Tan Ka Ken v Chan for Heng (CB-22NCvC-6-05/2021)

TAN KA KEN

TAN KAR ENG (NO. K/P: 741007-06-5471) ... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN CHAN FOR HENG (NO. K/P: 661201-06-5213) … DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Pada 11.01.2016 Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan telah memasuki satu perjanjian jual beli untuk membeli sebidang tanah di hakmilik HS(D) 4209, PT 185, Mukim Triang, Daerah Bera, Pahang dengan harga RM900,000.00 (Halaman 635 Ikatan D). 19/12/2024 12:07:54 CB-22NCvC-6-05/2021 Kand. 122 [2] Plaintif Pertama menyatakan bahawa dia telah membeli benih-benih pokok untuk menanam kesemuanya di hartanah tersebut. Plaintif Pertama telah membelanjakan RM480,000.00. Plaintif Pertama menyatakan nilai sebenar perbelanjaan tersebut ialah RM1,380,000.00. [3] Bahagian dalam tanah tersebut telah dipersetujui bahawa Plaintif Pertama sebanyak ½ bahagian, Plaintif Kedua sebanyak ¼ bahagian dan Defendan sebanyak ¼ bahagian. Pada 07.06.2016 Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan telah menandatangani satu dokumen yang menyatakan bahawa Defendan akan menanggung keseluruhan pembayaran balik kemudahan pinjaman sebanyak RM 345,000.00 dan faedah-faedah bank yang berkenaan. [4] Di dalam perjanjian 07.06.2016 di halaman 624 Ikatan D terdapat Fasal 4 yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “In consideration of the Second and Third Party having agreed to charge the Property to the Lender for the Loan, the First Party hereby grants an option to the Second and Third Party to purchase the First Party's ¼ undivided share in the Property at the price of RM345,000.00 in the event of the First Party failing to make 2 or more consecutive monthly loan instalment.” First Party dalam perjanjian bertarikh 07.06.2016 adalah merujuk kepada Chan For Heng (Defendan), Second Party adalah Tan Ka Ken (Plaintif Pertama) dan Third Party adalah Tan Kar Eng (Plaintif Kedua). [5] Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan telah ditawarkan pinjaman oleh bank Malayan Banking Berhad pada 14.03.2016 bagi jumlah sebanyak RM 345,000.00 yang menyatakan bahawa tempoh pembayaran adalah selama 120 bulan dan bayaran ansuran pada jumlah RM 4,114.00 sebulan (Halaman 402 Ikatan C). [6] Pada 07.08.2018 terdapat notis tuntutan pinjaman daripada Malayan Banking Berhad di atas kegagalan menjelaskan bayaran ansuran tertunggak selama dua bulan berjumlah sebanyak RM 8,306.00 (Halaman 385 Ikatan C). Begitu juga sebelum itu pada 14.05.2018 kegagalan pembayaran ansuran selama dua bulan berjumlah RM8,306.00. [7] Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan telah bersetuju bahawa Defendan seorang sahaja yang akan membangunkan hartanah tersebut dengan penanaman pokok-pokok buah-buahan. Mahkamah juga mendapati terdapat resit-resit yang menunjukkan bahawa Defendan telah membeli benih-benih pokok-pokok yang berkenaan. Pada masa yang sama juga Mahkamah mendapati ada dokumen-dokumen yang menunjukkan pembelian bahan-bahan yang digunakan untuk penanaman pokok-pokok tersebut. [8] Perhubungan di antara Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan mengalami masalah pada bulan Ogos 2019 apabila Defendan dikatakan tanpa persetujuan Plaintif-Plaintif telah membuat permohonan kepada Jabatan Ukur dan Pemetaan untuk mengukur bahagian ¼ tanah di mana terdapatnya tanaman pokok-pokok durian, limau dan mangga. Namun tiada sebarang keterangan bertulis yang menunjukkan terdapatnya tindakan sedemikian. Begitu juga tiada dokumen daripada Jabatan Ukur dan Pemetaan yang dapat mengesahkan fakta bahawa Defendan telah membuat permohonan sedemikian. [9] Dalam kes ini Plaintif-Plaintif menyatakan bahawa disebabkan kegagalan Defendan menjelaskan pembayaran dua kali ansuran kepada pihak bank membolehkan mereka menggunakan opsyen di dalam perjanjian bertarikh 07.06.2016 untuk membeli ¼ bahagian Defendan tersebut. [10] Selain daripada Defendan melalui tuntutan balas telah memohon untuk pemilikan bersama ditamatkan dan satu permohonan dibuat di bawah seksyen 142 Kanun Tanah Negara dilakukan. Defendan juga memohon atas gadaian di Malayan Banking Berhad dilepaskan. Kos untuk pelepasan itu ditanggung 75 % oleh Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan 25 %. [11] Dalam kes ini juga terdapat dokumen-dokumen yang disediakan oleh Defendan berkaitan dengan perbelanjaan yang digunakan bagi menggunakan tanah tersebut. Ia telah dihantar serah kepada Plaintif-Plaintif. [12] Isu dalam kes ini ialah seperti berikut:

Adakah terdapat perjanjian di antara Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan berkenaan pembelian tanah tersebut daripada pihak ketiga dan adakah terdapat perjanjian di antara Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan bertarikh 07.06.2016.

Adakah terdapat keingkaran pembayaran kepada bank terhadap pinjaman sebanyak RM 345,000.00.

Apakah di atas kemungkiran tersebut Plaintif-Plaintif boleh melaksanakan opsyen yang dipersetujui melalui perjanjian pada 07.06.2016.

Adakah tuntutan balas Defendan wajar dibenarkan atau ditolak. Isu (a) [13] Perjanjian di antara Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan untuk pembelian hartanah tersebut dapat disahkan oleh SP 4 Ho Thong Mee. SP 4 mengesahkan tanahnya dijual kepada Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan pada harga RM 900,000.00. Ia juga dapat dilihat di halaman 635 hingga 644 Ikatan D iaitu perjanjian jual beli tersebut. Adalah terang lagi bersuluh bahawa terdapat kewujudan perjanjian jual beli tersebut. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat terdapat perjanjian di antara Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan untuk membeli hartanah di HS(D) 4209 PT 185 Mukim Triang, Daerah Bera, Negeri Pahang dengan harga RM 900,000.00. [14] Seterusnya berkenaan dengan perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 07.06.2016. Defendan menyatakan dia tidak memahami perjanjian tersebut disebabkan dia buta huruf. Oleh itu dia tidak mengetahui bahawa kesan jika berlaku kelewatan bayaran ansuran sebanyak dua kali Plaintif-Plaintif mempunyai opsyen untuk membeli bahagian Defendan. [15] Penelitian kepada penyataan pembelaan asal dan pindaan tidak menyatakan non est factum. Oleh itu Mahkamah ini perlu merujuk kepada hakikat non est factum yang dinyatakan dalam kes Chin Leong Soon & Ors v Len Chee Omnibus Co Ltd & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 228 di mana YA Hakim Gill menyatakan seperti berikut: “I do not think so. Her claim is clearly based on the doctrine of non est factum, which means that if a person, owing to an error, executes a legal document which is of an entirely different character from that which he intended to sign, he is entitled to found his claim on it or to plead it as a defence if he is sued on the document.” [16] Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada kes Saunders (Executrix of Will of Gallie) v Anglia Building Society [1970] 3 All ER 961 di mana Lord Reid telah membincangkan non est factum dan pemakaiannya seperti berikut: “The plea of non est factum obviously applies when the person sought to be held liable did not in fact sign the document. But at least since the sixteenth century it has also been held to apply in certain cases so as to enable a person who in fact signed a document to say that it is not his deed. Obviously any such extension must be kept within narrow limits if it is not to shake the confidence of those who habitually and rightly rely on signatures when there is no obvious reason to doubt their validity. Originally this extension appears to have been made in favour of those who were unable to read owing to blindness or illiteracy and who therefore had to trust someone to tell them what they were signing. I think that it must also apply in favour of those who are permanently or temporarily unable through no fault of their own to have without explanation any real understanding of the purport of a particular document, whether that be from defective education, illness or innate incapacity. But that does not excuse them from taking such precautions as they reasonably can. The matter generally arises where an innocent third party has relied on a signed document in ignorance of the circumstances in which it was signed, and where he will suffer loss if the maker of the document is allowed to have it declared a nullity. So there must be a heavy burden of proof on the person who seeks to invoke this remedy. He must prove all the circumstances necessary to justify its being granted to him, and that necessarily involves his proving that he took all reasonable precautions in the circumstances. I do not say that the remedy can never be available to a man of full capacity. But that could only be in very exceptional circumstances; certainly not where his reason for not scrutinising the document before signing it was that he was too busy or too lazy. In general I do not think that he can be heard to say that he signed in reliance on someone he trusted. But, particularly when he was led to believe that the document which he signed was not one which affected his legal rights, there may be cases where this plea can properly be applied in favour of a man of full capacity. The plea cannot be available to anyone who was content to sign without taking the trouble to try to find out at least the general effect of the document. Many people do frequently sign documents put before them for signature by their solicitor or other trusted advisers without making any enquiry as to their purpose or effect. But the essence of the plea non est factum is that the person signing believed that the document he signed had one character or one effect whereas in fact its character or effect was quite different. He could not have such a belief unless he had taken steps or been given information which gave him some grounds for his belief. The amount of information he must have and the sufficiency of the particularity of his belief must depend on the circumstances of each case. Further the plea cannot be available to a person whose mistake was really a mistake as to the legal effect of the document, whether that was his own mistake or that of his adviser. That has always been the law and in this branch of the law at least I see no reason for any change. We find in many of the authorities statements that a man's deed is not his deed if his mind does not go with his pen. But that is far too wide. It would cover cases where the man had taken no precautions at all, and there was no ground for his belief that he was signing something different from that which in fact he signed. I think that it is the wrong approach to start from that wide statement and then whittle it down by excluding cases where the remedy will not be granted. It is for the person who seeks the remedy to show that he should have it. Finally, there is the question to what extent or in what way must there be a difference between that which in fact he signed and that which he believed he was signing. In an endeavour to keep the plea within bounds there have been many attempts to lay down a dividing line. But any dividing line suggested has been difficult to apply in practice and has sometimes led to unreasonable results. In particular I do not think that the modern division between the character and the contents of a document is at all satisfactory. Some of the older authorities suggest a more flexible test so that one can take all factors into consideration. There was a period when here as elsewhere in the law hard and fast dividing lines were sought, but I think that experience has shown that often they do not produce certainty but do produce unreasonable results. I think that in the older authorities difference in practical result was more important than difference in legal character. If a man thinks that he is signing a document which will cost him £10 and the actual document would cost him £1,000 it could not be right to deny him this remedy simply because the legal character of the two was the same. It is true that we must then deal with questions of degree but that is a familiar task for the courts and I would not expect it to give rise to a flood of litigation. There must I think be a radical difference between what he signed and what he thought he was signing—or one could use the words 'fundamental' or 'serious' or 'very substantial'. But what amounts to a radical difference will depend on all the circumstances. If he thinks he is giving property to A whereas the document gives it to B the difference may often be of vital importance, but in the circumstances of the present case I do not think that it is. I think that it must be left to the courts to determine in each case in light of all the facts whether there was or was not a sufficiently great difference. The plea non est factum is in sense illogical when applied to a case where the man in fact signed the deed. But it is none the worse for that if applied in a reasonable way.” Lord Wilberforce dalam kes tersebut juga menyatakan seperti berikut: “How, then, ought the principle, on which a plea of non est factum is admissible, to be stated? In my opinion, a document should be held to be void (as opposed to voidable) only when the element of consent to it is totally lacking, ie more concretely, when the transaction which the document purports to effect is essentially different in substance or in kind from the transaction intended. Many other expressions, or adjectives, could be used—'basically' or 'radically' or 'fundamentally'. In substance, the test does not differ from that which was applied in the leading cases of Thoroughgood's Case and Foster v Mackinnon, except in moving from the character/contents distinction to an area better understood in modern practice. To this general test it is necessary to add certain amplifications. First, there is the case of fraud. The law as to this is best stated in the words of the judgment in Foster v Mackinnon ((1869) LR 4 CP at 711) where it is said that a signature obtained by fraud: '… is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signer did not accompany the signature; in other words, that he never intended to sign, and therefore in contemplation of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is appended.' In other words, it is the lack of consent that matters, not the means by which this result was brought about. Fraud by itself may do no more than make the contract voidable. Secondly, a man cannot escape from the consequences, as regards innocent third parties, of signing a document if, being a man of ordinary education and competence, he chooses to sign it without informing himself of its purport and effect. This principle is sometimes found expressed in the language that 'he is doing something with his estate' (Hunter v Walters, Howatson v Webb) but it really reflects a rule of common sense on the exigency of busy lives. Thirdly, there is the case where the signer has been careless, in not taking ordinary precautions against being deceived. This is a difficult area. Until 1911 the law was reasonably clear; it had been stated plainly in Foster v Mackinnon that negligence—ie carelessness—might deny the signer the benefit of the plea. Since Bragg's case was decided in 1911 (Carlisle and Cumberland Banking Co v Bragg) the law has been that, except in relation to negotiable instruments, mere carelessness is not disabling; there must be negligence arising from a duty of care to the third person who ultimately relies on the document. It does not need much force to demolish this battered precedent. It is sufficient to point to two major defects in it. First, it confuses the kind of careless conduct which disentitles a man from denying the effect of his signature with such legal negligence as entitles a person injured to bring an action in tort. The two are quite different things in standard and scope. Secondly, the judgment proceeds on a palpable misunderstanding of the judgment in Foster v Mackinnon; for Byles J, so far from confining the relevance of negligence to negotiable instruments (as Bragg's case suggests), clearly thought that the signer of a negotiable instrument would be liable, negligence or no negligence, and that negligence was relevant in relation to documents other than negotiable instruments; eg (as in the actual case before him) to a guarantee. In my opinion, the correct rule, and that which in fact prevailed until Bragg's case, is that, leaving aside negotiable instruments to which special rules may apply, a person who signs a document, and parts with it so that it may come into other hands, has a responsibility, that of the normal man of prudence, to take care what he signs, which, if neglected, prevents him from denying his liability under the document according to its tenor. I would add that the onus of proof in this matter rests on him, ie to prove that he acted carefully and not on the third party to prove the contrary. I consider therefore that Carlisle and Cumberland Banking Co v Bragg was wrong, both in the principle it states and in its decision, and that it should no longer be cited as an authority for any purpose. The preceding paragraphs contemplate persons who are adult and literate: the conclusion as to such persons is that, while there are cases in which they may successfully plead non est factum, these cases will, in modern times, be rare. As to persons who are illiterate, or blind, or lacking in understanding, the law is in a dilemma. On the one hand, the law is traditionally, and rightly, ready to relieve them against hardship and imposition. On the other hand, regard has to be paid to the position of innocent third parties who cannot be expected, and often would have no means, to know the condition or status of the signer. I do not think that a defined solution can be provided for all cases. The law ought, in my opinion, to give relief if satisfied that consent was truly lacking but will require of signers even in this class that they act responsibly and carefully according to their circumstances in putting their signature to legal documents.” [17] Ia juga turut dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Ho Yau Hong & Ors v. How Yaw Ming & Another Appeal [2023] 1 LNS

[18] Apa yang jelas ialah seseorang tidak boleh hadir ke Mahkamah dengan menyatakan bahawa dia tidak mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan dengan perjanjian yang telah ditandatanganinya semata-mata disebabkan dia tidak membuat pemeriksaan, penelitian atau tidak mendapat nasihat undang-undang yang sewajarnya. Jika ini dilakukan dengan bersandarkan kepada non est factum maka mana-mana individu dapat dikecualikan daripada tanggungjawab undang-undang dengan hanya menyatakan tidak faham, tidak mengetahui dan tidak sedar kesan undang-undang terhadap dokumen yang ditandatanganinya. [19] Dalam kes ini apa yang cuba dinyatakan oleh Defendan bahawa dia tidak faham terhadap dokumen yang ditandatanganinya dan menyerahkan segala urusan tersebut kepada isteri beliau untuk diuruskan. Namun Mahkamah ini perlu mengambil perhatian bahawa perjanjian tersebut telah disediakan oleh peguam cara dan keterangan juga menunjukkan bahawa terdapat penerangan berkenaan perjanjian tersebut oleh peguam cara atau wakilnya. Oleh itu Mahkamah ini tidak dapat bersetuju bahawa Defendan tidak mengetahui berkenaan dengan perjanjian tersebut. Alasan bahawa Defendan menyerahkan kepada isterinya untuk menguruskannya juga tidak dapat menunjukkan bahawa Defendan tidak memahami perjanjian tersebut. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat perjanjian bertarikh 07.06.2016 adalah teratur dan mengikat Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan. Isu (b) [20] Berdasarkan keterangan dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan adalah didapati bahawa terdapat kemungkiran bayaran ansuran selama dua bulan kepada pihak bank. Ini dapat diteliti melalui dua surat tuntutan yang dikeluarkan oleh pihak bank. Adakah ini membolehkan Plaintif-Plaintif menggunakan opsyen yang dinyatakan dalam perjanjian pada 07.06.2016. [21] Penelitian kepada keterangan Defendan menyatakan bahawa tunggakan tersebut telah dijelaskan. Sebaliknya pihak Plaintif menyatakan bahawa terdapat kegagalan Defendan menjelaskan ansuran. Ini telah menjejaskan rekod pinjaman di bank yang melibatkan Plaintif-Plaintif. Oleh itu dakwaan Defendan bahawa tiada kemungkiran itu tidak tepat menurut Plaintif-Plaintif. Ini adalah disebabkan ia dapat dikesan melalui natijah yang dialami di dalam rekod pinjaman Plaintif-Plaintif sehingga menjejaskan Plaintif-Plaintif. [22] Dalam hal ini Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada jawapan Plaintif Pertama semasa pemeriksaan balas mengenai pembayaran penuh pinjaman tersebut yang dikatakan telah dibuat pada 17.09.2021 seperti berikut: NM: Saya katakan bahawa Defendan telah membuat pembayaran balik tersebut lebih awal daripada tempoh yang ditetapkan. Benar atau tidak? TLT: Saya setuju jika pengikut penyata bank. [23] Namun begitu Mahkamah juga wajar meneliti keterangan lanjut Plaintif Pertama berkenaan dengan isu ini apabila Plaintif Pertama menjelaskan seperti berikut: Judge: Adakah tidak dibayar oleh pihak Defendan, the instalment, bayaran-bayaran kepada bank? Trans : Adakah dibayar … Judge: Ya. TLT: Defendan tidak membayar mengikut masa yang ditetapkan. Jadi ada tunggakan dan pihak bank mengeluarkan surat tuntutan. Jadi kami membayar bagi pihak Defendan. (muka surat 68 muka surat 25 nota keterangan) [24] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu meneliti halaman 645 Ikatan D iaitu surat tuntutan yang dikemukakan oleh peguam pihak Plaintif kepada Defendan berkenaan dengan keingkaran pembayaran ansuran selama dua bulan dan pihak Plaintif memaklumkan ingin menguatkuasakan terma perjanjian berkenaan pembelian bahagian Defendan seperti yang telah dipersetujui. Surat tersebut adalah bertarikh 10.09.2020. Kemungkiran Defendan membuat bayaran ansuran tersebut telah menyebabkan pihak Plaintif dikatakan melalui surat tersebut telah membayar ansuran tersebut pada 26.10.2018,

15.07.2019 dan 17.10.2019. [25] Apa yang dapat dilihat dalam surat tersebut ialah kemungkiran tersebut telah berlaku dalam tahun 2019 dan 2018. Ia hanya menjadi isu melalui surat pada 10.09.2020. Selain daripada itu Mahkamah juga perlu meneliti writ saman yang difailkan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif adalah pada 19.05.2021. Di perenggan [22] penyata tuntutan telah dinyatakan tiga kali pembayaran ansuran yang dibuat oleh pihak Plaintif atas nama Defendan iaitu pada 26.10.2018 berjumlah RM 4,097.00. Kemudian 18.07.2019 berjumlah RM 4,153.00 dan 17.10.2019 dengan jumlah RM 3,961.00. Ini menunjukkan bahawa terdapatnya selang masa yang jauh di antara satu tarikh pembayaran antara satu sama lain. Ini menunjukkan bahawa selain daripada tarikh-tarikh tersebut serta notis peguam cara pihak bank berkenaan dengan Defendan gagal melunaskan bayaran ansuran selama dua bulan berturut-turut menunjukkan bahawa pihak Plaintif tidak dapat mengemukakan keterangan bahawa terdapat ansuran-ansuran lain yang tertunggak oleh pihak Defendan. [26] Dalam hal ini Mahkamah perlu menimbangkan bahawa terdapat perbezaan di antara tidak membayar ansuran dengan kelewatan membayar ansuran. Apa yang jelas ialah keseluruhan bayaran pinjaman tersebut telah dilunaskan oleh pihak Defendan. Ini tidak dapat dinafikan oleh pihak Plaintif. [27] Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat tiada asas untuk pihak Plaintif menguatkuasakan haknya untuk membeli bahagian pihak Defendan sedangkan keseluruhan bayaran pinjaman kepada pihak bank telah diselesaikan. Ini bermakna selepas bayaran tersebut diselesaikan pada 17.09.2021 sepatutnya cagaran yang diberikan kepada pihak bank boleh ditebus oleh pihak Plaintif-Plaintif. Ini bermakna selepas daripada penebusan cagaran tersebut maka tindakan yang sewajarnya boleh dilakukan oleh pihak Plaintif dan Defendan untuk sama ada meneruskan pemilikan bersama tanah tersebut atau mengambil tindakan yang sewajarnya bagi penamatan hakmilik tersebut. Ia bergantung kepada persetujuan kedua-dua pihak atau mengikut peruntukan di bawah Kanun Tanah Negara. Isu (c) [28] Mahkamah ini berpendapat berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan dan status pembayaran penuh kepada pinjaman bank tiada lagi asas untuk pihak Plaintif-Plaintif menggunakan opsyen yang terdapat dalam perjanjian bertarikh 07.06.2016 tersebut disebabkan tiadanya kemungkiran pembayaran ansuran kepada bank terhadap pinjaman berjumlah RM 345,000.00 tersebut walaupun tidak dapat dinafikan fakta bahawa terdapat kelewatan dalam pembayaran ansuran tersebut. [29] Dalam hal ini Mahkamah perlu meneliti slip-slip pembayaran kepada bank yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan yang telah dikemukakan sebagai dokumen di dalam Ikatan Dokumen yang dikemukakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa slip-slip pembayaran bank yang dikemukakan telah mengesahkan bahawa jumlah hutang yang berbaki dengan pihak bank telah dilunaskan sepenuhnya oleh pihak Defendan. Isu (d) [30] Di dalam tuntutan balas Defendan telah dinyatakan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan hendaklah diminta untuk membuat permohonan penamatan hakmilik bersama di bawah seksyen 142 Kanun Tanah Negara. Seksyen 142 Kanun Tanah Negara memperuntukkan seperti berikut:

Any application for approval of the partition of any land shall be made in writing to the Land Administrator in Form 9B, and shall be accompanied by—

such fee as may be prescribed;

a plan of the land on a scale sufficient to satisfy the Land Administrator of all the details of the partition, together with such number of copies thereof as may be prescribed or, in the absence of any such prescription, as the Land Administrator may require;

if it is so prescribed or, in the absence of any such prescription, if the Land Administrator so requires, a copy of any approval or consent required under paragraph 136(1)(c) (as applied by section 141);

all such written consents to the making of the application as are required under paragraph (e) of the said subsection as so applied; and

the written consent to the making of the application of any co-proprietor who has not joined therein, provided that in the case of an application made under section 141A, such consents shall be dispensed with.

Upon receiving any application under subsection (1), the Land Administrator shall endorse, or cause to be endorsed, a note thereof on the register document of title to the land to which it relates.

In the case of an application made under section 141A, the Land Administrator shall notify the other co-proprietors of the proposed partition, requiring them to submit in writing within a period of twenty-eight days from the date of service of the notice, any objection setting out fully the grounds on which the objection is based.

Upon expiry of the period specified in subsection (3), the Land Administrator—

where there are objections, shall notify the applicant and the remaining co-proprietors and hold an enquiry at the specified time and place, and—

if satisfied that good grounds exist, shall reject the application or, in the case of an application relating to land the partition of which requires the approval of the State Director, shall recommend that the application be rejected; or

(ii) in any other case, may approve the application or (as the case may be), recommend to the State Director that the application be approved; and

where there are no objections, after due consideration, may approve the application or (as the case may be), recommend to the State Director that the application be approved.

When the Land Administrator is satisfied that any application for partition of land is subject to—

the category "agriculture" or to any condition requiring its use for an agricultural purpose; and

the said land is two-fifths of a hectare or less than two-fifths of a hectare, he shall refer the application to be approved by the State Authority.” [31] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu melihat kepada seksyen 25 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 bersama-sama dengan para 3 Jadual. Seksyen 25 Akta tersebut menyatakan seperti berikut: “25 Powers of the High Court

Without prejudice to the generality of Article 121 of the Constitution the High Court shall in the exercise of its jurisdiction have all the powers which were vested in it immediately prior to Malaysia Day and such other powers as may be vested in it by any written law in force within its local jurisdiction.

Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) the High Court shall have the additional powers set out in the Schedule: Provided that all such powers shall be exercised in accordance with any written law or rules of court relating to the same.