1. ) Tee Kian Chiong v Lakefront Residence Sdn. Bhd. (BA-22NCVC-102-03/2022)

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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO.: BA-22NCvC-102-03/2022 _________________________________________________________

Schedule

Schedule H Sale and Agreements signed between the parties. [2] By Enclosure 10 the Plaintiffs/purchasers applied for summary judgment under O. 14 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) and by Enclosure 13, the Defendant applied under O.18 r.19 to strike out the Plaintiffs’ action herein. 3 [3] After hearing the counsel’s further oral submissions on 9 August 2022 in addition to their written submissions, this Court on 2 September 2022 granted summary judgment in favour of some but not all of the Plaintiffs and also dismissed the Defendant’s application for striking out. [4] Dissatisfied, the Defendant has appealed against the said decisions on summary judgment for some Plaintiffs and the dismissal of the Defendant’s application for striking out of the action. The other Plaintiffs, who were not given the summary judgment, have also appealed against the refusal of summary judgment for them. Law on Summary Judgment and Striking Out [5] The law relating to summary judgment is well-settled. Basically, in an application for summary judgment, once the Plaintiff has complied with the preliminary procedural requirements and has shown a prima facie case on his claim, the Defendant has to show a triable defence. [6] In assessing whether the defences are triable, the Court has to analyse the allegations and the evidence adduced in the affidavits and assess whether or not any of the defendant’s defences is arguable or has raised a bona fide dispute of a fact relevant to an arguable defence which warrants a full trial of the action. As decided by the Supreme Court in Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail Ali Johor & Ors [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 14: “Under an O. 14 application, the duty of a Judge does not end as soon as a fact is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed by the other on affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal, or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent or is inherently improbable in itself, then the Judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby rendering the issue as not triable. In our opinion, unless this principle is adhered to, a Judge is in no position to exercise his discretion judicially under an O. 14 application. Thus, apart from identifying the issues of fact or law, the Court must go one step further and determine whether they are triable. This principle is sometimes expressed by the statement that a complete defence need not be shown. The defence set up need only show that there is a triable issue.” 4 [7] Bare denials which do not condescend particulars are not enough to raise triable issue. To constitute triable issues, the assertions of the defendant have to be supported by evidence which shows a defence which is fit to be tried: Richard Kuok-Onn v. All Bright Plastics Sdn Bhd [2019] MLJU 1948, following the Court of Appeal in Chen Heng Ping @ Tian Seow Hock & 5 Others v. Intradagang 690. Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad [1995] 2 MLJ 363, [1995] 3 CLJ In Chen Heng Ping @ Tian Seow Hock & 5 Others v. Intradagang Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, Mahadev Shanker JCA held: “When an application is made for summary judgment under O.14 supported by an affidavit which goes to show that there is no defence, the defendants must show cause why leave to defend must be given. This means that the defendants must provide answers on oath which constitute evidence that they have a defence which is fit to be tried. Denials in a defence do not constitute evidence. They are challenges to the other side to show proof. In the present case the guarantors do not appear to have appreciated this. Their affidavits merely relied on the defence they pleaded, which consists of bare denials and points of law which they could not sustain.” [8] Summarily striking out of a plaintiff’s suit is only to be resorted to in clear and obvious case where the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of the process. Where the plaintiff’s action is obviously unsustainable or clearly has no chance of success, the plaintiff’s action is frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of the process and can be summarily struck out. See Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 [judgment delivered by Mohamed Dzaiddin bin Hj Abdullah SCJ (later CJ)], Metroplex Holdings Sdn Bhd v Commerce International Merchant Bankers Bhd [2013] 4 MLJ 520 (Court of Appeal), Harapan Permai Sdn Bhd v. Sabah Forest Industries Sdn Bhd [2010] 3 MLRA 37; ; [2011] 2 MLJ 192; ; [2011] 1 CLJ 285 (Court of Appeal). [9] While the courts are very reluctant to summarily strike out a suit on ground relating to the substantive merits of the case, the courts have in suitable cases allowed the summary striking out of court suits on one of these grounds, namely, where it is clear and obvious that (a) the limitation period has expired, (b) the plaintiff has no locus standi, (c) the action is barred by res judicata, (d) the action is incompetent, (e ) the action is barred by statute, (f) the subject-matter in the action 5 is non-justiciable, (g) the court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief or remedy prayed for in the action. [10] Where the subject-matter in the suit has been amicably settled, the court will strike out the suit on the ground that the action thereafter becomes academic or incompetent. In Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & 3 Ors v. British-American Life & General Insurances Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 606 the Supreme Court held that on the interpretation of the terms of settlement letter signed between the plaintiffs and the 7th defendants, the plaintiff agreed as part of the settlement to withdraw the suit against the defendants and therefore the Supreme Court struck out the entirety of the plaintiffs’ suit against all the defendants as it was bound to fail. Defendant’s defences here [11] In our present case, there is no argument relating to the preliminary procedural requirements having been complied with by the Plaintiff. The Defendant’s argument here that there are allegedly triable defences which warrant unconditional leave to defend be given here. [12] The Defendant here argues that the following questions and/or points constitute triable issues: (1) Extension of 18 months was granted by the Controller of Building; (2) Commencement date for the 36 months should be the date of the Sale and Purchase Agreement; (3) Whether suing for LADs subsequent to Federal Court’s decision in Ang Ming Lee case results in unfair advantage or unjust enrichment; (4) Whether the action is barred by expiry of limitation period and/or by laches; and (5) There were settlement letters signed between the Defendant and some of the Plaintiffs here. 6 [13] Although Enclosure 10 and Enclosure 13 are separate applications by opposite and different parties, there are common questions of law and facts which apply to both the applications. In the circumstances it is appropriate that the common questions of law and facts be dealt with and answered before this Court disposes of the parties’ opposing applications in Enclosure 10 and Enclosure 13. Extension of 18 months granted by the Controller of Building [14] In our present case, the Controller of Building granted an extension of 18 months for the Defendant-developer to complete the first 4 blocks of the residential units to be sold and built in the project, and this extension from the original 36 months under Schedule H to the extended 54 months was granted on 30.8.2012 before the commencement of the project construction and was incorporated as clause 23 of the Sale and Purchase Agreements (“SPAs”) which were subsequently signed between the Defendant-developer and the Plaintiffs-purchasers: see para 14(a) Exhibit “N-2” in the Defendant’s Affidavit-in-Support at pg 372 – 373 of Encl. 15 (pdf pg 347 – 348). [15] In Ang Ming Lee v. Menteri Kesejahteraan Bandar, Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan [2020] 1 CLJ 162 the Federal Court held that the Controller of Building’s purported extension or revision of the 36 months for delivery of vacant possession is ultra vires the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act as he has no power to do so and therefore the purported extension was null and void. This principle decided by the Federal Court is not limited to the purported extensions granted by the Controller of Building after the commencement of the development project. It also applies to any purported extension granted by the Controller of Building before the commencement of the development project. In other words, the Controller of Building has no power under the Act to grant any extension of time for the delivery of vacant possession, whether such purported power is exercised before or after the commencement of the development project. [16] In Ang Ming Lee case (ibid) and PJD Regency v. Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah [2021] 2 CLJ 441, the Federal Court did not hold that a purchaser who claims for the liquidated damages for late delivery of vacant possession must proceed by way of judicial review or must apply by judicial review to quash or set aside the 7 ultra vires decision of the Controller of Building first before the purchaser can recover the liquidated damages under the Schedule H Sale and Purchase Agreement. [17] There are appellate courts’ judgments which held that an ultra vires administrative decision can be ignored or disobeyed and there is no necessity to obtain the court order to quash it first: see Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Bandar Nusajaya Development Sdn Bhd [2016] 8 CLJ 163 (Federal Court); Chai Kwai Chun v. Lembaga Kelayakan [2002] 3 CLJ 231 (Court of Appeal). This Court agrees with Quay Chew Soon JC’s decision in Lam Su See v. Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 625; [2021] MLJU 713 which held that the ultra vires administrative extension by the Controller of Building can be disregarded without the need for judicial review proceedings to set it aside. [see paras. 28 - 32], a decision which was also followed by Leong Wai Hong JC in Lakefront Residence Sdn Bhd v. Loh Suh Yaw & Anor [2022] 1 LNS 1046. [18] In the premises, this Court rejects the Defendant’s argument regarding the 54-month period and the mode of proceeding here. This Court agrees with the Plaintiffs’ argument that the period for delivery of the vacant possession is 36 months and the Plaintiff’s commencement of the ordinary civil suit here is not irregular, nor is it an abuse of the process of the court. Commencement date for the 36 months [19] In PJD Regency case (ibid), the Federal Court held that for the purpose of assessing the due date for delivery of vacant possession, the 36 months for the delivery of vacant possession is computed form the date of the purchaser’s payment of the deposit or advance payment to the developer. [20] In the premises, this Court accepts the Plaintiffs’ argument but rejects the Defendant’s argument regarding the commencement date for computing the 36 months for delivery of vacant possession. [21] In paragraph 30 of the Plaintiff’s Affidavit-in-Support (Enclosure 11), the Plaintiffs tabulated the dates of payment of deposit as the commencement of the 36 months period and computed the period of delay in respect of the respective residential units bought by the Plaintiffs. This paragraph and its tabulation and computation were 8 not denied or disputed by the Defendant in its affidavit-in-reply: see Enclosure 18. [22] In the circumstances, this Court accepts the Plaintiffs’ computation of the periods of the delay in delivery of vacant possession of the respective units as stated in paragraph 30 of the Plaintiff’s Affidavit-in-Support (Enclosure 11). Whether suing for LADs subsequent to Federal Court’s decision in Ang Ming Lee case results in unfair advantage or unjust enrichment [23] There are appellate courts’ decisions that when the apex court has pronounced a judgment which lays down for the first time a legal principle of substantive law, such legal principle is as a general rule applicable to the cases which the court have to make decisions in similar cases subsequent to the date of pronouncement of the apex court’s decision irrespective of when the cases were filed or when the cause of action in such similar cases accrued, provided the commencement of the case is not barred by limitation statute: see Ling Peek Hoe & Anor v. Ding Siew Ching [2017] CLJ 641 (Federal Court); Abillah Laboo Khan v. PP [2002] 3 CLJ 521 (Court of Appeal); Letchumanan Chettiqr Alagappan v. Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 5 CLJ 418 (Federal Court). This is different from the concept of non-retrospective effect of an apex court decision which latter concept means that it does not apply to reverse or overturn the court cases which has been finally decided prior to the date of the apex court decision: Dato’ Prem Krishna Sahgal v. Muniandy Nadasan & Ors [2017] 10 CLJ 385 (Federal Court). [24] It is baseless to argue that a purchaser who files his/her suit for recovery of liquidated damages under a Schedule H Sale and Purchase Agreement pursuant to and acting upon the Federal Court’s recent decision has in any way enjoyed any unjust enrichment or has in any way obtained any unfair advantage. What the purchaser in such a situation has done is merely to pursue by court suit his entitlement to recovery of liquidated damages which the Federal Court has clearly and authoritatively pronounced in the recent decision – in a sense, he now walks on the correct expressway clearly shone by light of the recent federal Court’s decision in Ang Min Lee case instead of the dimly-lit road before the date of decision of the Federal Court in Ang Min Lee case. 9 [25] In the premises, this Court rejects the Defendant’s argument on alleged unfair advantage or unjust enrichment. Limitation period and laches [26] Where a purchaser sues for recovery of his/her liquidated damages under Schedule H SPA, the limitation period for commencement of the suit is 6 years from the accrual of the cause of action under the Limitation Act. This suit for recovery of liquidated damages is a cause of action under the statutory agreement and not a claim for relief in equity as such. It is improper to oppose such suit for recovery of damages under a contract containing statutory terms of agreement on ground of laches, a defence to claim for equitable relief. See Hotel Ambassador (M) Sdn Bhd v. Seapower (M) Sdn Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 174 (Supreme Court). [27] Clause 25(3) of the Sale and Purchase Agreement in Schedule H format here provides that the cause of action for recovery of liquidated damages shall be deemed to accrue on the date of the purchaser’s taking vacant possession of the premises. [28] In our present case, the Plaintiffs are claiming for the recovery of the liquidated damages for the delay in the delivery of vacant possession. In the Plaintiffs’ claims, there is no prayer for declaration to invalidate the Controller of Building’s purported decision on extension of time. [29] In Obata-Ambak Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd & Anor. [2022] 5 CLJ 251, [2022] MLJU 354 the purchaser specifically prayed for a declaration that the Controller of Builder’s extension decision was invalid and the Court of Appeal held that as the plaintiff filed the declaration suit more than 6 years after the Controller of Building’s decision was made, the plaintiff’s declaration suit was barred by limitation period. In Obata Ambak case (ibid), the cause of action was the declaration of invalidity of the Controller of Builder’s extension decision, therefore the cause of action accrued on the date of the said decision. On the point of limitation period, Obata Ambak case (ibid) can be distinguished on the facts. 10 [30] In Obata Ambak case (ibid), the Court of Appeal held to the effect that where the purchaser’s cause of action is based on clause 25 or clause 27 of the Schedule H Sale and Purchase Agreement, such cause of action accrues on the date of delivery of the vacant possession of the property. This is apparent from the following paragraphs of the Court of Appeal’s judgment therein: “[21] In the present appeals, it is the submission of the plaintiff that their cause of action to claim for LAD shall accrue on the date the plaintiff takes vacant possession of the properties. This is based on cl. 25(3) of the SPA, which reads as follows: For the avoidance of doubt, any cause of action to claim for liquidated damages by the Purchaser under this clause shall accrue on the date the Purchaser take vacant possession of the said Parcel. [22] It is, therefore, the submission of the plaintiff that the cause of action shall accrue on the date when the plaintiff/purchaser is deemed to have taken delivery of vacant possession of the properties. For the plaintiff, the cause of action accrued on 8 February 2017 (VP Notice + 14 days) and the six years limitation period shall expire on 7 February 2023. In the present action, since the plaintiff's claim herein was filed on 18 June 2020, it is therefore well within the limitation period. [25] We would agree with the plaintiff/appellant if the plaintiff's claim for LAD is simply based on cls. 25 and 27 of the SPAs, where the delivery period of the properties was agreed/contracted at 54 months. [26] However, the plaintiff's claim herein is not based on cls. 25 and 27 of the SPAs which the parties have signed. …….” [31] What the Court of Appeal held in Obata Ambak case (ibid) is that the accrual of the cause of action in a particular case depends on how a party pleads his cause of action in the particular case. Where a party pleads his cause of action on declaration of invalidity of the Controller of Building’s executive decision in granting extension of time for the developer [as was the case on the facts of Obata Ambak case (ibid)], the pleaded cause of action would accrued on the date of the Controller’s decision on the extension. Where a party pleads his cause of action on clauses 25 and/or 27 of the Schedule H Sale and Purchase Agreement, then the pleaded cause of action accrued on the date of delivery of vacant possession of the residential property as stipulated in clause 25(3) of the Agreement. 11 [32] In our present case, the Plaintiffs’ causes of action is recovery of the liquidated damages for late delivery of vacant possession based on clause 25 of the Schedule H Sale and Purchase Agreement, and therefore the Plaintiffs’ cause of action here accrued in November 2018, the date of delivery of vacant possession, pursuant to clause 25(3) of the SPA. Settlement Letters [33] In our present case, settlement letters dated November 2018 and December 2018 were signed by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 15th Plaintiffs and the Defendant whereby the said plaintiffs agreed to accept a stated sum of money as full and final settlement of their claims and the parties agreed to contra the settlement sums against the outstanding amounts payable by the purchasers to the developer: see para 24 of Defendant’s Affidavit-in-Support in Encl. 14 and Exhibit “N4” at pages 838 – 842 (pdf pages 465 – 469 in Encl. 16). [34] Relying upon two High Court decisions in Hedgeford v. Sri Gananatha [2018] 1 LNS 1497 and Leong Keng Chiong v. Prema Bonanza [2021] 1 LNS 569, the Plaintiffs argue that the settlement letters were invalid. In the oral submissions, the Plaintiffs produced an uncertified copy of the note of proceeding of the Court of Appeal’s recent decisions in Prema Bonanza case which seem to hold that a settlement letter cannot operate as estoppel against the purchaser’s rights to liquidated damages under the Schedule H Sale and Purchase Agreement. [35] In the Defendant’s counter-argument to the effect that the settlement letters were valid and binding, the Defendant relies upon the Court of Appeal’s decision in Oxbridge Height Sdn Bhd v. Abdul Razak Mohd Yusoff [2015] 2 CLJ 252 and the High Court decisions in Chua Chong Poh v. Kingsley Hills Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1452, Pinpoint Consortium (M) Sdn Bhd v. Mammoth Empire Sdn Bhd [2020] 10 MLJ 60 and Capitalcorp Securities v. Kweh Chen Seng [2002] 5 MLJ 699. In Pinpoint Consortium (M) Sdn Bhd v. Mammoth Empire Sdn Bhd, Wong Kien Keong J has referred to the various express provisions of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Actwhich facilitated and/or 12 encouraged amicable settlements of housing claims (including LAD claims) before the Housebuyers’ Tribunal and the enforcement of such settlements as awards of the tribunal before coming to the conclusion that amicable settlement of claims in connection with liquidated damages under the Schedule H Sale and Purchase Agreement is not prohibited or invalidated by the Act. Agreeing with such conclusion, this Court in PJD Landmarks Sdn Bhd v. Soh Jien Min & 16 Others [2022] CLJ 464 also highlighted the importance of compromise and settlements in dispute-resolution system and in the disposal of civil cases and the potential floodgates of holding that the post-completion settlement agreements are impliedly prohibited or invalidated by the Act and the potential risks, dangers and implications of holding such implied prohibition on all other disputes and claims which are based on other express statutory provisions of other statutes and/or on the implications of such ruling upon the consent judgments recorded in past cases of similar nature. Such concerns and complications would probably have to be resolved at the apex court of the country, as there appears to be conflicting decisions on this point of public importance to the housing industry. [36] In Oxbridge Height Sdn Bhd v Abdul Razak Mohd Yusof & Anor [2014] MLJU 1932 the Court of Appeal held:- ‘On a proper reading of this decision, we do not believe the Court of Appeal was totally excluding any question of waiver of LAD, especially conditional waiver. The Court of Appeal broached the possibility of compliance with a provision being excused by making a proper representation to the authorities. On the facts of this present appeal, this was exactly what transpired. The JPN was brought into the picture and kept fully appraised of the status of the housing project and the proposal of a settlement agreement to move the development forward to completion with a new completion date and a new date for calculating LAD. In the end, the property was completed and delivered to the respondents within the extended time. The developer also waived late payment interest. We have earlier alluded to cl. 2.5 which provided that in the event vacant possession was not delivered on “the new completion date in the manner provided in the principal agreement”, “the purchaser shall be at liberty to make a claim for the LAD as if this extension of time was not granted.” Thus, even in the settlement agreement there was no total contracting out of the LAD provision in the SPA. If delivery of vacant possession had not been delivered by the new completion 13 date, the respondents would have been at liberty to sue on the basis of the original LAD provision. We therefore found that on the peculiar facts of this appeal, there was no full contracting out and no situation where the purpose of the housing legislation being “to protect the weak against the strong” was ousted. In terms of policy, there should be nothing illegal in law for a Settlement Agreement to be negotiated with the full participation and direction from JPN with a view to save a failing housing project from being an abandoned project. It will be in the public interest, and in the interest of house buyers, if the law allowed a regulated settlement and waiver of LAD on terms as specified in the settlement agreement which was the subject matter of this appeal. It was therefore not right and proper for the respondents, despite their promise to conditionally waive LAD under the SPA, to resile from their promise and sue for late delivery under the SPA as if the settlement agreement did not exist.’ [37] The uncertified copy of the notes of proceedings in Prema Bonanza v. How Hoe Lim [Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. W- 02(IM)(NCVC)-1812-11/2020] and in Vignesh Naidu v. Prema Bpnanza [Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. W-02(IM)(NCVC)-880- 04/2021] seem to show that the Court of Appeal’s position that the settlement of LADs in relation to Schedule H Sale and Purchase Agreement is invalid and void under the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act. [38] In uncertified copy of the notes of proceedings in the Prema Bonanza cases, the Court of Appeal did not appear to have discussed or addressed the express provisions in sections of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act or the earlier Court of Appeal’s decision in Oxbridge Height Sdn Bhd v Abdul Razak Mohd Yusof & Anor [2014] MLJU 1932. [39] As the full grounds of judgment in the Court of Appeal’s decisions in Prema Bonanza cases have not been issued or provided to this Court and Plaintiffs are now relying on an uncertified copy of the notes of proceedings to argue on the Prema Bonanza cases and in light of the Court of Appeal’s full judgment in Oxbridge Height Sdn Bhd v Abdul Razak Mohd Yusof & Anor [2014] MLJU 1932 , this Court at this stage does not find this to be a clear case whether or not the post-completion settlement letters in our present case are valid compromise and settlement which extinguish the original causes of action or invalid agreements which are prohibited by the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act. In the 14 circumstances, this remains a triable issue or triable defence at this stage. [40] In the circumstances, this Court hold that the Defendant’s application for striking out the claims of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 15th Plaintiffs should be dismissed because there is a triable issue regarding the validity of the settlement letters and that application by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 15th Plaintiffs for summary judgment should also be dismissed because there is a triable defence regarding the validity of the settlement letters signed by them with the Defendant. Conclusion [41] In logic and reasoning, what is triable defence in the defendant’s application for striking out of the said plaintiffs’ claims by reason of the settlement letters is also a triable issue in the said plaintiffs’ application for summary judgment in the same suit as a result of the settlement letters. [42] In conclusion, this is not a clear and obvious case for summarily striking out the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 15th Plaintiffs’ claims in the present suit under O.18 r.19 in view of the triable issue on the validity or otherwise of the settlement letters. In the circumstances, the Defendant also has a triable issue regarding the settlement letters signed with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 15th Plaintiffs which therefore warrants the grant of leave to defend to the Defendant vis- à-vis these defendants. [43] In the premises, this Court has also come to the conclusion that the Defendant has no triable defence against the 5th , 7th to 14th, 16th and 17th Plaintiffs’ claims for liquidated damages in the present case as the 5th , 7th to 14th, 16th and 17th Plaintiffs did not sign any settlement letter or settlement agreement with the Plaintiff. [44] In conclusion, this Court held and ordered on 2 September 2022 that: (1) Part of the application in Enclosure 10 for summary judgment is allowed and the Defendant shall pay the following amounts to the respective Plaintiffs below-named: 15 Name of Plaintiffs Amount of LADs payable by the Defendant Ko Hooi Kwan [5th Plaintiff] RM78,054.53 Lim Jen Jen [7th Plaintiff] RM115,041.61 Pui Wee Kong [8th Plaintiff] and Ng Swee Luan [9th Plaintiff] RM142,756.98 Ling Hock Chon [10th Plaintiff] and Hoe Kim Wah [11th Plaintiff] RM93,380.46 Mawan Noor Aini binti Md Ismail [12th Plaintiff] and Fera Fizani binti Ahmad Fizri [13th Plaintiff] RM100,974.29 Lim Ching Yang [14th Plaintiff] RM132,795.80 Garry Chiang Pang Hong [16th Plaintiff] and Rachel Ruran Siran [17th Plaintiff] RM33,841.25 (2) Interests on the amounts stated in item (1) above at 5% per annum from the date of filing of this action (i.e.11.3.2022) to the date of full realisation; (3) The Defendants’ application for striking out in Enclosure 13 is dismissed with costs; (4) Costs of application in Enclosure 10 assessed at a combined amount of RM8,000, subject to allocator, shall be paid by the Defendant to the 5th , 7th to 14th, 16th and 17th Plaintiffs; and (5) Costs of application in Enclosure 13 assessed at a combined amount of RM6,000, subject to allocator, shall be paid by the Defendant to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 15th Plaintiffs. This Court also set the date for case management in respect of the preparation for trial of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 15th Plaintiffs’ claims in the action. 16 Dated this 26 September 2022. Signed ….............................................................. TEE GEOK HOCK JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM (NCVC 10) To the parties’ solicitors: 1. For the Plaintiffs : Wong Poh Yee Messrs K Y Soo (Kuala Lumpur) 2. For the Defendant : Enoveetha Bhaskaran Messrs Sree Harry & Co. (Petaling Jaya)