1. ) Teguh Wiramas Sdn Bhd v 1. ) Thien Seng Chan Sdn Bhd (WA-24C-147-11/2016 & WA-24C-164-12/2016)

The adjudication decision was improperly procured through fraud or bribery;

There has been a denial of natural justice;

The adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially; or

The adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction." [5] The Respondent said that it had at all times informed the Adjudicator that one YL Design Consultants which issued the Letter of Award dated 2.4.2013 ought to be made a party to the proceedings so 5 that YL Design Consultants can be questioned by the Plaintiff but this was denied by the Adjudicator. [6] The Claimant, as the unpaid party, had served its Payment Claim dated 14.4.2016 through its solicitors Messrs P.Y. Hoh & Tai to the Respondent. The Claimant had claimed for works amounting to RM 2,637,932.65 under Progress Claim No. 14 (RM1,885,189.50) and Progress Claim No. 15 (RM752,743.15) and 2.5% of the retention sum of RM 275, 494.56 (“retention sum”). [7] There was no Payment Response filed by the Respondent as the non-paying party. [8] In the Adjudication Response filed by the Respondent, it stated that Respondent had refused to pay Progress Claim 14 and Progress Claim 15 and the 2.5% retention sum as the Claimant had failed to produce a certificate from YL Design Consultants to justify the said claims. The Respondent also contended that there was no evidence from YL Design Consultants to confirm or authorize the payment of the said claims. [9] The Respondent also raised a set-off and counterclaim for costs of rectifying defects and also a claim for Liquidated and Ascertained Damages ("LAD") for what it alleged was delay in the Claimant 6 completing the works on time. The sum claimed for rectification costs was RM1,598,586.00 and that for LAD was RM1,710,000.00. [10] The Adjudicator had stated that he did not have the jurisdiction to hear the defence of set-off and the counterclaim of the Respondent as it was not raised in the Payment Response in that no Payment Response was filed. The Respondent argued that it is a breach of natural justice for the Adjudicator not to have considered the set-off and counterclaim raised as these were raised in the Adjudication Response. The Claimant in its Adjudication Reply served had raised its objection to the defence of set-off raised with respect to the claims for defective works and LAD claim as these were not raised in the Payment Response as it was not filed. [11] The Adjudicator had allowed the Claimant's claim as follows:

for Progress Claim No. 14 with an amount of RM1.888,043.93 due for payment on 24.4.2015;

(ii) for Progress Claim No. 15 with an amount of RM354.43 due for payment on 12.12.2015;

(iii) for Release of 2.5% Retention Sum with an amount of RM275,494.56 due for payment on 26.10.2015. 7 [12] The Adjudicator also awarded interest at 5.0% per annum on the sums above from their respective due dates to date of full payment, besides Adjudicator's fees, KLRCA's fees and party and party costs. [13] It was argued that as YL Design Consultants evidence is important in the Respondent's claim, it ought to have been called by the Adjudicator in the exercise of his powers under section 25 (g), (i), (k), (l) of CIPAA so that YL Design Consultants could be cross-examined by the Respondent. As the Adjudicator did not so exercise his powers, the Respondent submitted that natural justice was denied the Respondent and that the Adjudicator did not act independently or impartially. Principles Whether there was a breach of natural justice in the Adjudicator declining to consider the Respondent's set-off and counterclaim on ground that there was no Payment Response filed [14] The Adjudicator had understood his jurisdiction correctly in that it was conferred as well as circumscribed by the matters raised in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response as provided for under section 27(1) CIPAA which reads as follows: "27. Jurisdiction of Adjudicator 8

Subject to subsection (2), the adjudicator’s jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is limited to the matter referred to adjudication by the parties pursuant to sections 5 and 6." (emphasis added) [15] Thus in Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 728 it was observed as follows: "[12] ...as the adjudicator does not possess inherent jurisdiction, his jurisdiction is limited to the dispute raised under sections 5 and 6, i.e. the payment claim and the payment response. [13] ...The limits of jurisdiction of the adjudicator is a matter that is governed by law, i.e. s. 27 of CIPAA. ..." [16] In not filing a Payment Response, all it means is that the unpaid party in the Respondent is deemed to have disputed the Payment Claim. The burden is then on the unpaid party, who is the Claimant, to prove its claim. In disputing the claim in a case where no Payment Response is filed, the non-paying party cannot raise any positive defences of a set-off not raised in the Payment Response. [17] The Adjudicator's jurisdiction is not derived from the Adjudication Claim and the Adjudication Response or the Adjudication Reply. It does not stand to reason that a more prudent non-paying party is confined to 9 the matters raised in its Payment Response but that one that did not bother to serve a Payment Response on time may canvas every possible defence for so long as it is raised in its Adjudication Response! In WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v NS Bluescope Lysaght Malaysia Sdn Bhd & other case [2015] 1 LNS 1236 it was observed as follows: "[27] Subsection 27(1) restricts the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to the matters found in sections 5 and 6. In short, the Adjudicator takes jurisdiction from the payment claim and the payment response; not from the adjudication claim, adjudication response or even the adjudication reply. This is materially significant and important as this brings to bear the whole scheme of CIPAA 2012; that the adjudication proceedings is to deal with or resolve a payment dispute. That dispute is then referred to adjudication with the payment claim and payment response reduced into the formal forms as set out in sections 7 to 10." (emphasis added) [18] In View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 695, Mary Lim J (now JCA) examined section 27 of CIPAA and held as follows: 10 “[60] Subsection 27(1) limits the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction to the matters referred to adjudication pursuant to sections 5 and 6; namely the claims in the Payment Claim and the responses or defences in the Payment Response. This limitation is subject to subsection 27(2) which allows the parties to the adjudication to extend that jurisdiction by written agreement to matters beyond or outside sections 5 and 6. In the absence of such agreement, the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction does not extend to or include matters in the Adjudication Claim and the Adjudication

Response or even Adjudication Reply found in sections 9, 10 and It is obvious from subsections 27(1) and (2) that where the parties feel that the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction is insufficient to deal with their particular dispute; the parties can sit down and agree on extending that jurisdictional cover. In the present case, the parties could have dealt with this through a written agreement amongst themselves. There was no such effort; and the Court is not required to look into the reasons for the lack of such an effort. View Esteem could easily have brought up these three additional defences, responses or matters in its Payment Response; but it chose not, for whatever reason it may have. Having exercised that option, it is not open to View Esteem to now complain. 11 ... [63] Again, it is easy to appreciate why Parliament has seen it fit to limit the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction to only the matter(s) referred to adjudication pursuant to sections 5 and 6 when determining the dispute. Adjudication under CIPAA 2012 is both specific and special. It is specific in that it is intended only for payment disputes under construction contracts. It is special in that it offers a speedy provisionally binding resolution to that dispute. A payment dispute exists the moment a claim for payment for work or services rendered under a construction contract is not paid by the other party, or there is no response to that claim. In either event, the payment dispute comes into being or it “crystallises”. The whole adjudication process that takes place after that, from the appointment of the Adjudicator to the filing of the Adjudication Claim, the Adjudication Response and the Adjudication Reply are substantially formal manifestations of the dispute containing greater details of the claim, response or reply, as the case may be of that first Payment Claim and Payment Response. [64] Because adjudication is intended to provide a speedy resolution of that payment dispute [within the time lines found in 12 section 12, where an adjudication decision rendered outside the prescribed time lines is void unless extended by the written consent of the parties], the Adjudicator cannot be expected to deal with issues, legal and/or factual, which may still be “evolving” or in the making as the Adjudicator sits down to determine the dispute. Unrestricted arguments may unnecessarily prolong or even protract adjudication proceedings rendering the whole process impractical, inefficient or unwieldy. There should be certainty in the issues or matters that any party is expected to face in the adjudication proceedings so that the rules of fair play can be readily met. That cannot possibly be achieved if issues or matters are still or yet to be identified.” (Emphasis added) [19] Hamid Sultan JCA in the Court of Appeal in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2016] 6 MLJ 717, also adopts a similar view of section 27 of CIPAA. His Lordship stated as follows: “[16] Arriving at the CIPAA 2012 adjudication award is a two stage process. First stage is related to payment claim and payment response. Parties at this stage may settle the matter and if the matter is not settled. The dispute as borne out in the payment claim and response can only be referred to the adjudicator. This is statutorily a strict requirement (subject 13 only to section 26) as set out in section 27, thereby making the first stage as important stage in the adjudication process.” (emphasis added) [20] The Adjudicator was right in saying that he did not have jurisdiction to hear and consider the set off and counter claim for the Respondent– see paragraphs 54 (f) dan (g) of his Adjudication Decision. [21] The Respondent's learned counsel submitted that the Adjudicator’s decision to refuse to hear and consider the Respondent’s set off and counter claim is an error of law and the Respondent had been denied natural justice. With respect I must disagree. If the Adjudicator had proceeded to consider the defence of set-off and the counterclaim when these were not raised as no Payment Response was filed, he would have exceeded his jurisdiction and the Adjudication Decision would be liable to be set aside. [22] Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Adjudicator should have exercised his powers under section 26(1) CIPAA which allows him to consider the Plaintiff’s set off and counter claim. Section 26(1) and (2) read as follows: "(1) Subject to subsection (2), the non-compliance by the parties with the provisions of this Act whether in respect of time limit, form 14 or content or in any other respect shall be treated as an irregularity and shall not invalidate the power of the adjudicator to adjudicate the dispute nor nullify the adjudication proceedings or adjudication decision.

The adjudicator may on the ground that there has been non-compliance in respect of the adjudication proceedings or document produced in the adjudication proceedings—

Set aside either wholly or partly the adjudication proceedings;

Make any order dealing with the adjudication proceedings as the adjudicator deems fit; or

Allow amendment to be made to the document produced in the adjudication proceedings." (emphasis added) [23] The powers of an Adjudicator are to be exercised only in cases where he has jurisdiction. If he has no jurisdiction with respect to deciding a dispute before him, then it does not make sense to talk of his exercising his powers, be it to cure a non-compliance with any provision of the Act or to extend his jurisdiction which he does not have to begin with. 15 [24] More particularly, the powers are with respect to matters of "non-compliance in respect of the adjudication proceedings or document produced in the adjudication proceedings" as stated in section 26(2). [25] When then does an Adjudication proceeding commence? Under section 8 CIPAA on "Initiation of Adjudication", an Adjudication Proceeding is initiated with the service of a written Notice of Adjudication. Section 8 reads:

A claimant may initiate adjudication proceedings by serving a written notice of adjudication containing the nature and description of the dispute and the remedy sought together with any supporting document on the respondent. [26] Therefore if the Adjudicator's jurisdiction does not extend to consider the defence of set-off, then the Adjudicator cannot extend his own jurisdiction by extending the time for the Respondent to serve the Payment Response or to allow matters raised in the Adjudication Response in the form of the defence of set-off to be considered when it was not raised in the Payment Response in that no Payment Response was filed. [27] Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Adjudicator's powers may be extended under section 26 CIPAA. With 16 respect, I do not think so. It is only under section 27(2) CIPAA that his jurisdiction may be extended beyond the matters raised in the Payment Claim (section 5) and the Payment Response (section 6). Section 27(2) reads as follows: "27. Jurisdiction of Adjudicator

The parties to adjudication may at any time by agreement in writing extend the jurisdiction of the adjudicator to decide on any other matter not referred to the adjudicator pursuant to sections 5 and 6"(emphasis added) [28] There is a prescribed form to be used for this purpose in Form 10 of the KLRCA Adjudication Rules & Procedure. [29] An Adjudicator has vast powers under section 12(1) and section 25 of CIPAA with respect to the manner in which the arbitration proceedings should proceed. [30] Section 12(1) of CIPAA provides as follows: "The adjudicator shall conduct the adjudication in the manner as the adjudicator considers appropriate within the powers provided under section 25 " [31] It is not for this Court to set aside his Decision on the ground that had a certain procedure been followed, the Decision would have been 17 different. It is only when the exercise of his vast powers under section 25 CIPAA infringes the rules of natural justice or causes him to act in excess of his jurisdiction that this Court would interfere. The relevant powers complained of which the Respondent submitted he should have exercised in a certain manner are section 25(a),(g), (i), (k), (l) and (p) which read as follows: "25. Powers of the Adjudicator The adjudicator shall have the powers to—

Establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings including limiting the submission of documents by the parties;...

Conduct any hearing and limiting the hearing time;...

Inquisitorially take the initiative to ascertain the facts and the law required for the decision;...

Order interrogatories to be answered;...

Order that any evidence be given on oath;...

Extend any time limit imposed on the parties under this Act as reasonably required." 18 [32] The broad powers and discretion given to the Adjudicator under section 25 CIPAA are to aid and assist him in arriving at a fair and reasonable decision within the strict time frame prescribed. In Ranhill E & C Bhd v Tioxide (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd & Another cases [2015] 1 LNS 1435 Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) observed as follows: "[65] ...Subsection 12(1) provides that the adjudicator is to conduct the adjudication in the manner as the adjudicator considers appropriate within the powers provided under section

The adjudicator is conferred discretion as to how the adjudication is to be conducted. To assist the adjudicator in carrying out that responsibility, the adjudicator is endowed with certain unusual and arguably extensive powers which does not often see spelt out in other legislations ... [66] Section 25 provides the adjudicator with a long list of powers, that is, the power to:

establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings including the submission of documents by the parties ..." "[67] In other words, it is for the adjudicator to deal with how the adjudication proceedings are to proceed. This could include 19 the calling of meetings and whether there will be hearings including oral hearings where witnesses may or may not be called ..."(emphasis added) [33] The Respondent contended that as the consultant of the project, YL Design Consultants refused to cooperate with the Respondent, the Respondent was very much prejudiced in the filing of the Payment Response during the stipulated time period. It was further submitted that YL Design Consultants should have been made a party to the proceedings and that it should have been called by the Adjudicator so that it may be cross-examined by the Respondent. [34] This proposition is misconceived. It is for the un-paid party to decide on who it has to claim against with respect to its Payment Claim for "Payment" is defined in section 4 CIPAA as "a payment for work done or services rendered under the express terms of a construction contract." [35] Not any anyone can be brought in as a party to an adjudication under CIPAA but only the un-paid party and the non-paying party with respect to a Payment Claim as defined. The Adjudicator has no powers to add another party as a party to the Adjudication. 20 [36] Further an Adjudicator does not have the power to compel the attendance of any witness before him. There is no equivalent provision to that of section 29 the Arbitration Act 2005 that reads:

"Court assistance in taking evidence

Any party may with the approval of the arbitral tribunal, apply to the High Court for assistance in taking evidence.

The High Court may order the attendance of a witness to give evidence or, where applicable, produce documents on oath or affirmation before an officer of the High Court or any other person, including the arbitral tribunal." [37] The matter of evidence and witnesses are matters for the parties to prevail upon the Adjudicator and here, as the Adjudicator was of the view that the matters can be decided with reference to the documents filed, there was no need for him to hear witnesses. It has not been shown how there has been a breach of natural justice. [38] When one considers that the Respondent had not applied to the Adjudicator to conduct a hearing for the parties to be given the opportunity to cross examine the witnesses, one would have thought that the Respondent was satisfied and had no objection to the procedure indicated by the Adjudicator. Having not objected to the procedure 21 adopted by the Adjudicator, it is too late to object to it just 5 days before the deadline for the delivery of the Adjudication Decision. It is clearly an afterthought. [39] There is also no basis for the Respondent to allege that the Adjudicator had failed to act independently and impartially. The fact that the Adjudicator did not agree with the Respondent's position on the law is no proof that he had failed to act independently and impartially. Such an allegation should not be launched without some evidence pointing inexorably to a lack of independence or impartiality in the hearing and the delivery of the Adjudication Decision. [40] We do well to hearken to the dicta of Humphrey Lloyd J in the case of Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v. Mayor & Burgess London Borough of Lambeth Balfour [2002] Adj LR 04/12 where the following observations on a complaint of denial of natural justice in the adjudication proceedings was made: "29. Nevertheless, in my judgment, that which is applicable in arbitration is basically applicable to adjudication but, in determining whether a party has been treated fairly or in determining whether the adjudicator has acted impartially, it is very necessary to bear in mind that the point or issue which is to be brought to the attention of the parties must be one of which is either decisive or of 22 considerable potential importance to the outcome and not peripheral or irrelevant. It is now clear that the construction industry regards adjudication not simply as a staging post towards the final resolution of the dispute in arbitration or litigation but as having in itself considerable weight and impact that in practice goes beyond the legal requirement that the decision has for the time being to be observed. Lack of impartiality or of fairness in adjudication must be considered in that light. It has become all the more necessary that, within the rough nature of the process, decisions are still made in a basically fair manner so that the system itself continues to enjoy the confidence it now has apparently earned. The provisional nature of the decision also justifies ignoring non-material breaches. Such errors, if apparent (as they usually are), will be rectified in any negotiation and settlement based upon the decision. The consequence of material issues and points is that the dispute referred to adjudication will not have been resolved satisfactorily by any fundamental standard and the chances of it providing the basis for a settlement are much less and the chances of it proceeding to arbitration or litigation are much greater. However the time limits, the nature of the process and the ultimately non-binding nature of the decision, all mean that the standard required in practice is not 23 that which is expected of an arbitrator. Adjudication is closer to arbitration than an expert determination but it is not the same."(emphasis added) [41] Considerable restrain must be exercised when it is sought to be argued that there has been a breach of natural justice in trying to set aside an Adjudication Decision. The observation in Carillion Construction Limited v. Devonport Royal Dockyard Limited [2005] EWHC 778, by the English Court of Appeal resonates well with the experience of our Courts where invariably an attempt by a successful Claimant to enforce an Adjudication Decision is often met with an application to set aside the said Decision: "85. The objective which underlies the Act and the statutory scheme requires the courts to respect and enforce the adjudicator's decision unless it is plain that the question which he has decided was not the question referred to him or the manner in which he has gone about his task is obviously unfair. It should only be in rare circumstances that the courts will interfere with the decision of an adjudicator. The courts should give no encouragement to the approach adopted by DML in the present case; which (contrary to the DML's outline submissions, to which we have referred in paragraph 66 of this judgment) may, indeed 24 aptly be described as "simply scrabbling around to find some argument, however tenuous, to resist payment."

It is only too easy in a complex case for a party who is dissatisfied with the decision of an adjudicator to comb through the adjudicator's reasons and identify points upon which to present a challenge under the labels "excess of jurisdiction" or "breach of natural justice". It must be kept in mind that the majority of the adjudicators are not chosen for their expertise as lawyers. Their skills are as likely (if not more likely) to lie in other disciplines. The task of the adjudicator is not to act as arbitrator or judge. The time constraints within which he is expected to operate are proof of that. The task of the adjudicator is to find an interim solution which meets the needs of the case. Parliament may be taken to have recognised that, in the absence of an interim solution, the contractor (or sub-contractor) or his subcontractors will be driven into insolvency through a wrongful withholding of payments properly due. The statutory scheme provides a means of meeting the legitimate cash-flow requirements of contractors and their subcontractors. The need to have the "right" answer has been subordinated to the need to have an answer quickly. The scheme was not enacted in order to 25 provide definitive answers to complex questions. Indeed, it may be open to doubt whether Parliament contemplated that disputes involving difficult questions of law would be referred to adjudication under the statutory scheme; or whether such disputes are suitable for adjudication under the scheme. We have every sympathy for an adjudicator faced with the need to reach a decision in a case like the present.

In short, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the proper course for the party who is unsuccessful in an adjudication under the scheme must be to pay the amount that he has been ordered to pay by the adjudicator. If he does not accept the adjudicator's decision as correct (whether on the facts or in law), he can take legal or arbitration proceedings in order to establish the true position. To seek to challenge the adjudicator's decision on the ground that he has exceeded his jurisdiction or breached the rules of natural justice (save in the plainest cases) is likely to lead to a substantial waste of time and expense - as, we suspect, the costs incurred in the present case will demonstrate only too clearly." (emphasis added) 26 [42] The grounds for setting aside on a breach of natural justice and that the Adjudicator had failed to act independently and impartially have not been made out. The Adjudication Decision remains intact. Whether there should be a stay of the Adjudication Decision merely because the Respondent has filed a claim in Court against the Claimant [43] The Respondent said that as it has also filed an action against the Claimant and YL Design Consultants in KL High Court Civil Suit No: WA- 22C-92-12/2016. The subject matter of the Adjudication Decision in particular the Respondent's set off and counter claim and the wrongdoings of YL Design Consultants are included in that civil action. Learned counsel for the Respondent said that section 16(b) CIPAA has been satisfied and stay of the Adjudication Decision should be allowed till the disposal of the civil action in Court. Section 16(1) states as follows: “16. Stay of Adjudication Decision

A party may apply to the High Court for a stay of an adjudication decision in the following circumstances:

an application to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 has been made; or 27

the subject matter of the adjudication decision is pending final determination by arbitration or the court; [44] The fact that there is a pending arbitration or as in this case a litigation in court involving the same issues that had been decided by the Adjudicator does not mean that there should invariably be a stay of the Adjudication Decision. The fact of a litigation having been afoot is just a threshold condition and not determinative of a stay order. [45] If that were not so, then all that a Respondent need to do to avoid paying a Claimant pursuant to a successful Adjudication would be to just file a civil action in Court involving the same matters. It would be a backdoor way of stultifying the Adjudication Decision and stymieing the purpose of CIPAA which was designed to speed up the process of payment by principals to contractors for work done or services rendered, giving the construction industry its much needed cashflow, cascading down to those carrying out the works. [46] That cannot be right. Little wonder that in Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818, her Ladyship Mary Lim J (now JCA) argued forcefully that the Court would retain its discretion on stay of an Adjudication Decision and a stay would always be under exceptional circumstances only, having in mind always the purpose of CIPAA. Her Ladyship observed astutely as follows: 28 "[30] It is this court's view that in the exercise of discretion of whether to grant the stay or make an order for payment to the Director of KLRCA, the court must weigh into play in a fairly extensive way, the object of CIPAA; and that it is for a speedy disposal of a payment dispute. This is regardless of the fact that this is a payment dispute that arose in the final days of the construction contract, a point which the parties appear to have no issue with and there is no challenge in this respect anyway. Having gone through the hoops of adjudication, there is now decision in the defendant's favour. [31] This court is of the view that the defendant should not be deprived of the very benefit of why it resorted to adjudication in the first place; save if satisfactory reasons are present for a stay of that adjudication decision. [32] It is my further view that stay should only be granted in exceptional circumstances; and such circumstances must necessarily refer to the financial status of the other party. The merits of the case before the arbitration or the court; or even the chances of success in setting aside the adjudication decision are not relevant considerations. The grant of any stay must always weigh in the primary object of the CIPAA 29 2012; that it is to ensure a speedy resolution of a payment dispute; that it is to inject much needed cashflow into the contractual arrangements between parties that saw progressive payments of claims as the recognised and accepted way of doing business in construction contracts. It would be futile to encourage parties to resort to adjudication and then deprive a successful claimant of its claim by staying the access to the cash simply because there is another proceeding of the nature described in sub-s 16(1) which is pending. The whole concept of temporary finality would be lost and the object of the Act defeated if such was the consideration." (emphasis added) [47] Here in this case there is no evidence shown as to a reasonable apprehension that the Claimant would not be able to pay back should the Court find for the Respondent on the suit that has been commenced. There is no averment that if the Adjudication Sum is paid now then there is a reasonable fear that it would likely not be recoverable from the Claimant. Pronouncement [48] For the reasons given above, I had dismissed the Respondent/TSC's application to set aside the Adjudication Decision 30 and for stay of the Decision pending disposal of the civil action filed in this Court by the Respondent against the Claimant/Teguh Wiramas. [49] Correspondingly I allowed the Claimant's application to enforce the Adjudication Decision under section 28 CIPAA as if it is a judgment of the Court. [50] As both the applications were heard together, I had ordered the Respondent to pay the Claimant costs of RM10,000.00. Dated: 28 April 2017. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff in : OS WA 24C-147-11/2016 : Tan Chi Sian and for the Defendant in : (Messrs P.Y. Hoh & Tai) OS WA 24C-164-12/2016 : For the Plaintiff in : OS WA 24C-164-12/2016 : Patrick Dass and C W Chan and for the Defendant in : (Messrs Patrick Dass & Co) OS WA 24C-147-11/2016 :