1. ) Tan Ying Yee v Mayfair Ventures Sdn Bhd (BA-22NCvC-286-07/2021)

TAN YING YEE

LEW YEE LEE

CHIONG HONG BO

LIM KON GAY

TING HONG LIONG

NGIM SIEW LEE

LAU KIM FONG

WANG YI QUAN

PUNG HENG KIONG (NO. KP: 750719-08-6187) 31/10/2022 14:36:22 BA-22NCvC-286-07/2021 Kand. 69 2 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021

LIM EU GIN

ALESHA MAH EE LING

OH SIEW KHWANG

OH SIEW JEONG

LEONG CHA FATT

CHAN HUI SIANG

ALVIN TAN YENN SHENG

KEW LI JUEN

YUEN KUM KUAN

CHOOI WEI MENG

CHOW YUET MEI (NO. KP: 580708-08-5104/5400705) 3 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021

MAH CHUN WAI

YAP YUEN MEI

HOR WIN WAY

JOSEPHINE CHEN KIT YAN

LEE MUN CHEONG

ESWHY TAN SHIN YEE

CYNTHIA KOONG JIN NEE

MAGDELENE KOONG XUAN LING

HOR PUI SEE

LEE HONG KEAT

ONG MEI THENG (NO. KP: 820703-08-6060) 4 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021

KERK THENG THENG

KUA KEE TUI

CHUNG WEI LING

PHYLLIS LEOW SHU-YUEH

YOON CHI-EE

OH SIEW BEE

CHAN HIANG GEOK

YEONG CHEONG CHUN

LEE HSIAO LENG

NG MENG YIING

ADRIAN LEE ENG HOE (NO. KP: 730310-08-5455) 5 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021

LEE SOONG KEONG

NG KHAI YEING

ANG EAN CHUAN

TAN LEE LENG

CHIN WEE CHIN

IVY LEE AI LI (NO. KP: 760702-08-6294) ...PLAINTIFFS DAN MAYFAIR VENTURES SDN BHD (NO. SYKT: 201301016368 (1046201-T) …DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This matter involves two applications as follows:- i. Defendant’s Notice of Application dated 16.12.2021 to strike out Plaintiffs’ Writ of Summons dated 26.07.2021 and 6 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 Statement of Claims dated 23.07.2021 (‘Striking Out Application’) - (Enclosure 8). ii. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Application dated 16.12.2021 for a Summary Judgment against the Defendant (Summary Judgment Application) - (Enclosure 10). [2] I heard the Striking Out Application first and decided that based on the pleadings and submissions by both parties, the Plaintiffs’ claims are sustainable and Defendant failed to prove that it falls under any of the grounds stipulated under Order 18 rule 19(1) of the Rules of Court 2012. Thus, I dismissed Defendant’s application. Thereafter, I heard the Summary Judgment Application, which I have allowed with costs. [3] The Defendant is not satisfied with the decisions and hence filed these appeals against both my decisions for Enclosure 8 and 10. [4] This Grounds of Judgment deals with both Defendant’s appeals. Background facts [5] The Plaintiffs Sue Kok Lynn and six (6) others, purchased from Defendant various parcels in a residential project known as Lumi Tropicana (“Project”). 7 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 [6] Prior to the execution of the sale and purchase agreements, the Plaintiffs paid booking fees for their respective parcels. [7] Subsequently, Plaintiffs entered into their respective SPA (collectively “SPA”) with the Defendant. [8] The SPA were dated after the respective dates of payment of booking fees by each Defendant. [9] The SPA signed between the parties were supposedly in the prescribed statutory form under Schedule H of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 (“HDR”) which provides that vacant possession of the parcels and common facilities shall be delivered by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs within 36 months from the date of the SPA. [10] Inconsistent with the HDR, Defendant amended subclauses 25 (1) and 29 (1) of the SPA by changing the time for delivery of vacant possession from 36 months to 42 months. 8 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 [11] Inter alia, the SPA provides that failure to deliver the vacant possession before the deadline, the Defendant would be liable to pay liquidated ascertained damages (LAD) as follows:-

LAD (parcel) at the rate of 10% per annum of the purchase price;

LAD (common facilities) at the rate of 10% per annum of the last 20% of the purchase price. [12] Through a letter dated 29.6.2020, Defendant gave a written notice (“VP Notice”) to the Plaintiffs that the Certificates of Completion and Compliance (CCC) have been issued and vacant possession of the parcels is ready to be delivered to the Plaintiffs. [13] Defendant claims that they were unable to make an application to the relevant authorities for a Certificate of Completion and Compliance (‘CCC’) and could not deliver the vacant possession due to the implementation of various Movement Control Orders implemented by the Government. Defendant only obtained CCC on 17.6.2020. [14] The Plaintiffs then claim for liquidated ascertained damages (LAD) calculated from the expiry of 36 months from the dates of payment of 9 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 booking fees as the starting point, vacant possession was delivered late to the Purchasers beyond the 36 months completion period. [15] The Plaintiffs’ claim for LAD was calculated based on 36 months and the difference between the dates of payment of booking fees and the date of SPA. [16] Defendant had offered to pay liquidated damages to the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs had accepted the offer. Defendant alleged that the parties had achieved a full and final settlement on the liquidated damages. The settlements were made through settlement letters whereby the Defendants had agreed to pay the settlement sums to the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs had agreed to accept the settlement sums as full and final settlement for the liquidated damages. Analysis and Finding of this Court [17] It is noted that the contract between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant are contracts of sale and purchase of Property under the SPA which are governed by the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 (HDA). It is further noted that Defendant’s activities as a developer are subject to the HDA and the regulations thereunder namely the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 (HDR). The SPA 10 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 signed between the parties was in the prescribed form i.e. Schedule H of the HDR. Hence, it is regulated by statute. In relation to this, this Court observed that there have been many cases that have dealt with the issues pertaining to SPA under the HDA and HDR. By virtue of the principle of stare decisis, this Court is bound to follow the principles as laid down by those cases (see Mayfair Ventures Sdn Bhd v Cheang Chee Kong [2021] where the Court of Appeal has dismissed the developer’s leave application to appeal and upheld the High Court’s decision that allowed Plaintiffs’ claims, Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd v Hariram Jayaram & Ors and Other Appeals [2008] 4 MLJ 852, Ang Ming Lee and Ors v Menteri Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan [2020] 1 MLJ 281, PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor and other appeals [2021] 2 MLJ 60, Dsara Sentral Sdn. Bhd lwn Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah dan satu lagi [2020] MLJU 900 and Oxbridge Height Sdn Bhd v Abdul Razak Mohd Yusof & Anor [2015] 2 CLJ 252) which will be discussed below. [18] Defendant’s Striking Out Application is premised on all paragraphs

(a),(b),(c), and/or (d) of Order 18 rule (19)(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 for the Plaintiffs’ Writ dated 26.07.2021 and Statement of Claim dated 23.07.2021 against Defendant to be struck out on the basis that Plaintiffs’ claims are – 11 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 i) scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious; ii) prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or iii) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court; and iv) did not disclose any reasonable cause of action. [19] The learned counsel for Defendant raised five grounds in support of the Striking Out Application as follows:

The purchasers do not have locus standi.

The completion period as stated in the SPA is 42 months instead of 36 months.

The completion period shall commence from the date of the SPA and not the respective dates of payment of the booking fee.

There is no judicial review filed.

Parties have reached a settlement. [20] This Court noted that in resisting the Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Application (Enclosure 10), Defendant had raised similar grounds which formed the basis for Defendant’s Striking Out Application as follows:-

The completion period as stated in the SPA is 42 months instead of 36 months. 12 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021

The completion period shall commence from the date of the SPA and not the respective dates of payment of the booking fee.

Developer had purportedly given a rebate to the Purchaser.

There is no judicial review filed.

Parties have reached a settlement. [21] Since Defendant had raised similar grounds both, to support its Striking Out Application and to oppose the Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Application, this Court will deal with each ground raised simultaneously in respect of each of the applications namely Defendant’s Striking Out Application and Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Application. Defendant’s Striking Out Application (Enclosure 8) [22] In a Striking Out Application, the law is trite that Defendant must prove that the Plaintiffs’ claims, on the face of its pleadings, are obviously unsustainable and bound to fail. It is a summary power and only to be exercised in plain and obvious cases and where the claim is obviously unsustainable. Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs’ claims are unsustainable are based on the following grounds. 13 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 Purchasers have no locus standi [23] Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs have no locus standi to initiate this suit as they have assigned their rights under the SPA to their respective financiers. On the contrary, the Plaintiffs submit that they have the right to commence this suit against the Defendant based on clause 8 of the SPA which provides that as long as Plaintiffs notify the Government or the Purchaser’s financier under a deed of absolute assignment in writing within thirty (30) days after the action, suit or proceedings against the developer or any such other persons has been filed before any Court or tribunal, the Purchaser shall be entitled on his own volition in his own name, commence and maintain any action, suit or proceedings against the developer or any other person. Clause 8 of the SPA provides – ‘8. Purchaser’s right to initiate and maintain action The Purchaser shall be entitled on his own volition in his own name to initiate, commence, institute, and maintain in any court or tribunal any action, suit, or proceedings against the Developer or any other persons in respect of any matter arising out of this Agreement provided the Purchaser’s Financier or the Government under a deed of absolute assignment is notified in writing either before or within thirty (30) days after the action, suit or proceedings against the Developer or any such other persons has been filed before any court or tribunal.’ 14 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 [24] It is clear that clause 8 of the SPA allows Plaintiffs to take action against Defendant subject to Defendant being notified within the time stipulated. This Court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs have made the necessary notification as averred by Plaintiffs in their Affidavit (Enclosure 15) that exhibited the proof of posting of the written notice (Exhibit ‘PCSW- 1’) to Defendant. As such, the Plaintiffs have the locus standi to initiate and maintain this suit against the Defendant of their own volition, in their own names as provided under clause 8 of the SPA. The completion period as stated in the SPA is 42 months instead of 36 months. [25] As stated above, the SPA signed between the parties are in the prescribed Schedule H contract of sale. It is a statutory contract and therefore, the developer is subject to the provisions in the Act and its rules and regulations. Any deviation or variation from the terms and conditions of the contract of sale in Schedule H is not allowed and will be considered a contravention of the law making the SPA null and void and having no legal effect. This was clearly stated in the case of Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd v Hariram Jayaram & Ors and Other Appeals [2008] 4 MLJ 852 as follows:- ‘The contract which has fallen for construction in the present cases is a special contract. It is prescribed and regulated by statute. While 15 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 parties in normal cases of contract have freedom to make provisions between themselves, a housing developer does not enjoy such freedom. Hence, parties to a contract in Form H cannot contract out of the scheduled form. Terms more onerous to a purchaser may not be imposed. So too, terms imposing additional obligations on the part of a purchaser may not be included in the statutory form of contract.’ [26] Further, the Housing Development Act is a social legislation designed to protect the purchasers as held in the Federal Court case of Ang Ming Lee and Ors v Menteri Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan [2020] 1 MLJ 281. In line with the objectives of the law, for a contract under Schedule H, a developer cannot impose onerous obligations on the house buyers more than what has been provided under the law. Hence, Defendant is not allowed to change or vary the completion period from 36 months to 42 months. [27] Defendant argued that it has obtained the approval of the Ministry of Urban Wellbeing, Housing and Local Government (“Ministry”) to extend the completion date of the Lumi Tropicana Project to 42 months. Be that as it may, Defendant is bound by the terms under Schedule H to complete the Project within 36 months and if there is a delay beyond the 36 months, Plaintiffs are entitled to claim LAD calculated from the completion date of 16 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 36 months. Moreover, in the present case, the approval for the extension of time was never informed to the Plaintiffs at any time and no approval letter was produced before this Court. Thus, this Court considered the approval merely a bare allegation as no evidence was produced to such effect. [28] The Federal Court in Ang Min Lee (supra) has further held that sub regulation 11(3) of HDR is ultra vires the HDA as it confers the power to the controller to waive and modify the terms and conditions of the contract of sale when it has no power to do so. Consequently, the completion period should be 36 months and not 42 months as stipulated under HDR, a specific statute. The argument that the Plaintiffs have signed the SPA with the amended clauses 25 and 29 could not take away Plaintiffs’ statutory rights to claim compensation from the expiry of the 36 months period. The completion period shall commence from the date of the SPA and not the respective dates of payment of booking fees. [29] It is evident that some of the Plaintiffs, (except the 8th, 9th, 14th and 15th) have respectively paid booking fees to the Defendant prior to the execution of the SPA (receipts and bank statements (Exhibits ‘PCSW-2’)). By virtue of the Federal Court case of PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v Tribunal 17 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor and other appeals [2021] 2 MLJ 60, this Court is of the view that for purpose of calculation of LAD for a contract of sale regulated by the HDR, the date of delivery of vacant possession begins from the date of payment of booking fee and not the date of the SPA. [30] The case to support the above position is as held by Tengku Maimun CJ in PJD Regency (supra) as follows:- ‘Where there is a delay in the delivery of vacant possession by a developer to the purchaser in respect of Scheduled Contracts under Regulation 11(1) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 (Regulation 1989) enacted pursuant to Section 24 of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966, the date for calculation of liquidated agreed damages (‘LAD’) begins from the date of payment of deposit/booking fee/initial fee/expression by the purchaser of his written intention to purchase and not from the date of the sale and purchase agreement literally. There is no judicial review filed. [31] It is not disputed by Defendant that a copy of the approval to extend the time of completion purportedly given by the Ministry was not given to the Plaintiffs at the time of signing of the SPA, not given at the time when vacant possession was delivered to the Plaintiffs and neither was it produced before this Court in the present application. Due to the non- 18 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 production of the supporting document for approval for extension, this Court is inclined to agree with the Plaintiffs’ submission that failure to file a judicial review cannot be held against the Plaintiffs as they were not aware of the approval for the extension of time. As Defendant had failed to provide a copy of the extension approval to the Plaintiffs, Defendant cannot now be allowed to argue that the Plaintiffs should file for judicial review. Case in point is Dsara Sentral Sdn. Bhd lwn Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah dan satu lagi [2020] MLJU 900 wherein it was held – ‘[25] Mahkamah ini berpendapat adalah tidak adil untuk Pemohon menyatakan pihak Responden Kedua telah gagal mencabar kelulusan lanjutan tempoh tersebut apabila kelulusan lanjutan tersebut tidak pernah disampaikan atau diberitahu kepada Responden Kedua sejak ia diluluskan…. [32] Based on the affidavit evidence, it is shown that Defendant never notified the Plaintiffs of the approval for the extension of time and therefore it is merely a bare assertion on Defendant’s part. As such, the Plaintiffs could not be faulted for not filing any application for judicial review which is required to be filed within three months from the date when the grounds of the application were first communicated to the applicant. 19 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 Parties have reached a settlement. [33] It is Defendant’s contention that it has given rebates to the Plaintiffs and had offered to pay liquidated damages to the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs had accepted the offer. The parties have achieved a full and final settlement on the liquidated damages. The settlements were made through settlement letters whereby the Defendants had agreed to pay the settlement sums to the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs had agreed to accept the settlement sums as full and final settlement for the liquidated damages. [34] Henceforth, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit against Defendant as both parties have achieved a settlement in respect of the LAD. Pursuant to the Settlement Letter (Exhibit GYA-2 of Defendant’s Affidavit in Support), the Plaintiffs have agreed to accept the settlement sums as full and final settlement of the Plaintiffs’ claim for the LAD. Therefore, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to claim for the purported LAD which is much more than the settlement sums agreed between the parties. [35] Defendant relied on the case of Oxbridge Height Sdn Bhd v Abdul Razak Mohd Yusof & Anor [2015] 2 CLJ 252 where the Court of Appeal 20 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 held that the action of the purchasers filing their LAD claim constituted a breach of the settlement agreement. [36] In Oxbridge (supra), this Court finds that the settlement was reached with the full knowledge of the buyers of the situation of the development whereby the project was a ‘sick project’ that could be construed as delayed by force majeure. Defendant also argued that they would not be able to continue with the project unless the LAD claim was waived in view of the financial difficulties resulting from the force majeure. [37] Defendant further argued that by signing the settlement agreement, the Plaintiffs are caught by section 64 of the Contracts Act which provides the dispensation of a promise made to a promise as follows: “64. Promisee may dispense with or remit performance of promise Every promisee may dispense with or remit, wholly or in part, the performance of the promise made to him, or may extend the time for such performance, or may accept instead of it any satisfaction which he thinks fit. …..it was therefore not right and proper for the respondents, despite their promise to conditionally waive LAD under the SPA, to resile from their promise and sue for late delivery under the SPA as if the settlement agreement did not exist.” 21 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 [38] Unlike Oxbridge (supra), there is no prior knowledge on the part of the Plaintiffs, of the extension of completion time in the present case. The Plaintiffs are not aware of any extension of time given to Defendant. Even if there is, it is null and void and ought to be disregarded by reason of the Federal Court‘s decision in Ang Min Lee (supra) which held that subregulation 11(3) is ultra vires the Act and the controller has no power to grant the extension as he has no power to modify any terms inconsistent with the terms in the Schedule H contract of sale. [39] The effect of void decision has been discussed in the case of Chan Kwai Chun v Lembaga Kelayakan [2002] 3 CLJ 231, where the Court of Appeal stated at p.239 as follows:- ‘Decision based on examination results as pronounced on 13 September 2001 which is void is not a decision. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to the article by Michael Akehurst in Public Law

at p.619 which states: ‘A void decision is, strictly speaking, not a decision at all and therefore does not need to be revoked. If a public authority has taken a decision which is void, it is entitled to ignore that decision and to consider the matter again as if the decision had never existed. In this context, a decision is regarded as void if it is ultra vires. 22 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 [40] This Court also noted as submitted by the learned counsel for the Plaintiffs that the issue of judicial review vis-a-vis housing development cases is a non-starter. This is because the Court of Appeal had on numerous occasions, through at least 3 different panels affirmed various High Court’s decisions which granted summary judgment against developers without judicial review proceedings. In those cases, writ actions were invariably filed by purchasers to recover LAD and the issue of judicial review was raised, considered and rejected.

Court of Appeal Appeal No. W-02(IM)(NCvC)-1812- 11/2020 (Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd v How Hoe Lian @ Law Hoe

Court of Appeal Appeal No. W-02(IM)(NCvC)-1816- 11/2020 (Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd v. Galeri Bersatu Sdn Bhd);

Court of Appeal Appeal No. W-02(IM)(NCvC)-424- 03/2021 (Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd v. Leong Keng Chiang);

Court of Appeal Appeal No. W-02(IM)(NCvC)-625- 03/2021 (Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd v Lam Su See). Conclusion [41] Based on the foregoing, it is my considered view that the grounds relied upon by Defendant in support of its application to strike out Plaintiffs’ 23 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 claims are misconceived and without any merits. It fails to fulfill any of the grounds under Order 18 of the Rules of Court. I therefore, dismissed the Striking Out Application in Enclosure 8. Application for Summary Judgment (Enclosure 10) [42] As has been stated above, in opposing the Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Application, Defendant has used grounds that are similar to its Striking Out Application. This Court has considered each of the grounds and found that the grounds put forth by Defendant do not support its Striking Out Application. On the same note, it is this Court’s considered view that the grounds submitted by Defendant do not constitute triable issues that require Plaintiffs claim to proceed to a full trial with viva voce evidence. [43] In the case of Esso Standard Malaya Bhd v Southern Cross Airways (Malaysia) Bhd [1972] 1 MLJ 168 Raja Azlan Shah J (later LP) held at p.171 as follows:- ‘It is I think right that an order under R.S.C. Order 14 should be made only if the court thinks it is a plain case and ought not to go to trial. If one simply has a short matter of construction with a few documents, the court on summary application should decide what 24 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 in its judgment is the true construction. There should be no reason to go formally to trial where no further facts could emerge which would throw any light upon the letters that have to be construed.’ [44] This Court also relies on the case of Hong Leong Finance Berhad v Rextex Rubber Products (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1996] 4 CLJ 580 which encapsulated principle of summary judgment as follows:

the purpose of Order 14 Rules of the High Court is to enable plaintiff to obtain summary judgment without trial if he can prove his claim clearly and that the defendant is unable to set up bona fide defence or raise a triable issue.

A triable issue may be established by showing that there is defence to the claim, a dispute on the facts or that a point of law requires determination. The Court’s role at the hearing of an application for summary judgment is not to delve into the merit of the issues raised by the defendant or whether the defendant is likely to succeed or fail. Conclusion [45] Applying the principles of summary judgment as illustrated above, this Court opines that this is a fit and proper case to grant a summary judgment to the Plaintiffs. Defendant has not raised any triable issues that 25 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 warrant a full trial as the Plaintiffs claim are obviously sustainable. I, therefore, allowed Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Application with costs. Date: 31st October 2022 signed (ROHANA ABD MALEK) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC 2 Shah Alam Counsels: Solicitor for the Prayer/defendants Tetuan Justin Voon Chooi & Wing D6-5-13A, Bangunan Perdagangan D6, 801 Jalan Sentul 51000 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-27851015 Email: jcwefiling@gmail.com Solicitor for the Respondent/Plaintiffs: Tetuan Yong SL & Koh 1st Floor, Lot 5, Jalan 51A 46100 Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan 26 | BA-22NCvC-284-07/2021 Legislation referred Contracts Act 1950 Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1996 Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 - Reg 11(3), Schedule H Rules of Court 2012 - Order 14, Order 18 Cases referred 1. Mayfair Ventures Sdn Bhd v Cheang Chee Kong [2021]

Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd v Hariram Jayaram & Ors and Other Appeals [2008] 4 MLJ 852 3. Ang Ming Lee and Ors v Menteri Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan [2020] 1 MLJ 281 4. PJD Regency Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah & Anor and other appeals [2021] 2 MLJ 60 5. Dsara Sentral Sdn. Bhd lwn Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah dan satu lagi [2020] MLJU 900 6. Oxbridge Height Sdn Bhd v Abdul Razak Mohd Yusof & Anor [2015] 2 CLJ 252 7. Chan Kwai Chun v Lembaga Kelayakan [2002] 3 CLJ 231 8. Esso Standard Malaya Bhd v Southern Cross Airways (Malaysia) Bhd [1972] 1 MLJ 168 9. Hong Leong Finance Berhad v Rextex Rubber Products (M) Sdn