(b) What is beneficial to the company as a whole was set out in the case of Greenhaigh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd and Others [1950] 2 ALL ER 1120 and adopted by the Federal Court in Paidiah Genganaidu v The Lower Perak Syndicate Sdn Bhd & Ors [1974] 1 MLJ 220 and it reads as follows: “Certain things, I think, can be safely stated as emerging from those authorities. In the first place, it is now plain that "bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole" means not two things but one thing. It means that the shareholder must proceed on what, in his honest opinion, is for the benefit of the company as a whole. Secondly, the phrase, "the company as a whole," does not (at any rate in such a case as the present) mean the company as a commercial entity as distinct from the corporators. It means the corporators as a general body. That is to say, you may take the case of an individual 'hypothetical member and ask whether what is proposed is, in the honest opinion of those who voted in its favour, for that person's benefit. I 12 think the thing can, in practice, be more accurately and precisely stated by looking at the converse and by saying that a special resolution of this kind would be liable to be impeached if the effect of it were to discriminate between the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders so as to give to the former an advantage of which the latter were deprived. When the cases are examined where the resolution has been successfully attacked, it is on that ground that it has fallen down. It is, therefore, not necessary to require that persons voting for a special resolution should, so to speak, dissociate themselves altogether from the prospect of personal benefit and consider whether the proposal is for the benefit of the company as a going concern. If, as commonly happens, an outside person makes an offer to buy all the shares, prima facie, if the corporators think it is a fair offer and vote in favour of the resolution, it is no ground for impeaching the resolution because they are considering the position of themselves as individual persons.” [Emphasis ours] [8] I have read the appeal record and the able submissions of the learned counsel. After much consideration to the learned counsel of the 2nd respondent and of the 1st respondent, I take the view that the appeal must be allowed and the decision of the Minister must be quashed. [9] In the instant case, the 2nd respondent has not furnished the required information to CCM for the Minister’s consideration. On this issue, the 1st and 2nd respondents submission were not adequate to enable me to decide on the bona fide issue. [10] The conduct of the 2nd respondent has led to an unreasonable decision in the Wednesbury’s sense to have been made by the Minister. Lord Greene MR in the often cited case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] 2 ALL ER 680 had this to say: 13 “For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to the matter that he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting "unreasonably".” [11] The law on judicial review has advanced from the subjective to that of the objective test. [See Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kuala Lumpur v Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors [2014] 6 CLJ 541]. Any reasonable tribunal properly appraised of the facts and law would not succumb to the 2nd respondent attempt to amend the Memorandum of Articles. In the landmark case of Merdeka University Berhad v Government of Malaysia [1982] 2 MLJ 243 (FC), Suffian LP had this to say: “It will be noted that section 6 used the formula "If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied etc." In the past such a subjective formula would have barred the courts from going behind His Majesty's reasons for his decision to reject the plaintiff's application; but, as stated by the learned Judge, administrative law has since so far advanced such that today such a subjective formula no longer excludes judicial review if objective facts have to be ascertained before arriving at such satisfaction and the test of unreasonableness is not whether a particular person considers a particular course unreasonable, but whether it could be said that no reasonable person could consider that course reasonable.” [12] For reasons stated above the appeal is allowed. The 1st respondent’s decision is quashed with a note that the majority have dismissed the appeal. The 2nd respondent to pay the costs to the 1st appellant. 14 I hereby order so. Dated: 15 September 2017 sgd (DATUK DR. HAJI HAMID SULTAN BIN ABU BACKER) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia. Note: Grounds of judgment subject to correction of error and editorial adjustment etc. Counsel for Appellant: Mr. Gan Khong Aik [with Ms Kang Mei Yee] Messrs. Gan Partnership Advocates & Solicitors Unit A-35-3A, Menara UOA Bangsar No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1 59000 Kuala Lumpur. [Ref: GKA/323937/16] Counsel for 1st Respondent : Tuan Mohamad Rizal bin Fadzil Peguam Kanan Persekutuan Jabatan Peguam Negara Putrajaya. 15 Counsel for 2nd Respondent : Mr. Wong Rhen Yen [with Mr. S. Raven, Mr. Ahmad Ezmeel & Ms Siti Nur Amirah Aqilah binti Adzman] Messrs S. Ravenesan Advocates & Solicitors No. 54-2, Jalan Telawi Bangsar Baru 59100 Kuala Lumpur. [ref: SR005A(16)(DJZ)(Judicial Review)-GL(RV-ADZ)]