Tan Kok Heong v Menteri Besar Selangor (BA-21NCvC-49-12/2023)

TAN KOK HEONG

TAN KOK CHENG

TAN KOK GEA (NO. K/P: 620110-10-5071 / 6406382) [menyaman sebagai Pentadbir harta pusaka, Ang Kua (No. K/P: 260911-10-5016 / 0530319)] …PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF

KUMPULAN PERANGSANG SELANGOR BERHAD

PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH KUALA LANGAT …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 13/11/2024 08:47:37 BA-21NCvC-49-12/2023 Kand. 40 JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is the case of the promised “tanah gantian”– or so the Plaintiffs in the main suit would contend. The Defendants, however, would argue that this description is misplaced, as they deny any promise or agreement ever existed. [2] Notwithstanding the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claim in the main action, this Court is required to consider two interlocutory applications filed by the Defendants, namely Enclosure 14 and Enclosure 16. Enclosure 14 is an application by the Third Defendant to have certain questions determined by this Court pursuant to Order 33 rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Court 2012 whilst Enclosure 16 is an application by the First, Second and Fourth Defendants for, inter alia, the Plaintiffs’ Writ and Statement of Claim be struck out pursuant to Order 18 rule 19(1)(a), (b) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012. The Overriding Issues [3] The principal issue arising from the Notice of Application in Enclosure 14 is whether it is appropriate for this Court to invoke its powers pursuant to Order 33 rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Court 2012. [4] Stemming from the above primary issue is this additional subsidiary issue, namely, whether there are disputes as to facts warranting the calling of witnesses to testify at the trial. [5] As for Enclosure 16, the main issue is whether this is a proper case for this Court to exercise its powers to strike out the Plaintiffs’ Writ and Statement of Claim pursuant to Order 18 rule 19(1)(a), (b) and or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012. [6] Resulting from the above primary issue are the following secondary issues, namely:

Whether a promise has been made by the First Defendant in his capacity as the Menteri Besar the Second Defendant;

Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to rely on the doctrine of legitimate expectation; and

Whether the claim by the Plaintiffs is barred by limitation. The Plaintiffs’ Main Action [7] The Plaintiffs’ claim is premised on an alleged promise made by the First Defendant, the Menteri Besar of Selangor, to the Plaintiffs. That promise was allegedly made following the acquisition of the Plaintiffs’ lands by the Second Defendant, the State of Selangor and it was for the Plaintiffs’ lands to be “replaced” with other lands of the similar size. The acquisition of the lands was made by the Second Defendant for the benefit of the Third Defendant, Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Berhad. The Fourth Defendant is the Pentadbir Tanah of the District of Kuala Langat, Selangor. [8] Based on the above alleged promise by the First Defendant, the Plaintiffs are seeking, inter alia, the following reliefs from this Court: • Satu deklarasi bahawa Perjanjian Penggantian Tanah yang diberikan oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif melalui Surat Defendan Pertama bertarikh 19 April 1982 adalah sah; • Satu deklarasi bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah pecah amanah (“breach of trust”) dan mengingkar (“repudiated”) Perjanjian Penggantian Tanah tersebut apabila gagal memberikan tanah ganti kepada Plaintif-Plaintif; • Ganti rugi (selepas menolak RM43,331.00 sebagai pampasan pengambilan balik tanah yang telah diterima) kepada Plantif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua mengikut nilai pasaran Hakmilik C.T. 21341, Lot 3322, Mukim Tanjong Dua Belas, Daerah Kuala Langat, Negeri Selangor yang mempunyai keluasan 4.331 ekar pada tarikh penghakiman; • Alternatif, ganti rugi (selepas menolak RM43,331.00 sebagai pampasan pengambilan balik tanah yang telah diterima) kepada Plantif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua mengikut nilai pasaran Hakmilik C.T. 21341, Lot 3322, Mukim Tanjong Dua Belas, Daerah Kuala Langat, Negeri Selangor yang mempunyai keluasan 4.331 ekar yang telah ditaksir oleh Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri semasa ia dijualkan oleh Defendan Ketiga kepada Goodcrest Development Sdn Bhd; • Ganti rugi (selepas menolak RM48,750.00 sebagai pampasan pengambilan balik tanah yang telah diterima) kepada Plantif Ketiga mengikut nilai pasaran Hakmilik C.T. 21331, Lot 3312, Mukim Tanjong Dua Belas, Daerah Kuala Langat, Negeri Selangor yang mempunyai keluasan 4.875 ekar pada tarikh penghakiman; • Alternatif, ganti rugi (selepas menolak RM48,750.00 sebagai pampasan pengambilan balik tanah yang telah diterima) kepada Plantif Ketiga mengikut nilai pasaran Hakmilik C.T. 21331, Lot 3312, Mukim Tanjong Dua Belas, Daerah Kuala Langat, Negeri Selangor yang mempunyai keluasan 4.875 ekar seperti yang ditaksir oleh Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri semasa ia dijualkan oleh Defendan Ketiga kepada Goodcrest Development Sdn Bhd. The Striking Out Application in Enclosure 16 [9] This Court shall first deal with the striking out application in Enclosure 16. [10] The First, Second and Fourth Defendants’ application for the Plaintiffs’ Writ and Statement of Claim of 22 September, 2022 to be struck out pursuant to Order 18 rule 19(1)(a), (b) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 is premised on the following grounds:

Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Pertama, Kedua dan Keempat tidak mendedahkan apa-apa kausa tindakan yang munasabah terhadap Defendan Pertama, Kedua dan Keempat;

Tiada perjanjian telah dibuat oleh Defendan Pertama, Kedua dan Keempat dan ia masih dalam pertimbangan oleh tuan tanah dan tidak dimaklumkan perkembangan, maka doctrine waiver dan laches terpakai; dan

Tindakan ini terhalang oleh Had Masa yang ditetapkan menurut perundangan. [11] The First, Second and Fourth Defendants reiterated that the said promise that is relied upon by the Plaintiffs is based on a letter dated 19 April, 1982. Based on that said letter, the First, Second and Fourth Defendants conceded that first, “the letter was issued under the Menteri Besar Letter Head, Dato’ Hormat Rafei” and second, “signed by the late Menteri Besar Dato’ Hormat Rafei”. However, the First, Second and Fourth Defendants then went on to submit that “the letter indicates that the agreement was made by the Mesyuarat Lembaga Pengarah Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Berhad”. [12] In this regard, the First, Second and Fourth Defendants did in fact used the term “agreement” but argued that the agreement was made by the Mesyuarat Lembaga Pengarah Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Berhad. Kumpulan Peransang Selangor Berhad is the Third Defendant in this action. [13] The gist of the First, Second and Fourth Defendants’ submission is that the letter of 19 April, 1982 had been signed by the late Menteri Besar in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of the Third Defendant and that letter or agreement is not binding on the First, Second and Fourth Defendants. [14] It was also argued by the First, Second and Fourth Defendants that any replacement of title or land is to all intents and purposes an exercise involving alienation of land and this can only be carried out following strict compliance with the provisions of the National Land Code 2020. [15] The arguments of the First, Second and Fourth Defendants re the Plaintiffs’ reliance on the letter of 19 April, 1982 were twofold. First, it was contended that there had never been any decision made by the State Authority. Second, even if the First Defendant had issued the letter in his capacity as Menteri Besar of the State of Selangor or even if an approval had been made (which the First, Second and Fourth Defendants pointed out was not the case here), that letter or promise or that approval is still not binding on the First, Second and Fourth Defendants. The First, Second and Fourth Defendants relied on the decisions of the Federal Court in North East Plantations Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Dungun dan Satu Lagi [2011] 3 AMR 792; [2011] 4 CLJ 729; [2018] supp MLJ 293; [2011] 1 MLRA 207 (“North East Plantations Sdn Bhd”), Public Prosecutor v Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris (No 2) [1977] 1 MLJ 15; [1976] 1 MLRH 562, Sidek bin Haji Muhamad & Ors v The Government of the State of Perak & Ors [1982] CLJ Rep 321; [1982] 1 MLJ 313; [1982] 1 MLRA 156, Government of the State of Negeri Sembilan v Yap Chong Lan & Ors & Another Case [1984] 1 CLJ Rep 144; [1984] 2 MLJ 123; [1984] 1 MLRA 61, the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Chong Wooi Leong & Ors v Lebbey Sdn Bhd [1998] 3 CLJ 685; [1998] 2 MLJ 644; [1998] 1 MLRA 423 and Hotel Sentral (JB) Sdn Bhd v Pengarah Tanah Dan Galian Negeri Johor, Malaysia & Ors [2016] AMEJ 2287; [2017] 6 CLJ 161; [2017] 5 MLJ 116; [2016] MLRAU 487 and the High Court decision in Hamdan bin Johan & Ors v FELCRA Bhd & Ors [2010] 8 AMR 20; [2010] 3 CLJ 474; [2010] 8 MLJ 628; [2010] 1 MLRH 1. [16] The First, Second and Fourth Defendants further contended that the doctrine of legitimate expectation has no application in the present proceedings. They relied, once again, on the Federal Court in the North East Plantations Sdn Bhd case. [17] On the limitation point, the First, Second and Fourth Defendants averred that the Plaintiffs’ claim is barred by limitation pursuant to section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 or section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953. In addition, they also rely on the doctrine of laches, acquiescence and waiver. [18] In reply, the Plaintiffs urged this Court to dismiss Enclosure 16 on the basis that this is not a claim where it is “plain and obvious” and/or "obviously unsustainable" for this Court to invoke its powers under Order 18 rule 19(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 to strike out their Writ and Statement of Claim (Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 1969; [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 3 MLJ 36; [1993] 1 MLRA 611; Jamal Md Yunos v Teresa Kok Suh Sim [2020] AMEJ 1628; [2020] 1 LNS 1789; [2021] 1 MLJ 438; [2021] 3 MLRA 549; and Tan Wei Hong (a child suing through his guardian ad litem and next friend, Chuang Yin E) & Ors v Malaysia Airlines System Bhd & Ors [2018] 6 AMR 529; [2018] 9 CLJ 425; [2019] 1 MLJ 59; [2018] 6 MLRA

[19] The Plaintiffs averred that an appeal for “tanah gantian” was made by the Plaintiffs and the First, Second and Third Defendants were aware of this appeal. The Plaintiffs also asserted as follows: Melalui surat bertulis bertarikh 19.4.1982 yang dikeluarkan oleh D1 (“Surat D1 tersebut”) kepada pemilik-pemilik terkilan, beliau telah dalam kapasiti sebagai Menteri Besar Selangor dan/atau Pengerusi Majlis Mesyuarat D2 dan/atau Pengerusi kepada D3 memaklumkan bahawa melalui satu Mesyuarat Lembaga Pengarah D3 yang bersidang pada 14.4.1982, DefendanDefendan telah memutuskan, bersetuju, bahawa tanah-tanah rakyat (Kaum Cina) seluas kira-kira 278 ekar yang diambil untuk tujuan Perlombongan tersebut akan diganti dengan tanah yang juga diambil balik dari kawasan berhampiran Brookyn juga (“Perjanjian Penggantian Tanah tersebut”). Selain itu, Mesyuarat Lembaga Pengarah D3 telah melantik sebuah Jawatankuasa Khas untuk bertindak dan menyelesaikan Perjanjian Penggantian Tanah tersebut dengan teratur dan memuaskan semua pihak. [20] The Plaintiffs highlighted the fact that the letter of 19 April, 1982 – to which they had agreed to the contents therein – did not mention or state “bilakah atau tempoh berapa lama bahawa Defendan-Defendan akan memberikan Penggantian Tanah tersebut kepada Plaintif-Plaintif”. They claimed that this is a pertinent point. [21] As a result of the representation by the First Defendant, the Plaintiffs had accepted the sum of RM43,310.00 and RM48,750.00 as compensation for the acquisition of lot 21341 and lot 21331 respectively without further appeal and/or legal action. [22] Lot 21341 and Lot 21331 were compulsorily acquired by the Second Defendant on 14 March, 1983. [23] The Plaintiffs also submitted as follows: • Selepas satu tahun Perjanjian Penggantian Tanah tersebut diberikan, D1, D2 dan D4 memaklumkan bahawa terdapat beberapa mesyuarat telah diadakan terutamanya mesyuarat pada 6.5.1983 (“Mesyuarat tersebut”) dan menurut minit Mesyuarat tersebut, perkara-perkara penting berikut telah disahkan semasa Mesyuarat tersebut, iaitu:- o D3 telah berjanji akan mengantikan tanah yang telah diambil balik, cuma hanya belum dapat ditentukan bila masanya dan kawasan yang akan digantikan; o D3 telah memberikan kebenaran kepada tuan-tuan tanah untuk mengambil hasil yang ada di atas tanah sehingga Perlombongan tersebut dimulakan di atas tanah; dan o tuan-tuan tanah akan menarik balik Borang N yang telah dikemukakan oleh pihaknya kerana pada masa itu mereka tidak berpuasa hati dengan harga tanah yang diambil oleh D2 bagi pihak D3. • Selaras dengan hasil Mesyuarat tersebut, D4 telah melalui notis-notis bertulis yang bertarikh 22.12.1983 (“Kebenaran Pungutan Hasil tersebut”) memberikan kebenaran kepada Plaintif-Plaintif untuk memungut hasil tanaman di atas Hakmilik 21341 dan Hakmilik 21331 dengan syaratsyarat berikut:- o Plaintif-Plaintif hendaklah menerima “Borang K” yang dikeluarkan oleh D3; o Plaintif-Plaintif hendaklah berhenti memungut hasil apabila tanah terlibat dalam skim Perlombongan tersebut telah bermula; dan o Plaintif-Plaintif hendaklah memberitahu pengawal keselamatan sebelum memasuki tanah dan memungut hasil kebun. [24] Based on the above, the Plaintiffs admitted to continue “memungut hasil tanaman di atas Hakmilik 21341 dan Hakmilik 21331”. [25] The Plaintiffs also averred as follows: Hakmilik 21341 dan hakmilik-hakmilik dari Tanah Asal tersebut seterusnya ditukar kepada HS(D) 5670, PT 8789. Hakmilik 21331 dan hakmilik-hakmilik dari Tanah Asal tersebut seterusnya ditukar kepada HS(D) 5670, PT 8788 dan didaftarkan di bawah nama D3. Syarat-syarat nyata Hakmilik HS(D) 5670, PT 8789 dan Hakmilik HS(D) 5670, PT 8788 telah ditukar daripada pertanian kepada rumah kediaman selepas tanah-tanah diambil dan didaftar atas nama D3. Pada sekitar Oktober 2008, P1 TELAH dilarang oleh sekumpulan orang Cina untuk memungut hasil tanaman di atas Hakmilik 21341 dan Hakmilik 21331 walaupun D4 telah memberikan Kebenaran Pungutan Hasil tersebut untuk Plaintif-Plaintif berbuat demikian. Pada sekitar Januari 2009, Plaintif-Plaintif telah menerima notis-notis tuntutan dari Tetuan Geraldine Yeoh, Arjunan & Associates bertarikh 8.1.2009 19 (“Notis Tuntutan tersebut”) yang membuat dakwaan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif telah menduduki Hakmilik 21341 dan Hakmilik 21331 tanpa kelulusan daripada pemilik berdaftar, Goodcrest Development Sdn Bhd dan Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan notis supaya keluar daripada Hakmilik 21341 dan Hakmilik 21331 dalam tempoh 14 hari. [26] The above events led the Plaintiffs to allege in the present suit that the transfer of Lot 21341 and Lot 21331 raised suspicion and that there was a conspiracy to defraud amongst the Defendants against the Plaintiffs. The Findings of this Court [27] This Court is of the considered view that the letter of 19 April, 1982 was not a promise made by the then Menteri Besar in his capacity as the Menteri Besar of the Second Defendant or the State Authority. The promise made did not culminate in an agreement between the Plaintiff and the First, Second and Fourth Defendants. The evidence points to the First Defendant having issued and signed the letter in his capacity of the Chairman of the Board of the Third Defendant. [28] Even if the letter of 19 April, 1982 had been issued and signed by the First Defendant in his capacity as the Menteri Besar of Selangor, the doctrine of legitimate expectation is of no avail to the Plaintiffs. [29] This Court is cognizant of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Darahman bin Ibrahim & Ors v Majlis Kerajaan Negeri Perlis & Ors [2008] 4 AMR 97; [2008] 4 CLJ 538; [2008] 4 MLJ 309; [2008] 1 MLRA 411. The application of the doctrine was adumbrated by the Court of Appeal in the following terms: [21] This is an appeal against the decision of the learned judge of the High Court who dismissed with costs the appellants' claims against the three respondents. Giving way to the building of the Timah Tasoh dam in the State of Perlis, the appellants have all been resettled, from their original villages, to the Lubuk Sireh area. The promises, be it by conduct or otherwise, by the respondents gave rise to the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Indeed, the very doctrine has been raised in para 13(d)(iv) of the statement of claim. This doctrine, in its procedural aspects, bears a close resemblance to the audi alteram partem principle of natural justice. In the context of the substantive legal rights, this doctrine, in essence, has gone well beyond the boundaries of the procedural elements of natural justice. Sedley J, in R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 714at p 724, correctly put the doctrine under the broad umbrella of fairness when he said, “the real question is one of fairness in public administration. … It follows that it cannot be any less unfair to frustrate a legitimate expectation that something will or will not be done by the [public authority] than it is to frustrate a legitimate expectation that the applicant will be listened to before the [public authority] decides whether to take a particular step”. [30] Commenting on the facts before it, the Court of Appeal went on to state as follows: [29] It is apparent that the appellants agreed to move after hearing the promises advanced by the then Menteri Besar of Perlis. The cajoling succeeded. The Royal address too carried weight. With a carrot dangling in front o f them, so to speak, the appellants were more than willing to be resettled at Lubuk Sireh. They moved and resettled at Lubuk Sireh. They were led up the garden path, so to speak. The notion of legitimate expectation is an interesting area of the law. I would, with respect, endorse the approach of Lord Fraser in Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629, especially that part where His Lordship said that: legitimate expectations in this context are capable of including expectations which go beyond enforceable legal rights, provided they have some reasonable basis. His Lordship then proceeded to identify three practical questions underlying all legitimate expectation cases, namely:

To what has the authority committed itself?

Has the authority acted unlawfully in respect of its commitment?

What should the court do about it? [31] In allowing the appellants to rely on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the Court of Appeal held as follows: [138] As promised, I now revert back to the doctrine of legitimate expectation. This doctrine is often used in the field of public law. If used wisely, this doctrine serves as an effective weapon in challenging decisions of public bodies. If a decision is adverse to the person affected, it must follow a procedure that is fair. It must be emphasised that the right to be heard does not depend on any promise or practice of a hearing by the body taking the adverse decision. The right to be heard is an age-old principle of natural justice. A legitimate expectation of being heard is created by a promise or practice of being heard (Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu; and Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, HL). The right to substantive fairness is usually generated by a representation. [139] The following principles of law must be advanced:

There should be such unfairness as to amount to an abuse of power. If a statement has created a legitimate expectation that a certain decision will be taken or that decision will be taken on the assumption that a certain fact is true, it will often be unfair and an abuse of power to resile from it. The court will act and will impose the requirement of fairness on the public body concerned.

The requirements giving rise to a legitimate expectation must be present. These requirements are similar to the requirements of estoppel in private law (per Bingham J in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex p MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd and related applications [1990] 1 WLR 1545 at pp 1569H-1570B; per StuartSmith LJ, in R v Jockey Club, ex p RAM Racecourses Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 225 at 236h237b; and per Hidden J, in R v Inland Revenue & Commissioners, ex p SG Warburg & Co Ltd [1994] STC 518 at pp 535 c-j and 541j-542a). The requirements are — that the body concerned made a representation which was clear, unambiguous and devoid of qualification; that the applicant was within the category of people to whom it was made and that it was reasonable for him or her to rely on the representation and that the representee relied on such representation to his or her detriment.

Whether the representation can generate a legitimate expectation is also important. Only those people who have the authority, either actual or ostensible, in accordance to the law of agency can make such representations (Craig, Administrative Law, (2nd Ed 1989) atpp 471- 473). The courts have been very flexible and hold onto the views that if the person acted reasonably by relying on the representation because the representor was senior enough and came into contact with the public and the representor make such representations, that is said to be sufficient to trigger the legitimate expectation of the person concerned (per Denning MR in Lever Finance v Westminster (City) London Borough Council [1971] 1 QB 222 atp 230D-E).

It is for the court to decide whether there is an overriding reason for frustrating the legitimate expectation. In doing so, the court must always put to the forefront the question of fairness. [140] Having said all that, I must categorically say that there is considerable justification for invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation in favour of the appellants, and I so hold accordingly. The learned judge of the High Court fleetingly considered the doctrine of legitimate expectation at p 48 of RRJ1 and dismissed it by saying that the wrong assumptions on the part of the appellants and FELCRA cannot be used to trigger the doctrine of legitimate expectation (see p 49 of RRJ1). It must be recalled that the appellants did not assume that they were accepted as participants in the FELCRA Lubuk Sireh scheme. Exhibits (P1) at p 269 of RRJ2 and (P28) at p 536 of RRJ2 showed that, in fact, all those people (including the appellants) who were resettled were recognised as peserta rancangan. And it must also be recalled that the defence of wrong assumptions by FELCRA was not even pleaded by FELCRA in its statement of defence and, consequently, that defence must fail. I have demonstrated at great length in this judgment that in all the circumstances, I consider that this is an appropriate case where I must vigorously invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation in favour of the appellants. [32] In allowing the appellants appeal in the above case, the Court of Appeal had remarked that the High Court had only “fleetingly considered the doctrine of legitimate expectation”. [33] Bearing the above remarks in mind, this Court will undertake a thorough examination of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the context of the present case and application. [34] A key authority on the issue under consideration is the decision of the Federal Court in North East Plantations Sdn Bhd. In that case, the Federal Court in no uncertain terms held as follows: [28] Kami mendapati bahawa keputusan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi yang menyatakan bahawa kelulusan yang diberikan kepada perayu tidak memberikan apa-apa hak jangkaan munasabah kerana semasa pembatalan dilakukan tanah tersebut masih lagi tanah Kerajaan dan tiada hakmilik berdaftar diberikan kepada perayu adalah tepat dan wajar dan keputusan ini adalah bertepatan dengan prinsip di dalam kes Rahimah binti Ali (lihat ms 52-54 RR). [29] Kami juga berpendapat bahawa keputusan majoriti Mahkamah Rayuan adalah tepat apabila dinyatakan ‘Whether or not the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies depends on the facts of each case, it cannot and should not override the express statutory power vested in the State Authority.’ [35] The Plaintiffs in this case is seeking to hold the First, Second and Fourth Defendants liable for the promised “gantian tanah”. In North East Plantations Sdn Bhd, the Federal Court underscored the fact that: [14] Pelupusan Secara Pemberimilikan (Alienation) Adalah Suatu Proses Yang Bermula Dari Kelulusan Yang Diberi Oleh MMKN Dan Tamat Dengan Pendaftaran Dan Pemberian Surat Hakmilik. and in dealing with the question: “Adakah Sebarang Perjanjian Terjalin Antara Perayu Dan Responden Dan Adakah Perayu Mendapat Apa-apa ‘Beneficial Interest’ Apabila MMKN Meluluskan Secara Dasar Permohonan Perayu?”, held as follows: [30] Dengan hanya permohonan perayu untuk mendapatkan tanah telah diluluskan ianya tidak bermakna Kerajaan Negeri telah terikat secara kontraktual hingga menyebabkan Kerajaan Negeri tidak boleh lagi membuat keputusan untuk membatalkan kelulusan yang telah diberikan.

The Court may order any question or issue arising in a cause or matter, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by the pleadings or otherwise, to be tried before, at or after the trial of the cause or matter, and may give directions as to the manner in which the question or issue shall be stated. Dismissal of action after decision of preliminary issue (O. 33, r. 5)

If it appears to the Court that the decision of any question or issue arising in a cause or matter and tried separately from the cause or matter substantially disposes of the cause or matter or renders the trial of the cause or matter unnecessary, it may dismiss the cause or matter or make such other order or give such judgment therein as may be just. [47] It was the Third Defendant’s contention that the questions and issues that it has formulated will determine the entirety of the Plaintiff’s claims and result in a substantial saving of time and expenditure. [48] The above is certainly a compelling argument, which this Court will now proceed to consider. [49] The questions that the Third Defendant have framed are as follows:

2.1 sama ada tuntutan-tuntutan Plaintif-plaintif di sini pada dasarnya adalah untuk mendapatkan pampasan tambahan bagi tanah-tanah yang tertakhluk kepada peruntukan-peruntukan Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 (“APT 1960”).

2.1.1 Jika jawapan kepada perenggan 2.1 adalah Ya, sama ada prosiding di sini adalah defektif dan/atau berjumlah kepada penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini kerana ia memintas peruntukan-peruntukan statutori APT

Sekiranya Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini menentukan bahawa prosiding di sini adalah defektif dan/atau berjumlah kepada penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini, maka, keseluruhan tuntutan-tuntutan Plaintif-plaintif dalam tindakan ini seharusnya ditolak dengan kos untuk ditanggung oleh Plaintif-plaintif atas dasar indemniti penuh.

2.1.2 Jika jawapan kepada perenggan 2.1 adalah Ya, sama ada Plaintif-plaintif diestop daripada menuntut untuk pampasan tambahan selepas menerima pampasan di bawah APT 1960 tanpa bantahan. Sekiranya Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini menentukan bahawa Plaintif-plaintif harus diestop daripada menuntut untuk pampasan tambahan, maka, keseluruhan tuntutan-tuntutan Plaintif-plaintif dalam tindakan ini seharusnya ditolak dengan kos untuk ditanggung oleh Plaintif-plaintif atas dasar indemniti penuh.

2.2 sama ada terdapat apa-apa perjanjian untuk penggantian tanah yang sah seperti yang dirujuk dalam perenggan – perenggan 18 dan 19 Pernyataan Tuntutan.

2.2.1 sekiranya diputuskan bahawa tiada apa-apa perjanjian untuk penggantian tanah yang sah, maka, Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini seharusnya menolak keseluruhan tuntutan-tuntutan Plaintif-plaintif dalam tindakan ini dengan kos untuk ditanggung oleh Plaintif-plaintif atas dasar indemniti penuh.

2.2.2 sekiranya diputuskan bahawa terdapatnya suatu perjanjian untuk penggantian tanah yang sah:

2.2.2.1 sama ada tuntutan-tuntutan Plaintif-plaintif berdasarkan kemungkiran perjanjian untuk penggantian tanah tersebut adalah dihadkan masa di bawah Akta Had Masa 1953. Sekiranya ia diputuskan bahawa tuntutan-tuntutan Plaintifplaintif berdasarkan kemungkiran perjanjian untuk penggantian tanah tersebut adalah dihadkan masa, maka, Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini seharusnya menolak keseluruhan tuntutan-tuntutan Plaintif-plaintif dalam tindakan ini dengan kos untuk ditanggung oleh Plaintif-plaintif atas dasar indemniti penuh.

2.2.2.2 sama ada Defendan Ketiga adalah suatu pihak berkontrak (‘contracting party’) kepada perjanjian tersebut. Sekiranya ia diputuskan bahawa Defendan Ketiga bukannya suatu pihak berkontrak (‘contracting party’) kepada perjanjian tersebut, maka, Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini seharusnya menolak keseluruhan tuntutan-tuntutan Plaintif-plaintif dalam tindakan ini terhadap Defendan Ketiga dengan kos untuk ditanggung oleh Plaintif-plaintif atas dasar indemniti penuh.

2.3 sama ada Defendan Ketiga mempunyai kuasa di bawah undang-undang untuk mengambil tanah dan mengawal Defendan Keempat. Sekiranya diputuskan bahawa Defendan Ketiga tidak mempunyai kuasa di bawah undang-undang untuk mengambil tanah dan mengawal Defendan Keempat, maka, Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini seharusnya menolak keseluruhan tuntutan-tuntutan Plaintifplaintif dalam tindakan ini terhadap Defendan Ketiga dengan kos untuk ditanggung oleh Plaintif-plaintif atas dasar indemniti penuh. [50] To be clear, it was the Third Defendant’s contention that the Question and Issues in this Suit “revolve predominantly on legal questions which will result in the determination of the entire matter” and that “the determination of the Questions and Issues in the O.33 Application do not require consideration of extrinsic evidence as all material evidence are no longer available”. [51] The first issue for consideration is whether the Plaintiffs’ claim against the Third Defendant raise factual disputes that necessitates the calling of witnesses to testify at trial. The Third Defendant has submitted that they do not. [52] Expectedly, the Plaintiffs disagreed and argued instead that “terdapat pelbagai fakta dan isu material yang berbangkit” and that “adalah dalam pengetahuan penuh Defendan Ke-3 bahawa terdapat pelbagai isu-isu yang perlu dibicarakan apabila mereka memfailkan Pembelaan dan menjawab kepada Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif-Plaintif”. [53] The Plaintiffs contested the questions and issues framed by the Third Defendant, arguing that they were misconceived. They reiterated that the relevant causes of action are premised on breach of trust, fraud and conspiracy to defraud. [54] The Plaintiffs also averred that it was the “Defendan Ke-3 merupakan pihak sebenar yang memberikan Perjanjian Penggantian Tanah tersebut kepada Plaintif-Plaintif”. [55] On the limitation point, the Third Defendant raised the provision in section 47 of the Contracts Act 1950 to argue that when “no time for performance is specified, the engagement must be performed within a reasonable time”. On the other hand, the Plaintiffs relied on the case of Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Pulau Pinang v Abdul Latiff Hassan (As Administrator of Estates of Hj Mohammad Hj Abdul Rasid; Deceased) & Anor [2016] 2 CLJ 150; [2015] MLJU 1115; [2015] MLRHU 995 which had remarked that: [23] … the issue of limitation involves a serious interpretation of the law and assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case in order to determine whether limitation applies … is a triable issue which cannot be summarily disposed of by a striking out application. [56] While the Plaintiffs’ claim against the Third Defendant have yet to be established, it cannot be said that the Plaintiffs are 'clutching at straws' and bound to fail. After reviewing the pleadings, the affidavits in this Enclosure, the arguments presented and the authorities cited, this Court holds the view that this is not an appropriate case for invoking its powers under Order 33 of the Rules of Court 2012. In the interest of justice, the Plaintiffs' claims against the Third Defendant should be fully ventilated at trial. [57] In the upshot, the Third Defendant’s application in Enclosure 14 is dismissed with costs. [58] The Third Defendant to pay costs of RM6,000 to the Plaintiffs. Dated: 11 November, 2024 sgd [CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsel: Cecelia Tan with Fatin Izyan Muhamad Fadzil for the Plaintiffs (Messrs. Soh Hayati & Co.) Khairul Nizam Abu Bakar and Nurul Izzah binti Abdul Mutalib for the 1st, 2nd and 4th Defendants (Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor) Justin Wee and Cheong Ai Dee for the 3rd Defendant (Messrs. Justin Wee)