1. ) Suseela A/p Retnam v 1. ) Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang (BL-12BNCvC-5-06/2024)

SUSEELA A/P RETNAM [sebagai Pentadbir Harta Pusaka dan waris sah kepada Suppiah A/L Periannan (simati)]

S GANDHIMATHI A/P SUPPIAH ... PERAYU-PERAYU

PENGARAH TANAH DAN GALIAN (PERSEKUTUAN) NEGERI SELANGOR ... RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Sesyen di Klang Dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia (Bahagian Civil) Guaman Civil No.: BL-A52NCVC-34-04/2022

Suseela A/P Retnam (No. K/P: 560426-10-5324) [sebagai Pentadbir Harta Pusaka dan waris sah kepada Suppiah A/L Periannan (No. K/P: 440610-10-5053), simati]

S Gandhimathi A/P Suppiah (No. K/P: 760407-10-5296) ... Plaintif-Plaintif

S. Mathivannan A/L P. Suppiah (No. K/P: 730928-10-5905)

Pentadbir Tanah, Daerah Klang

Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian (Persekutuan) Negeri Selangor ... Defendan-Defendan] GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

For ease of reference of this appeal, parties will be referred to as they were in the proceedings before the Sessions Court.

This is an appeal filed by the Plaintiffs against the decision of the Sessions Court Judge ("SCJ") on 30.5.2024 in dismissing their claim against the $ 2^{nd} $ and $ 3^{rd} $ Defendants with costs.

As a brief background, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Plaintiff is the wife and administrator of the estate of Suppiah a/l Periannan ("Deceased") who died on 22.1.2008, while the $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Plaintiff is the daughter of the Deceased. The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant, according to the Plaintiffs, is the adopted son of the Deceased.

The Plaintiffs contend that sometime in the 1980s, the Deceased purchased a parcel of land identified as Lot 15768 (10434) R43, Jalan Kota Raja/KS7, Jalan Kebun, Kampung Jawa, Klang, Selangor ("Property"). Nevertheless, the individual title for the Property was not issued as the subdivision of the master title had not been completed at that time, despite the transaction allegedly being concluded. There was no private caveat entered by the Deceased on the Property in respect of the transaction.

It is further stated by the Plaintiffs in the Statement of Claim that-

the Deceased, the Plaintiffs and the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant resided in a house erected on the Property;

the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Plaintiff spent a total of RM55,000.00 from her Employees Provident Fund (EPF) to carry out refurbishment works on the house; and

the $ 2^{\mathrm{n d}} $ Plaintiff and the $ 1^{\mathrm{s t}} $ Defendant moved out of the house after marrying their respective spouses. However, the $ 1^{\mathrm{s t}} $ Defendant returned to reside in the house after the $ 1^{\mathrm{s t}} $ Plaintiff's son, Thiyakarajan a/l Suppiah, passed away in 2010.

On 8.10.2015, the Selangor State Government vide the $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendant acquired the Property for the West Coast Expressway (Banting-Taiping) project ("Project").

The Plaintiffs assert that in or around 2017,the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant had notified them of the State Government's intention to acquire the Property, agreed to manage the compulsory acquisition process, and undertook to keep them informed of the outcome.

A land inquiry was conducted by the $ 2^{n d} $ Defendant on 27.9.2017. Nonetheless, only the $ 1^{s t} $ Defendant was present despite the relevant notices had been duly sent to the Property address. Accordingly, a compensation totalling RM425,820.00 was released to the $ 1^{s t} $ Defendant on 26.9.2018 via direct credit into his bank account.

By way of a WhatsApp message dated 4.12.2018, the $ 2 ^{n d} $ Plaintiff questioned the $ 1 ^{s t} $ Defendant regarding the status of the acquisition. In response, the $ 1 ^{s t} $ Defendant admitted to receiving a compensation of RM280,000.00 but disclosed that the money had been exhausted to settle his liabilities and fund his home renovation.

On 5.12.2018, the $ 2^{nd} $ Plaintiff went to the office of the $ 2^{nd} $ Defendant where she was told that a compensation of RM425,000.00 had been paid to the $ 1^{st} $ Defendant on 26.9.2018 via direct credit into his bank account.

On 16.8.2019, the Plaintiffs filed a Writ and Statement of Claim against the Defendants claiming for the full amount of the compensation. In the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs aver that the $ ^{1st} $ Defendant fraudulently altered the Deceased's name to his own on the Majlis Perbandaran Klang Assessment Tax (Cukai Taksiran) record. This misrepresentation induced the $ ^{2nd} $ and $ ^{3rd} $ Defendants to believe that the $ ^{1st} $ Defendant was the beneficial owner of the Property. Consequently, the $ ^{1st} $ Defendant unlawfully received the compensation.

As against the $ 2^{n d} $ and $ 3^{r d} $ Defendants, the Plaintiffs contend that both government authorities were negligent and in breach of their statutory duties by failing to ascertain the actual beneficial owner of the Property.

A judgment in default of appearance was entered against the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant. The parties also were informed that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant had passed away prior to the commencement of the trial.

A full trial was conducted and on 30.5.2024 the SCJ dismissed the Plaintiffs' claim the $ 2^{n d} $ and $ 3^{r d} $ Defendants with costs on the following reasons, inter alia: "4. Plaintif-Plaintif menyatakan mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan proses pengambilan tanah berkenaan semasa ia masih sedang dijalankan namun mereka menyangka Defendan Pertama akan memaklumkan mereka berkenaan perkembangan proses pengambilan berkenaan. Malangnya, setelah beberapa ketika, Defendan Pertama memaklumkan Plaintif-Plaintif bahawa wang pampasan berkenaan telah dibayar kepada Defendan Pertama dan telah habis dibelanjakan oleh Defendan Pertama.

Mahkamah juga melihat kepada samada Plaintif-Plaintif berjaya menunjukkan bahawa mereka adalah pihak yang berkepentingan ke atas hartanah berkenaan semasa proses pembahagian hartanah berkenaan dijalankan oleh Defendan Kedua dan Ketiga. Semasa proses berkenaan berjalan, Defendan Pertama adalah individu yang tinggal secara rasmi di atas tanah berkenaan. Ini dibuktikan sendiri oleh Defendan Pertama melalui resit cukai tanah yang telah ditukar dari nama pemilik asal hartanah berkenaan/si mati ke atas nama Defendan Pertama. Ini juga selanjutnya dibuktikan dengan kehadiran Defendan Pertama semasa siasatan dan pemeriksaan dijalankan oleh Defendan Kedua dan Ketiga ke atas hartanah berkenaan.

Pada masa yang material, Surat Kuasa Mentadbir ke atas harta pusaka si mati belum dipohon dan diperolehi oleh waris-waris si mati. Oleh yang demikian, Defendan Kedua dan Ketiga juga tidak dapat memastikan siapakah pihak yang berkepentingan ke atas hartanah berkenaan. Hanya Defendan Pertama sahaja yang mengetahui berkenaan waris-waris lain iaitu Plaintiff-Plaintiff dan telah memilih untuk tidak memaklumkan Defendan Kedua dan Ketiga semasa proses pengambilan berkenaan. Plaintiff-Plaintiff pula tidak membuat semakan sendiri di Pejabat Tanah berkenaan dan meletakkan kepercayaan terhadap Defendan Pertama sepenuhnya. Oleh yang demikian, setakat mana proses perundangan diperuntukkan, Defendan Kedua dan Ketiga telah menjalankan tugasan mereka dan Mahkamah mendapati tiada pelanggaran tugas fidusiari dalam keadaan ini.

Plaintif juga membangkitkan isu samada Defendan Ketiga telah gagal mengambil langkah berjaga-jaga dalam mengesahkan bahawa Defendan Pertama merupakan satu-satunya orang yang berkelayakan untuk menerima pampasan untuk hartanah tersebut termasuk dengan cara mendapatkan Surat Kuasa Mentadbir daripada Defendan Pertama untuk membuktikan hak Defendan Pertama ke atas pampasan berkenaan. Namun, Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif-Plaintif gagal menunjukkan bahawa Defendan Kedua dan Ketiga telah gagal mengambil langkah berjaga-jaga yang sedemikian. Defendan Kedua dan Ketiga telah memberi keterangan bahawa mereka telah menjalankan siasatan dan membuat mesyuarat-mesyuarat dengan pihak-pihak yang berkaitan sebelum memberikan award pampasan berkenaan kepada Defendan Pertama. Plaintif-Plaintif juga gagal menunjukkan kewajipan perundangan untuk Defendan-Defendan (sic) bertanyakan atau membuat inquiri berkenaan Surat Kuasa Mentadbir atau Geran Probet sebelum award diputuskan. Malah dalam kes ini Surat Kuasa Mentadbir diperolehi Plaintif-Plaintif pada 28.6.2019 iaitu selepas proses pengambilan ini selesai.

Oleh yang demikian, tidak berlaku kecuaian di pihak Defendan Kedua dan Ketiga dalam proses pengambilan hartanah berkenaan dan dalam memberikan bayaran pampasan kepada Defendan Pertama kerana Defendan Kedua dan Ketiga telah mematuhi proses pengambilan tanah seperti yang diperuntukkan undang-undang."

In the oft-quoted case of Goh Bak Ming v. Yeoh Eng Kong & Other Appeals [2019] 1 CLJ 461; [2019] 3 MLRA 56, Vernon Ong Lam Kiat JCA (as he then was) speaking for the Court of Appeal held that the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the court below unless that court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision or there has been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence (see also Ming Holdings (M) Sdn Bhd v Tuan Syed Azahari bin Noh Shahabudin & Anor [2010] 4 MLJ 577; [2010] 6 CLJ 857 and Lee Ing Chin v. Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 CLJ 19; [2003] 2 MLJ 97).

In Dream Property Sdn Bhd v. Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 CLJ 453, the Federal Court vide Azahar Mohamed FCJ (later CJM) reiterated the principle on appellate intervention as follows at p.476: [60] It is now established that the principle on which an appellate court could interfere with findings of fact by the trial court is "the plainly wrong test" principle; see the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin & Anor (P) v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Anor [2004] 4 CLJ 309; [2005] 2 MLJ 1 (at p. 10) per Steve Shim CJ SS. More recently, this principle of appellate intervention was affirmed by the Federal Court in UEM Group Berhad v. Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd [2010] 9 CLJ 785 where it was held at p. 800: It is well settled law that an appellate court will not generally speaking, intervene with the decision of a trial court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. A plainly wrong decision happens when the trial court is guilty of no or insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence. (See Chow Yee Wah & Anor v. Choo Ah Pat [1978] 1 LNS 32; Watt v. Thomas [1947] AC 484; and Gan Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309).

In light of the above, it is incumbent upon this Court, as an appellate court to evaluate whether the Plaintiffs have succeeded in establishing that the SCJ was plainly wrong in arriving at her decision. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFFS WERE THE BENEFICIAL OWNER OF THE PROPERTY?

To begin with, it is apt to ascertain who was the lawful beneficial owner of the Property during the acquisition proceedings.

It is trite that only a "person interested" as defined in s.2 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 ("LAA") can claim for and be paid compensation in respect of land compulsory acquired. The definition is as follows: "person interested" includes every person claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act, but does not include a tenant at will;

The next question is whether the Plaintiffs met the criteria under s. 2 of the LAA above?

Upon perusal of the Note of Proceedings, I find that the Plaintiffs were not the registered owners of the Property. The Property was part of a land held under GRN 316747 Lot 15768 Mukim Klang, Selangor and registered under Pendaftar Hakmilik Negeri Selangor. There are three names registered as the trustees for the land, namely Ng Soon Beng, Ng Yeow Chee and Tan Teck Sim (see page 167 of the Appeal Record). The Plaintiffs' argument rests on the assertion that the Deceased purchased the Property thereby establishing the Plaintiffs as the beneficial owners thereof. Nonetheless, this claim lacks weight as such purchase was never registered with the $ ^{2^{nd}} $ and $ ^{3^{rd}} $ Defendants. Moreover, there was no caveat entered by the Deceased to demonstrate that he had interest in the Property.

Not only that, the Plaintiffs were not occupiers of the Property, a fact which was conceded by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Plaintiff. In fact, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant was the sole person occupying the Property throughout the compulsory acquisition proceedings. The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Plaintiff who is also SP1 when cross-examined said-PD: Tapi setujulah ada beberapa perkara yang perlu dipatuhi untuk pengambilan tanah tersebut dibuat? Ini puan setuju atau tidak SP1: Defendan Pertama tidak memberitahu kami dengan hal ini kerana kami tidak tahu kerana kami tidak tinggal di situ. PD: Baik puan. Saya cadangkan kepada puan bahawa dalam kes ini ada beberapa notis siasatan lawatan tapak telahpun dibuat di hartanah tersebut yang mana Defendan Satu sahaja di situ, setuju? SP1: Beliau yang tinggal di situ beliau yang akan terima notis itu PD: Dan tiada orang lain yang tinggal di situ melainkan beliau sahaja, setuju? SP1: Beliau sahaja yang tinggal PD: Jadi setuju bahawa hanya beliau yang tinggal di situ dan tidak ada orang lain? SP1: Ya. Beliau yang tinggal di situ PD: Dan juga pada tarikh-tarikh lawatan tapak diadakan secara fizikal pada hartanah tersebut oleh pihak Defendan Kedua juga tiada orang lain yang hadir di hartanah tersebut melainkan Defendan Pertama SP1: Ya. Saya setju beliau yang ada di situ

Additionally, there is not an iota of evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs to demonstrate that they possessed any registered interest in the Property at the material time of the acquisition proceedings. The Letter of Administration ("LA") was only granted to the 1st Plaintiff on 28.6.2019, nearly a year after the compensation was released to the 1st Defendant. Furthermore, the 1st Defendant is the registered account holder for the Assessment Tax issued by the Majlis Perbandaran Klang in respect of the Property. On the issue raised by the Plaintiffs that the 1st Defendant had altered the Assessment Tax, it is my view that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are under no duty to investigate or look behind documents presented to them in good faith during the land inquiry unless those documents are suspicious on their face.

In the upshot, I agree with the $ 2^{\mathrm{n d}} $ and $ 3^{\mathrm{r d}} $ Defendants that during the acquisition proceedings the Plaintiffs held no interest on the Property. WHETHER THE $ 2^{ND} $ AND $ 3^{RD} $ DEFENDANTS WERE CORRECT IN SERVING THE NOTICES ON THE $ 1^{ST} $ DEFENDANT AND ALLOWING HIM TO ATTEND THE LAND INQUIRY?

S.11 of the LAA reads-Service of notices

(1) The Land Administrator shall, in addition to giving public notice as required by subsection 10(1), in respect of all scheduled land specified in every notice in Form E, serve copies of such notice in the manner prescribed by section 53, upon —

the occupier of such land;

the registered proprietor of such land, where he is not the occupier thereof;

any person having a registered interest in such land;

any person whom he knows or has reason to believe to be interested therein: Provided that no omission or failure to serve such notice upon any person falling under paragraph (b) or (c) shall invalidate any enquiry held pursuant to the notice or any award made upon the conclusion of the enquiry if, by reason of damage or deterioration of the register document of title to such land, such person cannot be ascertained.

The Land Administrator in any particular case may also, by service of a notice in Form F, require the registered proprietor of any land, specified in any notice in Form E, or any other person who may in the opinion of the Land Administrator have knowledge of the fact referred to therein, within such period as may be prescribed in such notice to furnish a statement in writing of the information required by such Form.

At the risk of repetition, it suffices to say that only the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant being the actual occupier of the Property, satisfied the criteria under s. 11(1)(a) of the LAA to receive the requisite notices and participate in the land inquiry proceedings. WHETHER THE $ 2^{ND} $ AND $ 3^{RD} $ DEFENDANTS WERE IN BREACH OF THEIR STATUTORY DUTIES

It is a settled principle of law that a public authority acts in breach of statutory duty upon any failure to perform its mandatory statutory obligations. Hence, a question arises - did the $ 2^{n d} $ and $ 3^{n d} $ Defendants breach their statutory duties when they released the compensation to the $ 1^{s t} $ Defendant instead of the Plaintiffs?

To answer this, as I have alluded to earlier, there is no evidence establishing that the Plaintiffs held any interest in the Property.

As for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant, the $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ and $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants aver that the payment of compensation was made after a thorough investigation done. Othman bin Mat Hussain (SD1), the Assistant Land Administrator conducting the land inquiry in respect of the Property in his witness statement states-S10. Boleh nyatakan apa dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan Pertama bagi membuktikan Defendan Pertama layak dibayar award pampasan bangunan tersebut? J10. Defendan Kedua memutuskan pampasan bangunan berdasarkan Akuan bersumpah, lawatan tapak bangunan, keterangan dokumen pihak berkepentingan yang hadir pada masa bicara / siasatan dijalankan.

Evidently, the $ 2^{nd} $ and $ 3^{rd} $ Defendants disbursed the compensation in reliance on the $ 1^{st} $ Defendant's statutory declaration, wherein he affirmed that he was representing the Deceased's family members. Crucially, the shared paternal name of the $ 1^{st} $ Defendant and the $ 2^{nd} $ Plaintiff served as further proof to substantiate the $ 1^{st} $ Defendant's claim that he was acting on behalf of the Deceased's family. Moreover, the $ 1^{st} $ Defendant's name appeared on the Assessment Tax accounts of the Property. His status as the sole occupier of the Property was not only admitted by the Plaintiffs but was also verified through physical inspections of the site by the $ 2^{nd} $ and $ 3^{rd} $ Defendants. As such, it is my considered view that the $ 2^{nd} $ and $ 3^{rd} $ Defendants' conclusion that the $ 1^{st} $ Defendant constituted an "interested person" under the LAA, is legally tenable and supported by the facts.

In view of the foregoing, I find that the $ 2^{\mathrm{n d}} $ and $ 3^{\mathrm{r d}} $ Defendants were not in breach of their statutory duties as claimed by the Plaintiffs.

It is well established that the legal burden is on the plaintiff to prove its case. It is crystal clear from the above backdrop that the Plaintiffs have not proved their case according to law against the $ 2^{n d} $ and $ 3^{n d} $ Defendants. The dismissal of the claim against the $ 2^{n d} $ and $ 3^{n d} $ Defendants does not leave the Plaintiffs without recourse. They remain at liberty to proceed to claim the compensation directly against the estate of the $ 1^{s t} $ Defendant. Thus, I dismiss the Plaintiffs' appeal with costs. Dated: 15.5.2026 (SHAMSULBAHRI BIN HAJI IBRAHIM) JUDGE, HIGH COURT OF MALAYA, KLANG SELANGOR Counsels for the Appellants: R. Mageswaran Sujata a/p Mohanadas Messrs. M. Sujata & Associates Counsels for the Respondents: SFC Noor Fadzila Ishak FC Sheryn Yong Shi Yee Jabatan Peguam Negara, Putrajaya