Tey Chin Soon v Tey Chin Hong (JA-22NCvC-186-12/2024)

TEY CHIN SOON [NRIC No. : 850826-01-5059]

TEY CHIN HUI [NRIC No. : 821229-01-5808]

TEY CHIN PEI [NRIC No. : 841111-01-5018]

GAN MUI ENG @ GAN PIN [NRIC No. : 320710-01-5112 / 0067256) …PLAINTIFFS AND 18/12/2025 16:27:41

TEY CHIN HONG [NRIC No. : 880110-23-5467] (is sued in his personal capacity as well as the Administrator to the estate of TEY YU HING @ YU HING [NRIC : 520126-01-5267 / 4254728], deceased)

TAN YOOK HUA [NRIC No. : 520317-01-5200 / 4254336] …DEFENDANTS

This is Plaintiffs’ application for an order to wholly or partially strike out various paragraphs in Defendants’ Statement of Defence on the ground that such paragraphs, if allowed to remain, would prejudice the fair and expeditious determination of their claim. The Defendants object to the application, contending that they are entitled to reply and rebut the Plaintiffs' claim, as pleaded in Enclosure 1, which they argue is not straightforward and to put forward their defence and counterclaim.

Parties have filed written submissions and authorities in Enclosure 23 (Plaintiffs’ written submissions), 26 (Defendants’ written submission in reply) and 28 (Plaintiffs’ written submission in reply). Oral submissions were heard on 19 and 21 August 2025. The Court reserved its decision until 24 September 2025. The following are the Court decisions and the grounds therefor.

Plaintiffs and Defendants are family members. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd Plaintiffs and the 1st Defendant are siblings, and the 2nd Defendant is their mother, while the 4th Defendant is their grandmother (mother-in-law to the 2nd Defendant).

The relevant circumstances are these : On 11 May 2011, Tey Yu Hing @ Yu Hing (the deceased), the father of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Plaintiffs and 1st Defendant, as well as the husband of the 2nd Defendant and the only child of the 4th Defendant, went missing. On 30 July 2023, pursuant to the 2nd Defendant’s application, the High Court declared that the Deceased was presumed dead.

5.

on 8 November 2023, the High Court granted a Letter of Administration for the Deceased Estate to the 1st Defendant;

on 26 December 2023, the High Court issued a Distribution Order naming the 2nd Defendant as its sole beneficiary of the estate; and

The Affidavit in support of the application for the Letter of Administration and the list of beneficiaries only named the Defendants and the 3rd Plaintiff as beneficiaries.

Consequently, the Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking, among others—

declarations that the Letter of Administration and Distribution Order are null and void;

a re-hearing of the application for letters of administration to include the 1st, 2nd and 4th Plaintiffs as beneficiaries of the estate;

an order revoking the transfer of title in respect of the Deceased’s three properties; and

injunctive relief to restrain dealings with the Deceased’s movable assets.

In response, the Defendants filed their Defence and Counterclaim (via Enclosure 9). In essence, the Defence sets out the background of the strained family relationship, alleges that the Plaintiffs made no contribution to the family, and asserts that the 2nd Defendant had significantly contributed to the Deceased’s company and assets, thereby justifying the appointment of the 1st Defendant as administrator and the 2nd Defendant as sole beneficiary. In their Counterclaim, the Defendants seek confirmation of the orders already granted concerning the administration and distribution of the estate and the transfer of title. In the alternative, they claim monetary compensation for contributions and expenses incurred, and seek an injunction to preserve the 2nd Defendant’s ownership of the property, which they contend was neither part of the Deceased’s estate nor a gift from the Deceased.

The Plaintiffs, through Enclosure 15 and Affidavit in Support in Enclosure 16, apply to strike out wholly and partially various paragraphs in the Defendants’ statement of defence and counterclaim, which this Court summarise as below—

the whole paragraphs 5-12, 14-19, 38-42, 44,78,104,106, 127, 128, 129(d)(i),(d)(ii),(e)-(i); and

partial of paragraphs 94, 115(g), 115(i), 115(l) and 126. The Defendant strongly objected to this application.

Plaintiffs contend that the impugned averments have unnecessarily complicated their otherwise straightforward claim by raising matters that are time-barred, irrelevant, sub judice, bare or consisting of bare or false allegations and afterthought.

In general, Order 18 rule 19 Rules of the Court 2012 empowers the Court, at any stage of the proceedings, to strike out any pleading or part thereof on the following grounds—

it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be (see: Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United

it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious (see: Sivakumar a/l Varatharaju Naidu v Ganesan a/l Retanam [2011] 6 MLJ 70; Boey Oi Leong v. Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLRH 274; Mohamed Nazri Abdul Aziz v. Abu Samah Hj Wahab & 6 Ors [2005] 4 MLRH 655; Datuk Ir Che Amran Bin Mohd Yusoff v Yayasan Melaka & Ors [2003] MLJU 7);

it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action (see: Jega Jothy C Thiagarajah & Ors. v Shanmugam Ana

it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court (see: Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v. Wee Chong Jin [1998] 1 SLR 374; Malaysia Building Society Bhd V. Tan Sri General Ungku Nazaruddin Ungku Mohamed [1998] 1 MLRA 67).

The case law also sets a precedent for striking out parts of the pleading, such as in the case of Abdul Aziz Abdul Hamid & Yang Lain lwn. Perak Roadways Bhd [2006] 3 MLRH 840 and Hadi bin Hassan v Suria Records Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] 3 MLJ 522. Thus, this Court finds that Plaintiffs’ application for striking out of a particular portion of the Defendant's statement of claim and counter defence, whether wholly or partially, is not alien in nature.

The issue is whether the impugned averments fall within any of the categories under Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012 so as to warrant striking out. To answer this, the Court considered whether the Defendants’ specific defence and counterclaim, which the Plaintiff applied for striking out, disclosed no reasonable cause of action or defence / scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the Court?

This Court observation and finding are as follows—

paragraphs 5-12 and 14 stated two main facts which the Plaintiffs dispute:

the purported final wishes by the deceased to bequeath his properties to the 2nd Defendant, and

(ii) the 2nd Defendant’s monetary contribution to the deceased company, at the time that the deceased was still alive. Since the deceased went missing and was only presumed dead on 30 July 2023, the Defendant submitted that the 2nd Defendant is entitled to the proprietary estoppel and estoppel. Hence, the cause of action only arises when her rights have been affected or prejudiced, ie. in 2024 at the time when Plaintiffs change their mind on acknowledging her as the sole beneficiary of the properties. Thus, striking out these paragraphs, according to the Defendants, is equal to striking out the Defendants’ defence and counterclaim. This Court accepts the Defendants’ justification and declines to strike out these averments.

Paragraphs 15-21 concern PCM Home Service, the deceased company and the Properties Management and Cleaning Service Centre, which the 1st Defendant established in 2012. The Defendant assert that, with the 2nd Defendant’s contributions, these entities were used to sustain and support the Deceased’s company, thereby evidencing their contribution to the Deceased’s assets. This Court accepts the Defendants’ justification and declines to strike out these paragraphs;

Paragraphs 22-29 are averments on the strained relationship between the families, especially between the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Plaintiffs with the Defendants. The Court finds that these averments are scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious, and bear no probative value to the issues in dispute. Accordingly, they are struck out;

Paragraphs 38-42 and 115(G) concern personal familial matters which the Defendants allege motivated the Plaintiffs to withdraw their consent for the 2nd Defendant to be sole beneficiary of the estate. This includes reference to the intended sale of property at a higher price. The Court finds these allegations to be scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious, and unrelated to the main action. Further, the inclusion of the car purchased after the Deceased’s death is irrelevant, as it does not form part of the estate and no pleading alleges that estate funds were used. Similarly, the alleged missing safe box is a personal matter unconnected to the Plaintiffs’ claim. Both issues disclose no reasonable cause of action or defence;

Paragraph 44 and paragraph 115(i) relate to the establishment of a factory on the Deceased’s property and rental payments therefrom. As these matters arose after the Deceased’s death, they do not disclose any reasonable cause of action or defence and are struck out;

Paragraph 78 refers to two incidents:

the transfer of insurance proceeds received by the 2nd and 3rd Plaintiffs as nominees of the Deceased, and

(ii) repayment of the 3rd Plaintiff’s PTPTN loan allegedly settled by the Deceased. The Court finds both incidents to be scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious, and of no probative value to the trial;

Paragraph 104 is a reference to a letter dated 3 July 2024, which was in reference to the negotiations by the Defendants. The Court finds this averment discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence and strikes it out;

Paragraphs 106 and 115(l) relate to citations which were already determined by the Court on 6 November 2024. These issues are res judicata and cannot be reopened. They therefore carry no probative value and are struck out as scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious;

Paragraph 94 is Defendant's averment of their distrust to the Plaintiff. This Court finds such an averment scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious and of no relevance to the main claim;

Paragraphs 126, 127 and 128 concern expenses allegedly incurred by the Defendants in relation to the property. Whether these claims are time-barred is a matter to be determined at trial. They are therefore not struck out; and

Paragraph 129(d)(i), (ii), (e), (f), (g) and (i) form part of the Defendants’ counterclaims. The Court finds these are capable of proper determination at trial and accordingly declines to strike them out.

Based on the above, the Plaintiff’s application is allowed in part and dismissed in part, with the following orders—

the following paragraphs are struck out: 22-29, 38-42, 44, 78, 94, 106, 104, 115G, 115(i), 115(l);

The Plaintiff’s application is dismissed in respect of paragraphs 5-12, 14-21, 126, 127, 128 and 129(d)(i) and (ii), 129(e), 129(f), 129(g) and 129(i); and

cost RM 5,000, jointly and severally, subject to the allocator.

In addition to that, the rejoinder in Enclosure 17, which was filed without leave and out of time, is struck out and removed from the record of proceedings. Dated : 24 September 2025 Dr. Noradura binti Hamzah Judicial Commissioner High Court Civil 2 Johor Bahru Solicitor for the Plaintiff’s : Messrs Tan Vincent & Co. Solicitor for the Defendant’s : Messrs H.F Tan Law Chambers