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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (BAHAGIAN DAGANG) GUAMAN NO. WA-22NCC-54-01/2019
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High Court of Malaysia19 Sept 2022WA-22NCC-54-01/2019
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“sh accrual of the cause of action for total failure of consideration. [32] The relevant provisions on fresh accrual of action where there is an acknowledgment of a debt are sections 26 and 27 of the Limitation Act”
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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (BAHAGIAN DAGANG) GUAMAN NO. WA-22NCC-54-01/2019
1
TAN HAN KWAN
2
TAN MEI LI
3
TAN SU LI
4
TAN CHOR ENG (NO. K/P: 330723-01-5129) … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF
1
CH’NG KONG SAN
2
TEH SIEW HOE
3
KSCH PROPERTY SDN BHD (NO SYARIKAT: 663455-M) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw JUDGMENT A. Introduction [1] The plaintiffs filed an application to amend the re-amended writ of summons and statement of claim, both dated 11 May 2015 (“Amendment Application”). [2] I dismissed the Amendment Application as I found that the application, made after the conclusion of six days of trial and prior to the filing of written submissions, is not bona fide. Instead, the application appeared to be a tactical manoeuvre designed to reinstate a cause of action that had already been struck out. Further, the prejudice that would be caused to the defendants by the amendments cannot be compensated by costs. I also found there to be no reasonable reason provided by the plaintiffs to justify the delay in filing the application. B. Background Facts [3] The plaintiffs were the original shareholders of the 3rd defendant. [4]
Preamble
Pursuant to a sale and purchase agreement dated 24 May 2015 (“SPA”) between the 3rd defendant and Dazzling Symphony Sdn Bhd (“Vendor”), the 3rd defendant purchased a piece of land situated at Lot No. 14, Lorong Enau, Kuala Lumpur (“Land”) from the Vendor. The total purchase price for the Land is RM7,300,000. [5] An initial payment of RM2,530,000 was made by the 3rd defendant to the Vendor. However, the 3rd defendant faced difficulties in coming up S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw with the remainder of the purchase price, amounting to RM4,770,000 (“Balance Purchase Price”). [6] The 1st defendant, an investor who was introduced to the plaintiffs by a mutual acquaintance, paid the Balance Purchase Price to the Vendor, and the plaintiffs transferred 80% of their shareholding in the 3rd defendant to the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant (the 1st defendant’s wife). [7] The nature of this transaction and its implications are the subject matter of this action. The plaintiffs’ case is that the Balance Purchase Price paid by the 1st defendant to the Vendor is the purchase consideration for 80% of the shares in the 3rd defendant, which is ultimately payable to the plaintiffs. The 1st defendant however claimed that he paid the Balance Purchase Price to the 3rd defendant and not to the plaintiffs, in return for the 80% shareholding in the 3rd defendant. [8] The plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendants on 29 January 2019, alleging total failure of consideration, unjust enrichment and conspiracy to defraud. [9] In the course of proceedings, the 1st and 2nd defendants applied to strike out the amended writ of summons dated 15 February 2019 and the re-amended statement of claim dated 4 March 2019. On 1 August 2019, the striking-out application was allowed in part by Azizul Azmi Adnan J. The learned judge struck out the claim in so far as it related to the causes of action for total failure of consideration and unjust enrichment, as he found that limitation had set in for these causes of S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw action. The plaintiffs’ appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 29 June 2020. [10] I took over conduct of this matter in 2021. This case proceeded to full trial on 15 to 18 November 2021, 11 March 2022 and 19 May 2022. At the conclusion of the trial, I directed written submissions and written submissions-in-reply to be filed and exchanged simultaneously on 20 July 2022 and 10 August 2022, respectively. Oral submissions were fixed for 22 August 2022. [11] However, the Amendment Application was filed on 23 June 2022. With the Amendment Application, all previous directions on post-trial submissions were put on hold. C. The Amendment Application [12] The main reason for the Amendment Application is to reinstate the cause of action of total failure of consideration that had been struck out by Azizul Azmi Adnan J. The plaintiffs also included an additional prayer for punitive damages. [13] The plaintiffs contend that there was a fresh accrual of the cause of action for total failure of consideration, as the 1st defendant had, during the course of trial, acknowledged the debt owing to the plaintiffs. [14] The plaintiffs relied on order 20 rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC”) in making the Amendment Application. The relevant provision states that: S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw “(1) Subject to Order 15, rules 6, 6A, 7 and 8 and the following provisions of this rule, the Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow the plaintiff to amend his writ, or any party to amend his pleading, on such terms as to costs or otherwise as may be just and in such a manner, if any, as it may direct.” (emphasis added) [15] Based on the above provision, it is clear that an application to amend pleadings can be made at any stage of the proceedings. [16] The locus classicus for amendment of pleadings is Yamaha Motor Co Ltd v Yamaha Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Ors [1983] 1 MLJ 213. The Federal Court provided guidance on questions that must be considered in an amendment application: “The general principle is that the court will allow such amendments as will cause no injustice to the other parties. Three basic questions should be considered to determine whether injustice would or would not result, (1) whether the application is bona fide; (2) whether the prejudice caused to the other side can be compensated by costs and (3) whether the amendments would not in effect turn the suit from one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character. (See Mallal's Supreme Court Practice page 342). If the answers are in the affirmative, an application for amendment should be allowed at any stage of the proceedings particularly before trial …” S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw (emphasis added) [17] In Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Low Thiam Hoe and another appeal [2016] 1 MLJ 301, the Federal Court added further considerations that should be taken into account when an amendment application is not made at an early stage: “[33] Having considered the facts and the circumstances of the present case, our views are as follows:
a
(a) when dealing with an application to amend the pleadings, which introduce a new case in the claim or defence, on the eve of the trial, the principles in Yamaha Motor are not the sole considerations;
b
(b) the principles in Yamaha Motor applies to cases where the application to amend the pleadings is made at an early stage of the proceedings;
c
(c) that there has to be a cogent and reasonable explanation in the applicant’s affidavit as to why the application was filed late;
d
(d) that the application to amend the pleadings is not a tactical manoeuvre; S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw
e
(e) that the proposed amendment must disclose full particulars for the court to ascertain if there is a real prospect of success in proving the same; and
f
(f) that lateness in the application to amend the pleadings cannot necessarily be compensated by payment of costs.” [18] Guided by the cases above, the following factors must be taken into account in considering the Amendment Application: a. Whether the Amendment Application is bona fide. In this regard, this court should also assess whether the Amendment Application is a tactical manoeuvre. b. Whether prejudice caused to the defendants can be compensated by cost. c. Whether the amendments would in effect turn this suit from one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character. d. Whether there is a cogent and reasonable explanation for the delay in the filing of the Amendment Application. e. Whether the Amendment Application has disclosed full particulars, so that this court can ascertain if there is a real prospect of success in proving the viability of the application. S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw D. Considerations And Findings [19] Guided by Yamaha Motor and Hong Leong Finance Bhd, I dismissed the Amendment Application as I found that the Amendment Application is not bona fide, but is instead likely to be a tactical manoeuvre to reinstate a cause of action that had been struck out. Further, prejudice caused to the defendants if the application is allowed, cannot be compensated by costs. I am also not satisfied that there are reasonable reasons to justify the delay in the filing of the Amendment Application. The Amendment Application Is Not Bona Fide [20] I find the Amendment Application is not bona fide, as the plaintiffs are seeking to reintroduce an earlier cause of action that had been struck out. [21] In Kintown Contractor Sdn Bhd v Tometa-Mira Concrete Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 859, the High Court considered the plaintiff’s appeal against the decision of the Sessions Court, which allowed the defendant’s application to amend its defence and counterclaim. The application sought to add a claim for special damages with particulars, which was previously struck out for want of particulars. [22] The High Court allowed the appeal, and held as follows at paragraph 14: “[i] that the Respondent's/Defendant's Amendment Application to include particulars in respect of its claim for special damages is not made bona fide because the S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw Respondent/Defendant seeks to reintroduce or include the Respondent's/Defendant's claim for special damages which was previously struck out by the Bintulu High Court Judge on 13/12/2013 for lack of particulars arising out of the Appellant's/Plaintiff's said application to strike out the Respondent's/Defendant's defence and counterclaim filed in the Sessions Court vide Enclosure 10. [ii] Thus as at 13/12/2013, the Respondent/Defendant only had a claim for general damages remaining against the Appellant/Plaintiff but not the claim for special damages which had been struck out. Further after its ruling, the learned High Court Judge never directed the Respondent/Defendant to file any amendment application nor did the Respondent/Defendant lodge an appeal against the ruling of the learned High Court Judge. By amending its Counterclaim to re-introduce or include a claim for special damages after the Respondent/Defendant's earlier claim for special damages was struck out, the Respondent/Defendant is seeking a "second bite at the proverbial cherry". This Court notes that the Respondent/Defendant only applied to amend its counterclaim to include particulars of special damages after its original claim for special damages had been struck out by the High Court Judge on 13/12/2013; … S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw [v] that the Respondent's/Defendant's Amendment Application is a tactical manoeuvre to defeat the Respondent's/Defendant's claim because the Respondent's/Defendant's claim for special damages has swelled from zero to RM235,020.00 … [vi] that the Respondent's/Defendant's Amendment Application changed the character of the Respondent's/Defendant's original counterclaim as the Respondent/Defendant's earlier claim for special damages had been struck out on 13/12/2013. By its Amendment Application, the Respondent/Defendant sought to re-introduce its claim for special damages which was struck out by the High Court Judge whose decision was appealed against. If the Respondent/Defendant is permitted to amend its counterclaim to include its claim for special damages with particulars which was struck out by the High Court Judge earlier, this Court would in effect be allowing the Defendant to re-enact or reintroduce its claim for special damages which had already been struck out by the Bintulu High Court on 13/12/2013.; and [vii] that in the light of the foregoing this Court finds that the Respondent's/Defendant's Amendment Application causes prejudice to the Appellant's/Plaintiff's which cannot be compensated with costs.” S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw [23] Similar to Kintown Contractor, in the present case, the plaintiffs’ claim for total failure of consideration and unjust enrichment was struck out by Azizul Azmi Adnan J. His Lordship held that this portion of the plaintiffs’ claim was plainly unsustainable as it was barred by limitation: “28. The plaintiffs also claimed for the return of the 80% shares that had been transferred to the defendants. The basis of this claim was the total failure of consideration under contract and unjust enrichment. I was of the view that this portion of the plaintiffs’ claim was plainly unsustainable because it was barred by limitation.
29
The first defendant had paid the vendor of the land on 23 September 2005. It will be recalled that the plaintiffs contend that this consideration ought notionally have flowed from the first defendant to the plaintiffs, then from the plaintiffs to the Company, and subsequently from the Company to the vendor. As I understand the case for the plaintiffs, Mr Ch’ng made payment directly to the vendor as a practical matter, although legal it was a payment on behalf of the Company, routed through the plaintiffs.
30
Taking the plaintiffs’ case at its maximum, there must have been an agreement for the sale of the shares no later than the date on which Mr Ch’ng made payment to the vendor. As a consequence, the period for limitation will have commenced on 23 September 2005. Limitation would have thus set in on 24 September 2011, in as far as the contractual claim was concerned. S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw
31
The claim for unjust enrichment would accrue when the shares were transferred to the first and second defendants, for this was when the consideration for the shares became payable. By the plaintiffs’ own case, the shares were transferred to Mr Ch’ng and his wife on 5 October 2005, which meant that limitation for this particular case of action would have set in six years hence.
32
For these reasons, I allowed the striking out of the plaintiff’s contractual claim against the first and second defendants, as well as the claim founded on unjust enrichment against them.” [24] It is my view that the Amendment Application, which is intended to reinstate the cause of action of total failure of consideration that had been struck out would, borrowing the words of the learned High Court judge in Kintown Contractor, be akin to allowing the plaintiffs to take a second bite of the cherry. With this consideration, I find the Amendment Application is not made bona fide. [25] Further, following the decision of Azizul Azmi Adnan J, the doctrine of res judicata would apply to prevent the reintroduction of the claim for total failure of consideration (see Asia Commercial Finance (M) Berhad v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 783 and Dato’ Sivananthan Shanmugam v Artisan Fokus Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 CLJ 1062). [26] In Sykt Perkhidmatan Bas Sibuga Sdn Bhd v Sykt Bas Jalan Leila Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 CLJ 614, Richard Malanjum J (as his Lordship S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw then was) held that a striking out order, which was granted on the ground that an action is statute-barred, constitutes a final order for which the doctrine of res judicata would apply. [27] One final point I considered, which led me to the finding that the Amendment Application is not bona fide, is the reason given by the plaintiffs in making the Amendment Application. The plaintiffs claimed that during trial, the 1st defendant had acknowledged the debt owing to the plaintiffs, and this acknowledgment had led to a fresh accrual of the cause of action for total failure of consideration. [28] It is the plaintiffs’ case that the acknowledgments are contained in the 1st defendant’s witness statement signed on 19 May 2022 (“WS-DW3(A)”) and his responses during his cross-examination. [29] The following is set out in question 7 of WS-DW3(A): “Q7 : What was the consideration for the transfer of the Plaintiffs' 80% shareholding in the Company to Datin Teh and yourself? A : I state that my act of advancing the balance purchase price for the Land amounting to RM4.77 million on behalf for the Company is the consideration for the transfer of the Plaintiffs' 80% shareholding to Datin Teh and myself. S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw As such and as stated in the duly executed share transfer forms, the consideration for the transfer of the Plaintiffs' 80% shareholding in the Company to Datin Teh and myself was at a nominal price of RM4.00 (RM1.00 to each Plaintiff). I further state that on 23.9.2005, Tan Mei Li and Tan Chor Eng also signed a letter confirming that the consideration for the transfer of the Plaintiffs' 80% shareholding in the Company to Datin Teh and myself had been fully paid. I refer to the letter dated 23.9.2005 at CBD Volume 2(2). p. 425.” (emphasis added) [30] During cross-examination on 19 May 2022, the 1st defendant in response to questions from learned counsel for the plaintiffs, confirmed his stand that the act of advancing the Balance Purchase Price for the purchase of the Land is the consideration for 80% shareholding in the 3rd defendant. The relevant parts of the notes of proceedings are set out below: S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw a. At line 20 of page 629: “OCJ : That is all Dato’ thank you (plaintiffs’ for your confirmation. Refer to counsel) Q7 – WS-DW3(A). Dato’ this is the part where I talk about the act of advancing. Q7 you at the 1st paragraph itself, it says very clearly My Lady permission just to repeat that paragraph, ‘I state that my act of advancing the balance purchase price for the Land amounting to RM4.77 million on behalf for the Company is the consideration for the transfer of the Plaintiffs’ 80% shareholding to Datin Teh and myself’. Dato’ based on all these a few questions. : Yeah. (1st defendant) OCJ : Again, I want to be sure with you that here you are talking about the act only. The act only you S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw are saying is a consideration, correct? : The act of advancing, yes. OCJ : Dato’ sorry not to belabour this point but you are not saying that the RM4.77million is the consideration but just the act? : The act of advancing, yes.” b. At line 18 of page 729: “OCJ : Your answer in Court today, is that your consideration for the transfer of 80% shares is the act of advancing and RM4.00. Do you agree? : Yes.” (emphasis added) [31] The plaintiffs argued the confirmations given by the 1st defendant in WS-DW3(A) and during cross-examination, that the act of advancing the Balance Purchase Price for the purchase of the Land is the consideration for 80% shareholding in the 3rd defendant, tantamount to an S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw acknowledgment of debt which gives rise to a fresh accrual of the cause of action for total failure of consideration. [32] The relevant provisions on fresh accrual of action where there is an acknowledgment of a debt are sections 26 and 27 of the Limitation Act
1953
These provisions are reproduced below: “26 Fresh accrual of action on acknowledgment or part payment …
Subsection
(2) Where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest therein, and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment … 27 Formal provisions as to acknowledgments and part payments
Subsection
(1) Every such acknowledgment as is referred to in section 26 or in the proviso to section 16 of this Act shall be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment …” S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw [33] Based on sections 26 and 27 of the Limitation Act 1953, for a cause of action to accrue afresh, there must be an acknowledgment of a debt, and the acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment. I am unable to see how the 1st defendant’s answers in WS-DW3(A) and during cross-examination would qualify as an acknowledgment of the defendants’ debt to the plaintiffs. In my view, the 1st defendant had merely restated their position that the act of advancing the Balance Purchase Price is the consideration for the transfer of 80% of the shares in the 3rd defendant to the 1st and 2nd defendants. [34] This position was set out in the following paragraphs of the 1st and 2nd defendants’ amended defence dated 25 May 2021: a. Paragraph 19.1: “It was concluded that the Plaintiffs would transfer 80% stake in the 3rd Defendant to the 1st Defendant on the condition that the 1st Defendant will advance to pay on behalf of the 3rd Defendant (i) the balance purchase price of RM4.77 million; (ii) the DBKL contribution of RM372,000; and (iii) stamp duty charges and other ancillary fees, with the understanding that it is to be repaid; (emphasis added) S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw b. Paragraph 28: “Paragraph 29 of the Re-Amended SOC is denied. The 1st and 2nd Defendants plead that the Plaintiffs had no expectation and it has never been the understanding and agreement between the Plaintiffs and the 1st and 2nd Defendants that the Plaintiffs are to receive the RM4.77 million that had been advanced to on behalf of the 3rd Defendant to Dazzling Symphony.” (emphasis added) [35] Based on the above, I am of the view that the argument that statements made in the course of trial are an acknowledgment of the defendants’ debt is not made in good faith, and is likely to have been an excuse to justify the late filing of the Amendment Application. It is on this basis that I find that the Amendment Application is not bona fide. Prejudice Caused To The Defendants Cannot Be Compensated By Costs [36] The Amendment Application is made at a very late stage of the proceedings, after trial and prior to the filing of post-trial written submissions. S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw [37] In Hong Leong Finance, the Federal Court considered the issue of prejudice and costs in an application made at a late stage in the proceedings: “[18] It is pertinent to note that Yamaha Motor was decided under the old RHC 1980. The civil procedure has since then changed with the introduction of the pre-trial case management in the year 2000 under O 34 of the RHC 1980 (22 September 2000) and now under O 34 of the RC 2012 (1 August 2012). Nowadays the court recognises especially under the new case management regime that a different approach needs to be taken to prevent delay in the progress of a case to trial and for its completion. The progress of the case is no longer left in the hands of the litigants but with the court in the driver’s seat (see the case of Syed Omar bin Syed Mohamed v Perbadanan Nasional Bhd [2013] 1 MLJ 461; [2012] 9 CLJ 557). In particular when an application to amend the pleading is made at a very late stage as was done in the present case, the principles in Yamaha Motor ought not to be the sole consideration. This is because an order for compensation by payment of costs in such a case may not be an adequate remedy and it would also disrupt the administration of justice which affects the courts, the parties and the other users of the judicial process (see the case of Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd v Perembun (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 1 MLJ 80).” (emphasis added) S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw [38] Likewise, in K Rajashekar a/l Kanapathy & Ors v Palm Court Condominium & Ors [2014] 9 MLJ 297, the court held as follows: “[27] The authorities discussed above make it clear that the court is and should be less ready to allow a very late amendment than it used to be in former times, and that a heavy onus lies on a party seeking to make a very late amendment to justify it. The later an application is made, the stronger would be the grounds required to justify it. The delay must be explained and justified. A failure to explain the delay is fatal especially where the amendments sought are substantial in nature. Last minute applications are to be discouraged as they would inevitably entail an adjournment, and an award of costs may not adequately compensate someone who is desirous of concluding a piece of litigation which has been hanging over his head.” (emphasis added) [39] I am of the considered view that the Amendment Application, if allowed, would be prejudicial to the defendants. The amendments would introduce a new cause of action that had not been considered in the course of trial and would introduce an additional prayer for punitive damages. If these amendments are allowed, the parties’ cases will be reopened. Witnesses will be recalled and additional witnesses would need to be called. This will inevitably delay a matter that had already been delayed, to the prejudice of the defendants. Such prejudice cannot be compensated by costs. S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw There Is No Reasonable Reason To Justify The Delay In The Amendment Application [40] The plaintiffs claimed that in the course of trial, the 1st defendant had acknowledged the debt owing to the plaintiffs, and that this acknowledgment had led to a fresh accrual of the cause of action for total failure of consideration. Hence the plaintiffs’ case is that it is necessary to file the Amendment Application at this late stage in the proceedings. The plaintiffs argued that the delay can be justified by the fact that the acknowledgments were only made during trial. [41] For the reasons explained in paragraphs [27] to [35] above, I am unable to agree with the plaintiffs’ argument that there was an acknowledgment of debt made during trial, leading to a fresh accrual of the cause of action for total failure of consideration. Following this finding, there is no legitimate reason to justify the late filing of the Amendment Application. E. Decision [42] The Amendment Application is made after the conclusion of six days of trial. Therefore, there is a heavy burden placed on the plaintiffs to justify these amendments. I am of the view that this burden has not been met. [43] It is on this basis that I dismissed the Amendment Application, with costs. S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw Dated 16 December 2022 - sgd - Adlin Abdul Majid Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Commercial Division (NCC6) Kuala Lumpur Counsel: Plaintiffs : Ooi Chih-Jen (together with Yap Tat Sing) of Messrs. Chris Lim Su Heng 1st and 2nd : Andrew Fernandez (together with Anson Chee) of defendants Messrs. Chooi & Company + Cheang & Ariff 3rd defendant : Wong Mun Hoe (together with Lydia Chong) of Messrs. Munhoe Legislation referred to: Rules of Court 2012, order 20 rule 5 Limitation Act 1953, section 26, section 27 Cases referred to: Asia Commercial Finance (M) Berhad v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 783 Dato’ Sivananthan Shanmugam v Artisan Fokus Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 CLJ 1062 Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Low Thiam Hoe and another appeal [2016] 1 MLJ 301 S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw K Rajashekar a/l Kanapathy & Ors v Palm Court Condominium & Ors [2014] 9 MLJ 297 Kintown Contractor Sdn Bhd v Tometa-Mira Concrete Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 859 Sykt Perkhidmatan Bas Sibuga Sdn Bhd v Sykt Bas Jalan Leila Sdn Bhd [1997] 3 CLJ 614 Yamaha Motor Co Ltd v Yamaha Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Ors [1983] 1 MLJ 213 S/N pl0EEsQt9ki/SaYvT5Vhvw
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