Thuraisingam A/L Pitchay Marie v Cheah Ewe Huat (PA-11BNCvC-5-07/2025)

THURAISINGAM A/L PITCHAY MARIE (NO. K/P:531116-07-5729) (untuk dirinya dan mewakili estate bagi Agajothie a/l Pitchay Marie)

PUSPOM A/P PITCHAY MARIE (NO. K/P: 560112-07-5484) …PERAYU-PERAYU DAN CHEAH EWE HUAT (NO. K/P:550502-07-5093) …RESPONDEN (DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI GEORGETOWN DALAM NEGERI PULAU PINANG, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. PA-A72NCvC-51-02/2022 ANTARA CHEAH EWE HUAT (NO K/P:550502-07-5093) …PLAINTIF

THURAISINGAM A/L PITCHAY MARIE (NO K/P:531116-07-5729) 26/01/2026 08:54:40 PA-11BNCvC-5-07/2025 Kand. 37 Page 2 of 18 (untuk dirinya dan mewakili estate bagi Agajothie a/l Pitchay Marie)

PUSPOM A/P PITCHAY MARIE (NO K/P: 560112-07-5484) …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] This is an appeal by the Appellants against the decision of the Magistrate, whereby the Magistrate allowed the Respondent’s claim of vacant possession of the land known as Lot 2810, Seksyen 1, No. Hakmilik 31881, Bandar Tanjong Tokong, Daerah Timur Laut, Negeri Pulau Pinang (Land) be delivered to the Respondent. [2] The Appellants also filed a stay application pending the disposal of this appeal. [3] After hearing the appeal, this Court dismisses the appeal, and the stay application becomes academic. The reasons are as deliberated herewith. [4] For convenience, the respective parties shall be referred to as the Plaintiff and Defendants as they were at the Magistrate’s Court. The Appellants are referred to as the Defendants, and the Respondent is referred to as the Plaintiff. Page 3 of 18 BRIEF FACTS [5] On 29.09.2003, the Land, together with two (2) houses at No. 482 and 482A, MK 18, Jalan Tanjong Tokong, Georgetown, Penang, was transferred from Choi Kam Wah to Bukit Merdeka Sdn. Bhd. [6] Later, on 20.10.2010, Bukit Merdeka Sdn. Bhd., entered into a Tenancy Agreement with the First Defendant in respect of house No. 482 at a monthly rental of RM400.00 for a period of two (2) years from 15.10.2010 to 14.10.2012. [7] Following the expiry of the tenancy period, Bukit Merdeka Sdn. Bhd. has attempted to claim vacant possession of the Land and the houses from the First Defendant. However, the First Defendant has failed/refused to deliver vacant possession. [8] Therefore, Bukit Merdeka Sdn. Bhd. through Messrs. Subra Sumarni & Associates filed a legal action no. A72-23-03/2013 at the George Town Magistrate's Court against the First Defendant claiming vacant possession and a Default Judgment was entered against the First Defendant on 17.06.2013. [9] On 17.06.2016, through the Plaintiff's new solicitors, Messrs. A.G. Roseli & Paul, a Writ of Possession was filed to enforce the Default Judgment. [10] However, since Bukit Merdeka Sdn. Bhd. had transferred ownership of the Land to the Plaintiff on 28.06.2016, the Writ of Possession had to be withdrawn, and a notice of discontinuance was filed on 14.10.2016. Page 4 of 18 [11] It is undisputed that the Plaintiff is the registered owner of the Land and the houses since 28.06.2016. Therefore, the Plaintiff claims vacant possession and general damages for the Defendants' trespass on his Land. Parties Contention [12] The Defendants contended that they and their family have been residing at the premises known as No. 482 and No. 482A, MK 18, Jalan Tanjong Tokong, Georgetown, Penang, for more than sixty (60) years. [13] The Defendants further contended that on 8.8.2018, the Plaintiff personally commenced an Originating Summons at the Georgetown High Court seeking vacant possession of the Land. On 4.1.2019, the High Court dismissed the Originating Summons with costs, and no appeal was filed against that decision. Thus, the said High Court order remains valid, binding, and conclusive. [14] Subsequently, the Plaintiff initiated further proceedings at the Magistrates’ Court in 2020 against unnamed occupants of the Land. The Defendants were compelled to intervene, and the suit was eventually struck out with costs, which the Plaintiff appeals against. Although the appeal was allowed by the High Court, the writ action was later struck out, and the Plaintiff’s application for reinstatement was dismissed with costs. No appeal was filed against that dismissal. [15] The Defendants also referred to an ex-parte Originating Summons for a writ of distress filed by the Plaintiff on 28.10.2020, which was initially allowed but later overturned on appeal by the High Court with costs awarded to the First Appellant. Page 5 of 18 [16] On 15.2.2022, the Plaintiff filed a fresh writ action at the Magistrates’ Court, which Order granted on 9.7.2025 is hereby appealed. The Defendants contended that this action is founded on the same facts, involves the same subject matter, and seeks substantially the same reliefs as the earlier proceedings that had been dismissed. [17] The Defendants then contended that the Plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from relitigating issues which had already been conclusively determined by the High Court in 2019. They further asserted that the Plaintiff and Bukit Merdeka Sdn. Bhd. are effectively the same party, as the Plaintiff acted as the representative of the company and later became the registered proprietor. [18] The Defendants referred to the Court of Appeal cases of Chemfert Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lim Hua [2010] 5 MLJ 228 and Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 regarding res judicata. Reference was also made to the Federal Court case of Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 5 MLJ 1. [19] It is the Defendants’ contention that the Magistrate had erred in law and in fact when she failed to hold that the Plaintiff is caught by the principle of res judicata pursuant to the High Court Order dated 04.01.2019 (High Court Order), and thus barred or estopped from filing the suit at the Magistrates’ Court. [20] The Defendants also contended that they are not trespassers, that they have a right to remain in occupation pending lawful determination, and that the Magistrate erred in law and in fact in granting vacant Page 6 of 18 possession and allowing general damages for trespass without the Plaintiff having discharged the burden of proof or adduced evidence to support such damages. The Defendants then referred to the Federal Court case of Ann Joo Steel Bhd v Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Negeri Pulau Pinang & Anor and another appeal [2020] 1 MLJ 689. [21] Thus, the Appellant contended that the said High Court Order has become final and conclusive as there is no appeal against that order. The Order is therefore binding on all parties, in which the Defendants retain the right to hold over, and that the Defendants are not trespassers. [22] On the other hand, the Plaintiff contended that he is the registered proprietor of the Land, having been registered as the owner on 28.6.2016. [23] According to the Plaintiff, the Defendants were previously permitted to occupy the premises pursuant only to a Tenancy Agreement entered into between Bukit Merdeka Sdn. Bhd. and the First Appellant, which expired on 14.10.2012 and was never renewed. After the expiry of the tenancy, the Defendants continued to occupy the Land and houses without consent and without paying rent. [24] The Plaintiff also contended that earlier actions filed by Bukit Merdeka Sdn. Bhd. are distinct from the present suit here, as they were commenced by a separate legal entity before the transfer of ownership to the Plaintiff. He further contended that the Originating Summons filed in the High Court in 2018 was dismissed for procedural defects, not on the merits, and therefore does not give rise to res judicata. Page 7 of 18 [25] The Plaintiff asserted that the present suit in the Magistrate's Court is the only action in which he has proceeded to a full trial on the merits to determine whether the Plaintiff is entitled to vacant possession and damages for trespass against the Defendants. [26] The Plaintiff maintained that the Defendants have no legal or equitable interest in the Land, have no subsisting tenancy, or permission to occupy the premises, and have admitted that they do not pay rent. As such, the Plaintiffs contended that the Defendants are trespassers. [27] The Plaintiff further contended that the Learned Magistrate correctly found that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply as the said trial before the Magistrate Court was the only action that proceeded to a full trial and was disposed of on merits. Also, the Plaintiff contended that the finding of the Magistrate that the Plaintiff is not a vexatious litigant was correctly made. [28] Additionally, the Plaintiff highlighted that he is the registered proprietor of the Land, a fact not disputed by the Defendants. The Defendants’ contention regarding holding over is irrelevant in this case because no contracts were entered into between the Plaintiff and the Defendants. Moreover, it is the Defendants’ own admission that they are not paying rent to the Plaintiff. [29] With respect to damages, the Plaintiff contended that once trespass is established, general damages are recoverable, and that the Magistrate was correct in granting general damages subject to assessment to be determined in a separate application. Page 8 of 18 [30] The Plaintiff also contended that the suit is not time-barred under the Limitation Act 1953, as the action to recover the Land was commenced well within the statutory limitation period of twelve (12) years from the date the Plaintiff became the registered proprietor. [31] In conclusion, the Plaintiff contended that there is no error in fact and in law in the decision of the Magistrate and that no miscarriage of justice has occurred. Reference was made to the Court of Appeal case of MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Tan Bock Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd [2016] 2 MLJ 428 and the Federal Court case of Dream Property Sdn Bhd v. Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 MLJ 441. Decision of the Magistrate [32] It is the finding of the Magistrate that the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the Land, as registered on 28.6.2016. This fact was supported by documentary evidence, including the issue document of title and the private land search, which were not disputed by the Defendants. [33] On the issue of res judicata, the Magistrate held that the Plaintiff was not barred from instituting the present suit. The Magistrate found that the previous proceedings relied upon by the Defendants either involved different parties, enforcement proceedings, were dismissed on procedural grounds, or were disposed of without a full trial on the merits. Accordingly, none of those proceedings precluded the present action. The Magistrate in reaching such a finding was guided by the principle of res judicata as laid down in Chemfert Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Lim Hua [2010] 7 CLJ 491, where reference was made to the case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd. v. Kawal Teliti Sdn. Bhd. [1995] 3 CLJ 783. Page 9 of 18 [34] Further, the Magistrate rejected the Defendants’ contention that the Plaintiff was a vexatious litigant, with the finding that the filing of multiple proceedings alone did not amount to an abuse of process. It was held that the Plaintiff had merely invoked the appropriate legal avenues available at different stages to recover vacant possession of the Land and houses, and that such conduct did not constitute vexatious litigation. [35] Next, in determining whether the Plaintiff was entitled to vacant possession or otherwise, the Learned Magistrate relied on the principle of indefeasibility of title, and referred to Section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 which provides that-

Registration to confer indefeasible title or interest except in certain circumstances

The title or interest of any person or body for the time bring registered as proprietor of any land, or in whose name any lease, charge or easement is for the time being registered, shall, subject to the following provisions of this section, be indefeasible.

The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible:

in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy;

where the registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient or void instrument; or

where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written law. [36] Thus, holding that the Plaintiff’s status as registered proprietor and the absence of any legal right on the part of the Defendants to remain in occupation, the Magistrate held that the Plaintiff was entitled to immediate vacant possession of the Land together with the houses erected thereon. Page 10 of 18 The defence of holding over was neither properly pleaded nor supported by evidence, and in any event was inapplicable in the absence of any tenancy relationship with the Plaintiff. [37] Further, based on the evidences including the testimony of the First Defendant, the Magistrate found that the Defendants had not paid any rent since the expiry of the tenancy and continued to occupy the premises despite knowing that the Plaintiff was the registered owner. [38] The Magistrate further found that the Defendants were trespassers, as they occupied the premises without lawful authority, consent, or payment of rent after the expiry of the tenancy and after the transfer of ownership to the Plaintiff. [39] In relation to damages, the Magistrate Court found that the Plaintiff had been deprived of the use and enjoyment of the Land and houses since 28.6.2016 as a result of the Defendants’ trespass. Accordingly, the Court allowed the Plaintiff’s claim for general damages for trespass, subject to a separate assessment. [40] Further, on the issue of limitation and laches, the Magistrate held that the Plaintiff had not slept on his rights. The Magistrate Court found that the present action was commenced within the statutory limitation period, and that the Plaintiff had taken steps to assert his rights after becoming the registered proprietor. The defence of limitation and laches was therefore rejected as Section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 is applicable. Page 11 of 18 [41] The Magistrate then allowed the Plaintiff’s claim for vacant possession, general damages for trespass, subject to assessment, and awarded costs in favour of the Plaintiff. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Appellate Intervention [42] The “plainly wrong” test applies when determining whether an appellate Court should intervene in a lower court's decision. The “plainly wrong” test means when the “learned trial Judge had gone plainly wrong … in the sense that it could not reasonably be explained or justified and so was one which no reasonable Judge could have reached.” (See: Tengku Dato' Ibrahim Petra bin Tengku Indra Petra v Petra Perdana Bhd & Another Appeal [2018] 2 MLJ 177; [2018] 2 CLJ 641; [2018] 1 AMR 517; [2018] 1 MLRA 263 (FC), Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator Of The Estates Of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67; [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 8 AMR 227; [2020] 6 MLRA 193 (FC), Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1; [2004] 4 CLJ 309; [2004] 6 AMR 781; [2004] 2 MLRA 1 (FC). [43] Moreover, in Beldeu Singh v Dr. Kenneth Andrew [2009] 1 LNS 659; [2009] 5 MLRA 362; [2011] 4 MLJ 769, the Court of Appeal held- “[18] We are mindful of the fact that an appellate court does not have the audio visual advantage which the trial court has, in seeing, hearing and assessing the witnesses at the trial. Hence, an appellate court is not likely to reverse or depart from the trial judge's finding save where he has misdirected himself” [44] In this regard, the Magistrate in her grounds of judgment, stated in length on res judicata, citing her reasons as- Page 12 of 18 [66] Berdasarkan kepada kes yang dirujuk di atas, beralih kepada fakta-fakta tindakan ini, tindakan-tindakan yang telah difailkan sebelum ini adalah seperti berikut-

Writ Saman bertarikh 5.3.2013 dan Pernyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 4.3.2013 terhadap Defendan Pertama di Mahkamah Majistret Georgetown (kes no. A72-23-03/2013) untuk antara lain, menuntut sewa tertunggak dan diberikan milikan kosong premis beralamat di No. 482, Mukim 18, Jalan Tanjong Tokong, 10470 Pulau Pinang. Penghakiman lngkar Kehadiran bertarikh 17.6.2013 telah difailkan oleh Syarikat tersebut terhadap Defendan Pertama;

(ii) Pada sekitar tahun 2016, syarikat tersebut telah memfailkan Writ Milikan no. PA-76-67-06/2016 di Mahkamah Majistret Georgetown terhadap Defendan Pertama ke atas rumah No. 482 tersebut berdasarkan Penghakiman Mahkamah Majistret Georgetown bertarikh 17.6.2013;

(iii) Pada atau sekitar 8.8.2018, Plaintif telah memfailkan Saman Pemula No. PA-24NCvC-679-08/2018 di Mahkamah Tinggi Georgetown di bawah Aturan 89 terhadap Defendan Pertama dan adik mendiang beliau, Agajothie a/I Pitchay Marie sebagai penceroboh ("trespassers") seperti di Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini.

(iv) Pada atau sekitar 4.3.2020, Plaintif telah memfailkan tindakan Writ Saman No. PA-A72NCvC-77-03/2020 di Mahkamah Tinggi Georgetown.

Pada atau sekitar 28.10.2020, Plaintif telah memfailkan tindakan untuk distres melalui Saman Pemula (ex-parte) No. PA-A74-315-10/2020 di Mahkamah Majistret Georgetown terhadap Defendan Pertama bagi menahan semua harta alih di premis yang beralamat di No. 482, MK 18, Jalan Tanjong Tokong, 10470 Georgetown, Pulau Pinang. [67] Mahkamah mendapati berkenaan tindakan pertama iaitu di (i) perenggan [66] di atas, Plaintif adalah tidak dihalang oleh prinsip res judicata atas sebab-sebab tersebut-

Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif dalam tindakan tersebut adalah bukan Plaintif dalam tindakan ini. Plaintif dalam tindakan tersebut adalah Syarikat Bukit Merdeka Sdn. Bhd.

(ii) Selain itu, Mahkamah mendapati tindakan tersebut dibawa atas kapasiti sebagai penyewa berdasarkan perjanjian penyewaan yang ditandatangai oleh syarikat tersebut dan Defendan Pertama dalam tindakan ini.

(iii) Mahkamah mendapati Penghakiman tersebut juga bukan selepas perbicaraan penuh malah Penghakiman dalam tindakan tersebut merupakan Penghakiman lngkar Kehadiran.

(iv) Selanjutnya, Mahkamah mendapati pemindahan diantara Plaintif dalam tindakan ini dengan syarikat tersebut masih belum berlaku pada ketika itu. lni adalah kerana tindakan No. A72-23-03/2013 tersebut difailkan pada 5.3.2013 dan pemindahan tanah tersebut adalah pada 28.6.2016. Oleh itu, tidak mungkin untuk Plaintif dalam tindakan ini membawa tindakan guaman seperti yang difailkan disini pada tahun 2013. [68] Mahkamah mendapati berkenaan tindakan kedua iaitu di (ii) perenggan [66] di atas, Plaintif adalah tidak dihalang oleh prinsip res judicata atas sebab-sebab tersebut-

lni merupakan tindakan Writ Distres dan bukan tindakan guaman sivil. Tindakan Writ Distres ini difailkan oleh syarikat tersebut untuk pelaksanaan Penghakiman yang direkodkan dalam kes A72-23-03/2013.

(ii) Namun, Mahkamah mendapati tindakan Writ Distres ini telah diberhentikan akibat pembubaran syarikat tersebut pada ketika itu.

(iii) Mahkamah mendapati syarikat tersebut tidak dapat meneruskan dengan pelaksanaan jika syarikat tersebut telah dibubarkan. Atas sebab tersebut, tindakan Writ Dsitres ini telah diberhentikan. [69] Mahkamah mendapati berkenaan tindakan ketiga iaitu di (iii) Page 14 of 18 perenggan [66] di atas, Plaintif adalah tidak dihalang oleh prinsip res judicata atas sebab-sebab tersebut-

Tindakan ini merupakan Saman Pemula yang difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Georgetown di bawah Aturan 89 terhadap Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua seperti dalam tindakan ini.

(ii) Pada 4.1.2019, Mahkamah Tinggi Georgetown telah menolak keseluruhan Saman Pemula tersebut dengan kos sebanyak RM5,500.00.

(iii) Defendan-Defendan mengatakan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengatakan bahawa Defendan-Defendan memegang hak sebagai "holding over" dan bukan penceroboh "trespassers". Namun, setelah meneliti kertas-kertas kausa yang difailkan, tiada bukti dikemukakan oleh Defendan-Defendan yang menunjukkan perintah seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Defendan-Defendan di atas.

(iv) Selain itu, setelah meneliti hujahan bertulis Defendan di lkatan D, muka surat 1 hingga 6, Mahkamah mendapati isu-isu yang dibangkitkan dalam hujahan tersebut adalah bahawa permohonan ini adalah defektif atas alasan Defendan Kedua merupakan ahli keluarga yang tidak terlibat dalam prosiding tersebut. Selain itu, Defendan-Defendan telah berhujah bahawa prosedur yang digunakan oleh Plaintif adalah tidak betul kerana Aturan 89 tidak sepatutnya digunakan untuk perjanjian yang telah tamat.

Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa penolakkan Saman Pemula ini adalah disebabkan prosedur yang tidak teratur dan atas alasan bahawa permohonan tersebut adalah defektif. [70] Mahkamah mendapati berkenaan tindakan keempat iaitu di (iv) perenggan [66] di atas, Plaintif adalah tidak dihalang oleh prinsip res judicata atas sebab-sebab tersebut-

Mahkamah mendapati ini merupakan tindakan guaman sivil yang telah difailkan seperti tindakan guaman ini tetapi tindakan ini tidak pernah dibicarakan.

(ii) Pembatalan tindakan telah dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Majistret. Tetapi setelah rayuan difailkan ke Mahkamah Tinggi, Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan rayuan tersebut dan kembalikan tindakan ke Mahkamah Majistret untuk dibicarakan.

(iii) Perbicaraan tersebut tidak diteruskan dan tindakan tersebut telah dibatalkan tanpa Mahkamah mendengar merit kes tersebut. [71] Mahkamah mendapati berkenaan tindakan kelima iaitu di (v) perenggan [66] di atas, Plaintif adalah tidak dihalang oleh prinsip res judicata atas sebab-sebab tersebut-

Tindakan ini sekali lagi merupakan tindakan untuk distres melalui Saman Pemula untuk tunggakan sewa tertunggak.

(ii) Tindakan ini difailkan dengan menggunakan Perjanjian Penyewaan bertarikh 20.10.2010

(iii) Pengutipan sewaan tertunggak adalah dari 28.6.2018 hingga 28.10.2020.

(iv) Rayuan tindakan ini adalah berkenaan pentafsiran Akta Covid berkenaan dengan sewaan tertunggak. [72] Atas sebab-sebab yang dijelaskan di atas, Mahkamah mendapati Plaintif adalah tidak dihalang oleh prinsip res judicata memandangkan sebelum tindakan ini difailkan, dibicarakan dan dilupuskan oleh Mahkamah ini, tiada apa-apa presiding selain tindakan ini dimana Mahkamah telah memberikan Penghakiman atas kausa tindakan seperti ini.” [45] The Magistrate further decided that- [89] Berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan yang dirujuk di atas, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Defendan-Defendan bersetuju bahawa Plaintif rnerupakan pernilik berdaftar tanah tersebut, Page 16 of 18 Defendan-Defendan rnenduduki rurnah-rurnah tersebut tanpa rnernbayar sebarang sewa dan Defendan-Defendan rnenuntut parnpasan daripada Plaintif untuk beliau pindah keluar dari tanah dan rurnah-rumah tersebut ke ternpat yang lain (narnun tiada tuntutan balas difailkan dalarn tindakan ini). [97] Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa benar Defendan-Defendan telah tinggal di sana tanpa membayar sebarang sewa kepada Plaintif walaupun mengetahui bahawa Plaintif merupakan pemilik berdaftar tanah dan rumah-rumah tersebut. [98] Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa Defendan-Defendan tidak mempunyai sebarang lesen atau kebenaran untuk menghuni tanah tersebut kecuali perjanjian sewa yang dimasuki di antara syarikat Bukit Merdeka dan Defendan Pertama pada 15.10.2010 bagi tempoh dua (2) tahun bagi rumah no 482 sahaja. Tempoh sewa tersebut telah pun tamat pada 14.10.2012 dan tidak diperbaharui. Tiada perjanjian sewa bagi rumah no 482-A. Sejak 15.10.2012 (tamat tempoh sewa dengan Defendan Pertama) sehingga 28.6.2016 (tarikh pindah milik tanah kepada Plaintif), Defendan Pertama telah sahkan tiada bayaran sewa dan tiada lanjutan tempoh sewa dengan syarikat Bukit Merdeka. [99] Plaintif tidak pernah bersetuju untuk menyewa tanah atau rumah-rumah tersebut. Plaintif juga tidak pernah memberikan kebenaran atau lesen kepada Defendan-Defendan untuk menghuni atau terus menghuni tanah dan rumah-rumah tersebut sejak didaftar sebagai pemilik berdaftar. [100] Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati adalah jelas bahawa Defendan-Defendan merupakan penceroboh tanah tersebut.” [46] Upon perusal of all the documents pertaining to the appeal and the grounds of judgment of the Magistrate, as well as the written submissions of both learned counsels, this Court is satisfied that it is not necessary to interfere with the Magistrate’s decision. This Court is of the considered view that there is no error of law and fact in the decision of the Magistrate. Page 17 of 18 CONCLUSION [47] Accordingly, under O. 55 of ROC, this appeal is by way of a rehearing, and this Court has assessed and weighed all the evidence and laws placed before this Court in its entirety. In this regard, for all the reasons aforesaid, this Court finds that there is no merit in the appeal to warrant appellate intervention (See Ong Leong Chiou v. Keller (M) Sdn Bhd (FC) [2021] 4 MLRA 211; [2021] 3 MLJ 622; [2021] 4 CLJ 821, Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra Tengku Indra Petra v. Petra Perdana Berhad & Another Case (FC) [2018] 1 MLRA 263; [2018] 2 MLJ 177; [2018] 2 CLJ 641, Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng & Ors (FC), [2020] 12 MLJ 67; [2020] 6 MLRA 193 and MMC Oil & Gas Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Tan Bock Kwee & Sons Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLRA 144; [2016] 2 MLJ 428; [2016] 4 CLJ 665). [48] Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the decision of the Magistrate is affirmed and ordered accordingly. Dated: 24 January 2026 -SGD- (SUZANA BINTI MUHAMAD SAID) Judicial Commissioner of The High Court OCVC 2 Pulau Pinang Page 18 of 18 For the Appellants : Dato' Tharumarajah and Tan Jia Jun Messrs. T Tharuma & Assoc For the Respondent : Vimalan Messrs. A G Roseli & Paul