police can arise in two ways: (1) the claimant is legally required to comply with a direction or demand by the police; or (2) a claimant is not under a legal obligation to comply with a direction or demand, but a reasonable person in the subject's position would feel so obligated, and conclude that they were not free to go. Therefore, even absent a legal obligation to comply with a police demand or direction, and even absent physical restraint by the state, a detention exists in situations where a reasonable person in the accused's shoes would feel obligated to comply with a police direction or demand and that they are not free to leave.

Here, the evidence discloses that police officers held Anis's hands and physically brought her to a police car without her consent; that they did not inform her of the grounds for apprehension or that she was being taken for medical assessment rather than criminal arrest; that they seized her identity card and mobile phones; and that she was denied access to Siti, her lawyer for several hours. The Defendants' own POL-57 Form described Anis as uncooperative during detention, thus characterising her resistance to what I found to be an unlawful detention as a behavioural problem rather than the exercise of her rights. These circumstances, assessed through the lens of reasonable apprehension, compound the detention's unlawfulness.

With that, I find that the Defendants have failed to discharge their burden of proving lawful justification. D1 was not called to explain why he instructed the arrest, and the evidence relied upon was unjustified, with no contemporaneous assessment of Anis's condition made, but documents that contradict their case, and importantly, there was no evidence of dangerousness established in any manner or form by Anis. The detention of Anis on 21.06.2018 constitutes false imprisonment.

Battery is the intentional and direct application of force to another person without consent or lawful justification. In the medical context, any treatment without valid consent constitutes battery. In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, the House of Lords there held that even where a patient lacks capacity, the relevant statutory framework must be strictly followed. In the said case, Lord Griffiths stated that doctors treating mental patients "must be subject to the specific statutory constraints on treatment for mental disorder." The mere suspicion of a mental disorder does not dispense with consent requirements, as the statutory procedures must be followed.

It is undisputed that Anis was subjected to blood tests, urine tests, and a CT scan at Hospital Kajang. It is also undisputed that Anis's own consent was not obtained. The Defendants do not dispute that Anis protested.

The Defendants argue that family consent was sufficient (per SD7's testimony) and that s 14(3)(b) MHA 2001 empowers the Medical Director to conduct examinations within 24 hours of admission, fortified by the necessity for the tests to be conducted to rule out organic causes of mental symptoms.

Nonetheless, it must be remembered that s 11 MHA 2001 authorises only the apprehension of a person and conveyance to a medical officer for examination. It is silent on invasive medical procedures such as blood tests, urine tests, and CT scans. The power to apprehend does not include the power to conduct invasive procedures.

The Defendants' reliance on s 14 MHA 2001 is misplaced. S 14(1) MHA 2001 provides that when a person is brought before a medical officer under ss 11, 12, 13, or 73 MHA 2001, the officer shall examine the person and either:

Release if not mentally disordered;

Release if mentally disordered but not requiring treatment; or

Make an order for admission if satisfied that the person is mentally disordered.

S 14(3)(b) MHA 2001, which empowers the Medical Director to conduct examinations within 24 hours, applies only after an order under s 14(1)(c) MHA 2001 is made. No such order was made here. The examination under s 14(1) of the MHA 2001 was incomplete when Siti took Anis away. The Defendants cannot rely on a provision that was never triggered.

Anis was a 24-year-old adult at the material time. Under Malaysian law, an adult of sound mind has absolute autonomy over medical treatment. Parental consent is relevant only for minors or adults who lack capacity. There was no determination that Anis lacked capacity. Indeed, the Defendants' own POL-57 Form recorded that she was not suffering from mental illness.

The autonomy deficit in this case reflects a broader structural concern identified by Hamid (2024), who has observed that the Malaysian legal framework applies different standards of autonomy to patients with physical illness and those with mental disorders, which is a double standard that amounts to injustice. Under s 77 MHA 2001, consent for conventional treatment is not required for mentally disordered persons (apart from surgery, ECT, or clinical trials). However, as Hamid (2024) notes, while the Act establishes a priority-ranking system for obtaining consent, beginning with the patient's own consent where capable, this system "can also silence and override a patient's autonomy and self-choice." The absence of mental capacity legislation in Malaysia, unlike in the United Kingdom, which enacted the Mental Capacity Act 2005, means there is no statutory framework for assessing capacity, no presumption of capacity, and no requirement to support decision-making before substituting for it.

Here, no capacity assessment was ever conducted. SD7, the Psychiatric MO, confirmed that Anis was calm, coherent, and with appropriate affect during her assessment. SD7 could not say Anis was mentally unwell or incapable of making her own decisions. In these circumstances, the principle established in Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649 that the right to choose whether to consent to treatment exists even where the reasons for making the choice are "rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent" applies with full force. Anis's refusal of the medical tests should have been respected.

SD7 testified that "next of kin or family members can give consent." This is correct only where the patient lacks capacity. Where a patient is an adult with capacity, family consent cannot override the patient's own refusal. Anis protested; her refusal should have been respected unless and until a proper capacity assessment determined otherwise.

As I found that the s 11 MHA 2001 arrest was unlawful, there was no lawful basis for Anis to be at Hospital Kajang at all. A fortiori, there was no lawful basis for any medical procedures. An unlawful detention cannot be cured by subsequent compliance with procedure,

The medical tests were conducted without Anis's consent, without any determination that Anis lacked capacity; without compliance with the statutory framework under s 14 MHA 2001; and pursuant to an unlawful arrest. The tests, therefore, constitute a battery.

Trespass to land is the unjustifiable interference with possession of land. Entry onto another's property without consent or lawful authority constitutes trespass. Police officers have no general right to enter private premises; they require either consent, a warrant, or specific statutory authority.

Sections 58 and 59 of the CPC provide for search warrants. S 105 CPC permits arrest without warrant for seizable offences. The power to arrest is distinct from the power to enter and search premises, which requires independent authorisation. To appreciate this, the relevant parts on searching for persons wrongfully confined (as suspected by the police raiding team) are the following: Search for persons wrongfully confined

(1) If any Magistrate has reason to believe that any person is confined under such circumstances that the confinement amounts to an offence he may issue a search warrant.

The person to whom the warrant is directed may search for the person confined.

The search shall be made in accordance with the warrant and he person, if found, shall be immediately taken before a Magistrate who shall make such order as in the circumstances of the case seems proper. Persons in charge of closed places to allow search

(1) Whenever any place liable to search or inspection under this Chapter is closed any person residing in or being in charge of that place shall on demand of the officer or other person executing the warrant and on production of the warrant allow him free ingress to it and afford all reasonable facilities for a search in it.

If ingress to such place cannot be so obtained the officer or other person executing the warrant may proceed in the manner provided by subsection 16(2).

On 23.06.2018 at approximately 9 pm, police officers attended Siti's residence. They called out to occupants for approximately 15 minutes. Receiving no response despite observing movement inside, they broke down the front grill, front door, a bedroom door, and a bathroom door to find Anis.

The Defendants argue that they were acting to "rescue" Anis under s 363 PC (kidnapping), where kidnapping is a seizable offence permitting arrest without warrant. They had observed movement before entry, called out that the occupants' non-cooperation justified forced entry, and that their actions were proportionate, given the urgency. It is undisputed that no search warrant was obtained, where the Defendants do not claim protection under s 58 CPC. As such, they must therefore identify an alternative lawful authority for entry.

The Defendants rely on s 105 CPC which reads: Arrest to prevent seizable offences

A police officer knowing of a design to commit any seizable offence may arrest without orders from a Magistrate and without a warrant the person so designing if it appears to the officer that the commission of the offence cannot otherwise be prevented.

It permits arrest without warrant where a police officer knows of a "design to commit any seizable offence." However, s 105 CPC authorises arrest, not entry into premises. The power to arrest a person for a seizable offence does not automatically include the power to enter private premises to find that person. Had the Defendants sought to enter the premises to conduct a search, s 58 CPC would have required them to obtain a warrant, which they had not done. The Purpose Was Rescue, Not Arrest

The Defendants admit they entered to "rescue" Anis, not to arrest her. SD4 stated: "kesalahan yang dilaporkan adalah Kes 363 Kanun Keseksaan dan saya bertindak untuk menyelamatkan mangsa." This was a search operation, not an arrest operation. Search operations require warrants.

The allegation of kidnapping under s 363 PC was subsequently withdrawn as a basis for any charge. Anis was a 24-year-old adult who voluntarily left Hospital Kajang with Siti. An adult cannot be "kidnapped" by voluntarily accompanying another person. The entire premise for the "rescue" was legally and factually baseless.

The Defendants argue their actions were proportionate given the urgency. This misunderstands the issue. Proportionality is relevant to the manner of exercising a lawful power. It cannot transform an unlawful act into a lawful one. Entry without a warrant or statutory authority is unlawful regardless of how it is executed.

The Defendants argue that the occupants' failure to respond, despite visible movement, justified forced entry. However, occupants of a residence have no legal obligation to open their door to police at 9 pm. The Defendants could have obtained a warrant, stationed officers at the premises, or sought court authorisation. Instead, they broke in without legal authority.

The failure to explore less intrusive alternatives before resorting to forced entry is significant. Diab and Sanderson (2022) identify force as one of the core dimensions of reasonable apprehension, requiring that it be proportionate and used as a last resort. SD3 acknowledged during cross-examination that the police could have called Siti or Anis before the raid, but did not do so because he was "not ordered to."

The availability of less intrusive measures, such as a phone call, a warrant application, or continued observation, was regrettably not explored. The raid was conducted on blind obedience to orders, without independent consideration of whether the circumstances warranted the level of force deployed. SD3's own "Persons of Unsound Mind Found Wandering" Form, completed after the raid, recorded all risk fields as nil, which contradicts the urgency claimed to justify the forced entry.

With the foregoing reasons, I find that the entry into Siti's residence was without warrant or consent; it was not authorised by s 105 CPC (which permits arrest, not search); and was based on an unfounded kidnapping allegation. The Defendants had committed trespass.

Siti was arrested at approximately 12:40 am on 24.06.2018. Shewas detained at the lockup of the Semenyih Police Station and brought before the Magistrate's Court for a remand application at 11 am on 24.06.2018. The remand application was rejected. She was released at approximately 12:30 pm, after being detained for approximately 12 hours.

The Defendants argue that Siti obstructed SD7's examination by removing Anis from Hospital Kajang, where this constituted a physical obstruction under s 186 PC. They further contend that the rejection of remand does not negate the offence, but it merely indicates no further detention was needed; and that the arrest was based on reasonable grounds viewed objectively.

S 186 PC provides: Whoever obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions may be arrested without a warrant.

The term "obstruction" in s 186 PC has been interpreted to require criminal force or show of criminal force. Mere verbal disagreement or non-physical interference does not suffice.

The police report by SD2 (Kajang/23052/18) makes no mention of the use of force by Siti. SD7's report (Kajang/23420/18) likewise does not allege the use of force. If Siti had used or threatened force, this would surely have been recorded in the contemporaneous police reports. Its absence is telling.

The evidence shows that Siti entered Hospital Kajang, demanded Anis's identification card, and removed Anis from the premises. Siti questioned the lawfulness of Anis's detention and the medical procedures being conducted. Questioning lawfulness, particularly by a lawyer like Siti, cannot be criminal obstruction.

Initially, Siti was also suspected of kidnapping under s 363 PC. This allegation was withdrawn. The withdrawal indicates the police themselves recognised there was no basis for it. An adult voluntarily accompanying another adult is not kidnapping.

The Defendants argue that remand rejection does not negate the underlying offence. While technically correct, the rejection is probative. A Magistrate's rejection of remand indicates an insufficient basis to believe that continued detention is warranted for investigation. Combined with the failure to ever charge Siti, this demonstrates the case's weakness from the outset.

Siti was never charged with any offence arising from the 21.06.2018 incident. If there had been a genuine basis for a s 186 PC charge, one would have expected prosecution to follow. The absence of any charge is strong evidence that the arrest lacked foundation.

The manner in which Siti was detained further undermines the Defendants' case. She was handcuffed, held overnight at Lokap Balai Polis Semenyih, and brought before the Kajang Magistrate Court the next morning in remand clothing without undergarments. Three high-ranking officers sought remand, which SD2's own evidence described as "highly unusual for a remand proceeding." The disproportionate resources deployed against a lawyer who had questioned the lawfulness of her client's detention suggest that the arrest served purposes beyond legitimate law enforcement.

Yang (2025), writing on the relationship between legal regulation of policing and mental health outcomes, has observed that delayed access to counsel compounds hopelessness and thwarted belonging are conditions that the public health literature identifies as risk factors for adverse mental health outcomes. In this case, Anis was detained at IPD Kajang and denied access to her lawyer, Siti, who was being arrested at the same station at the same time. The video evidence (SP6's recordings) shows Anis confined in a room with a police officer physically blocking the door while she shouted that she had not been kidnapped and wanted to see Siti. The simultaneous denial of liberty to both lawyer and client created a situation in which each was unable to advocate for the other, which is the very circumstance that this Court finds particularly troubling.

I find that the arrest of Siti was not supported by evidence of physical obstruction but was based partly on a kidnapping allegation that was withdrawn and followed by a rejected remand, which had never resulted in charges. The Defendants have not discharged their burden of proving lawful justification. Therefore, I find that the detention constitutes false imprisonment.

Anis was again detained on 23.06.2018 under s 11 MHA 2001 and brought to Hospital Kajang a second time. For the same reasons set out above, the Defendants have not established they had reason to believe Anis was mentally disordered and dangerous. The evidence relied upon remained stale with no fresh assessment ever made. Therefore, I find that the second detention constitutes false imprisonment.

Article 5(1) FC provides: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law."

This is a fundamental right. Any deprivation of liberty must be justified by law; unlawful detention is a constitutional violation. The detentions of both Plaintiffs were unlawful. S 11 MHA 2001 arrests lacked the requisite reasonable belief; Siti's arrest under s 186 PC lacked evidence of obstruction by force. The Plaintiffs' rights under Article 5(1) FC were violated.

While the FC does not expressly recognise the right to health as a fundamental right, the Federal Court in Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 2 CLJ 771 FC interpreted the "right to life" under Article 5(1) FC broadly as the following: Adopting the approach that commends itself to me, I have reached the conclusion that the expression 'life' appearing in art 5(1) does not refer to mere existence. It incorporates all those facets that are an integral part of life itself and those matters which go to form the quality of life. Of these are the right to seek and be engaged in lawful and gainful employment and to receive those benefits that our society has to offer to its members. It includes the right to live in a reasonably healthy and pollution free environment.

Arumugam (2022) has argued that this broad interpretation could and should encompass the right to health, including mental health, implicitly imposing an obligation on the State to provide adequate mental healthcare and to ensure that the exercise of police powers under mental health legislation respects the dignity and autonomy of the person concerned. The deprivation of liberty in this case was effected through mental health legislation. But without the statutory preconditions being satisfied, it is precisely the type of arbitrary state action that Article 5(1) FC exists to prevent.

The landmark authority of Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No. 3) [2003] 2 AC1 lays down the elements of misfeasance in public office, which are:

The defendant is a public officer;

The loss was caused by the exercise of power as a public officer; and

The act falls within either the targeted malice limb (intent to harm) or the illegality limb (knowledge that the act is unlawful and will probably injure the plaintiff, or reckless indifference thereto).

In Tony Pua Kian Wee v Government of Malaysia [2020] 1 CLJ 337 FC, these elements are re-endorsed, and it is emphasised that the tort protects citizens against abuse of power, combining public and private law elements.

Despite the Defendants' argument that they had performed public duties without ulterior motive, the Plaintiffs have not proved malice, and merely stating the cause of action without proving its elements is insufficient. I did not find any malice, namely the specific intent to harm the Plaintiffs. The evidence does not establish that the Defendants acted with the purpose of injuring the Plaintiffs; rather, they acted on Anis's mother's complaint.

However, the illegality limb may be satisfied by such reckless indifference to the legality of the act and its probable consequences. In Tony Pua, this type of tort is described as follows: [185] It is therefore an intentional tort. The element which receives the most emphasis is that of bad faith, ie the abuse of power and the targeted malice or the complete indifference to the effect of the abuse of power on the plaintiff or a class of such persons. It is also the element which makes this tort hard to plead and to prove as it is only in rare circumstances that such facts subsist as would allow the plea to remain on the record. In many instances the plea is struck out as it is simply insufficient. This is because it is not every act or omission on the part of a public officer which lends itself to the bringing of an action premised on this tort. It requires outrageous conduct with the requisite intention to injure and this serves as a safeguard to preclude a multitude of actions from being initiated.

The evidence demonstrates reckless indifference where the s 11 MHA 2001 arrest of Anis was based solely on a mother's complaint without independently assessing whether reasonable grounds existed. SD5 admitted the arrest was at the mother's request alone. No investigation diary was produced showing any independent assessment.

Furthermore, the medical tests were conducted despite Anis's protests, without proper consent or statutory authority, and in circumstances where the Defendants' own POL-57 Form recorded no mental illness. In addition, the trespass occurred when the Defendants broke into Siti's residence without a warrant, based on a kidnapping allegation they later withdrew. This suggests either that they knew it was baseless or that they should have known it was baseless. Siti was also arrested for "obstruction" without any evidence of force, held overnight, and released when remand was refused. No charges followed.

I see a pattern emerging at each stage, with the Defendants proceeding without adequate legal foundation and disregarding the limits of their powers. This constitutes reckless indifference. This pattern aligns with the structural deficiencies in the Malaysian apprehension framework, as identified in academic commentary. As comparative scholarship has observed, the opacity of our police procedures is particularly concerning: where the legal framework provides neither transparent standards for police conduct nor accessible complaint mechanisms, the conditions for systematic overreach are structurally embedded.

The absence of requirements for notifying grounds, contemporaneous note-taking, time limits, and independent review leaves the manner of apprehension to the unchecked discretion of individual officers, with no mechanism for accountability. The evidence in this case, particularly SD3's admission that he acted on orders without reading any police reports, SD5's concession that police did not independently assess Anis's mental state, and SD4's failure to produce the investigation diary, illustrates the practical consequences of this structural opacity.

As such, my conclusive finding is that misfeasance in public office is established on the reckless indifference limb.

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs failed to adduce documentary evidence, such as medical reports, to support their claim (see Sambaga Valli a/p KR Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur [2018] 1 MLJ 784 CA). Such evidence is required to corroborate claims of stress and trauma, and aggravated and exemplary damages require malice or oppressive conduct, which is absent.

With respect, the Defendants had misread Sambaga Valli. The relevant judgment is reproduced here for context: [14] It is trite that a person injured by another's wrong is entitled to general damages for non-pecuniary such as his pain and suffering, hardship, discomfort, mental distress and loss of amenities of life. There is no standard rule to measure the damage in such cases. The Courts usually determine the amount based on a fair and reasonable standards, free from sentimental or fanciful standards, and based upon evidence adduced. The Court should also consider the age, health and condition of the injured party pre-injury as compared with his condition after the injury. The Court also consider the need for medical, psychological or physical symptoms, and the impact on the plaintiff's conduct and lifestyle before apportioning the amount of damages. [15] We have scrutinised the evidence on record and found that the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence, such as a medical report, to corroborate his claim that she and her family had suffered stress and trauma resulting from the respondents' trespass, conversion and detinue. [16] There is, however, some evidence to establish that the plaintiff had endured hardship when the defendants had wrongly seized her goods in their raid and she had lost her capital and could not pay off her business creditors as the monies loaned were invested in the seized goods. Consequently, the plaintiff was forced to sell her assets, including her car, house and jewellery.

Documentary proof was thus not determinative.

For false imprisonment, non-pecuniary loss is presumed from the wrongful act. In the book by McGregor on Damages (21st ed) at p.1873: "Where heads of damage are routinely inferred by the courts—pain and suffering in personal injury claims; deprivation of liberty in false imprisonment claims; injury to feelings in discrimination claims—the courts have laid down tariffs..."

The deprivation of liberty is itself the harm. A plaintiff need not prove consequential psychiatric injury to recover damages for false imprisonment. The law presumes that unlawful detention causes distress, humiliation, and loss of dignity.

This presumption is well-grounded in empirical research on the effects of involuntary detention. Yang (2025) has identified several mediating mechanisms through which the deprivation of liberty harms mental health: acute stress, which increases during police encounters and is a demonstrated risk factor for adverse outcomes; hopelessness, which may result from the perceived lack of recourse available to detained persons; and thwarted belonging with feelings of loneliness and social isolation. These all increase when the persons are detained without access to counsel, family members, or mental health professionals.

Here, Anis was detained twice in three (3) days, subjected to involuntary medical tests, denied access to her lawyer, and had her identity documents confiscated. Siti was arrested, handcuffed, held overnight in a lock-up, and brought before a court in remand clothing. The law's presumption of harm from such treatment requires no further empirical validation. Both Plaintiffs testified to mental anguish and trauma. Anis stated: "The emotional scars from the traumatic experiences above will always remain." Siti described the humiliation of detention, including being brought through public areas of the court without proper attire.

In Siti Zabedah bt Kasim v Akmal Nadzim bin Abdullah & Orsl [2026] 7 MLJ 386 HC, RM60,000 was awarded for general and aggravated damages together with RM100,000 award for exemplary damages for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The awards were based solely on the plaintiff's testimony, with no documentary evidence of psychiatric harm.

General damages compensate for non-pecuniary loss, particularly for the loss of liberty, distress, humiliation, and injury to dignity. For Anis, I assess the false imprisonment on 21.06.2018 was about 5 hours, the existence of battery (which medical tests were conducted without consent, the false imprisonment on 23-24.06.2018 for several hours and the fact that she was a young woman of 24 years detained twice in three days under the mental health legislation, which had inherently stigmatised her.

As for Siti, her residence was trespassed upon, resulting in property damage and an invasion of privacy. Siti was also falsely imprisoned for approximately 12 hours overnight. As a lawyer, she was detained and brought before the Court for remand in public view, apparently violating her constitutional rights.

This Court awards to Anis the sum of RM80,000 and to Siti the sum of RM100,000 as general damages.

In considering an aggravated damages award, I remind myself that they are "compensation for the injured feelings of the plaintiff where his sense of injury resulting from the wrongful physical act is justifiably heightened by the manner in which or motive for which the defendant did it." (see: Roshairee bin Abdul Wahab v Mejar Mustafa bin Omar & Ors [1996] 3 MLJ 337 HC).

In this situation of this case, the aggravating circumstances occurred via the:

Use of the MHA 2001 against a young adult who had simply left home is stigmatising and humiliating;

Conduct of invasive medical tests despite protests;

Forcible entry into Siti's home, breaking multiple doors, causing property damage and violating the sanctity of her residence;

Overnight detention of Siti, a lawyer, based on unfounded allegations;

Failure to independently verify the basis for action, instead simply complying with a mother's request against an adult daughter.

The stigmatising effect of invoking mental health legislation against a person who is not mentally disordered is a well-documented aggravating factor. Varriale (2025), in a study of police encounters with persons with mental illness, found that encounters involving stigmatisation and criminalisation were consistently associated with negative experiences, and that persons subjected to such encounters described them as "significant and potentially life-altering events" characterised by "injustice...like treating a person like they have no value." The invocation of the MHA 2001 against Anis, who was a young woman who had left home to escape abuse and was conducting herself normally, carries precisely this stigmatising quality.

The Defendants' characterisation of her resistance as evidence of mental disorder, rather than as a rational response to an unlawful deprivation of liberty, compounds the indignity. This Court awards to Anis the sum of RM30,000 and to Siti the sum of RM40,000 as aggravated damages.

As for exemplary damages, such damages are best described in Rookes v Bernard [1964] AC 1229 where they are available for "oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servant of government." This is precisely the category engaged here.

Exemplary damages should mark the disapproval of such oppressive or arbitrary behaviour; be awarded only if basic and aggravated damages are inadequate punishment; and be sufficient to mark disapproval but no more than necessary (see: Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 All ER 762).

The Defendants' actions were oppressive and arbitrary, i.e.:

Detaining an adult under mental health legislation based on stale evidence and a mother's request, without independent assessment;

Breaking into a residence without a warrant based on a baseless kidnapping allegation;

Arresting a lawyer for "obstruction" without evidence of force, holding her overnight, then releasing her when remand failed;

Conducting medical tests on a protesting patient without proper consent.

The pattern of conduct disclosed by the evidence in this case reflects structural deficiencies in our framework for police apprehension of mentally disordered persons that have been identified by academic commentary. The framework lacks several features that define best practice in comparable jurisdictions: there is no requirement to consult a mental health professional before or during apprehension; no publicly documented standard operating procedure; no Appropriate Adult scheme; no statutory diversion mechanism; no independent Mental Health Tribunal; and no mental capacity legislation. The comparative experience of jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, where the Policing and Crime Act 2017 introduced a requirement to consult with a mental health professional before exercising apprehension powers. Even the Mental Health Units (Use of Force) Act 2018 requires police attending to wear body cameras. It demonstrates that these safeguards are achievable and effective. The exemplary damages awarded in this case are intended not only to mark disapproval of the Defendants' specific conduct but to signal the urgent need for systemic reform.

These actions require condemnation. This Court awards to Anis the sum of RM50,000 and to Siti the sum of RM80,000 as exemplary damages.

S 5 GPA 1956 provides that:

Liability of the Government in tort Subject to this Act, the Government shall be liable for any wrongful act done or any neglect or default committed by any public officer in the same manner and to the same extent as that in which a principal, being a private person, is liable for any wrongful act done, or any neglect or default committed by his agent, and for the purposes of this section and without prejudice to the generality thereof, any public officer acting or purporting in good faith to be acting in pursuance of a duty imposed by law shall be deemed to be the agent of and to be acting under the instructions of the Government.

S 6(1) GPA 1956 provides that:

Limits of liability of the Government

No proceedings shall lie against the Government by virtue of section 5 in respect of any act, neglect or default of any public officer, unless proceedings for damages in respect of such act, neglect or default would have lain against such officer personally.

Any written law which negatives or limits the amount of the liability of any public officer in respect of any act, neglect or default committed by that officer shall, in the case of proceedings against the Government under section 5 in respect of such act, neglect or default of such officer, apply in relation to the Government as it would have applied in relation to such officer if the proceedings against the Government had been proceedings against such officer.

No proceedings shall lie against the Government by virtue of section 5 in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by any person while discharging or purporting to discharge any responsibilities of a judicial nature vested in him, or any responsibilities which he has in connection with the execution of judicial process.

No proceedings shall lie against the Government by virtue of section 5 in respect of any act, neglect or default of any public officer, unless that officer was at the material time employed by the Government and paid in respect of his duties as an officer of the Government wholly out of the revenues of the Government, or any fund certified by the appropriate financial officer for the purposes of this subsection or was at the material time holding an office in respect of which the appropriate financial officer certifies that the holder thereof would normally be so paid.

In any claim in tort against the government, the government officer responsible for the alleged tortious act must be made a party, and that officer's liability must be established before the government can be made liable vicariously (see: Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Lay Kee Tee & Ors [2009] 1 CLJ 663 FC).

The Defendants are public officers (police officers and government hospital staff). I found them personally liable for false imprisonment, battery, trespass, constitutional violations, and misfeasance. Accordingly, D30 is vicariously liable.

The Defendants are therefore liable for false imprisonment of Anis on 21.06.2018 and 23.06.2018; of Siti on 23-24.06.2018. They are also liable for battery on Anis and committed trespass into Siti's residence. They also violated the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights by committing misfeasance in public office. As aforesaid, where they are ordered to pay damages as aforesaid, they are also to pay interest at 5% per annum on these judgment sums from the date of judgment until full settlement, together with costs. Dated: 3 June 2026 Arziah binti Mohamed Apandi Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court NCvC 8 Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur Plaintiff's Counsel Mr. Surendra Ananth (together with him Mr. Kevin Ngu) Messrs Heng Xu & Associates Kuala Lumpur Tel. No.: 03-6201 1068/011-1027 6149 Email: kevin@hengxuassociates.com Defendant's Counsel : Pn. Anis Najwa Bt Nazari Senior Federal Counsel Jabatan Peguam Negara Putrajaya Tel. No.: 03-8872 2604 Email: anis.najwa@agc.gov.my Cases referred: Sri Sanjeevan Ramakrishnan v ASP Poonnam E Keling & Ors [2025] 5 CLJ 509 FC Zulkiflee bin SM Anwar Ulhaque & Anor v Arikrishna Apparau & Ors [2014] 3 MLJ 553 CA Lee Kwan Woh v PP [2009] 5 MLJ 301 FC Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia [2010] 2 MLJ 333 FC Muhamad Juzaili bin Mohd Khamis v State Government of Negeri Sembilan [2015] 3 MLJ 513 CA Assa Singh v Mentri Besar, Johore [1969] 2 MLJ 30 FC Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 4 MLJ 449 FC CCH & Anor (on behalf of themselves and as litigation representatives of one CYM, a child) v Pendaftar Besar bagi Kelahiran dan Kematian, Malaysia [2022] 1 MLJ 71 FC Datuk Seri Khalid bin Abu Bakar & Ors v N Indra a/p P Nallathamby (the administrator of the estate and dependent of Kugan a/I Ananthan, deceased) and another appeal [2015] 1 MLJ 353 CA Mah Kiat Seng v Attorney-General [2024] 5 SLR 1180 R v Le (2019) 2 SCR 692 Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 Re T[1992]4 All ER 64 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No. 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 Tony Pua Kian Wee v Government of Malaysia [2020] 1 CLJ 337 FC Sambaga Valli a/p KR Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur [2018] 1 MLJ 784 CA Siti Zabedah bt Kasim v Akmal Nadzim bin Abdullah & Orsl [2026] 7 MLJ 386 HC Roshairee bin Abdul Wahab v Mejar Mustafa bin Omar & Ors [1996] 3 MLJ 337 HC Rookes v Bernard [1964] AC 1229 Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 All ER 762 Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Lay Kee Tee & Ors [2009] 1 CLJ 663 FC Bala Krishnan Appala Naidu v Ketua Inspektor Prabakaran [2011] 2 CLJ 890 HC Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 2 CLJ 771 FC Acts/Law referred: Section 11 of the Mental Health Act 2001 (old) Section 11 of the Mental Health Act 2001 Section 14(3)(b) Mental Health Act 2001 Section 56 Criminal Procedure Code Section 58 Criminal Procedure Code Section 105 Criminal Procedure Code Section 186 Penal Code Section 363 Penal Code Sections 5 and 6 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 Articles referred: Teplin, L. A., & Pruett, N. S. (1992). Police as streetcorner psychiatrist: Managing the mentally ill. International journal of law and psychiatry, 15(2), 139-156. Karystianis, G., Stephenson, F., Taflan, P., Reutens, S., Heffernan, E., & Butler, T. (2026). Who you gonna call? Examining police reports involving people with psychosis to improve front line management. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 16, 1728409. Yang, D. W. (2025). " Doing their jobs": Legal regulation of policing and suicide risk of justice-involved persons in Singapore. International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 14(1), 46-58. Heffernan, J., Pennay, A., Li, X., & Gray, R. (2024). The association between the Police, Ambulance, Clinician Early Response model and involuntary detentions of people living with mental illness: A retrospective observational study. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 31(6), 1007-1019. Chan, G. K. (2025). Individual liberty, safety and police liabilities under the mental health (care and treatment) act. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 99, 102065. Diab, R., & Sanderson, J. (2022). Reasonable Apprehension Under Mental Health Law. Queen's LJ, 48, 83. Abdul Hamid, H. Defining rights and autonomy of mentally disordered persons in Malaysia (2024) CLJU(A) xxxviiii. Arumugam, M. Does a legal framework for mental health exists in Malaysia? (2022) 1 LNS(A) Ixxxviiii.