Lampiran
Lampiran 22 bertarikh 29-8-2023 ialah Perintah Mahkamah di mana terdapat pengendorsan menurut Aturan 45 kaedah 7 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 iaitu − PENGENDORSAN MENURUT ATURAN 45 KAEDAH 7 KAEDAH-KAEDAH MAHKAMAH 2012 KEPADA DEFENDAN Jika TEGAP TUNAS DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD mengingkari atau abai mematuhi Perintah ini, maka kamu LEE KUAN SOON (NO. K/P: 611018-10-5293) dan MOHAMMAD KAMAL BIN MOHD AFFANDI (NO. K/P: 530718-03-5375), pengarah-pengarah TEGAP TUNAS DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD yang tersebut di atas boleh dikenakan proses pelaksanaan bagi maksud memaksa yang tersebut itu supaya mematuhinya. [4] Berikutan dengan Perintah Mahkamah, pada 6-11-2023, Plaintif-Plaintif memfailkan notis permohonan ex parte (Lampiran 25) untuk kebenaran bagi perintah komital dikeluarkan kepada pengarah-pengarah Defendan iaitu Lee Kuan Soon (No. K/P: 611018-10-5293) dan Mohammad Kamal bin Mohd Affandi (No. K/P: 530718-03-5375) kerana tidak mematuhi Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 22-8-2023. [5] Pada 27-11-2023, Perintah Mahkamah (Lampiran 29) membenarkan Lampiran 25. [6] Lampiran 30 bertarikh 4-12-2023, Plaintif-Plaintif melalui Notis Permohonannya memohon perintah komital dikeluarkan kepada pengarah-pengarah Defendan iaitu Lee Kuan Soon (No. K/P: 611018-10- 5293) dan Mohammad Kamal bin Mohd Affandi (No. K/P: 530718-03- 5375) kerana tidak mematuhi Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 22-8-2023. [7] Afidavit sokongan Plaintif-Plaintif (Lampiran 31) menyatakan − (a) pada 22-8-2023, Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi memerintahkan Defendan mendapatkan “blanket consent” daripada LPHS untuk memindahmilik Hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif-Plaintif. (b) Surat peguam cara Defendan bertarikh 24-10-2023 kepada peguam cara Plaintif-Plaintif menyatakan bahawa surat LPHS bertarikh 3-4-2023 telah membalas surat Defendan di mana keputusan LPHS ialah rayuan Defendan bagi pengurangan denda/penalti telah ditolak. (c) kegagalan Defendan mematuhi Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 22-8-2023 maka prosiding komital dibawa oleh Plaintif-Plaintif terhadap Defendan. Lampiran 35 (Notis Permohonan Defendan untuk mengetepikan Perintah Mahkamah) [8] Pengarah Defendan iaitu Lee Kuan Soon dan Mohammad Kamal bin Mohd Affandi memfailkan Lampiran 35 menurut Aturan 32 kaedah 6 dan/atau Aturan 92 kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan/atau bidangkuasa sedia ada Mahkamah untuk suatu perintah seperti yang berikut: (a) Perintah Pengkomitan (Kandungan 25) bertarikh 27-11-2023 (yang dimeterai sebagai Kandungan 29) terhadap Lee Kuan Soon dan Mohammad Kamal bin Mohd Affandi adalah diketepikan (set aside). (b) Perintah penggantungan terhadap prosiding pengkomitan yang difailkan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif diberikan, sementara menunggu pendengaran/bicara dan pelupusan bagi permohonan ini. (c) kos dibayar oleh Plaintif-Plaintif kepada Lee Kuan Soon dan Mohammad Kamal bin Mohd Affandi. [9] Alasan yang dinyatakan oleh pengarah-pengarah Defendan dinyatakan dalam 2 afidavit sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh setiap pengarah (Lee Kuan Soon dan Mohammad Kamal bin Mohd Affandi) iaitu − (a) Plaintif-Plaintif gagal mematuhi keperluan tatacara yang diperuntukkan di bawah Aturan 52 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 semasa memfailkan permohonan meminta kebenaran bagi pengkomitan terhadap Lee Kuan Soon dan Mohammad Kamal bin Mohd Affandi. (b) oleh kerana keperluan tatacara yang diperuntukkan di bawah Aturan 52 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 memerlukan pematuhan ketat (strict compliance), kegagalan Plaintif-Plaintif untuk berbuat demikian/ketidakpatuhan Plaintif-Plaintif telah menyebabkan Perintah Pengkomitan (Lampiran 25) bertarikh 27-11-2023 (Perintah Pengkomitan Ex Parte) yang diperoleh Plaintif-Plaintif adalah cacat, tidak teratur dan tidak sah dan sepatutnya diketepikan oleh Mahkamah ini. [10] Berdasarkan nasihat peguam cara Defendan, Lee Kuan Soon dan Mohammad Kamal bin Mohd Affandi memfailkan dua afidavit sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh setiap pengarah Defendan. Isi kandungan afidavit adalah sama dan menyatakan perkara yang berikut: (a) Perintah Pengkomitan Ex Parte adalah cacat, tidak teratur dan tidak sah, maka perlu diketepikan. Ini kerana semasa memfailkan Permohonan Ex Parte, Plaintif-Plaintif sebagai pemohon-pemohon gagal memenuhi/mematuhi keperluan prosedur yang diperuntukkan di bawah Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. Perenggan 13 afidavit sokongan memperihalkan ketidakpatuhan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif iaitu − • gagal memfailkan suatu pernyataan di bawah A. 52 k. 3(2), pernyataan hanya difailkan selepas Plaintif-Plaintif mendapatkan kebenaran Mahkamah melalui Perintah Pengkomitan Ex Parte; • Plaintif-Plaintif tidak sepatutnya memulakan prosiding pengkomitan terhadap pengarah-pengarah Defendan tanpa melibatkan Defendan sebagai seorang penghina yang didakwa melakukan penghinaan Mahkamah; • Plaintif-Plaintif gagal membuktikan kepada Mahkamah bahawa sesalinan Perintah Saman Pemula berjaya diserahkan kepada pengarah-pengarah Defendan secara serahan kediri. Tiada bukti akuanterima oleh pengarah-pengarah Defendan dikemukakan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif. • Plaintif-Plaintif gagal membuktikan kepada Mahkamah ini bahawa sesalinan Notis Rasmi untuk menunjuk sebab berjaya disampaikan kepada pengarah-pengarah Defendan secara serahan kediri. Tiada bukti akuanterima oleh pengarah-pengarah Defendan dikemukakan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif. (b) Plaintif-Plaintif sebagai pemohon-pemohon gagal memenuhi/mematuhi keperluan prosedur yang diperuntukkan di bawah Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 selepas memperoleh Perintah Pengkomitan Ex Parte. Perenggan 14 afidavit sokongan memperihalkan ketidakpatuhan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif iaitu − • Plaintif-Plaintif gagal untuk menyampaikan sesalinan kertas kausa yang lengkap bagi prosiding pengkomitan kepada pengarah-pengarah Defendan. hanya Kandungan 30 dan Kandungan 31 sahaja diserahkan kepada Defendan. Kertas kausa lain bagi Notis Permohonan Ex Parte Plaintif-Plaintif untuk meminta kebenaran Mahkamah iaitu Kandungan 25, 26 dan 27 serta Perintah Pengkomitan Ex Parte (kandungan 29) tidak diserahkan secara kediri kepada pengarah-pengarah Defendan. • afidavit penyampaian yang difailkan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif tidak menunjukkan bukti bahawa Kandungan 30 dan Kandungan 31 berjaya diserahkan kepada pengarah-pengarah Defendan. [11] Pengarah-pengarah Defendan menyatakan bahawa keperluan tatacara di bawah Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 adalah suatiu pematuhan ketat (strict compliance) kerana permohonan pe gkomitan adalah bersifat quasi-criminal dan melibatkan kebebasan peribadi pengarah-pengarah Defendan (Lee Kuan Soon dan Mohammad Kamal bin Mohd Affandi). [12] Berdasarkan nasihat peguam cara Defendan, pengarah-pengarah Defendan (Lee Kuan Soon dan Mohammad Kamal bin Mohd Affandi) mempercayai bahawa ketidakpatuhan oleh plaintif-Plaintif adalah fatal dan suatu kecacatan yang tidak boleh diperbaiki. Maka, permohonan Defendan vide pengarah-pengarah Defendan agar prosiding pengkomitan ini digantung sementara menunggu pendengaran dan pelupusan Notis Permohonan Defendan (Lampiran 35). Analisa dan Dapatan Mahkamah [13] Saman Pemula Plaintif-Plaintif adalah berpaksikan kepada − • Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 28-12-2002 antara Plaintif-Plaintif (pembeli) dan Defendan (Pemaju). • seksyen 53 Specific Relief Act 1950 yang disalin semula − ACT 137 Specific Relief Act 1950 (Revised - 1974) PART III - PREVENTIVE RELIEF CHAPTER X - OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTIONS Section 53. Mandatory injunctions. When, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite acts. ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A, by new buildings, obstructs lights to the access and use of which B has acquired a right by prescription. B may obtain an injunction, not only to restrain A from going on with the buildings, but also to pull down so much of them as obstructs B’s lights. (b) A builds a house with eaves projecting over B’s land. B may sue for an injunction to pull down so much of the eaves as so project. (c) In the case put as illustration (i) to section 52, the court may also order all written communications made by B, as patient, to A, as medical adviser, to be destroyed. (d) In the case put as illustration (v) to section 52 the court may also order A’s letters to be destroyed. (e) A threatens to publish statements concerning B which would be punishable under Chapter XXI of the Penal Code [Act 574]. The court may grant an injunction to restrain the publication, even though it may be shown not to be injurious to B’s property. (f) A, being B’s medical adviser, threatens to publish B’s written communications with him, showing that B has led an immoral life. B may obtain an injunction to restrain the publication. (g) In the cases put as illustrations (s) and (t) to section 52, and as illustrations (e) and (f) to this section, the court may also order the copies produced by piracy, and the trademarks, statements, and communications, therein respectively mentioned, to be given up or destroyed. • seksyen 38 Akta Kontrak 1950 yang disalin semula − ACT 136 Contracts Act 1950 (Revised - 1974) PART V - OF THE PERFOMANCE OF CONTRACTS Section 38. Obligation of parties to contracts. (1) The parties to a contract must either perform, or offer to perform, their respective promises, unless the performance is dispensed with or excused under this Act, or of any other law. (2) Promises bind the representatives of the promisors in case of the death of the promisors before performance, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract. ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A promises to deliver goods to B on a certain day on payment of RM1,000. A dies before that day. A’s representatives are bound to deliver the goods to B, and B is bound to pay the RM1000 to A’s representatives. (b) A promises to paint a picture for B by a certain day, at a certain price. A dies before the day. The contract cannot be enforced either by A’s representatives or by B. • O. 52 Rules of Court 2012 yang disalin semula − P.U.(A) 205/2012 Rules of Court 2012 Order 52. Committal Definition (O. 52, r. 1) 1. In this Order — “Court” means the High Court, Sessions Court and Magistrates’ Court; “Judge” means a High Court Judge, Sessions Court Judge or Magistrate. Committal for contempt of Court (O. 52, r. 2) 2. The Court may, on the application of any party to any cause or matter or on its own motion, make an order of committal in Form 107. Contempt committed in the face of the Court (O. 52, r. 2a) 2A. (1) If a contempt is committed in the face of the Court, it shall not be necessary to serve a formal notice to show cause, but the Court shall ensure that the person alleged to be in contempt understands the nature of the offence alleged against him and has the opportunity to be heard in his own defence, and the Court shall make a proper record of the proceedings. (2) Where a Judge is satisfied that a contempt has been committed in the face of the Court, the Judge may order the contemnor to appear before him on the same day at the time fixed by the Court for the purpose of purging his contempt. (3) Where such person has purged his contempt by tendering his unreserved apology to the Court and the Judge considers the contempt to be not of a serious nature, the Judge may excuse such person and no further action shall be taken against him. (4) Where such person declines or refuses to purge his contempt, then the Judge shall sentence him. Other cases of contempt (O. 52, r. 2b) 2A. In all other cases of contempt of Court, a formal notice to show cause why he should not be committed to the prison or fined shall be served personally. Application to Court (O. 52, r. 3) 3. (1) No application to a Court for an order of committal against any person may be made unless leave to make such an application has been granted in accordance with this rule. (2) An application for such leave must be made ex parte to the Court by a notice of application supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the name, description and address of the person sought to be committed and the grounds on which his committal is sought, and by an affidavit, to be filed before the application is made, verifying the facts relied on. Application for order after leave to apply granted (O. 52, r. 4) 4. (1) When leave has been granted under rule 3 to apply for an order of committal, the application for the order must be made by notice of application to the Court, and, unless the Court granting leave has otherwise directed, there must be at least eight clear days between the service of the notice of application and the day named therein for the hearing. (2) Unless within fourteen days after such leave was granted the notice of application is filed, the leave shall lapse. (3) Subject to paragraph (4), the notice, accompanied by a copy of the statement and affidavit in support of the application for leave under rule 3 and the order granting such leave, must be served personally on the person sought to be committed. (4) Without prejudice to the powers of the Court or Judge under Order 62, rule 5, the Court or Judge may dispense with service of the notice under this rule if it or he thinks it just to do so. Saving for power to commit without application for purpose (O. 52, r. 5) 5. Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Order shall be taken as affecting the power of the Court to make an order of committal of its own motion against a person guilty of contempt of Court. Provisions as to hearing (O. 52, r. 6) 6. (1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Court hearing an application for an order of committal may sit in private or in Chambers in the following cases: (a) where the application arises out of proceedings relating to the wardship or adoption of an infant or wholly or mainly to the guardianship, custody, maintenance or upbringing of an infant, or rights of access to an infant; (b) where the application arises out of proceedings relating to a person suffering or appearing to be suffering from mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 2001; (c) where the application arises out of proceedings in which a secret process, discovery or invention was in issue; (d) where it appears to the Court that in the interests of the administration of justice or for reasons of national security the application should be heard in private, but, except as aforesaid, the application shall be heard in open Court. (2) If the Court hearing an application in private or in Chambers by virtue of paragraph (1) decides to make an order of committal against the person sought to be committed, it shall in open Court state— (a) the name of that person; (b) in general terms, the nature of the contempt of Court in respect of which the order of committal is being made; and (c) if he is being committed for a fixed period, the length of that period. (3) Except with the leave of the Court hearing an application for an order of committal, no grounds shall be relied upon at the hearing except the grounds set out in the statement under rule 3. The foregoing provision is without prejudice to the powers of the Court under Order 20, rule 8. (4) If on the hearing of the application the person sought to be committed expresses a wish to give oral evidence on his own behalf, he shall be entitled to do so. Contempt committed by corporation (O. 52, r. 6a) 6A. If a corporation is guilty of contempt of Court, the Court may fine the corporation or punish any officer of the corporation who caused or wilfully permitted or contributed to the contempt of Court or fine the corporation and punish the officer. Power to suspend execution of committal order (O. 52, r. 7) 7. (1) The Court by whom an order of committal is made may by order direct that the execution of the order of committal shall be suspended for such period or on such terms or conditions as it may specify. (2) Where execution of an order of committal is suspended by an order under paragraph (1), the applicant for the order of committal must, unless the Court otherwise directs, serve on the person against whom it was made a notice informing him of the making and terms of the order under that paragraph. Discharge of person committed (O. 52, r. 8) 8. (1) The Court may, on the application of any person committed to prison for any contempt of Court, discharge him. (2) Where a person has been committed for failing to comply with a judgment or order requiring him to deliver any thing to some other person or to deposit it in Court or elsewhere, then, if the thing is in the custody or power of the person committed, the Sheriff in the High Court or the bailiff in the Subordinate Court, as the case may be, may take possession of it as if it were the property of that person and, without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), the Court may discharge the person committed and may give such directions for dealing with the thing taken by the Sheriff or the bailiff as it thinks fit. Saving for other powers (O. 52, r. 9) 9. Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this Order shall be taken as affecting the power of the Court to make an order requiring a person guilty of contempt of Court, or a person punishable by virtue of any written law in like manner as if he had been guilty of contempt of the Court, to pay a fine or to give security for his good behaviour, and those provisions, so far as applicable, and with the necessary modifications, shall apply in relation to an application for such an order as they apply in relation to an application for an order of committal. Form of warrant of committal (O. 52, r. 10) 10. A warrant for committal must be in Form 108. [14] Pemfailan Saman Pemula (OS) oleh Plaintif-Plaintif ini mempunyai kaitan yang ketat dan secara langsung dengan Defendan (syarikat). Pengarah-pengarah Defendan ialah Lee Kuan Soon dan Mohammad Kamal bin Mohd Affandi. [15] Apa yang dipohon oleh Plaintif-Plaintif semata-mata berkenaan dengan Hartanah kepunyaan Plaintif-Plaintif yang sepenuhnya berkaitan dengan Lembaga Perumahan Hartanah Selangor (LPHS). [16] Defendan dan Lembaga Perumahan Hartanah Selangor (LPHS) mempunyai nexus dan secara langsung membawa impak kepada Hartanah Plaintif-Plaintif. Apakan cara bagi penyelesaian permohonan Plaintif-Plaintif ini oleh Mahkamah ini? Adakah tujuan utama permohonan pengkomitan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif untuk menyumbat pengarah-pengarah Defendan (Lee Kuan Soon dan Mohammad Kamal bin Mohd Affandi) ke penjara Sungai Buloh atau Kajang atau lokap polis? [17] Hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif-Plaintif adalah − “The Plaintiffs seek mandatory injunctive relief to direct the Defendant to obtain blanket consent for the property they sold to the Plaintiffs on the 28/12/2002. The Court granted the injunctive order on the 22/8/2023 with penal endorsement under O45 r 7 of the Rules of Court 2012. The Defendant has breached the order of the Court dated 22/8/2023 by first misleading the Court on the fact that they were awaiting the reply on the appeal to LPHS dated 31/1/2023 but, in fact, they had already gotten a reply on the 3/4/2023. A copy of the letter from LPHS is found at exhibit-TB 3 enclosure 26. This has been confirmed by the Defendant solicitors. The Plaintiffs have written to the Court via a letter dated 12/10/2023 (enclosure 24) informing of the misinformation by the Defendant which the Court based the order on. The Plaintiffs then gave a notice that the Defendant has breached the order dated 22/8/2023 exhibit TB 5 (enclosure 26) and informed them that a contempt proceeding will be invoked against them for not obtaining the blanket consent as ordered by the Court. The Plaintiffs than filed an ex parte application for leave of Court to invoke contempt proceedings which the Court has granted the same on the 30/11/2023 (enclosure 29). The Plaintiffs than filed an application enclosing the Affidavit in Support and statement pursuant O. 52 r. 4(3) and served the same on the Directors of the Defendant on the 5/12/2023. Issues: (1) The Defendant raised the issue that the Defendant was not served personally because there is no acknowledgement of receipt by the directors of the Defendant pursuant to O. 52 r. (3). (2) The Defendant also says that the ex parte application was not enclosed with the statement and this is compulsory and the order dated 27/11/2023 should be set aside. The Plaintiffs says that the Application, the Affidavit in Support, Further Affidavit, the Order dated 27/11/2023 and the statement was served on the directors of the defendant company on the 5/12/2023. The directors need not sign and acknowledge receipt of documents as stipulated by O 62 r3. It only says leaving a copy with the Directors/Defendants. The case of Hong Leong Finance Berhad v Pasir Permata Sdn Bhd & Ors [1989] 1 CLJ 939 says that “there was good personal service of the writ on the third defendant, the Plaintiff had brought the writ to the knowledge and attention of the third defendant. It was not necessary for the process server to hand the writ personally to the third defendant.”. The Plaintiffs aver if every personal service were to be made compulsory to obtain the Defendants acknowledgment than no documents can be served personally. The findings were supported by another High court case, Dato Tan Chin Who v Dato Haji Zulkarnain Bin Dato Sheikh Ahmad Yang Dipertua Council of Justice Of The Peace State Of Negeri Sembilan [2004] MLJU 6 where at page 22 the Judge said that “it seems clear to me that so long as a copy of the writ is left with the person to be served i.e. the second defendant herein, then personal service is affected. The process server on the 14/12/2023 (enclosure 34) has stated in his Affidavit of Service that he served the documents on the Defendant’s directors at their office. The fact that the lawyers were present during the 1st case management on the 21/12/2023 date shows that the directors have knowledge of the contempt proceeding against them. The Defendants are precluded from applying to set aside the order by virtue of O. 2 r. 2 of the Rules of Court 2012, as they have taken steps in the proceeding. (Hong Leong Finance Berhad v Pasir Permata Sd. Bhd. & 5 Ors [1989] 1 CLJ 939) As for the non-compliance of O. 52 r. 3(2), the Plaintiffs says that the statement referred to can be inferred in the Affidavit in Support and Further Affidavit and also the Notice dated 7/4/2023 (enclosure 2) and 22/6/2023 (enclosure 16) send to the Defendant stating out the contempt committed by them. The Ex Parte application is not necessary to be served on the Defendant. The Plaintiffs have served the statement under O. r. 4 (3) as required by the Rule of Court, 2012, therefore they are not prejudiced. They have known the charges under the contempt long before the application was made. The service of the statement, application, affidavit in support and further affidavit is found in the Affidavit of Service dated 14/12/2023. The Plaintiffs rely on the case of To Thomas v Asia Fishing Industry Pte LTD [1977] 1 MLJ 151 where in the Federal Court the Judges had decided that in a contempt of court by disobedience of an injunction was equivalent to a criminal charge. For disobedience of an injunction a man could be sent to prison for an indefinite time. In the matter of contempt arising out of disobedience to an order of injunction of court the test is to ask whether defendant knows of it. It need not be necessary that he should be served. The court referred to the case of United Telephone Co v Dale (1884) 25 ChD 778 where J Pearson said − ‘In no case will the court enforce obedience to an order of injunction by means of a committal to prison, simply upon the ground that the order was not been served, when it appears beyond all doubt or dispute that the defendant is aware that the injunction has been granted, and it is the intention of the Plaintiff to enforce it.’. This is similar to our situation that an injunctive relief has been obtained by the Plaintiffs and the Defendant refused to obey it, knowingly what would be the consequence, as such the Defendant is not prejudice on any account. In the case of Arthur Lee Meng Kwang v Faber Merlin Malaysia Bhd & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 193 the Supreme court had made a distinction in principle between cases where there have been non-observance of some safe guards laid down in Order 52 Rules of the High court in the interest of the alleged contemnor and a technical irregularity. Whilst the former is fatal, the latter is not. The Supreme Court finds that irregularities under O. 52 r. 3 is mere technical irregularities and it is not fatal. The case of Harta Bitara Development Sdn Bhd v Khairuddin Bin Hj Mustapa (sebagai President Pertubuhan Seni Silat Lincah Malaysia) [2021] MLJU 2819 the Judge said − ‘The critical importance of the Order 52 r. 3 which governs the application for leave, it is absolutely imperative that the court assess the sufficiency of Order 52 statement at the leave stage prior to it be granted to commence the substantive committal 8 proceedings.’. However, the judge went on to say that as long as the plaintiff has set out the non-compliance with the Court Notice and the writ of possession, which in turn are the very grounds upon which the committal leave Order was previously granted is good enough. In other words, the Judge is saying strict compliance is not necessary as long as the Defendant has enough knowledge of the contempt. This is supportive in our case that the Defendant has been served with the statement as per Order 52 r. 4 (3) as such they have knowledge of the contempt and there is no prejudice. The case of Chandra Sri Ram v Murray Hiebert [1997] 3 MLJ 240 J Low Hop Bing says − ‘Even assuming for a moment that there was a procedural irregularity, which I think there was none-such procedural irregularity did not affect did not affect the validity of the ex parte application or the substantive notice of motion.’. In Nicholls v Nicholls (1997) 147 NLJ 61, the English Court of Appeal had the occasion to consider, inter alia, the effect of procedural irregularities on the validity of committal orders. The court there took the opportunity to review fully the previous authorities on this subject in the hope that it would be possible to provide greater clarity than existed at present as to the state of the law. The first ground stated in the appeal to the court of Appeal was − ‘That the committal order dated 15 March 1996 in Form N79 failed to give proper details of the contempt found 9 proved.’ Lord Woolf MR, in giving the judgment of the court, cited extensively from previous authorities and after carefully reviewing them, was disinclined to set side committal orders on technical grounds. His Lordship held, inter alia, the court itself has a very substantial interest in seeing that its orders are upheld. If committal orders are to be set aside on purely technical grounds which have nothing to do with the justice of the case, then this has the effect of undermining the system of justice and the credibility of the court order. While the procedural requirements in relation to applications to commit and committal orders are there to be obeyed and to protect the contemnor, if there is non-compliance with the requirements which does not prejudice the contemnor, to set aside the order purely on the grounds of technicality is contrary to the interest of justice. As long as the order made by the judge was a valid order, the approach of this court will be to uphold the order in the absence of any prejudice to the contemnor as a consequence of doing so. In our case the Order was made on the 22/8/2023 and the Defendant did not comply with order. The Defendant has misled the Court that there was an appeal pending with LPSH and they have not received any reply. However, the Defendant had already received their reply way before the order was made. The Defendant has yet to comply with the order to obtain blanket consent for the Plaintiffs. They have not purged their contempt. Any technical objection should be dismissed and the contempt proceeding should be heard on the merits.”. [18] Hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Defendan adalah − “11. Upon perusing the cause papers for the Ex-Parte Leave Application which led to the issuance of the Ex-Parte Contempt Order, the Defendant’s Directors, based on the advice of the solicitors, had filed an application to set aside the Ex-Parte Contempt Order (i.e. Enclosure 35), on the basis that the Plaintiffs (being the Applicant) had failed to adhere to the mandatory procedural requirements for committal proceedings stipulated under the Rules of Court 2012. 12. Unfortunately, the setting aside application was dismissed by this Honourable Court on 12.03.2024. The Defendant’s Directors then filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision where the appeal is now fixed for a Case Management on 03.07.2024. 13. While waiting for the appeal to be heard, Enclosure 30 is now fixed for inter partes Hearing before this Honourable Court on 07.06.2024, which is where the parties are presently. The Law: 14. The law governing the grant of committal orders is well established. 15. Order 52 of The Rules of Court 2012 sets out a specific procedure for the Plaintiffs (as the Applicants) to comply with for committal proceedings. 16. In the case of Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v. Lim Pang Cheong @ George Lim & Ors [2012] 3 MLJ 458, the Federal Court affirmed that committal proceedings are of a criminal in nature, as they involve the liberty of the alleged contemnor(s). Due to this, committal proceedings necessitate strict adherence to procedural requirements, which are also mandatory in nature. 17. The Federal Court's decision, as excerpted below, emphasizes the criminal nature of committal proceedings and the strict requirement for procedural safeguards to be adhered to. … 18. Furthermore, in the case of Sivalingam A/L S. Ponniah & Ors v. Balakrishnan A/L S. Ponniah & Ors [2003] 3 MLJ 353, the High Court held that the burden of proof required by an Applicant (i.e. the Plaintiff) to apply for an order of committal against proposed contemnors (i.e. the Defendant’s Directors) is beyond a reasonable doubt. 19. The burden of proof for an Applicant to prove beyond reasonable doubt is subsequently confirmed by The Federal Court in the case of Monatech (M) SDN BHD v. Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd [2002] 4 MLJ 241. 20. In this regard, it is incumbent upon this Honourable Court to take into account the principles laid down when examining the present committal proceedings filed by the Plaintiffs, or whether the terms of the Court Order contended to have been not complied with by the Defendant’s Directors. The Defendant’s Directors’ Submissions: Should there be an order of committal made against the Defendant’s Directors vide Enclosure 30? (a) Enclosure 30 ought to be dismissed as it is tainted with procedural irregularities which is fatal. 21. First and foremost, on the issue of the compliance of the procedural safeguards for the committal proceedings, the Defendant’s Directors take the position that the procedural safeguards provided under Order 52 of the Rules of Court 2012 are not strictly adhered to by the Plaintiffs. This constitutes substantive and fundamental errors that cannot be cured and ought to render this committal proceedings be dismissed in limine. 22. Amongst others, the non-compliance are as follows: 22.1. The Plaintiffs failed to comply with Order 52 Rule 3(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 by not filing the Order 52 Statement during the Ex-Parte Leave Application stage. It was only filed by the Plaintiffs at the Inter-Partes stage. 22.2. The Plaintiffs had failed to comply with Order 52 Rule 6A of the Rules of Court 2012 as the Plaintiffs had failed to cite the Defendant Company as a party in this contempt proceedings (the proposed contemnors) during the Ex - Parte Leave Application stage. 22.3. The Plaintiffs had failed to comply with Order 52 Rule 4(3) of the Rules of Court 2012 as the Plaintiffs had failed to serve the complete set of cause papers for the committal proceedings upon the Defendant’s Directors afterobtaining leave to commence committal proceedings through the Ex-Parte Contempt Order. 23. As the issue of procedural safeguards is a subject matter of the Defendant’s Directors’ Appeal against Enclosure 35 at the Court of Appeal, the Defendant’s Directors will not deal with it further in the present submissions. 24. Despite the procedural non-compliances by the Plaintiffs (as outlined above) which are considered fatal, the Defendant’s Directors further submit that Enclosure 30 is filed without any basis, and hence must be dismissed by this Honourable Court with costs. The Defendant’s Directors will now proceed with their submissions to address the merits of Enclosure 30. (b) Enclosure 30 ought not to be allowed to commit the Defendant’s Directors for contempt of Court as the terms stated in the OS Order are ambiguous due to lack of time compliance. 25. In determining the merits of Enclosure 30 and in deciding whether an order of committal ought to be made against the Defendant’s Directors, the Defendant’s Directors wish to draw this Honourable Court’s attention to the Order 52 Statement in Enclosure 33. 26. Despite the Order 52 Statement being filed by the Plaintiffs only at the inter partes stage (clearly amounting to non-compliance with Order 52), it should be the core document referred to at an inter partes hearing for the committal proceedings, as it is akin to a charge sheet against the Defendant’s Directors in committal proceedings. (Refer to the High Court’s case of Lim Chiew v. Siteman Construction Sdn Bhd; Lee Chao Yong [2016] 1 CLJ 9027. With reference to the Order 52 Statement, it is evident that the Plaintiffs claimed the Defendant’s Directors acted in contempt of Court for not complying with the OS Order dated 22.08.2023. 29. By referring to wordings of the clauses of the OS Order, it is clear and apparent that the OS Order is a positive order which directs and/or compels the Defendant to apply for blanket consent from LPHS. However − 29.1. The OS Order does not stipulate/specify the time for compliance for the Defendant to comply with the OS Order in applying the blanket consent from LPHS; and 29.2. The Defendant’s compliance of the OS Order to apply for blanket consent is dependent on LPHS. 30. The Defendant’s Directors refer to Order 42 rule 6(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 and submit that the requirement for time stipulation is a pre-requisite for a positive order. 31. The Defendant’s Directors further submit that the absence of a specified time for compliance renders the order defective and ambiguous. In such cases, a contempt charge against the proposed contemnors is fundamentally flawed and unsustainable. 32. To support the Defendant’s Directors’ submissions above, reference is made to the High Court’s case of Dewan Perniagaan Melayu, Malaysia Negeri Johor v. Menteri Besar Johor & Ors [2017] 10 CLJ 632 where His Lordship Mohd Nazlan Ghazali JC (as he then was) held the following: ‘A Contempt Charge Based On Order Without Time Stipulation Is Defective [50] I do not think this is a valid proposition for the simple reason that the failure of the respondents to raise the same earlier cannot operate against the alleged contemnor such as the respondents in a quasi-criminal proceedings where the applicant bears the burden of proving non-observance of the court order by the alleged contemnor beyond a reasonable doubt. A court order requiring compliance cannot form a basis of a charge of contempt if it makes no reference to the time for compliance. In the absence of a specification of time for compliance in respect of the terms in a court order, a charge of contempt is inherently defective and thus cannot ever succeed.’. 33. A similar position was also adopted by His Lordship Mohd Nazlan Ghazali J (as he then was) in the High Court’s case of Dato’ Seri Timor Shah Rafiq v. Nautilus Tug & Towage Sdn Bhd [2019] 4 CLJ. His Lordship held as follows: ‘[64] The inspection order, prayer 1 in particular, is patently open-ended. Given that it is intended to allow the auditor of the director to conduct the requisite inspection, the open-endedness and the lack of specificity on the accounting periods render the inspection order vague, too wide and ambiguous. [65] Committal proceedings must only be pursued on the basis of the enforcement of court orders which are expressed in clear language and devoid of uncertainty. The benefit of the uncertainty and ambiguity in the present inspection order must at any rate be given to the alleged contemnors – the defendant, Suresh and Azian. On this basis too, the ex parte leave ought to be set aside.’. 34. In fact, in the case of Dato’ Seri Yusof Dato’ Biji Sura v. BTM Timber Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors [2009] 5 CLJ 412, the Court of Appeal also affirmed the principle that the ambiguous and/or vague terms of the Order ambiguous or vague terms in an order cannot be enforced by way of committal. The ruling of the Court of Appeal is reproduced as follows: ‘Decision [13] The learned judge was clearly right in stating that an order will not be enforced by committal if its terms are vague or ambiguous, the rule being analogous to that which governs the interpretation of penal statutes.’. 35. In light of the aforementioned legal principles and case precedents, the Defendant’s Directors contend that the Plaintiffs’ attempt to pursue committal proceedings against the Defendant’s Directors via Enclosure 30, based on the OS Order which lacks specific timeframes for compliance, would be fundamentally flawed and legally unsustainable. Therefore, the Defendant’s Directors submit that Enclosure 30 ought to be dismissed. (c) Enclosure 30 ought to be dismissed as the OS Order has been fully complied by the Defendant. 36 It is the Defendant’s Directors’ submissions that Enclosure 30 ought to be dismissed as the OS Order has been fully complied by the Defendant. 37. At all material times, the following facts had been transpired for the Defendant to apply for blanket consent from LPHS: 37.1. Before the commencement of the suit (i.e. Main Action) and before this Honourable Court grants the OS Order, the Defendant had lodged appeals with LPHS on 23.12.2022 and 31.01.2023. This is a fact known to the Plaintiffs as well. 37.2. The Defendant then received a letter dated 03.04.2023 from LPHS stating that the Defendant's appeal could not be considered. In that letter, LPHS also directed the Defendant to submit the Sales and Purchase Agreements for the eight (8) relevant units (including the Plaintiffs’ units), so that LPHS could calculate the current fine/penalty payment to the Defendant. 37.3. After receiving the letter dated 03.04.2023 from LPHS, the Defendant wrote letters dated 02.05.2023 and 06.06.2023 and attached the requested documents to LPHS. 37.4. At that time, the Defendant was awaiting a response from LPHS regarding the amount of fine imposed and required to be paid by the Defendant, so that the Defendant could proceed with the application for the blanket consent. However, no response was received by the Defendant. 37.5. On 22.08.2023, the OS Order was already granted by this Honourable Court. As the Defendant intended to apply for the blanket consent and was still awaiting a response from LPHS, the Defendant decided not to appeal against the OS Order. After the OS Order was granted, the Defendant (through its representative) also frequently communicated with a LPHS officer, named Mr. Mohammed Firdaus bin Abd Shukor, to follow up on the status of the Defendant's fine calculation, but the LPHS Officer could not confirm to the Defendant when the Defendant would receive a response from LPHS. 37.6. On 27.11.2023, the Defendant wrote a letter to LPHS to do a further follow up with LPHS. On the same day, the LPHS Officer replied to the Defendant by email and informed theDefendant that LPHS was still in the process of imposing fines/penalties on the Defendant. However, no response was received by the Defendant after the email from LPHS dated 27.11.2023. 37.7. Therefore, on 07.01.2024, the Defendant emailed the LPHS Officer once again, which the LPHS Officer replied to the next day, informing the Defendant that LPHS had calculated fines against the Defendant. However, the amount of fine calculated and to be imposed on the Defendant was not stated in the LPHS Officer’s email. 37.8. On 26.01.2024, LPHS wrote a letter informing the Defendant that the Defendant must settle a fine amounting to RM71,250.00 within sixty (60) days to LPHS. The fine was then settled by the Defendant on 04.03.2024. 37.9. On 15.03.2024, the LPHS Officer confirmed via email that LPHS had received payment from the Defendant and would issue a payment receipt on/before 18.03.2024, and the Defendant was allowed to make the application for the blanket consent after obtaining such confirmation. The Defendant did not receive the payment receipt from LPHS on 18.03.2024. 37.10. The Defendant’s application for blanket consent has been duly submitted by the Defendant to LPHS on 29.03.2024 immediately after receiving the payment receipt from LPHS. 38. Based on the above, it is clear that the Defendant did not intentionally, unwillingly, and/or neglect and/or fail to comply with the OS Order, as the obligation to comply was dependent on LPHS, in which the Defendant was awaiting a reply from LPHS all this while. The facts stated above also clearly demonstrate that the Defendant has taken all necessary actions to ensure compliance with the OS Order, to which the same has been duly complied with by the Defendant on 29.03.2024. 39. Therefore, any claims/allegations by the Plaintiffs that the Defendant is breaching the OS Order which ought to be made a committal order via Enclosure 30 are unfounded and should be dismissed by this Honourable Court. Conclusion 40. In light of the circumstances of the case and for the reasons given above, the Defendant’s Directors submit that Enclosure 30 is untenable in law and in fact which should be dismissed by this Honourable Court with costs.”. [19] Berdasarkan hujahan utama peguam cara terpelajar Defendan, Mahkamah mendapati peguam cara terpelajar Defendan “menyerang” dan mempertikaikan mengenai kecacatan/ketidakaturan dari aspek tatacara yang gagal dipatuhi oleh Plaintif-Plaintif. [20] Mahkamah ini bukanlah secara sewenang-wenangnya membenarkan permohonan Plaintif-Plaintif walaupun mempunyai kecacatan/ketidakaturan dari aspek tatacara. Perlanggaran Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 22-8-2023 iaitu suat breach of injunctive order adalah memprejudiskan Plaintif-Plaintif yang mana Plaintif-Plaintif bersungguh-sungguh hendak menguatkuasakan Perintah yang dipohon itu. [21] Mahkamah ini juga mendapati keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuuan dalam kes yang dipetik oleh peguam cara Defendan itu (Tan Sri Dato’ (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v. Lim Pang Cheong @ George Lim & Ors (supra) ialah “irregularities which are technical irregularities which did not cause any prejudice or injustice to the defendant should be dismissed.”. Selanjutnya, peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif-Plaintif membalas hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Defendan dengan memetik keputusan Supreme Court dalam kes Arthur Lee Meng Kwang v. Faber Merlin Malaysia Bhd & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 193 “irregularities under O53 r3 is mere technical irregularities and it is not fatal.”. [22] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa peguam cara terpelajar Defendan tidak mempertikaikan mengenai penyampaian Perintah Mahkamah kepada pengarah-pengarah Defendan. Tidak perlu dinafikan bahawa terdapat penal notice menurut O. 45 r.7 Rules of Court 2012 untuk memberitahu pengarah-pengarah Defendan bahawa kegagalan mematuhi Perintah Mahkamah maka tindakan pelaksanaan diteruskan. [23] Permohonan Plaintif-Plaintif di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah berkaitan dengan hakmilik hartanah yang dimiliki oleh Plaintif-Plaintif di mana tindakan untuk memastikan pindahmilik telah terjejas memandangkan isu LPHS tersebut. Jawapan/maklum balas LPHS dengan nyata menunjukkan bahawa penalti yang dikenakan kepada Defendan hendaklah dibayar terlebih dahulu, [24] Pada saat dan ketika Plaintif-Plaintif memfailkan OS terhadap Defendan, maklumat mengenai kelulusan/kebenaran daripada LPHS tidak dalam pengetahuan Plaintif-Plaintif. Peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif-Plaintif sendiri telah membuat “cariannya” dengan menulis surat kepada LPHS di mana jawapan LPHS menyatakan bahawa LPHS telah menjawab kepada Defendan. [25] Hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif-Plaintif adalah benar iaitu − “The last thing that the Plaintiffs need to add here is that the Defendant has committed a contempt in the face of the Court by misleading the Court that they were awaiting a reply for their appeal to LPHS via a letter dated 31/1/2023 to waive the penalty imposed by LPHS. The Defendant did not inform the Court that they had already got a reply from LPHS on the 3/4/2023 but the Court gave an order dated 22/8/2023 assuming that the Defendant had not got a reply yet. This was brought to the attention of the Court on the 12/10/2023 via letter and it alleged in the Plaintiffs’ Afidavit Lanjutan in Enclosure 32.”. [26] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa OS yang difailkan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif adalah jelas dan bertujuan untuk menyelesaikan pindahmilik yang dibeli oleh Plaintif-Plaintif (pembeli-pembeli) daripada Defendan (pemaju). [27] Terdapat sekatan/halangan memandangkan pindahmilik tersebut berkaitan dengan LPHS iaitu antara Defendan dan LPHS. [28] Apabila Mahkamah ini membenarkan perintah sebagaimana dipohon oleh Plaintif-Plaintif, maka kemungkiran/perlanggaran Perintah Mahkamah membawa kepada tindakan committal di bawah O. 52 Rules of Court 2012. [29] Perintah Mahkamah terhadap Defendan dan/atau pengarah-pengarah Defendan (LEE KUAN SOON/NO. K/P: 611018-10-5293 dan MOHAMMAD KAMAL BIN MOHD AFFANDI/NO. K/P: 530718-03-5375, pengarah-pengarah TEGAP TUNAS DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD yang tersebut di atas boleh dikenakan proses pelaksanaan bagi maksud memaksa yang tersebut itu supaya mematuhinya. Pada 22-8-2023 dan Mahkamah ini memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “Saman Pemula yang difailkan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif terhadap Defendan berkenaan dengan deklarasi sebagaimana relief 1 adalah dibenarkan. Bagi perintah sebagaimana pada relief 2 adalah dibenarkan sehingga rayuan Defendan kepada Lembaga Perumahan Hartanah Selangor (LPHS) dijawab oleh LPHS. Relief lain adalah ditolak. Kos permohonan ditanggung oleh Defendan.”. Kesimpulan [30] Berdasarkan alasan yang dinyatakan Mahkamah ini memutuskan untuk menolak permohonan pengarah-pengarah bagi Defendan (Kandungan 35) dengan kos sebanyak RM5,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi Alokatur dibayar kepada Plaintif-Plaintif Bertarikh: 10 Mei 2024. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Sivil NCvC12 Peguam cara: Bagi pihak Plaintif-Plaintif: Gunaseelan A/L Ganesan Tetuan G Gunaseelan & Associates, Petaling Jaya. Bagi pihak Defendan: Ong Hui Yi Tetuan Gan, Lee & Tan, Kuala Lumpur.