Court DecisionMY-HC

WA-22NCvC-335-05/2021

Tiong Wang Hock v Sin Kim Kuan (WA-22NCvC-335-05/2021)

High Court of Malaysia28 Nov 2025

The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.

Open official source PDF Report an issue

Outcome

What the court ordered

Encl.
1.
8.6.2021 D9 Notice of Discontinuance 13 2.
2.11.2021 D2 Judgment in Default 95 3.
2.11.2021 D7 Consent Judgment 122
4.
25.11.2021 D3, D8, D12, D14, D15 Notice of Discontinuance 116 5.
25.11.2021 D13 Judgment in Default 114 6.
25.11.2021 D20 Consent Judgment 136
The Plaintiffs commenced this trial against the remaining 10 Defendants as follows: Defendants/Witness Names 1 D1 (DW1) Sin Kim Kuan 2 D4 (DW6) Lau Yien Toh 3 D5 (DW2) Teoh Eng Wah 4 D6 (DW4) Liew Si Moy 5 D10 (DW5) Lim Chung Phin 6 D11 (DW7) Amy Loi Rong Rong 7 D16 (DW9) Tan Chai Tong 8 D17 (DW10) Ooi Tooi Seah 9 D18 (DW11) Tan Keit Lee 10 D19 (DW3) Gan Yu Chai 11 DW8 Wendy Loi Ting Ting
The Issues To Be Tried (Encl. 149) filed by the respective parties are as follows: Plaintiffs’ Issues
Whether the Plaintiffs are the transferors and/or payors of the amounts to the respective Defendants and/or into the bank accounts of and/or held by the respective Defendants as stated in Annexure A of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021.
Whether the First Plaintiff and/or Second Plaintiff had made a cash deposit into the bank accounts of the 4th Defendant and 11th Defendant as stated in Annexure B of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021.
Whether the Defendants knew and/or had a relationship and/or had dealings (whether by contract or otherwise) with the Plaintiffs.
Whether there was any consideration given by the Defendants for the receipt of money in their respective bank accounts as stated in Annexure A and B of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021.
Whether the retention of monies by the Defendants in their bank accounts as stated in Annexure A and B of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021 is an unjust enrichment by the Defendants.
Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution for the monies paid and/or transferred to the Defendants as stated in Annexure A and B in the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021.
Whether the Defendants have dishonestly assisted in the fraud by Loi and/or had received the monies with knowledge that they were not entitled to receive the said monies and/or that they did not give any consideration for the receipt of the said monies.
Whether the retention of the monies by the said Defendants is unconscionable.
Whether the Defendants’ are holding the monies as stated in Annexure A and B of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021 as constructive trustees for the Plaintiffs. The 1st, 5th and 19th Defendants’ Issues
Whether the 1st Defendant and the 5th Defendant had no knowledge in relation to the purpose of arrangements made by Loi Hieng Hung on the bank accounts held by the 1st and 5th Defendant.
Whether the 1st Defendant and 5th Defendant never spent the monies received from the Plaintiffs into their bank accounts.
Whether or not there was personal interest and/or benefit obtained or received by the 1st Defendant and 5th Defendant on the monies deposited by the Plaintiffs into the bank account of the 1st and 5th Defendant.
Whether the 1st Defendant and 5th Defendant were merely recipients of payments made by the Plaintiffs and all the monies deposited by the Plaintiffs into their bank accounts were proceeds to Loi and not the 1st Defendant and 5th Defendant.
Whether the 19th Defendant gave a friendly loan of RM550,000.00 by cash to Loi Hieng Hung.
Whether the monies deposited by the Plaintiffs to the 19th Defendant’s bank account as arranged by Loi Hieng Hung was a repayment of loan monies from Loi Hieng Hung to the 19th Defendant.
Whether the 19th Defendant is entitled to retain the monies received from the Plaintiffs with consideration given to Loi Hieng Hung.
Whether the Plaintiff’s cause of action against the Defendants is tainted by illegality where the Plaintiffs distributed, carried out and/or were involved in an illegal investment in breach of the law together with Loi Hieng Hung. The 4th and 11th Defendants’ Issues
Whether the 4th and 11th Defendants or Loi had received the money which was purportedly transferred and/or paid into the 4th and 11th Defendants’ bank accounts.
Whether the Plaintiffs knew that Loi had received the money purportedly transferred and/or paid into the 4th and 11th Defendants’ bank accounts. The 6th and 10th Defendants’ Issues
Whether the Defendants received the monies with the knowledge that they were not entitled to receive the said monies.
Whether the 6th and 10th Defendants provided services to Loi Hieng Hung and as consideration, Loi Hieng Hung had caused monies to be deposited from third party (including the Plaintiffs) into the 6th and 10th Defendants’ accounts.
Whether the Plaintiffs knew and/or carried out and/or were involved in illegal activities in all arrangements between the Plaintiffs with Loi Hieng Hung.
Whether the Plaintiffs have come to this Court with clean hands.
Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs claimed against the 6th and 10th Defendants.
Whether the Plaintiffs action against the 6th and 10th Defendants are a back-door attempt and/or abuse of Court process to obtain the Plaintiffs’ investment monies and/or to cover the Plaintiffs’ losses and/or damages. The 16th, 17th and 18th Defendants’ Issues
Whether the Plaintiffs had acted negligently, recklessly and/or with greed in depositing their money into the bank accounts of the 16th to 18th Defendants whom they did not have any relationship and/or know?
Whether the 16th to 18th Defendants can be liable purportedly for unjust enrichment when and/or at the time all the money deposited in their bank accounts were actually and/or in fact withdrawn and used and/or enjoyed by the said Loi himself? Evidence adduced by witnesses
The following witnesses of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants testified in Court and their evidence are reflected in the Notes of Proceedings as reflected in the Table below: P/D Witness Name of Witness NOP Encl. (Date) NOP PDF Pages
P1 PW1 Tiong Wang Hock 208 (7.4.2025) 209 (8.4.2025) 10 – 170 7 – 126 2. P2 PW2 Sylvester San Mun Kin 209 (8.4.2025) 210 (9.4.2025) 127 – 159 5 – 17 3. - PW3 Tiong Choo Miau 210 (9.4.2025) 18 – 72 4. D1 DW1 Sin Kim Kuan 210 (9.4.2025) 74 – 95 5. D5 DW2 Teoh Eng Wah 210 (9.4.2025) 98 – 118 6. D19 DW3 Gan Yu Chai 210 (9.4.2025) 119 – 128 7. D10 DW4 Lim Chung Phin 211 (10.4.2025) 7 – 21 8. D6 DW5 Liew Si Moy 211 (10.4.2025) 21 – 30 9. D4 DW6 Lau Yien Toh 211 (10.4.2025) 33 – 53 10. D11 DW7 Amy Loi Rong Rong 211 (10.4.2025) 54 – 65 11. - DW8 Wendy Loi Ting Ting 212 (29.4.2025) 5 – 12 12. D16 DW9 Tan Chai Tong 212 (29.4.2025) 13 – 22 13. D17 DW10 Ooi Tooi Seah 212 (29.4.2025) 22 – 28 14. D18 DW11 Tan Keit Lee 212 (29.4.2025) 28 – 39 Salient Facts
The Plaintiffs are the transferors and/or payors of the total sum of RM5,236,238.00 to the respective Defendants and/or into the bank accounts that are and/or were held by the Defendants respectively. Correspondingly, the Defendants are and/or were the respective account holders and/or recipients of the amounts that were transferred/paid by the Plaintiffs respectively. (PW1 Q3; PW2 Q4)
The reason for the transfers/payments by the Plaintiffs was because sometime in May 2015, the 1st Plaintiff was approached by Loi in respect of a potential investment relating to the outsourcing of foreign labour for company/companies in Penang and which Loi claimed the 1st Plaintiff would be entitled to 50% to 100% of the profits from the Investment. (PW1 Q4 and Q5)
Following that, between the period of around 2015 to around 2021 in which the various transactions by the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs were made, the 1st Plaintiff had inquired with Loi in respect of the Investment. At all material times, Loi gave various excuses in respect of the purported Investment and spun stories regarding the involvement of other purported individuals involved with the names “Wu”, “Datuk” and “Tan Sri”. (PW1 Q8 and B10 pp 8-49, 50-147)
Sometime in February 2021, the 1st Plaintiff again inquired as to the profits pertaining to the investment. However, he was met with the same excuses. Dissatisfied with the responses, the 1st Plaintiff pressed the issue further with Loi and this was when the 1st Plaintiff was informed that the Investment did not exist, and that it was a part of a fraud. The 1st Plaintiff then discovered that Loi, Wu, Datuk and Tan Sri are all the same person. (PW1 Q8, B10 pp 150-151)
Upon discovery of the fraud, the 1st Plaintiff made a police report on 24.2.2021 where he had, amongst others, stated the following:
That the 1st Plaintiff made his first payment for a sum of RM500,000.00 to Loi via cash in relation to the said investment, and this was done at Ampang Point.
From 2015 to around 2021, the Plaintiffs had made hundreds of transactions to most of the above-named Defendants. (B1 pp 282-284 and PW1 Q9)
18.
On 24.4.2021, the 1st Plaintiff made another police report stating, inter alia, that he had made cash deposits to the bank accounts of D4 and D11. (B1 pp 285-287 and PW1 Q9)
On 19.4.2021, the Plaintiffs conducted a bankruptcy search which verified that Loi Hieng Hung was a bankrupt. (B9 p 5; PW1 Q10)
On 2.6.2021, the Plaintiffs applied for leave to commence proceedings against Loi Hieng Hung as he was a bankrupt. Leave was obtained via High Court Order on 6.9.2021. (B2 pp. 6-300, 343-344, and PW1 Q10) Plaintiffs’ Submissions (Encl. 221 and 248)
In relation to D1 (Sin Kim Kuan):
D1 was indeed enriched by the very fact that her bank accounts (Maybank 108038991805; Hong Leong 14150131258; RHB Bank 15825300069038) received the total sum of RM1,040,568.00. This fact was admitted in D1’s Defence. D1 further agreed during cross-examination that there was no documentary evidence before the Court showing she ever denied receiving RM1,040,568.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. (BOP A p. 93 para. 3, NOP p. 79, B9 pp 185-279 and 315)
In relation to D5 (Teoh Eng Wah):
D5 was enriched as his bank account (Maybank 107050006654) received RM230,600.00 from the Plaintiffs. This fact was admitted by D5 in his Defence. (BOP A p.103, NOP p. 100 and PW1 Q5)
In relation to D19 (Gan Yu Chai):
D19 was enriched by the fact that his bank account (Affin Bank 200190045270) received a total sum of RM548,480.00 from the Plaintiffs. This was an admitted fact in D19’s Defence. (BOP A p. 112, PW1 Q5, PW2 Q4)
In relation to D10 (Lim Chung Phin):
D10 was enriched as his bank account (Public Bank No. 4409540815) received a total of RM55,000.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. This fact was admitted by D10 during cross-examination and in his witness statement. (NOP p. 17 DW4 Q12 PW1 Q5)
In relation to D6 (Liew Si Moy):
D6 was enriched as her bank account (Maybank 110032129238) received RM221,700.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. This fact was admitted by D6 during cross-examination. (NOP p. 29) Agree or disagree that your bank account did receive RM221,700 from the Plaintiff. LIEW Agree.”
In relation to D4 (Lau Yien Toh, wife of Loi):
D4 was enriched as her bank accounts (Alliance Bank 110630010017228; Maybank 161211320932; Public Bank 4106137816) received a total of RM1,334,145.00 from the 1st Plaintiff via bank transfer, and RM888,000.00 via cash deposits. (PW1 Q5) • Q&A 5 PW-1 • D4’s Maybank Statement (B6 pp 202-289) • D4’s Alliance Bank Statement (B4 pp 47-117) • D4’s Public Bank Statement (B8 pp 218-277 • Cash Deposits (B8 pp 165, 150) • Cash Deposits (B4 pp 18-19, 163, 171)
In relation to D11 (Amy Loi Rong Rong):
D11 was enriched as her bank account (Alliance Bank 110630020003618) received RM16,000.00 via bank transfer and RM160,000.00 via cash deposits from the 1st Plaintiff. (PW1 Q5; B9 pp 39, 156)
In relation to D17 (Ooi Tooi Seah):
D17 was enriched as D17’s bank account (CIMB 7063111402) received RM259,940.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. (PW1 Q5; B9 pp 279-299; B1 pp 178-186 NOP pp 24 and 25) Can you confirm that you did receive RM259,000 from the Plaintiff? […] OOI Agree.”
In relation to D18 (Tan Keit Lee): D18 was enriched as D18’s bank account (CIMB 7022641846) received RM134,100.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. D18 admitted his account received the 1st Plaintiff’s money. (PW-1 Q5 pp 141, 287-300 B9, pp 273-277 B1, p. 23 NOP) But the money from the Plaintiffs did go inside the account? Yours. Correct? Yes, or no? Yes or no, Mr Tan? KEIT Yes.” The 1st Plaintiff’s submissions (Encl. 221 and 248)
The summary of the 1st Plaintiff’s case and submissions are as follows:
The Plaintiffs transferred/paid amounts into the respective Defendants’ bank accounts as the 1st Plaintiff was defrauded by one Loi Hieng Hung.
The Defendants never gave any consideration for the amounts received from the Plaintiffs and have been unjustly enriched. Therefore, the Defendants should return the amounts received to the Plaintiffs.
Each of the Defendants have asserted that they were not unjustly enriched, offering various explanations as to how the amounts received were used. However, none of these explanations are substantiated by reliable documentary evidence.
None of the Defendants’ actions after receiving the Plaintiffs' funds alter the fact that they were enriched at the Plaintiffs’ expense. Their subsequent use or dissipation of the funds does not relieve them of the obligation to make restitution.
Even if the Defendants had withdrawn the amounts and thrown them into the deep blue sea, that act would not negate their enrichment.
Accepting such a position would lead to an absurd outcome: that a recipient of funds (transferred to the recipient due to fraud) who provided no consideration could avoid liability merely by dissipating the money in any arbitrary or self-serving manner.
The Defendants may argue that the Plaintiffs’ loss was due to their own greed or negligence or alleged participation in illegal activities, and that the Plaintiffs should therefore be denied restitution. These assertions are speculative and unsupported by personal knowledge. Submissions of D1, D5 and D19 (Encl. 228 and 246)
D1, D5 and D19 submit that the 1st Plaintiff claim is tainted with illegality and that the arrangements between the Plaintiffs and Loi characterised as an investment were in fact illegal transactions that contravened public policy.
The contemporaneous documents and the evidence of the 1st Plaintiff reflected that the transactions were in fact moneylending transactions between the 1st Plaintiff and Loi. (paras. 10 and 11)
The 1st Plaintiff had on numerous occasions agreed to lend money to Loi at his requests with the expectation of receiving exorbitant returns in addition to the principal sums advanced. (NOP pp. 16 and 17 and section 2 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 definitions of borrower, interest, moneylending and moneylender)
The Federal Court in the case of Triple Zest Trading & Suppliers & Ors v. Applied Business Technologies Sdn. Bhd. [2023] 6 MLJ 818 decided that where there is an agreement to lend money subject to the payment of a sum that is in excess of the principal amount payable to the lender, that additional sum payable constitutes “interest”. (see also Ang Ee Zhuan v. Hew Shiau Yeong & Anor [2024] MLJU 1988)
The 1st Plaintiff had on at least 3 occasions extended loans to Loi at his requests with the expectation of receiving exorbitant returns in add ition to repayment of the principal sums. It is sufficient that there exists an agreement to lend money on term requiring repayment of a sum exceeding the principal amount advanced. (ss. 5 (2) and 10OA Moneylenders Act 1951 presumption as to the business of moneylending & Triple Zest supra paras 56 and 57)
The High Court in the case of Abda Airfreight Sdn. Bhd. v. Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia Bhd. [2001] 3 MLJ 641 decided as follows: “(b) if the contract is ex facie lawful, but both parties intend to exploit it for an illegal purpose, then the contract is illegal in its inception despite the appearance of it being innocent. This would be the situation where both parties intend to accomplish an unlawful end and, consequently both would be without remedy.”
The investment between the 1st Plaintiff and Loi is illegal in its inception despite the appearance of it being innocent. The guise of the said investment to engage in unlicensed moneylending activities is in contravention of the Moneylenders Act 1951.
The Federal Court in the case of Datuk Ong Kee Hui v. Sinyium Anak Mutit [1983] 1 MLJ 35 decided as follows: “ex turpi causa non oritur action (No action can arise from an illegal act) Even if he had no knowledge of the illegality, the arrangement being intrinsically and inevitably illegal, the law gives him no allowance for innocence so far as consequences are concerned. The court will not assist a person to pursue his claim if it arises ex turpis and when the defendant is equally at fault the court will apply the maxim potior est condition defendentis (in a case of equal or mutual fault)”
The Court of Appeal in the case of Lee Nyan Hon & Bros Sdn. Bhd. v. Metro Charm Sdn. Bhd. [2009] 6 MLJ 450 decided as follows: “No court will enforce an illegal contract or allow itself to be made the instrument of enforcing obligations arising out of a contract or transaction which is illegal, and the illegality is duly brought to the notice of the court, and the person invoking the aid of the court is himself implicated in the illegality, even if the defendant has not pleaded the illegality. So long as the evidence adduced by the plaintiff proves the illegality, the court will not assist him.”
The Federal Court in the case of Merong Mahawangsa Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v. Dato’ Shazryl Eskay bin Abdullah [2015] 5 MLJ 619 decided as follows: “Clearly, therefore, courts are bound at all stages to take notice of illegality, whether ex facie or which later appears, even though not pleaded, and to refuse to enforce the contract. At the outset we must say that the trial courts must be vigilant not to provide any relief on contracts which is void on the grounds of public policy, or illegality, whether of not it is the pleaded case of the parties or whether the issue was raised during the trial.”
The Court of Appeal in the case of Dr Mansur bin Hussain & Ors v. Barisan Tenaga Perancang (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2019] MLJU 1552 decided as follows: “As such, when both parties before court are in pari delicto or where both parties are at equal fault, the court will not involve itself in resolving one side’s claim over the other and whoever is in possession of whatever is in dispute continues to do so in the absence of a superior claim. The court will not render assistance to those who come before it with unclean hands and the remedy of restitution under s. 66 of the Contracts Act will not avail such litigants.”
D1, D5 and D19 submit that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is a cause of action founded in equity, a party seeking equitable relief must come to court with clean hands.
Both D1 and D5 never received any form of benefit from Loi in return for lending him their bank accounts. In the case of Ooi Meng Khin v. Amanah Scotts Properties (KL) Sdn. Bhd. [2014] 6 MLJ 488 the Court of Appeal decided that in dealing with the Law of Restitution it has been outlined that the claimant must show the defendant has been enriched by a benefit, that the benefit had been obtained at the expense of the plaintiff and that the benefit must be gained in circumstances where it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the same.
There was no unjust enrichment on the part of D19, as he had duly provided valuable consideration of RM550,000.00 interest free loan to Loi prior to receiving repayment from Loi via the Plaintiffs’ transfers.
The Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) submit that the 1st Plaintiff claim is tainted with illegality and the Court ought to deny its assistance to the parties who being implicated in such illegality now seeks to enhance a cause of action that relies upon or arises from those unlawful acts. Submissions of D4 and D11 (Encl. 215 and 249)
D4 and D11 submissions in a nutshell are as follows:
the Plaintiffs have failed to discharged their burden of proof as there is no credible evidence that the Plaintiffs have paid any monies to D4 and D11;
even if the receipt of monies is proven (which is denied) D4 and D11 were not parties to, nor involved in any of the alleged transactions between the Plaintiffs and Loi;
at all material times, D4 and D11 were not in control over their respective bank accounts and conversely their bank accounts were under the full control of Loi; and
D4 and D11 did not personally receive or benefit from any monies which the 1st Plaintiff had allegedly transferred to the bank accounts of D4 and D11.
D4 and D11 submit that the Plaintiffs failed to prove their allegation that the sums of RM2,222,145.00 and RM176,000.00 had been transferred or deposited to the bank accounts of D4 and D11 respectively. The Plaintiffs failed to show proof of the any cash deposits of RM888,000.00 into D4 bank’s account (Annexure B of the Amended Statement of Claim). The 1st Plaintiff conceded that there were no supporting documents in respect of the cash transactions into D4 bank accounts. (NOP pp. 152, 157 and 158).
Any fraudulent conduct allegedly committed by Loi, if at all proven is irrelevant to D4 and D11. The losses and damages suffered by the Plaintiffs arose solely by their voluntary decision and knowledge in entering into the alleged investment scheme as represented by Loi.
There is absence of specific facts to support the allegation that D4 and D11 had dishonestly assisted in Loi’s alleged fraud. The Court of Appeal in the case of Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v. Robert Doran & Ors and other appeals [2013] 2 MLJ 174 decided as follows: “The allegation of dishonesty must be clearly pleaded in the statement of case. We consider that this involves setting out concisely the facts upon which the allegations of the subjective element of dishonesty is founded and also the facts upon which reliance is placed as demonstrating that the objective element is satisfied, at any rate unless it is manifest that if the facts supporting the subjective elements are proved, then the objective element would be satisfied too.”
The funds allegedly transferred into D4 and D11 bank’s accounts were done so upon Loi’s express instructions, without any evidence of a meeting of minds with D4 and D11 on a common intention to defraud the Plaintiffs. These accounts were under the control of Loi who was in possession of both the ATM cards and PIN numbers of both the accounts. They had no knowledge of not did they participate in any alleged fraudulent scheme by Loi. There is no evidence to establish any dishonest assistance, false representation or conspiracy on the part of D4 and D11. (para. 46, 47 and 49).
D4 and D11 further submit that the 1st Plaintiff’s claim for restitution against them must fail, as there is no evidence that D4 and D11 were ever unjustly enriched by the alleged monies deposited by the 1st Plaintiff. The Plaintiffs have failed to prove D4 and D11 retained or benefitted from the alleged monies deposited or that such retention (if any) was unjust. (para. 57) In cross-examination by D4 and D11 counsel, the 1st Plaintiff agreed that Loi had never raised any complaint about not receiving the alleged deposits made by the 1st Plaintiff (NOP 1 p. 160) as follows: “YHW: I am going to put to you, I think you have answered this earlier, but I’ll put to you again that at no time had Loi ever come back to you and complained that he never received the monies which you claimed to have banked in cash into those accounts. TIONG: Yes.” Submissions of D6 and D10 (Encl. 224 and 244)
D6 and D10 submissions in a nutshell are as follows:
Both D6 and D10 have no relationship whatsoever with the Plaintiffs and are not involved in any business and/or investment dealings between the Plaintiffs and Loi Hieng Hung.
Both D6 and D10 are not privy to any arrangement and/or transaction between the Plaintiffs and Loi.
Monies received by both D6 and D10 are for valuable consideration. (para 11)
D6 and D10 are in the business of procuring domestic and/or foreign labour. Loi has been using the services provided by D6 and D10 since 2015. Loi will cause monies to be deposited from 3rd parties into the accounts belonging to both Defendants for the services provided. (para 12 and 13)
The Defendants (D6 and D11) submit that the Plaintiffs have failed to discharge their burden of proving that Loi committed fraud against them. The burden of proof under section 101 Evidence Act 1950 lies on the Plaintiffs to establish the alleged fraud on the balance of probabilities. During cross-examination (NOP pp 78-88) the 1st Plaintiff was unable to reconcile the record of all the transaction made.
The Plaintiffs failed to adduce cogent evidence to implicate D6 and D10 for dishonest assistance. The standard of proof for fraud in on the balance of probabilities. (see Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn. Bhd. v. Damai Setia Sdn. Bhd. [2015] 7 CLJ 584 Federal Court)
The Defendants were deprived of the right and/or opportunity to cross-examine Loi. The Plaintiff’s conduct was a tactical manoeuvre in filing two separate actions, one against 20 Defendants in this action and the other against Loi and this tantamount to an abuse of the Court’s process. (para 139 and 142). Both D6 and D10 pray that the Plaintiffs’ claim against them be dismissed with costs. Submissions of D16, D17 and D18 (Encl. 231 and 251)
D16, D17 and D18 submissions in a nutshell are as follows:
the alleged purpose of the investment between the Plaintiffs remains unproven and is illegal (para 7 and 11);
the Plaintiffs failed to prove that there was dishonest assistance and knowing receipts by D16, 17 and 18 (para 29); and
the Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment is unsustainable and pray that the claim be dismissed with costs (para 33). Law on Unjust Enrichment
In the case of Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Limited [1943] AC 32, Lord Wright stated the following at page 61: “It is clear that any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now recognized to fall within a third category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution.”
The High Court in the case of AmBank (M) Bhd v. KB Leisure (M) Sdn Bhd [2012] 7 MLJ 364 at pp 373-374 decided as follows: “[25] …The House of Lords, allowing the claim in part, held that a recipient of stolen money was under an obligation to restore an equivalent sum to the victim if he had not received in good faith and given full consideration for it, and had thus been unjustly enriched at the expense of the true owner. Here, it was held that the casino had not given good consideration as gambling contracts were null and void under the law and the casino was under no legal obligation to honour the bets. However, equity required taking into consideration that the casino had also paid out winnings to the fraudulent solicitor, so the amount that the firm could recover from the casino was limited to the casino's net winnings against the solicitor over the entire course of betting. … [28] Lord Templeman added that in a claim for money had and received by a thief, the plaintiff victim must show that money belonging to him was paid by the thief to the defendant and that the defendant was unjustly enriched and remained unjustly enriched, (Emphasis added.) An innocent recipient of stolen money may not be enriched at all. But an innocent recipient of stolen money will be enriched if the recipient has not given full consideration. [29] Lord Goff of Chieveley explained that at common law, property in money, like other fungibles, is lost as such when it is mixed with other money. However, equity will in appropriate circumstances allow the tracing of stolen money by its rightful owner into the hands of subsequent recipients. As such, an action for money had and received is not usually founded on any wrongdoing by the third party, but on the fact that the third party cannot in conscience retain the money, or … for the third party to retain the money would result in his unjust enrichment.”
The Federal Court in the case of Dream Property Sdn Bhd v. Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 MLJ 441 decided that a cause of action in unjust enrichment can give rise to a right to restitution if the requisite requirements are established as follows: “[117] The above passages from the judgments of the House of Lords are instructive and are significant contribution to the development of law of unjust enrichment. The principle underlying the cases of Banque Financiere de la Cite v. Parc (Battersea) Ltd and Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v. IRC is that, in the context of the present case, a cause of action in unjust enrichment can give rise to a right to restitution where it can be established that:
the plaintiff must have been enriched;
the enrichment must be gained at the defendant’s expense;
that the retention of the benefit by the plaintiff was unjust; and
there must be no defence available to extinguish or reduce the plaintiff’s liability to make restitution.” Dishonest Assistance and Knowing Receipt
The Federal Court in the case of Datuk M Kayveas v. See Hong Chen & Sons Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] MLJU 1499 discussed on constructive trust and referred to the following: “[35] In Paragon Finance pic v. DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 Millet LJ said: “A constructive trust arises by operation of law whenever the circumstances are such that it would be unconscionable for the owner of property (usually but not necessarily the legal estate) to assert his own beneficial interest in the property and deny the beneficial interest of another. …” [36] The Court in Takako Sakao v. Ng Pek Yuen & Anor (supra) opined that: “A constructive trust is imposed by law irrespective of the intention of the parties. And it is imposed only in certain circumstances. […] What equity does in those circumstances is to fasten upon the conscience of the holder of the property a trust in favour of another in respect of the whole or a part thereof.”
The Court of Appeal in the case Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v. Robert Doran & Ors and other appeals [2013] 2 MLJ 174 at p. 209 decided that there must be a breach of trust by someone other than the defendant (in our case, Loi), the defendant must have helped that person in the breach, and the defendant must have a dishonest state of mind: “Knowing assistance” is one of two types of third-party liabilities under trust law, established in Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, and based on the following dictum of Lord Selbourne LC: (The responsibility of a trustee) may no doubt be extended in equity to others who are not properly trustees, if they are found … actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui que trust. But … strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps of which a court of equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees. As a general rule, there must be a breach of trust or fiduciary duty by someone other than the defendant, the defendant must have helped that person in the breach, and the defendant must have a dishonest state of mind.”
The Court of Appeal in Ooi Meng Khin v. Amanah Scotts Properties (KL) Sdn Bhd [2014] 6 MLJ 488 listed the elements of Knowing Receipt as follows: “[25] It would be useful to now look at the essential ingredients that would need to be proven by a claimant desirous of benefitting from utilizing this concept of knowing receipt to found his cause of action against the third-party recipient. Again, assistance may be obtained from the case of Zage III’s case where three elements needed to be fulfilled, namely:
a disposal of the plaintiff’s assets in a breach of fiduciary duty;
the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of the plaintiff, and
knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets received are traceable to the/a breach of the fiduciary duty.” Court’s Analysis and Evaluation
I have read and perused the Written Submissions and Authorities filed by the 1st Plaintiff and the Defendants. I have also considered the Oral Submissions and Arguments forwarded and articulated by the respective parties’ counsel on 26.9.2025. D1, D5 and D19
The Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) submitted that the contemporaneous documents and the evidence of the 1st Plaintiff reflected that the transactions were in fact moneylending transactions between the 1st Plaintiff and Loi.
The 1st Plaintiff submits that the 1st Plaintiff does not fall under the definition of moneylending in section 2 of the Moneylending Act 1951 (NOP pp 18 and 24) and that was expecting profits or returns on his investment (witness statement Q6) which never materialized. Further, there is no loan agreement to lend money and that the evidence by the 1st Plaintiff demonstrated that the investments with Loi were made-up stories and a fraud perpetrated on him by Loi. (NOP p 118)
Be that as it may, I am inclined to agree with the Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) submissions that in the 1st Plaintiff is not entitled to invoke or rely on the doctrine of unjust enrichment to recover losses arising from his own illegal and unlawful transactions.
The cause of action for dishonest assistance against the Defendants must be pleaded and in the Statement of Claim the particulars regarding the alleged dishonest assistance purportedly rendered by the Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) to Loi in paragraph 18 is lacking in the manner how the Defendants could have assisted Loi or to plead facts capable of establishing the Defendants had acted dishonestly so as to cause the Plaintiffs to suffer loss.
Needless to say, in the circumstances of this case the particulars of dishonest conspiracy is lacking to support the argument of dishonest assistance. Parties are bound by their pleaded case. (see the case of Mkini Dotcom Sdn. Bhd. v. Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn. Bhd. [2021] 7 CLJ 145 Federal Court) D4 and D11
The 1st Plaintiff conceded that mere legal ownership of a bank account does not necessarily equate to control over the same and that any other person in possession of the ATM card and PIN number could be in control and operate the said account. In cross-examination by D4 and D11 counsel, the 1st Plaintiff is fully aware that Loi was an undischarged bankrupt and therefore prohibited from operating his own bank account and admitted that he held the ATM Card of D4 (wife) and D11 (daughter). (NOP 1 at p. 92)
D4 and D11 have not been unjustly enriched not has D4 and D11 received any of the monies alleged to have been transferred by the 1st Plaintiff. Therefore, the 1st Plaintiff has not right to claim restitution against D4 and D11. The threshold of unjust enrichment in a cause of action has not been met in order to give rise to a right to restitution as outlined by the Federal Court in the case of Dream Property Sdn. Bhd. v. Atlas Housing Sdn. Bhd. [2015] 2 MLJ 441 as follows:
the Defendant has been enriched;
the enrichment was gained at the Plaintiff’s expense;
that the retention of the benefit is unjust; and
there is no applicable defence that extinguishes or reduces the Defendant’s liability to make restitution.
The transactions between the Plaintiffs and Loi are illegal. The 1st Plaintiff alleged that there was an investment scheme introduced and/or represented by Loi into which he purportedly invested a total RM6,736,360.00. The 1st Plaintiff admitted that he had proceeded with the investment despite the lack of any formal documentation. (see NOP 1 p. 7)
The 1st Plaintiff was evasive in cross-examination (NOP 1 p 106) in disclosing the source of funds raises and this raises serious concerns about the lawfulness of the funds and the legitimacy of the alleged transactions.
Therefore the 1st Plaintiff now cannot rely on the equitable jurisdiction of the Court to recover monies where he knowingly participated in a purported investment scheme tainted with illegality. (para. 65 and 70) D6 and D10
The descriptions recorded in the transactions such as “personal loans, audit fees and medical” suggest that these descriptions imply that the monies were disbursed as personal or professional assistance or friendly loans rather than as part of any investment scheme. (para. 48 of Encl. 224)
The Plaintiffs failed to prove the both D6 and D10 assisted in the alleged fraud for dishonest assistance or investment scheme with a dishonest state of mind. (see CIMB Bank Bhd. v. Maybank Trustees Bhd & Other Appeals [2014] 3 CLJ 1 Federal Court). The 1st Plaintiff did not plead the element of dishonesty in the Statement of Claim. (see Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v. Robert Doran & Ors [2012] CLJU 775 Court of Appeal)
Both D6 and D10 cannot be held liable for knowing receipt as they are not aware nor is there any evidence to suggest that they ought to have been aware that the monies received from the Plaintiffs were traceable to any fraudulent scheme allegedly perpetrated by Loi as reflected in their cross-examination by the 1st Plaintiff counsel. (NOP pp. 19 and 27) In furtherance to this, the 1st Plaintiff has knowingly engaged in illegal activity as the 1st Plaintiff has transferred monies in the pretext of paying the “head of immigration and judges”. (NOP p 63)
In this respect, the Court is inclined to agree with D6 and D10 submissions (para 89 and 90) that the chosen method of remittance is highly and strongly supports the inference that the Plaintiffs were aware of the illegitimate nature of the underlying transactions and that such arrangements are inconsistent with lawful, transparent business practices and serve as a further indication that the Plaintiffs were complicit in a scheme that was intended to operate outside the bounds of legality.
Therefore, as a result of the participation in these illegal transactions, the Plaintiffs are estopped from maintaining any cause of action against the Defendants and from seeking any relief in this action. Commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet (no one ought to derive a benefit from their own wrongdoing).
The question of whether a claim brought is founded in contract or in tort, public policy only requires the Court to deny its assistance to a Plaintiff seeking to enforce a cause of action if he was implicated in the illegality and in putting forward his case he sees to rely upon the illegal acts. (see Lee Nyan Hon & Brothers Sdn. Bhd. v. Metro Charm Sdn. Bhd. [2009] 6 CLJ 626 Court of Appeal).
The 1st Plaintiff source of income remains unclear and insufficiently explained. Despite the substantial sums of money involved, 1st Plaintiff was unable or unwilling to provide a transparent account of the origin of these funds. (NOP pp 60 and 61). Be that as it may, the Court is of the considered view that the receipt and retention of the said monies by D6 and D10 do not constitute unjust enrichment. D16, D17 and D18
The evidence before Court in respect of the bank statements of the Defendants show that monies were transferred in the Defendants’ account for various other reasons other that the alleged investment between the Plaintiffs and Loi. (NOP pp. and 93). The Court is inclined to agree with the submissions of the Defendants (Encl. 231 para 10) the monies transferred to the Defendants accounts were specifically for Loi’s personal gain and/or for an illegal investment between parties and therefore it is unjust to claim the monies from the Defendants on the ground of unjust enrichment.
The arrangement between the Plaintiffs and Loi to utilise 3rd party accounts to allegedly run the investments in itself is illegal which raises the inevitable inference that the Plaintiffs are colluding in the circumstances of this case to defraud the Defendants. In cross-examination by counsel for D16, D17 and D18 that the 1st Plaintiff conceded that the arrangement the 1st Plaintiff had with Loi is that funds will be transferred to 3rd party accounts. (NOP p. 98) The Plaintiffs have no right to claim for restitution from the Defendants when the arrangement and investment is illegal in nature.
In respect of the issue whether the Defendants assisted and/or knowingly received the monies, the Plaintiffs are aware ab initio that 3rd party accounts are controlled by Loi to benefit the alleged investment. (NOP p. 100) The Court finds that the Plaintiffs failed to prove that Defendants had knowledge over the alleged investment and/or assisted Loi in the alleged fraud. (NOP pp 104 and 105)
The Federal Court in the case of Detik Ria Sdn. Bhd. v. Prudential Corporation Holdings Limited & Anor [2025] 3 MLRA 544 decided as follows: “[167] The parties should not be allowed to protect themselves against the risk of their illegal transaction being discovered. In other words, where parties knowingly engage in an illegal transaction, they assume the risks associated with it meaning that they become culpable for the illegal act or error in issue.” Summary of Court’s Evaluation
The Court makes the following findings in a nutshell:
the conduct of the 1st Plaintiff constitute an irresistible inference that there was a conspiracy between the Plaintiffs and Loi to defraud the Defendants and/or a scheme to launder illegal funds;
the underlying transactions between Loi and the Plaintiffs are illegal in nature without proof of any valid investment transactions/scheme, hence no restitution shall arise from such unlawful transactions/scheme;
The 1st Plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden to prove his case against the Defendants on the balance of probabilities (see ss. 101 and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950); and
The 1st Plaintiff has failed to establish any case of unjust enrichment or dishonest/knowingly assistance against the Defendants to justify the alleged claims of restitution by the Plaintiffs. 2nd Plaintiff: Undischarged Bankrupt
Counsel for the Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) submitted that on the position of the 2nd Plaintiff’s claim ought to be struck out for want of locus standi. In this action, the 2nd Plaintiff was adjudged a bankrupt on 19.8.2024 as reflected in a letter dated 14.7.2025 (Encl. 217). Nevertheless, the 2nd Plaintiff continued to pursue this action without obtaining the previous sanction from the Director General of Insolvency.
By his previous solicitors’ letter dated 17.7.2025 (Encl. 220) the 2nd Plaintiff confirmed that he would not be applying for the Director General of Insolvency’s previous sanction to maintain and continue with this present action and expressly stated that he has no objection to his claim being struck out by Court.
The Court of Appeal in the case of Goh Eng Hwa v. M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn. Bhd. [2004] 3 MLJ 97 succinctly explains the requirement of a sanction as follows: “The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is ‘incompetent’ to maintain action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without ‘the previous sanction’ then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void. The act being a nullity for lack of capacity or competency, the question of pleading does not arise.” Conclusion
In the circumstances, the Court finds that on the totality of the evidence adduced by the 1st Plaintiff and the Defendants’ witnesses, the 1st Plaintiff has failed to prove the claim against the respective Defendants for unjust enrichment, dishonest assistance and knowing receipt on a balance of probabilities.
Consequently, the 1st Plaintiff claim against the Defendants (D1, D4, D5, D6, D10, D11, D16, D17, D18 and D19) for the reliefs below are dismissed with costs as follows:
A declaration that the 1st Plaintiff is entitled to monies paid to the Defendants;
An order of restitution for the monies to be paid by the Defendants to the 1st Plaintiff;
An order that the monies in the bank accounts held by the Defendants be paid to the 1st Plaintiff;
A declaration that the Plaintiffs are entitled to monies paid to the 4th and 11th Defendants; and
An order of restitution for the monies to be paid by the 4th and the 11th Defendants to the 1st Plaintiff.
The claim by the 2nd Plaintiff is hereby struck out with costs to be paid forthwith for lack of previous sanction from the Director General of Insolvency.
In awarding costs to the Defendants for this action, the Court has taken into consideration of the order made by the Court in Encl. 42 in respect of the Plaintiffs’ application in Encl. 4 whereby the Court on 16.7.2021 ordered costs as “costs in the cause”.

How this case connects

Citations and treatment detected automatically from later judgments and the authorities this decision relies on.

Cited by

Later cases and laws citing this decision

Not yet cited by a later decision.

Authorities cited

Earlier cases and laws this decision relies on

Refers toCONTRACTS ACT 1950Legislation
“to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 The court will not render assistance to those who come before it with unclean hands and the remedy of restitution under s. 66 of the Contracts Act will not avail such litigants.””
Refers toEvidence ActExternal
“55. The Defendants (D6 and D11) submit that the Plaintiffs have failed to discharge their burden of proving that Loi committed fraud against them. The burden of proof under section 101 Evidence Act 1950 lies on the Plaintiffs to establish the alleged fraud on the balance of probabilities. During cross-examination (NOP”
Refers toINSOLVENCY ACT 1967Legislation
“een obtained from the Director General of Insolvency to enable the 2nd Plaintiff to continue with this action. Consequently, the 2nd Plaintiff’s claim is thereby struck off. Section 38 (1) (a) of the Insolvency Act 1967 reads as follows: “38 Duties and disabilities of bankrupt”
Refers toMoneylenders ActExternal
“numerous occasions agreed to lend money to Loi at his requests with the expectation of receiving exorbitant returns in addition to the principal sums advanced. (NOP pp. 16 and 17 and section 2 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 definitions of borrower, interest, moneylending and moneylender)”
Refers toMoneylending ActExternal
“67. The 1st Plaintiff submits that the 1st Plaintiff does not fall under the definition of moneylending in section 2 of the Moneylending Act 1951 (NOP pp 18 and 24) and that was expecting profits or returns on his investment (witness statement Q6) which never materialized. Further, there is no loan agreement to lend mo”

Show 6 more

Refers toUnlawful Activities ActExternal
“Pursuant to the report made, the police have since frozen the bank accounts held by the Defendants under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act, 2001. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17”
Cites[2012] CLJU 775External
“t of dishonesty in the **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 Statement of Claim. (see Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v. Robert Doran & Ors [2012] CLJU 775 Court of Appeal)”
Cites[2024] MLJU 1988External
“y subject to the payment of a sum that is in excess of the principal amount payable to the lender, that additional sum payable constitutes “interest”. (see also Ang Ee Zhuan v. Hew Shiau Yeong & Anor [2024] MLJU 1988) **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24”
Follows[1943] AC 32External
“59. In the case of Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Limited [1943] AC 32, Lord Wright stated the following at page 61: “It is clear that any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that i”
Follows[2013] MLJU 1499External
“62. The Federal Court in the case of Datuk M Kayveas v. See Hong Chen & Sons Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] MLJU 1499 discussed on constructive trust and referred to the following: “[35] In Paragon Finance pic v. DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 Millet LJ said: “A constructive trust arises by operation of law”
Follows[2019] MLJU 1552External
“42. The Court of Appeal in the case of Dr Mansur bin Hussain & Ors v. Barisan Tenaga Perancang (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2019] MLJU 1552 decided as follows: “As such, when both parties before court are in pari delicto or where both parties are at equal fault, the court will not involve itself in resolving one side’s claim o”

Auto-detected from judgment text; not a substitute for a citator check.

Content

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) CIVIL SUIT NO.: WA-22NCvC-335-05/2021

Between

TIONG WANG HOCK

(no. K/P: 700308-13-5145)

SYLVESTER SAN MUN KIN (NO. K/P: 630524-10-7447) … PLAINTIFFS

And

SIN KIM KUAN

(no. K/P: 690428-08-5238)

LOO WOOI KEONG

(no. K/P: 781005-07-5357)

OOI HOOI ENG

(no. K/P: 900810-02-5511)

LAU YIEN TOH (NO. K/P: 660114-13-5274) 05/12/2025 10:40:53

WA-22NCvC-335-05/2021

Kand. 255

TEOH ENG WAH

(no. K/P: 670806-02-5139)

LIEW SI MOY

(no. K/P: 540820-12-5464)

CHA KOK SOON

(no. K/P: 920711-14-6543)

LEE HSIN KEAT

(no. K/P: 900803-02-5775)

CHAI VUI FOO

(no. K/P: 920805-13-5343)

LIM CHUNG PHIN

(no. K/P: 490417-12-5111)

AMY LOI RONG RONG

(no. K/P: 950916-13-5896)

OOI AH ENG

(no. K/P: 510903-07-5194)

LEONG SHUI MEI

(no. K/P: 751221-12-5710)

KHAW CHENG HOE

(no. K/P: 660518-07-5001)

SIN KAH MENG

(no. K/P: 590716-07-5319)

TAN CHAI TONG

(no. K/P: 521106-09-5049)

OOI TOOI SEAH

(no. K/P: 730326-07-5032)

TAN KEIT LEE

(no. K/P: 950519-07-5033)

GAN YU CHAI

(no. K/P: 690507-06-5323)

MVK DATA PROCESSING SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 1243289-K) … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT The Plaintiffs’ claims

The Plaintiffs are the transferors and/or payors of the total sum of RM4,406,568.00 to the respective Defendants and/or into the bank accounts that are and/or were held by the Defendants respectively.

The Defendants are and/or were the respective account holders and/or recipients of the amounts that were paid and/or transferred by the Plaintiffs respectively.

Sometime in May 2015, the 1st Plaintiff was approached by one Loi Hieng Hung (I/C No.: 631015-13-5129) in respect of an investment. Loi is an acquaintance of the 1st Plaintiff from Miri Sarawak. The investment was in respect of the outsourcing of foreign labour for companies in Penang. Loi informed the 1st Plaintiff that the 1st Plaintiff will be entitled to 50% to 100% of the profits from the investment. The 1st Plaintiff had trusted Loi and decided to participate in the investment. The 1st Plaintiff had paid Loi a sum of RM500,000.00 in cash for the investment. Loi had represented to the 1st Plaintiff that he is/was a bankrupt and as such, monies in respect of the investment were to be paid into the accounts held by the Defendants.

Preamble

Pursuant to the representation by Loi between 2015 to February 2021, the Plaintiffs had made the payments to the Defendants and/or bank accounts held by the Defendants in Annexure A of the Statement of Claim. The Plaintiffs do no personally know and/or are not related and/or acquainted with the Defendants. The Plaintiffs do not have any dealings and/or relations with the Defendants whether contractually or otherwise. Unjust Enrichment

The Defendants’ receipt of the monies is not supported by any consideration. Accordingly, there is total failure of consideration on the part of the Defendants in their receipt of the monies from the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants’ retention of the monies would amount to unjust enrichment on the part of the Defendants. The Plaintiffs claimed that they are entitled to restitution and the Defendants are liable to return the monies to the Plaintiffs.

Dishonest Assistance

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants had dishonestly assisted in the fraud by Loi and/or had knowingly received the monies, knowing that they are entitled to receive such monies and/or that they had provided no consideration whatsoever in return for the receipt of these monies.

Reliefs

The cause of action by the Plaintiffs is for an order of restitution, misrepresentation, fraud and unjust enrichment. The Plaintiffs claim against the Defendants as follows:

a declaration that the Plaintiffs are entitled to monies paid to the Defendants;

an order of restitution for the monies to be paid by the

Defendants to the Plaintiffs;

an order that the monies in the bank accounts held by the Defendants as set out in Annexure A to be paid to the Plaintiffs;

a declaration that the Plaintiffs are entitled to monies paid to the 4th and 11th Defendants as set out in

Annexure B; and

interests and costs. 2nd Plaintiff a bankrupt, case against 2nd Plaintiff struck off

By Order of Court dated 4.8.2025 (Encl. 243), the 2nd Plaintiff’s solicitors Messrs Thomas Philip was discharged as Solicitors for the 2nd Plaintiff with no order as to costs. The Court was informed that the 2nd Plaintiff is an undischarged bankrupt. No sanction has been obtained from the Director General of Insolvency to enable the 2nd Plaintiff to continue with this action. Consequently, the 2nd Plaintiff’s claim is thereby struck off. Section 38 (1) (a) of the Insolvency Act 1967 reads as follows: “38 Duties and disabilities of bankrupt

Where a bankrupt has not obtained his discharge

the bankrupt shall be incompetent to maintain any action (other than an action for damages in respect of an injury to his person) without the previous sanction of the Director General of Insolvency.”

There is a total of 20 Defendants in this suit. Preceding the commencement of this trial, the Plaintiffs filed the following in relation to the respective 10 Defendants: Date Defendants

Order

para

Encl.

8.6.2021 D9 Notice of Discontinuance 13 2.

2.11.2021 D2 Judgment in Default 95 3.

2.11.2021 D7 Consent Judgment 122

25.11.2021 D3, D8, D12, D14, D15 Notice of Discontinuance 116 5.

25.11.2021 D13 Judgment in Default 114 6.

25.11.2021 D20 Consent Judgment 136

The Plaintiffs commenced this trial against the remaining 10 Defendants as follows: Defendants/Witness Names 1 D1 (DW1) Sin Kim Kuan 2 D4 (DW6) Lau Yien Toh 3 D5 (DW2) Teoh Eng Wah 4 D6 (DW4) Liew Si Moy 5 D10 (DW5) Lim Chung Phin 6 D11 (DW7) Amy Loi Rong Rong 7 D16 (DW9) Tan Chai Tong 8 D17 (DW10) Ooi Tooi Seah 9 D18 (DW11) Tan Keit Lee 10 D19 (DW3) Gan Yu Chai 11 DW8 Wendy Loi Ting Ting

The Issues To Be Tried (Encl. 149) filed by the respective parties are as follows: Plaintiffs’ Issues

Whether the Plaintiffs are the transferors and/or payors of the amounts to the respective Defendants and/or into the bank accounts of and/or held by the respective Defendants as stated in Annexure A of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021.

Whether the First Plaintiff and/or Second Plaintiff had made a cash deposit into the bank accounts of the 4th Defendant and 11th Defendant as stated in Annexure B of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021.

Whether the Defendants knew and/or had a relationship and/or had dealings (whether by contract or otherwise) with the Plaintiffs.

Whether there was any consideration given by the Defendants for the receipt of money in their respective bank accounts as stated in Annexure A and B of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021.

Whether the retention of monies by the Defendants in their bank accounts as stated in Annexure A and B of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021 is an unjust enrichment by the Defendants.

Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution for the monies paid and/or transferred to the Defendants as stated in Annexure A and B in the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021.

Whether the Defendants have dishonestly assisted in the fraud by Loi and/or had received the monies with knowledge that they were not entitled to receive the said monies and/or that they did not give any consideration for the receipt of the said monies.

Whether the retention of the monies by the said Defendants is unconscionable.

Whether the Defendants’ are holding the monies as stated in Annexure A and B of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021 as constructive trustees for the Plaintiffs. The 1st, 5th and 19th Defendants’ Issues

Whether the 1st Defendant and the 5th Defendant had no knowledge in relation to the purpose of arrangements made by Loi Hieng Hung on the bank accounts held by the 1st and 5th Defendant.

Whether the 1st Defendant and 5th Defendant never spent the monies received from the Plaintiffs into their bank accounts.

Whether or not there was personal interest and/or benefit obtained or received by the 1st Defendant and 5th Defendant on the monies deposited by the Plaintiffs into the bank account of the 1st and 5th Defendant.

Whether the 1st Defendant and 5th Defendant were merely recipients of payments made by the Plaintiffs and all the monies deposited by the Plaintiffs into their bank accounts were proceeds to Loi and not the 1st Defendant and 5th Defendant.

Whether the 19th Defendant gave a friendly loan of RM550,000.00 by cash to Loi Hieng Hung.

Whether the monies deposited by the Plaintiffs to the 19th Defendant’s bank account as arranged by Loi Hieng Hung was a repayment of loan monies from Loi Hieng Hung to the 19th Defendant.

Whether the 19th Defendant is entitled to retain the monies received from the Plaintiffs with consideration given to Loi Hieng Hung.

Whether the Plaintiff’s cause of action against the Defendants is tainted by illegality where the Plaintiffs distributed, carried out and/or were involved in an illegal investment in breach of the law together with Loi Hieng Hung. The 4th and 11th Defendants’ Issues

Whether the 4th and 11th Defendants or Loi had received the money which was purportedly transferred and/or paid into the 4th and 11th Defendants’ bank accounts.

Whether the Plaintiffs knew that Loi had received the money purportedly transferred and/or paid into the 4th and 11th Defendants’ bank accounts. The 6th and 10th Defendants’ Issues

Whether the Defendants received the monies with the knowledge that they were not entitled to receive the said monies.

Whether the 6th and 10th Defendants provided services to Loi Hieng Hung and as consideration, Loi Hieng Hung had caused monies to be deposited from third party (including the Plaintiffs) into the 6th and 10th Defendants’ accounts.

Whether the Plaintiffs knew and/or carried out and/or were involved in illegal activities in all arrangements between the Plaintiffs with Loi Hieng Hung.

Whether the Plaintiffs have come to this Court with clean hands.

Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs claimed against the 6th and 10th Defendants.

Whether the Plaintiffs action against the 6th and 10th Defendants are a back-door attempt and/or abuse of Court process to obtain the Plaintiffs’ investment monies and/or to cover the Plaintiffs’ losses and/or damages. The 16th, 17th and 18th Defendants’ Issues

Whether the Plaintiffs had acted negligently, recklessly and/or with greed in depositing their money into the bank accounts of the 16th to 18th Defendants whom they did not have any relationship and/or know?

Whether the 16th to 18th Defendants can be liable purportedly for unjust enrichment when and/or at the time all the money deposited in their bank accounts were actually and/or in fact withdrawn and used and/or enjoyed by the said Loi himself? Evidence adduced by witnesses

The following witnesses of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants testified in Court and their evidence are reflected in the Notes of Proceedings as reflected in the Table below: P/D Witness Name of Witness NOP Encl. (Date) NOP PDF Pages

P1 PW1 Tiong Wang Hock 208 (7.4.2025) 209 (8.4.2025) 10 – 170 7 – 126 2. P2 PW2 Sylvester San Mun Kin 209 (8.4.2025) 210 (9.4.2025) 127 – 159 5 – 17 3. - PW3 Tiong Choo Miau 210 (9.4.2025) 18 – 72 4. D1 DW1 Sin Kim Kuan 210 (9.4.2025) 74 – 95 5. D5 DW2 Teoh Eng Wah 210 (9.4.2025) 98 – 118 6. D19 DW3 Gan Yu Chai 210 (9.4.2025) 119 – 128 7. D10 DW4 Lim Chung Phin 211 (10.4.2025) 7 – 21 8. D6 DW5 Liew Si Moy 211 (10.4.2025) 21 – 30 9. D4 DW6 Lau Yien Toh 211 (10.4.2025) 33 – 53 10. D11 DW7 Amy Loi Rong Rong 211 (10.4.2025) 54 – 65 11. - DW8 Wendy Loi Ting Ting 212 (29.4.2025) 5 – 12 12. D16 DW9 Tan Chai Tong 212 (29.4.2025) 13 – 22 13. D17 DW10 Ooi Tooi Seah 212 (29.4.2025) 22 – 28 14. D18 DW11 Tan Keit Lee 212 (29.4.2025) 28 – 39 Salient Facts

The Plaintiffs are the transferors and/or payors of the total sum of RM5,236,238.00 to the respective Defendants and/or into the bank accounts that are and/or were held by the Defendants respectively. Correspondingly, the Defendants are and/or were the respective account holders and/or recipients of the amounts that were transferred/paid by the Plaintiffs respectively. (PW1 Q3; PW2 Q4)

The reason for the transfers/payments by the Plaintiffs was because sometime in May 2015, the 1st Plaintiff was approached by Loi in respect of a potential investment relating to the outsourcing of foreign labour for company/companies in Penang and which Loi claimed the 1st Plaintiff would be entitled to 50% to 100% of the profits from the Investment. (PW1 Q4 and Q5)

Following that, between the period of around 2015 to around 2021 in which the various transactions by the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs were made, the 1st Plaintiff had inquired with Loi in respect of the Investment. At all material times, Loi gave various excuses in respect of the purported Investment and spun stories regarding the involvement of other purported individuals involved with the names “Wu”, “Datuk” and “Tan Sri”. (PW1 Q8 and B10 pp 8-49, 50-147)

Sometime in February 2021, the 1st Plaintiff again inquired as to the profits pertaining to the investment. However, he was met with the same excuses. Dissatisfied with the responses, the 1st Plaintiff pressed the issue further with Loi and this was when the 1st Plaintiff was informed that the Investment did not exist, and that it was a part of a fraud. The 1st Plaintiff then discovered that Loi, Wu, Datuk and Tan Sri are all the same person. (PW1 Q8, B10 pp 150-151)

Upon discovery of the fraud, the 1st Plaintiff made a police report on 24.2.2021 where he had, amongst others, stated the following:

That the 1st Plaintiff made his first payment for a sum of RM500,000.00 to Loi via cash in relation to the said investment, and this was done at Ampang Point.

From 2015 to around 2021, the Plaintiffs had made hundreds of transactions to most of the above-named Defendants. (B1 pp 282-284 and PW1 Q9)

18.

Preamble

Pursuant to the report made, the police have since frozen the bank accounts held by the Defendants under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act, 2001.

On 24.4.2021, the 1st Plaintiff made another police report stating, inter alia, that he had made cash deposits to the bank accounts of D4 and D11. (B1 pp 285-287 and PW1 Q9)

On 19.4.2021, the Plaintiffs conducted a bankruptcy search which verified that Loi Hieng Hung was a bankrupt. (B9 p 5; PW1 Q10)

On 2.6.2021, the Plaintiffs applied for leave to commence proceedings against Loi Hieng Hung as he was a bankrupt. Leave was obtained via High Court Order on 6.9.2021. (B2 pp. 6-300, 343-344, and PW1 Q10) Plaintiffs’ Submissions (Encl. 221 and 248)

In relation to D1 (Sin Kim Kuan):

D1 was indeed enriched by the very fact that her bank accounts (Maybank 108038991805; Hong Leong 14150131258; RHB Bank 15825300069038) received the total sum of RM1,040,568.00. This fact was admitted in D1’s Defence. D1 further agreed during cross-examination that there was no documentary evidence before the Court showing she ever denied receiving RM1,040,568.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. (BOP A p. 93 para. 3, NOP p. 79, B9 pp 185-279 and 315)

In relation to D5 (Teoh Eng Wah):

D5 was enriched as his bank account (Maybank 107050006654) received RM230,600.00 from the Plaintiffs. This fact was admitted by D5 in his Defence. (BOP A p.103, NOP p. 100 and PW1 Q5)

In relation to D19 (Gan Yu Chai):

D19 was enriched by the fact that his bank account (Affin Bank 200190045270) received a total sum of RM548,480.00 from the Plaintiffs. This was an admitted fact in D19’s Defence. (BOP A p. 112, PW1 Q5, PW2 Q4)

In relation to D10 (Lim Chung Phin):

D10 was enriched as his bank account (Public Bank No. 4409540815) received a total of RM55,000.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. This fact was admitted by D10 during cross-examination and in his witness statement. (NOP p. 17 DW4 Q12 PW1 Q5)

In relation to D6 (Liew Si Moy):

D6 was enriched as her bank account (Maybank 110032129238) received RM221,700.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. This fact was admitted by D6 during cross-examination. (NOP p. 29) Agree or disagree that your bank account did receive RM221,700 from the Plaintiff. LIEW Agree.”

In relation to D4 (Lau Yien Toh, wife of Loi):

D4 was enriched as her bank accounts (Alliance Bank 110630010017228; Maybank 161211320932; Public Bank 4106137816) received a total of RM1,334,145.00 from the 1st Plaintiff via bank transfer, and RM888,000.00 via cash deposits. (PW1 Q5) • Q&A 5 PW-1 • D4’s Maybank Statement (B6 pp 202-289) • D4’s Alliance Bank Statement (B4 pp 47-117) • D4’s Public Bank Statement (B8 pp 218-277 • Cash Deposits (B8 pp 165, 150) • Cash Deposits (B4 pp 18-19, 163, 171)

In relation to D11 (Amy Loi Rong Rong):

D11 was enriched as her bank account (Alliance Bank 110630020003618) received RM16,000.00 via bank transfer and RM160,000.00 via cash deposits from the 1st Plaintiff. (PW1 Q5; B9 pp 39, 156)

In relation to D17 (Ooi Tooi Seah):

D17 was enriched as D17’s bank account (CIMB 7063111402) received RM259,940.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. (PW1 Q5; B9 pp 279-299; B1 pp 178-186 NOP pp 24 and 25) Can you confirm that you did receive RM259,000 from the Plaintiff? […] OOI Agree.”

In relation to D18 (Tan Keit Lee): D18 was enriched as D18’s bank account (CIMB 7022641846) received RM134,100.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. D18 admitted his account received the 1st Plaintiff’s money. (PW-1 Q5 pp 141, 287-300 B9, pp 273-277 B1, p. 23 NOP) But the money from the Plaintiffs did go inside the account? Yours. Correct? Yes, or no? Yes or no, Mr Tan? KEIT Yes.” The 1st Plaintiff’s submissions (Encl. 221 and 248)

The summary of the 1st Plaintiff’s case and submissions are as follows:

The Plaintiffs transferred/paid amounts into the respective Defendants’ bank accounts as the 1st Plaintiff was defrauded by one Loi Hieng Hung.

The Defendants never gave any consideration for the amounts received from the Plaintiffs and have been unjustly enriched. Therefore, the Defendants should return the amounts received to the Plaintiffs.

Each of the Defendants have asserted that they were not unjustly enriched, offering various explanations as to how the amounts received were used. However, none of these explanations are substantiated by reliable documentary evidence.

None of the Defendants’ actions after receiving the Plaintiffs' funds alter the fact that they were enriched at the Plaintiffs’ expense. Their subsequent use or dissipation of the funds does not relieve them of the obligation to make restitution.

Even if the Defendants had withdrawn the amounts and thrown them into the deep blue sea, that act would not negate their enrichment.

Accepting such a position would lead to an absurd outcome: that a recipient of funds (transferred to the recipient due to fraud) who provided no consideration could avoid liability merely by dissipating the money in any arbitrary or self-serving manner.

The Defendants may argue that the Plaintiffs’ loss was due to their own greed or negligence or alleged participation in illegal activities, and that the Plaintiffs should therefore be denied restitution. These assertions are speculative and unsupported by personal knowledge. Submissions of D1, D5 and D19 (Encl. 228 and 246)

D1, D5 and D19 submit that the 1st Plaintiff claim is tainted with illegality and that the arrangements between the Plaintiffs and Loi characterised as an investment were in fact illegal transactions that contravened public policy.

The contemporaneous documents and the evidence of the 1st Plaintiff reflected that the transactions were in fact moneylending transactions between the 1st Plaintiff and Loi. (paras. 10 and 11)

The 1st Plaintiff had on numerous occasions agreed to lend money to Loi at his requests with the expectation of receiving exorbitant returns in addition to the principal sums advanced. (NOP pp. 16 and 17 and section 2 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 definitions of borrower, interest, moneylending and moneylender)

The Federal Court in the case of Triple Zest Trading & Suppliers & Ors v. Applied Business Technologies Sdn. Bhd. [2023] 6 MLJ 818 decided that where there is an agreement to lend money subject to the payment of a sum that is in excess of the principal amount payable to the lender, that additional sum payable constitutes “interest”. (see also Ang Ee Zhuan v. Hew Shiau Yeong & Anor [2024] MLJU 1988)

The 1st Plaintiff had on at least 3 occasions extended loans to Loi at his requests with the expectation of receiving exorbitant returns in add ition to repayment of the principal sums. It is sufficient that there exists an agreement to lend money on term requiring repayment of a sum exceeding the principal amount advanced. (ss. 5 (2) and 10OA Moneylenders Act 1951 presumption as to the business of moneylending & Triple Zest supra paras 56 and 57)

The High Court in the case of Abda Airfreight Sdn. Bhd. v. Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia Bhd. [2001] 3 MLJ 641 decided as follows: “(b) if the contract is ex facie lawful, but both parties intend to exploit it for an illegal purpose, then the contract is illegal in its inception despite the appearance of it being innocent. This would be the situation where both parties intend to accomplish an unlawful end and, consequently both would be without remedy.”

The investment between the 1st Plaintiff and Loi is illegal in its inception despite the appearance of it being innocent. The guise of the said investment to engage in unlicensed moneylending activities is in contravention of the Moneylenders Act 1951.

The Federal Court in the case of Datuk Ong Kee Hui v. Sinyium Anak Mutit [1983] 1 MLJ 35 decided as follows: “ex turpi causa non oritur action (No action can arise from an illegal act) Even if he had no knowledge of the illegality, the arrangement being intrinsically and inevitably illegal, the law gives him no allowance for innocence so far as consequences are concerned. The court will not assist a person to pursue his claim if it arises ex turpis and when the defendant is equally at fault the court will apply the maxim potior est condition defendentis (in a case of equal or mutual fault)”

The Court of Appeal in the case of Lee Nyan Hon & Bros Sdn. Bhd. v. Metro Charm Sdn. Bhd. [2009] 6 MLJ 450 decided as follows: “No court will enforce an illegal contract or allow itself to be made the instrument of enforcing obligations arising out of a contract or transaction which is illegal, and the illegality is duly brought to the notice of the court, and the person invoking the aid of the court is himself implicated in the illegality, even if the defendant has not pleaded the illegality. So long as the evidence adduced by the plaintiff proves the illegality, the court will not assist him.”

The Federal Court in the case of Merong Mahawangsa Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v. Dato’ Shazryl Eskay bin Abdullah [2015] 5 MLJ 619 decided as follows: “Clearly, therefore, courts are bound at all stages to take notice of illegality, whether ex facie or which later appears, even though not pleaded, and to refuse to enforce the contract. At the outset we must say that the trial courts must be vigilant not to provide any relief on contracts which is void on the grounds of public policy, or illegality, whether of not it is the pleaded case of the parties or whether the issue was raised during the trial.”

The Court of Appeal in the case of Dr Mansur bin Hussain & Ors v. Barisan Tenaga Perancang (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2019] MLJU 1552 decided as follows: “As such, when both parties before court are in pari delicto or where both parties are at equal fault, the court will not involve itself in resolving one side’s claim over the other and whoever is in possession of whatever is in dispute continues to do so in the absence of a superior claim. The court will not render assistance to those who come before it with unclean hands and the remedy of restitution under s. 66 of the Contracts Act will not avail such litigants.”

D1, D5 and D19 submit that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is a cause of action founded in equity, a party seeking equitable relief must come to court with clean hands.

Both D1 and D5 never received any form of benefit from Loi in return for lending him their bank accounts. In the case of Ooi Meng Khin v. Amanah Scotts Properties (KL) Sdn. Bhd. [2014] 6 MLJ 488 the Court of Appeal decided that in dealing with the Law of Restitution it has been outlined that the claimant must show the defendant has been enriched by a benefit, that the benefit had been obtained at the expense of the plaintiff and that the benefit must be gained in circumstances where it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the same.

There was no unjust enrichment on the part of D19, as he had duly provided valuable consideration of RM550,000.00 interest free loan to Loi prior to receiving repayment from Loi via the Plaintiffs’ transfers.

The Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) submit that the 1st Plaintiff claim is tainted with illegality and the Court ought to deny its assistance to the parties who being implicated in such illegality now seeks to enhance a cause of action that relies upon or arises from those unlawful acts. Submissions of D4 and D11 (Encl. 215 and 249)

D4 and D11 submissions in a nutshell are as follows:

the Plaintiffs have failed to discharged their burden of proof as there is no credible evidence that the Plaintiffs have paid any monies to D4 and D11;

even if the receipt of monies is proven (which is denied) D4 and D11 were not parties to, nor involved in any of the alleged transactions between the Plaintiffs and Loi;

at all material times, D4 and D11 were not in control over their respective bank accounts and conversely their bank accounts were under the full control of Loi; and

D4 and D11 did not personally receive or benefit from any monies which the 1st Plaintiff had allegedly transferred to the bank accounts of D4 and D11.

D4 and D11 submit that the Plaintiffs failed to prove their allegation that the sums of RM2,222,145.00 and RM176,000.00 had been transferred or deposited to the bank accounts of D4 and D11 respectively. The Plaintiffs failed to show proof of the any cash deposits of RM888,000.00 into D4 bank’s account (Annexure B of the Amended Statement of Claim). The 1st Plaintiff conceded that there were no supporting documents in respect of the cash transactions into D4 bank accounts. (NOP pp. 152, 157 and 158).

Any fraudulent conduct allegedly committed by Loi, if at all proven is irrelevant to D4 and D11. The losses and damages suffered by the Plaintiffs arose solely by their voluntary decision and knowledge in entering into the alleged investment scheme as represented by Loi.

There is absence of specific facts to support the allegation that D4 and D11 had dishonestly assisted in Loi’s alleged fraud. The Court of Appeal in the case of Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v. Robert Doran & Ors and other appeals [2013] 2 MLJ 174 decided as follows: “The allegation of dishonesty must be clearly pleaded in the statement of case. We consider that this involves setting out concisely the facts upon which the allegations of the subjective element of dishonesty is founded and also the facts upon which reliance is placed as demonstrating that the objective element is satisfied, at any rate unless it is manifest that if the facts supporting the subjective elements are proved, then the objective element would be satisfied too.”

The funds allegedly transferred into D4 and D11 bank’s accounts were done so upon Loi’s express instructions, without any evidence of a meeting of minds with D4 and D11 on a common intention to defraud the Plaintiffs. These accounts were under the control of Loi who was in possession of both the ATM cards and PIN numbers of both the accounts. They had no knowledge of not did they participate in any alleged fraudulent scheme by Loi. There is no evidence to establish any dishonest assistance, false representation or conspiracy on the part of D4 and D11. (para. 46, 47 and 49).

D4 and D11 further submit that the 1st Plaintiff’s claim for restitution against them must fail, as there is no evidence that D4 and D11 were ever unjustly enriched by the alleged monies deposited by the 1st Plaintiff. The Plaintiffs have failed to prove D4 and D11 retained or benefitted from the alleged monies deposited or that such retention (if any) was unjust. (para. 57) In cross-examination by D4 and D11 counsel, the 1st Plaintiff agreed that Loi had never raised any complaint about not receiving the alleged deposits made by the 1st Plaintiff (NOP 1 p. 160) as follows: “YHW: I am going to put to you, I think you have answered this earlier, but I’ll put to you again that at no time had Loi ever come back to you and complained that he never received the monies which you claimed to have banked in cash into those accounts. TIONG: Yes.” Submissions of D6 and D10 (Encl. 224 and 244)

D6 and D10 submissions in a nutshell are as follows:

Both D6 and D10 have no relationship whatsoever with the Plaintiffs and are not involved in any business and/or investment dealings between the Plaintiffs and Loi Hieng Hung.

Both D6 and D10 are not privy to any arrangement and/or transaction between the Plaintiffs and Loi.

Monies received by both D6 and D10 are for valuable consideration. (para 11)

D6 and D10 are in the business of procuring domestic and/or foreign labour. Loi has been using the services provided by D6 and D10 since 2015. Loi will cause monies to be deposited from 3rd parties into the accounts belonging to both Defendants for the services provided. (para 12 and 13)

The Defendants (D6 and D11) submit that the Plaintiffs have failed to discharge their burden of proving that Loi committed fraud against them. The burden of proof under section 101 Evidence Act 1950 lies on the Plaintiffs to establish the alleged fraud on the balance of probabilities. During cross-examination (NOP pp 78-88) the 1st Plaintiff was unable to reconcile the record of all the transaction made.

The Plaintiffs failed to adduce cogent evidence to implicate D6 and D10 for dishonest assistance. The standard of proof for fraud in on the balance of probabilities. (see Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn. Bhd. v. Damai Setia Sdn. Bhd. [2015] 7 CLJ 584 Federal Court)

The Defendants were deprived of the right and/or opportunity to cross-examine Loi. The Plaintiff’s conduct was a tactical manoeuvre in filing two separate actions, one against 20 Defendants in this action and the other against Loi and this tantamount to an abuse of the Court’s process. (para 139 and 142). Both D6 and D10 pray that the Plaintiffs’ claim against them be dismissed with costs. Submissions of D16, D17 and D18 (Encl. 231 and 251)

D16, D17 and D18 submissions in a nutshell are as follows:

the alleged purpose of the investment between the Plaintiffs remains unproven and is illegal (para 7 and 11);

the Plaintiffs failed to prove that there was dishonest assistance and knowing receipts by D16, 17 and 18 (para 29); and

the Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment is unsustainable and pray that the claim be dismissed with costs (para 33). Law on Unjust Enrichment

In the case of Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Limited [1943] AC 32, Lord Wright stated the following at page 61: “It is clear that any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now recognized to fall within a third category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution.”

The High Court in the case of AmBank (M) Bhd v. KB Leisure (M) Sdn Bhd [2012] 7 MLJ 364 at pp 373-374 decided as follows: “[25] …The House of Lords, allowing the claim in part, held that a recipient of stolen money was under an obligation to restore an equivalent sum to the victim if he had not received in good faith and given full consideration for it, and had thus been unjustly enriched at the expense of the true owner. Here, it was held that the casino had not given good consideration as gambling contracts were null and void under the law and the casino was under no legal obligation to honour the bets. However, equity required taking into consideration that the casino had also paid out winnings to the fraudulent solicitor, so the amount that the firm could recover from the casino was limited to the casino's net winnings against the solicitor over the entire course of betting. … [28] Lord Templeman added that in a claim for money had and received by a thief, the plaintiff victim must show that money belonging to him was paid by the thief to the defendant and that the defendant was unjustly enriched and remained unjustly enriched, (Emphasis added.) An innocent recipient of stolen money may not be enriched at all. But an innocent recipient of stolen money will be enriched if the recipient has not given full consideration. [29] Lord Goff of Chieveley explained that at common law, property in money, like other fungibles, is lost as such when it is mixed with other money. However, equity will in appropriate circumstances allow the tracing of stolen money by its rightful owner into the hands of subsequent recipients. As such, an action for money had and received is not usually founded on any wrongdoing by the third party, but on the fact that the third party cannot in conscience retain the money, or … for the third party to retain the money would result in his unjust enrichment.”

The Federal Court in the case of Dream Property Sdn Bhd v. Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 MLJ 441 decided that a cause of action in unjust enrichment can give rise to a right to restitution if the requisite requirements are established as follows: “[117] The above passages from the judgments of the House of Lords are instructive and are significant contribution to the development of law of unjust enrichment. The principle underlying the cases of Banque Financiere de la Cite v. Parc (Battersea) Ltd and Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v. IRC is that, in the context of the present case, a cause of action in unjust enrichment can give rise to a right to restitution where it can be established that:

the plaintiff must have been enriched;

the enrichment must be gained at the defendant’s expense;

that the retention of the benefit by the plaintiff was unjust; and

there must be no defence available to extinguish or reduce the plaintiff’s liability to make restitution.” Dishonest Assistance and Knowing Receipt

The Federal Court in the case of Datuk M Kayveas v. See Hong Chen & Sons Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] MLJU 1499 discussed on constructive trust and referred to the following: “[35] In Paragon Finance pic v. DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 Millet LJ said: “A constructive trust arises by operation of law whenever the circumstances are such that it would be unconscionable for the owner of property (usually but not necessarily the legal estate) to assert his own beneficial interest in the property and deny the beneficial interest of another. …” [36] The Court in Takako Sakao v. Ng Pek Yuen & Anor (supra) opined that: “A constructive trust is imposed by law irrespective of the intention of the parties. And it is imposed only in certain circumstances. […] What equity does in those circumstances is to fasten upon the conscience of the holder of the property a trust in favour of another in respect of the whole or a part thereof.”

The Court of Appeal in the case Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v. Robert Doran & Ors and other appeals [2013] 2 MLJ 174 at p. 209 decided that there must be a breach of trust by someone other than the defendant (in our case, Loi), the defendant must have helped that person in the breach, and the defendant must have a dishonest state of mind: “Knowing assistance” is one of two types of third-party liabilities under trust law, established in Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, and based on the following dictum of Lord Selbourne LC: (The responsibility of a trustee) may no doubt be extended in equity to others who are not properly trustees, if they are found … actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui que trust. But … strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps of which a court of equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees. As a general rule, there must be a breach of trust or fiduciary duty by someone other than the defendant, the defendant must have helped that person in the breach, and the defendant must have a dishonest state of mind.”

The Court of Appeal in Ooi Meng Khin v. Amanah Scotts Properties (KL) Sdn Bhd [2014] 6 MLJ 488 listed the elements of Knowing Receipt as follows: “[25] It would be useful to now look at the essential ingredients that would need to be proven by a claimant desirous of benefitting from utilizing this concept of knowing receipt to found his cause of action against the third-party recipient. Again, assistance may be obtained from the case of Zage III’s case where three elements needed to be fulfilled, namely:

a disposal of the plaintiff’s assets in a breach of fiduciary duty;

the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of the plaintiff, and

knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets received are traceable to the/a breach of the fiduciary duty.” Court’s Analysis and Evaluation

I have read and perused the Written Submissions and Authorities filed by the 1st Plaintiff and the Defendants. I have also considered the Oral Submissions and Arguments forwarded and articulated by the respective parties’ counsel on 26.9.2025. D1, D5 and D19

The Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) submitted that the contemporaneous documents and the evidence of the 1st Plaintiff reflected that the transactions were in fact moneylending transactions between the 1st Plaintiff and Loi.

The 1st Plaintiff submits that the 1st Plaintiff does not fall under the definition of moneylending in section 2 of the Moneylending Act 1951 (NOP pp 18 and 24) and that was expecting profits or returns on his investment (witness statement Q6) which never materialized. Further, there is no loan agreement to lend money and that the evidence by the 1st Plaintiff demonstrated that the investments with Loi were made-up stories and a fraud perpetrated on him by Loi. (NOP p 118)

Be that as it may, I am inclined to agree with the Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) submissions that in the 1st Plaintiff is not entitled to invoke or rely on the doctrine of unjust enrichment to recover losses arising from his own illegal and unlawful transactions.

The cause of action for dishonest assistance against the Defendants must be pleaded and in the Statement of Claim the particulars regarding the alleged dishonest assistance purportedly rendered by the Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) to Loi in paragraph 18 is lacking in the manner how the Defendants could have assisted Loi or to plead facts capable of establishing the Defendants had acted dishonestly so as to cause the Plaintiffs to suffer loss.

Needless to say, in the circumstances of this case the particulars of dishonest conspiracy is lacking to support the argument of dishonest assistance. Parties are bound by their pleaded case. (see the case of Mkini Dotcom Sdn. Bhd. v. Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn. Bhd. [2021] 7 CLJ 145 Federal Court) D4 and D11

The 1st Plaintiff conceded that mere legal ownership of a bank account does not necessarily equate to control over the same and that any other person in possession of the ATM card and PIN number could be in control and operate the said account. In cross-examination by D4 and D11 counsel, the 1st Plaintiff is fully aware that Loi was an undischarged bankrupt and therefore prohibited from operating his own bank account and admitted that he held the ATM Card of D4 (wife) and D11 (daughter). (NOP 1 at p. 92)

D4 and D11 have not been unjustly enriched not has D4 and D11 received any of the monies alleged to have been transferred by the 1st Plaintiff. Therefore, the 1st Plaintiff has not right to claim restitution against D4 and D11. The threshold of unjust enrichment in a cause of action has not been met in order to give rise to a right to restitution as outlined by the Federal Court in the case of Dream Property Sdn. Bhd. v. Atlas Housing Sdn. Bhd. [2015] 2 MLJ 441 as follows:

the Defendant has been enriched;

the enrichment was gained at the Plaintiff’s expense;

that the retention of the benefit is unjust; and

there is no applicable defence that extinguishes or reduces the Defendant’s liability to make restitution.

The transactions between the Plaintiffs and Loi are illegal. The 1st Plaintiff alleged that there was an investment scheme introduced and/or represented by Loi into which he purportedly invested a total RM6,736,360.00. The 1st Plaintiff admitted that he had proceeded with the investment despite the lack of any formal documentation. (see NOP 1 p. 7)

The 1st Plaintiff was evasive in cross-examination (NOP 1 p 106) in disclosing the source of funds raises and this raises serious concerns about the lawfulness of the funds and the legitimacy of the alleged transactions.

Therefore the 1st Plaintiff now cannot rely on the equitable jurisdiction of the Court to recover monies where he knowingly participated in a purported investment scheme tainted with illegality. (para. 65 and 70) D6 and D10

The descriptions recorded in the transactions such as “personal loans, audit fees and medical” suggest that these descriptions imply that the monies were disbursed as personal or professional assistance or friendly loans rather than as part of any investment scheme. (para. 48 of Encl. 224)

The Plaintiffs failed to prove the both D6 and D10 assisted in the alleged fraud for dishonest assistance or investment scheme with a dishonest state of mind. (see CIMB Bank Bhd. v. Maybank Trustees Bhd & Other Appeals [2014] 3 CLJ 1 Federal Court). The 1st Plaintiff did not plead the element of dishonesty in the Statement of Claim. (see Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v. Robert Doran & Ors [2012] CLJU 775 Court of Appeal)

Both D6 and D10 cannot be held liable for knowing receipt as they are not aware nor is there any evidence to suggest that they ought to have been aware that the monies received from the Plaintiffs were traceable to any fraudulent scheme allegedly perpetrated by Loi as reflected in their cross-examination by the 1st Plaintiff counsel. (NOP pp. 19 and 27) In furtherance to this, the 1st Plaintiff has knowingly engaged in illegal activity as the 1st Plaintiff has transferred monies in the pretext of paying the “head of immigration and judges”. (NOP p 63)

In this respect, the Court is inclined to agree with D6 and D10 submissions (para 89 and 90) that the chosen method of remittance is highly and strongly supports the inference that the Plaintiffs were aware of the illegitimate nature of the underlying transactions and that such arrangements are inconsistent with lawful, transparent business practices and serve as a further indication that the Plaintiffs were complicit in a scheme that was intended to operate outside the bounds of legality.

Therefore, as a result of the participation in these illegal transactions, the Plaintiffs are estopped from maintaining any cause of action against the Defendants and from seeking any relief in this action. Commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet (no one ought to derive a benefit from their own wrongdoing).

The question of whether a claim brought is founded in contract or in tort, public policy only requires the Court to deny its assistance to a Plaintiff seeking to enforce a cause of action if he was implicated in the illegality and in putting forward his case he sees to rely upon the illegal acts. (see Lee Nyan Hon & Brothers Sdn. Bhd. v. Metro Charm Sdn. Bhd. [2009] 6 CLJ 626 Court of Appeal).

The 1st Plaintiff source of income remains unclear and insufficiently explained. Despite the substantial sums of money involved, 1st Plaintiff was unable or unwilling to provide a transparent account of the origin of these funds. (NOP pp 60 and 61). Be that as it may, the Court is of the considered view that the receipt and retention of the said monies by D6 and D10 do not constitute unjust enrichment. D16, D17 and D18

The evidence before Court in respect of the bank statements of the Defendants show that monies were transferred in the Defendants’ account for various other reasons other that the alleged investment between the Plaintiffs and Loi. (NOP pp. and 93). The Court is inclined to agree with the submissions of the Defendants (Encl. 231 para 10) the monies transferred to the Defendants accounts were specifically for Loi’s personal gain and/or for an illegal investment between parties and therefore it is unjust to claim the monies from the Defendants on the ground of unjust enrichment.

The arrangement between the Plaintiffs and Loi to utilise 3rd party accounts to allegedly run the investments in itself is illegal which raises the inevitable inference that the Plaintiffs are colluding in the circumstances of this case to defraud the Defendants. In cross-examination by counsel for D16, D17 and D18 that the 1st Plaintiff conceded that the arrangement the 1st Plaintiff had with Loi is that funds will be transferred to 3rd party accounts. (NOP p. 98) The Plaintiffs have no right to claim for restitution from the Defendants when the arrangement and investment is illegal in nature.

In respect of the issue whether the Defendants assisted and/or knowingly received the monies, the Plaintiffs are aware ab initio that 3rd party accounts are controlled by Loi to benefit the alleged investment. (NOP p. 100) The Court finds that the Plaintiffs failed to prove that Defendants had knowledge over the alleged investment and/or assisted Loi in the alleged fraud. (NOP pp 104 and 105)

The Federal Court in the case of Detik Ria Sdn. Bhd. v. Prudential Corporation Holdings Limited & Anor [2025] 3 MLRA 544 decided as follows: “[167] The parties should not be allowed to protect themselves against the risk of their illegal transaction being discovered. In other words, where parties knowingly engage in an illegal transaction, they assume the risks associated with it meaning that they become culpable for the illegal act or error in issue.” Summary of Court’s Evaluation

The Court makes the following findings in a nutshell:

the conduct of the 1st Plaintiff constitute an irresistible inference that there was a conspiracy between the Plaintiffs and Loi to defraud the Defendants and/or a scheme to launder illegal funds;

the underlying transactions between Loi and the Plaintiffs are illegal in nature without proof of any valid investment transactions/scheme, hence no restitution shall arise from such unlawful transactions/scheme;

The 1st Plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden to prove his case against the Defendants on the balance of probabilities (see ss. 101 and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950); and

The 1st Plaintiff has failed to establish any case of unjust enrichment or dishonest/knowingly assistance against the Defendants to justify the alleged claims of restitution by the Plaintiffs. 2nd Plaintiff: Undischarged Bankrupt

Counsel for the Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) submitted that on the position of the 2nd Plaintiff’s claim ought to be struck out for want of locus standi. In this action, the 2nd Plaintiff was adjudged a bankrupt on 19.8.2024 as reflected in a letter dated 14.7.2025 (Encl. 217). Nevertheless, the 2nd Plaintiff continued to pursue this action without obtaining the previous sanction from the Director General of Insolvency.

By his previous solicitors’ letter dated 17.7.2025 (Encl. 220) the 2nd Plaintiff confirmed that he would not be applying for the Director General of Insolvency’s previous sanction to maintain and continue with this present action and expressly stated that he has no objection to his claim being struck out by Court.

The Court of Appeal in the case of Goh Eng Hwa v. M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn. Bhd. [2004] 3 MLJ 97 succinctly explains the requirement of a sanction as follows: “The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is ‘incompetent’ to maintain action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without ‘the previous sanction’ then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void. The act being a nullity for lack of capacity or competency, the question of pleading does not arise.” Conclusion

In the circumstances, the Court finds that on the totality of the evidence adduced by the 1st Plaintiff and the Defendants’ witnesses, the 1st Plaintiff has failed to prove the claim against the respective Defendants for unjust enrichment, dishonest assistance and knowing receipt on a balance of probabilities.

Consequently, the 1st Plaintiff claim against the Defendants (D1, D4, D5, D6, D10, D11, D16, D17, D18 and D19) for the reliefs below are dismissed with costs as follows:

A declaration that the 1st Plaintiff is entitled to monies paid to the Defendants;

An order of restitution for the monies to be paid by the Defendants to the 1st Plaintiff;

An order that the monies in the bank accounts held by the Defendants be paid to the 1st Plaintiff;

A declaration that the Plaintiffs are entitled to monies paid to the 4th and 11th Defendants; and

An order of restitution for the monies to be paid by the 4th and the 11th Defendants to the 1st Plaintiff.

The claim by the 2nd Plaintiff is hereby struck out with costs to be paid forthwith for lack of previous sanction from the Director General of Insolvency.

In awarding costs to the Defendants for this action, the Court has taken into consideration of the order made by the Court in Encl. 42 in respect of the Plaintiffs’ application in Encl. 4 whereby the Court on 16.7.2021 ordered costs as “costs in the cause”.

Decision

Based on the aforesaid reasons, the 1st Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants in the Amended Statement of Claim (Encl. 26) in paragraphs 21 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are hereby dismissed.

The 1st Plaintiff is to pay each of the Defendants (D1, D4, D5, D6, D10, D11, D16, D17, D18 and D19) costs of RM20,000.00 (subject to allocatur) as costs of this action and costs in the cause (Encl. 42).

The 2nd Plaintiff’s claim is hereby struck out with costs of RM2,000.00 to each the Defendants (D1, D4, D5, D6, D10, D11, D16, D17, D18 and D19) to be paid forthwith. Dated: 28 November 2025 sgd ………………………………………….. (EDDIE YEO SOON CHYE) Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Kuala Lumpur Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Rene Yap Ai Ping Messrs. Thomas Philip Kuala Lumpur. Counsel for the 1st, 5th & 19th Andy Yeoh Tze Hwa, Tan Zi Kang & Defendants: Lim Jian Heng Messrs. Yeoh Shim Siow & Lay Kuan Kuala Lumpur. Counsels for the 4th & 11th Chia Hui Ming, Woo Jin Leang, Defendants: Ivy Chin & Sim Khai Hung (PIC) Messrs. Chia Hui Ming & Co. Petaling Jaya. Counsel for the 6th & 10th Yeoh Jie Hu Defendants: Messrs. Yeoh & Partners Petaling Jaya. Counsel for the 16th, 17th & 18th Shaaleni Ravendran Defendants: Messrs. K Kumara & Co. Pulau Pinang.

Something wrong on this page?

Wrong text, a broken link, out-of-date content, or a removal request — tell us and we'll check it against the official source.

Report an issue Request removal

Malaysian judgment

Case metadata

Court: High Court of Malaysia
Decision date: 28 Nov 2025
Case number: WA-22NCvC-335-05/2021
Coram: YA Tuan Eddie Yeo Soon Chye
Practice area: Restitution – Unjust enrichment – Failure of consideration Dishonest assistance – Knowing receipt – Constructive trust Illegality – Ex turpi causa – Public policy – In pari delicto Moneylenders Act 1951 – Unlicensed moneylending – Investment or loan Bankruptcy – Undischarged bankrupt – Sanction of Director General of Insolvency – Locus standi Anti–Money Laundering, Anti–Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 – Freezing of bank accounts Burden of proof – Fraud – Standard of proof – Sections 101 and 103 Evidence Act 1950 Clean hands doctrine – Equitable relief – Restitution denied Third party bank accounts – Control of account – Absence of benefit – No unjust enrichment Civil procedure – Claim dismissed – Costs – Allocatur
Version: Alasan Penghakiman 1
Published: 5 Dec 2025
Source ID: b6a4a765-8ef4-4464-8c51-50414f59715b

Catchwords

Restitution – Unjust enrichment – Failure of consideration Dishonest assistance – Knowing receipt – Constructive trust Illegality – Ex turpi causa – Public policy – In pari delicto Moneylenders Act 1951 – Unlicensed moneylending – Investment or loan Bankruptcy – Undischarged bankrupt – Sanction of Director General of Insolvency – Locus standi Anti–Money Laundering, Anti–Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 – Freezing of bank accounts Burden of proof – Fraud – Standard of proof – Sections 101 and 103 Evidence Act 1950 Clean hands doctrine – Equitable relief – Restitution denied Third party bank accounts – Control of account – Absence of benefit – No unjust enrichment Civil procedure – Claim dismissed – Costs – Allocatur

Parties

1. ) TIONG WANG HOCK - plaintiff - ejudgment_parties
2. ) SYLVESTER SAN MUN KIN - plaintiff - ejudgment_parties
1. ) SIN KIM KUAN - defendant - ejudgment_parties
2. ) LOO WOOI KEONG - defendant - ejudgment_parties
3. ) OOI HOOI ENG - defendant - ejudgment_parties
4. ) LAU YIEN TOH - defendant - ejudgment_parties

Primary source

Compare this reader text against the official judgment source.

Open source PDF

Tiong Wang Hock v Sin Kim Kuan (WA-22NCvC-335-05/2021)

High Court of Malaysia28 Nov 2025

The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.

Outcome

What the court ordered

Encl.
1.
8.6.2021 D9 Notice of Discontinuance 13 2.
2.11.2021 D2 Judgment in Default 95 3.
2.11.2021 D7 Consent Judgment 122
4.
25.11.2021 D3, D8, D12, D14, D15 Notice of Discontinuance 116 5.
25.11.2021 D13 Judgment in Default 114 6.
25.11.2021 D20 Consent Judgment 136
The Plaintiffs commenced this trial against the remaining 10 Defendants as follows: Defendants/Witness Names 1 D1 (DW1) Sin Kim Kuan 2 D4 (DW6) Lau Yien Toh 3 D5 (DW2) Teoh Eng Wah 4 D6 (DW4) Liew Si Moy 5 D10 (DW5) Lim Chung Phin 6 D11 (DW7) Amy Loi Rong Rong 7 D16 (DW9) Tan Chai Tong 8 D17 (DW10) Ooi Tooi Seah 9 D18 (DW11) Tan Keit Lee 10 D19 (DW3) Gan Yu Chai 11 DW8 Wendy Loi Ting Ting
The Issues To Be Tried (Encl. 149) filed by the respective parties are as follows: Plaintiffs’ Issues
Whether the Plaintiffs are the transferors and/or payors of the amounts to the respective Defendants and/or into the bank accounts of and/or held by the respective Defendants as stated in Annexure A of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021.
Whether the First Plaintiff and/or Second Plaintiff had made a cash deposit into the bank accounts of the 4th Defendant and 11th Defendant as stated in Annexure B of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021.
Whether the Defendants knew and/or had a relationship and/or had dealings (whether by contract or otherwise) with the Plaintiffs.
Whether there was any consideration given by the Defendants for the receipt of money in their respective bank accounts as stated in Annexure A and B of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021.
Whether the retention of monies by the Defendants in their bank accounts as stated in Annexure A and B of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021 is an unjust enrichment by the Defendants.
Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution for the monies paid and/or transferred to the Defendants as stated in Annexure A and B in the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021.
Whether the Defendants have dishonestly assisted in the fraud by Loi and/or had received the monies with knowledge that they were not entitled to receive the said monies and/or that they did not give any consideration for the receipt of the said monies.
Whether the retention of the monies by the said Defendants is unconscionable.
Whether the Defendants’ are holding the monies as stated in Annexure A and B of the Amended Statement of Claim dated 12.7.2021 as constructive trustees for the Plaintiffs. The 1st, 5th and 19th Defendants’ Issues
Whether the 1st Defendant and the 5th Defendant had no knowledge in relation to the purpose of arrangements made by Loi Hieng Hung on the bank accounts held by the 1st and 5th Defendant.
Whether the 1st Defendant and 5th Defendant never spent the monies received from the Plaintiffs into their bank accounts.
Whether or not there was personal interest and/or benefit obtained or received by the 1st Defendant and 5th Defendant on the monies deposited by the Plaintiffs into the bank account of the 1st and 5th Defendant.
Whether the 1st Defendant and 5th Defendant were merely recipients of payments made by the Plaintiffs and all the monies deposited by the Plaintiffs into their bank accounts were proceeds to Loi and not the 1st Defendant and 5th Defendant.
Whether the 19th Defendant gave a friendly loan of RM550,000.00 by cash to Loi Hieng Hung.
Whether the monies deposited by the Plaintiffs to the 19th Defendant’s bank account as arranged by Loi Hieng Hung was a repayment of loan monies from Loi Hieng Hung to the 19th Defendant.
Whether the 19th Defendant is entitled to retain the monies received from the Plaintiffs with consideration given to Loi Hieng Hung.
Whether the Plaintiff’s cause of action against the Defendants is tainted by illegality where the Plaintiffs distributed, carried out and/or were involved in an illegal investment in breach of the law together with Loi Hieng Hung. The 4th and 11th Defendants’ Issues
Whether the 4th and 11th Defendants or Loi had received the money which was purportedly transferred and/or paid into the 4th and 11th Defendants’ bank accounts.
Whether the Plaintiffs knew that Loi had received the money purportedly transferred and/or paid into the 4th and 11th Defendants’ bank accounts. The 6th and 10th Defendants’ Issues
Whether the Defendants received the monies with the knowledge that they were not entitled to receive the said monies.
Whether the 6th and 10th Defendants provided services to Loi Hieng Hung and as consideration, Loi Hieng Hung had caused monies to be deposited from third party (including the Plaintiffs) into the 6th and 10th Defendants’ accounts.
Whether the Plaintiffs knew and/or carried out and/or were involved in illegal activities in all arrangements between the Plaintiffs with Loi Hieng Hung.
Whether the Plaintiffs have come to this Court with clean hands.
Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs claimed against the 6th and 10th Defendants.
Whether the Plaintiffs action against the 6th and 10th Defendants are a back-door attempt and/or abuse of Court process to obtain the Plaintiffs’ investment monies and/or to cover the Plaintiffs’ losses and/or damages. The 16th, 17th and 18th Defendants’ Issues
Whether the Plaintiffs had acted negligently, recklessly and/or with greed in depositing their money into the bank accounts of the 16th to 18th Defendants whom they did not have any relationship and/or know?
Whether the 16th to 18th Defendants can be liable purportedly for unjust enrichment when and/or at the time all the money deposited in their bank accounts were actually and/or in fact withdrawn and used and/or enjoyed by the said Loi himself? Evidence adduced by witnesses
The following witnesses of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants testified in Court and their evidence are reflected in the Notes of Proceedings as reflected in the Table below: P/D Witness Name of Witness NOP Encl. (Date) NOP PDF Pages
P1 PW1 Tiong Wang Hock 208 (7.4.2025) 209 (8.4.2025) 10 – 170 7 – 126 2. P2 PW2 Sylvester San Mun Kin 209 (8.4.2025) 210 (9.4.2025) 127 – 159 5 – 17 3. - PW3 Tiong Choo Miau 210 (9.4.2025) 18 – 72 4. D1 DW1 Sin Kim Kuan 210 (9.4.2025) 74 – 95 5. D5 DW2 Teoh Eng Wah 210 (9.4.2025) 98 – 118 6. D19 DW3 Gan Yu Chai 210 (9.4.2025) 119 – 128 7. D10 DW4 Lim Chung Phin 211 (10.4.2025) 7 – 21 8. D6 DW5 Liew Si Moy 211 (10.4.2025) 21 – 30 9. D4 DW6 Lau Yien Toh 211 (10.4.2025) 33 – 53 10. D11 DW7 Amy Loi Rong Rong 211 (10.4.2025) 54 – 65 11. - DW8 Wendy Loi Ting Ting 212 (29.4.2025) 5 – 12 12. D16 DW9 Tan Chai Tong 212 (29.4.2025) 13 – 22 13. D17 DW10 Ooi Tooi Seah 212 (29.4.2025) 22 – 28 14. D18 DW11 Tan Keit Lee 212 (29.4.2025) 28 – 39 Salient Facts
The Plaintiffs are the transferors and/or payors of the total sum of RM5,236,238.00 to the respective Defendants and/or into the bank accounts that are and/or were held by the Defendants respectively. Correspondingly, the Defendants are and/or were the respective account holders and/or recipients of the amounts that were transferred/paid by the Plaintiffs respectively. (PW1 Q3; PW2 Q4)
The reason for the transfers/payments by the Plaintiffs was because sometime in May 2015, the 1st Plaintiff was approached by Loi in respect of a potential investment relating to the outsourcing of foreign labour for company/companies in Penang and which Loi claimed the 1st Plaintiff would be entitled to 50% to 100% of the profits from the Investment. (PW1 Q4 and Q5)
Following that, between the period of around 2015 to around 2021 in which the various transactions by the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs were made, the 1st Plaintiff had inquired with Loi in respect of the Investment. At all material times, Loi gave various excuses in respect of the purported Investment and spun stories regarding the involvement of other purported individuals involved with the names “Wu”, “Datuk” and “Tan Sri”. (PW1 Q8 and B10 pp 8-49, 50-147)
Sometime in February 2021, the 1st Plaintiff again inquired as to the profits pertaining to the investment. However, he was met with the same excuses. Dissatisfied with the responses, the 1st Plaintiff pressed the issue further with Loi and this was when the 1st Plaintiff was informed that the Investment did not exist, and that it was a part of a fraud. The 1st Plaintiff then discovered that Loi, Wu, Datuk and Tan Sri are all the same person. (PW1 Q8, B10 pp 150-151)
Upon discovery of the fraud, the 1st Plaintiff made a police report on 24.2.2021 where he had, amongst others, stated the following:
That the 1st Plaintiff made his first payment for a sum of RM500,000.00 to Loi via cash in relation to the said investment, and this was done at Ampang Point.
From 2015 to around 2021, the Plaintiffs had made hundreds of transactions to most of the above-named Defendants. (B1 pp 282-284 and PW1 Q9)
18.
On 24.4.2021, the 1st Plaintiff made another police report stating, inter alia, that he had made cash deposits to the bank accounts of D4 and D11. (B1 pp 285-287 and PW1 Q9)
On 19.4.2021, the Plaintiffs conducted a bankruptcy search which verified that Loi Hieng Hung was a bankrupt. (B9 p 5; PW1 Q10)
On 2.6.2021, the Plaintiffs applied for leave to commence proceedings against Loi Hieng Hung as he was a bankrupt. Leave was obtained via High Court Order on 6.9.2021. (B2 pp. 6-300, 343-344, and PW1 Q10) Plaintiffs’ Submissions (Encl. 221 and 248)
In relation to D1 (Sin Kim Kuan):
D1 was indeed enriched by the very fact that her bank accounts (Maybank 108038991805; Hong Leong 14150131258; RHB Bank 15825300069038) received the total sum of RM1,040,568.00. This fact was admitted in D1’s Defence. D1 further agreed during cross-examination that there was no documentary evidence before the Court showing she ever denied receiving RM1,040,568.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. (BOP A p. 93 para. 3, NOP p. 79, B9 pp 185-279 and 315)
In relation to D5 (Teoh Eng Wah):
D5 was enriched as his bank account (Maybank 107050006654) received RM230,600.00 from the Plaintiffs. This fact was admitted by D5 in his Defence. (BOP A p.103, NOP p. 100 and PW1 Q5)
In relation to D19 (Gan Yu Chai):
D19 was enriched by the fact that his bank account (Affin Bank 200190045270) received a total sum of RM548,480.00 from the Plaintiffs. This was an admitted fact in D19’s Defence. (BOP A p. 112, PW1 Q5, PW2 Q4)
In relation to D10 (Lim Chung Phin):
D10 was enriched as his bank account (Public Bank No. 4409540815) received a total of RM55,000.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. This fact was admitted by D10 during cross-examination and in his witness statement. (NOP p. 17 DW4 Q12 PW1 Q5)
In relation to D6 (Liew Si Moy):
D6 was enriched as her bank account (Maybank 110032129238) received RM221,700.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. This fact was admitted by D6 during cross-examination. (NOP p. 29) Agree or disagree that your bank account did receive RM221,700 from the Plaintiff. LIEW Agree.”
In relation to D4 (Lau Yien Toh, wife of Loi):
D4 was enriched as her bank accounts (Alliance Bank 110630010017228; Maybank 161211320932; Public Bank 4106137816) received a total of RM1,334,145.00 from the 1st Plaintiff via bank transfer, and RM888,000.00 via cash deposits. (PW1 Q5) • Q&A 5 PW-1 • D4’s Maybank Statement (B6 pp 202-289) • D4’s Alliance Bank Statement (B4 pp 47-117) • D4’s Public Bank Statement (B8 pp 218-277 • Cash Deposits (B8 pp 165, 150) • Cash Deposits (B4 pp 18-19, 163, 171)
In relation to D11 (Amy Loi Rong Rong):
D11 was enriched as her bank account (Alliance Bank 110630020003618) received RM16,000.00 via bank transfer and RM160,000.00 via cash deposits from the 1st Plaintiff. (PW1 Q5; B9 pp 39, 156)
In relation to D17 (Ooi Tooi Seah):
D17 was enriched as D17’s bank account (CIMB 7063111402) received RM259,940.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. (PW1 Q5; B9 pp 279-299; B1 pp 178-186 NOP pp 24 and 25) Can you confirm that you did receive RM259,000 from the Plaintiff? […] OOI Agree.”
In relation to D18 (Tan Keit Lee): D18 was enriched as D18’s bank account (CIMB 7022641846) received RM134,100.00 from the 1st Plaintiff. D18 admitted his account received the 1st Plaintiff’s money. (PW-1 Q5 pp 141, 287-300 B9, pp 273-277 B1, p. 23 NOP) But the money from the Plaintiffs did go inside the account? Yours. Correct? Yes, or no? Yes or no, Mr Tan? KEIT Yes.” The 1st Plaintiff’s submissions (Encl. 221 and 248)
The summary of the 1st Plaintiff’s case and submissions are as follows:
The Plaintiffs transferred/paid amounts into the respective Defendants’ bank accounts as the 1st Plaintiff was defrauded by one Loi Hieng Hung.
The Defendants never gave any consideration for the amounts received from the Plaintiffs and have been unjustly enriched. Therefore, the Defendants should return the amounts received to the Plaintiffs.
Each of the Defendants have asserted that they were not unjustly enriched, offering various explanations as to how the amounts received were used. However, none of these explanations are substantiated by reliable documentary evidence.
None of the Defendants’ actions after receiving the Plaintiffs' funds alter the fact that they were enriched at the Plaintiffs’ expense. Their subsequent use or dissipation of the funds does not relieve them of the obligation to make restitution.
Even if the Defendants had withdrawn the amounts and thrown them into the deep blue sea, that act would not negate their enrichment.
Accepting such a position would lead to an absurd outcome: that a recipient of funds (transferred to the recipient due to fraud) who provided no consideration could avoid liability merely by dissipating the money in any arbitrary or self-serving manner.
The Defendants may argue that the Plaintiffs’ loss was due to their own greed or negligence or alleged participation in illegal activities, and that the Plaintiffs should therefore be denied restitution. These assertions are speculative and unsupported by personal knowledge. Submissions of D1, D5 and D19 (Encl. 228 and 246)
D1, D5 and D19 submit that the 1st Plaintiff claim is tainted with illegality and that the arrangements between the Plaintiffs and Loi characterised as an investment were in fact illegal transactions that contravened public policy.
The contemporaneous documents and the evidence of the 1st Plaintiff reflected that the transactions were in fact moneylending transactions between the 1st Plaintiff and Loi. (paras. 10 and 11)
The 1st Plaintiff had on numerous occasions agreed to lend money to Loi at his requests with the expectation of receiving exorbitant returns in addition to the principal sums advanced. (NOP pp. 16 and 17 and section 2 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 definitions of borrower, interest, moneylending and moneylender)
The Federal Court in the case of Triple Zest Trading & Suppliers & Ors v. Applied Business Technologies Sdn. Bhd. [2023] 6 MLJ 818 decided that where there is an agreement to lend money subject to the payment of a sum that is in excess of the principal amount payable to the lender, that additional sum payable constitutes “interest”. (see also Ang Ee Zhuan v. Hew Shiau Yeong & Anor [2024] MLJU 1988)
The 1st Plaintiff had on at least 3 occasions extended loans to Loi at his requests with the expectation of receiving exorbitant returns in add ition to repayment of the principal sums. It is sufficient that there exists an agreement to lend money on term requiring repayment of a sum exceeding the principal amount advanced. (ss. 5 (2) and 10OA Moneylenders Act 1951 presumption as to the business of moneylending & Triple Zest supra paras 56 and 57)
The High Court in the case of Abda Airfreight Sdn. Bhd. v. Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia Bhd. [2001] 3 MLJ 641 decided as follows: “(b) if the contract is ex facie lawful, but both parties intend to exploit it for an illegal purpose, then the contract is illegal in its inception despite the appearance of it being innocent. This would be the situation where both parties intend to accomplish an unlawful end and, consequently both would be without remedy.”
The investment between the 1st Plaintiff and Loi is illegal in its inception despite the appearance of it being innocent. The guise of the said investment to engage in unlicensed moneylending activities is in contravention of the Moneylenders Act 1951.
The Federal Court in the case of Datuk Ong Kee Hui v. Sinyium Anak Mutit [1983] 1 MLJ 35 decided as follows: “ex turpi causa non oritur action (No action can arise from an illegal act) Even if he had no knowledge of the illegality, the arrangement being intrinsically and inevitably illegal, the law gives him no allowance for innocence so far as consequences are concerned. The court will not assist a person to pursue his claim if it arises ex turpis and when the defendant is equally at fault the court will apply the maxim potior est condition defendentis (in a case of equal or mutual fault)”
The Court of Appeal in the case of Lee Nyan Hon & Bros Sdn. Bhd. v. Metro Charm Sdn. Bhd. [2009] 6 MLJ 450 decided as follows: “No court will enforce an illegal contract or allow itself to be made the instrument of enforcing obligations arising out of a contract or transaction which is illegal, and the illegality is duly brought to the notice of the court, and the person invoking the aid of the court is himself implicated in the illegality, even if the defendant has not pleaded the illegality. So long as the evidence adduced by the plaintiff proves the illegality, the court will not assist him.”
The Federal Court in the case of Merong Mahawangsa Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v. Dato’ Shazryl Eskay bin Abdullah [2015] 5 MLJ 619 decided as follows: “Clearly, therefore, courts are bound at all stages to take notice of illegality, whether ex facie or which later appears, even though not pleaded, and to refuse to enforce the contract. At the outset we must say that the trial courts must be vigilant not to provide any relief on contracts which is void on the grounds of public policy, or illegality, whether of not it is the pleaded case of the parties or whether the issue was raised during the trial.”
The Court of Appeal in the case of Dr Mansur bin Hussain & Ors v. Barisan Tenaga Perancang (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2019] MLJU 1552 decided as follows: “As such, when both parties before court are in pari delicto or where both parties are at equal fault, the court will not involve itself in resolving one side’s claim over the other and whoever is in possession of whatever is in dispute continues to do so in the absence of a superior claim. The court will not render assistance to those who come before it with unclean hands and the remedy of restitution under s. 66 of the Contracts Act will not avail such litigants.”
D1, D5 and D19 submit that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is a cause of action founded in equity, a party seeking equitable relief must come to court with clean hands.
Both D1 and D5 never received any form of benefit from Loi in return for lending him their bank accounts. In the case of Ooi Meng Khin v. Amanah Scotts Properties (KL) Sdn. Bhd. [2014] 6 MLJ 488 the Court of Appeal decided that in dealing with the Law of Restitution it has been outlined that the claimant must show the defendant has been enriched by a benefit, that the benefit had been obtained at the expense of the plaintiff and that the benefit must be gained in circumstances where it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the same.
There was no unjust enrichment on the part of D19, as he had duly provided valuable consideration of RM550,000.00 interest free loan to Loi prior to receiving repayment from Loi via the Plaintiffs’ transfers.
The Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) submit that the 1st Plaintiff claim is tainted with illegality and the Court ought to deny its assistance to the parties who being implicated in such illegality now seeks to enhance a cause of action that relies upon or arises from those unlawful acts. Submissions of D4 and D11 (Encl. 215 and 249)
D4 and D11 submissions in a nutshell are as follows:
the Plaintiffs have failed to discharged their burden of proof as there is no credible evidence that the Plaintiffs have paid any monies to D4 and D11;
even if the receipt of monies is proven (which is denied) D4 and D11 were not parties to, nor involved in any of the alleged transactions between the Plaintiffs and Loi;
at all material times, D4 and D11 were not in control over their respective bank accounts and conversely their bank accounts were under the full control of Loi; and
D4 and D11 did not personally receive or benefit from any monies which the 1st Plaintiff had allegedly transferred to the bank accounts of D4 and D11.
D4 and D11 submit that the Plaintiffs failed to prove their allegation that the sums of RM2,222,145.00 and RM176,000.00 had been transferred or deposited to the bank accounts of D4 and D11 respectively. The Plaintiffs failed to show proof of the any cash deposits of RM888,000.00 into D4 bank’s account (Annexure B of the Amended Statement of Claim). The 1st Plaintiff conceded that there were no supporting documents in respect of the cash transactions into D4 bank accounts. (NOP pp. 152, 157 and 158).
Any fraudulent conduct allegedly committed by Loi, if at all proven is irrelevant to D4 and D11. The losses and damages suffered by the Plaintiffs arose solely by their voluntary decision and knowledge in entering into the alleged investment scheme as represented by Loi.
There is absence of specific facts to support the allegation that D4 and D11 had dishonestly assisted in Loi’s alleged fraud. The Court of Appeal in the case of Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v. Robert Doran & Ors and other appeals [2013] 2 MLJ 174 decided as follows: “The allegation of dishonesty must be clearly pleaded in the statement of case. We consider that this involves setting out concisely the facts upon which the allegations of the subjective element of dishonesty is founded and also the facts upon which reliance is placed as demonstrating that the objective element is satisfied, at any rate unless it is manifest that if the facts supporting the subjective elements are proved, then the objective element would be satisfied too.”
The funds allegedly transferred into D4 and D11 bank’s accounts were done so upon Loi’s express instructions, without any evidence of a meeting of minds with D4 and D11 on a common intention to defraud the Plaintiffs. These accounts were under the control of Loi who was in possession of both the ATM cards and PIN numbers of both the accounts. They had no knowledge of not did they participate in any alleged fraudulent scheme by Loi. There is no evidence to establish any dishonest assistance, false representation or conspiracy on the part of D4 and D11. (para. 46, 47 and 49).
D4 and D11 further submit that the 1st Plaintiff’s claim for restitution against them must fail, as there is no evidence that D4 and D11 were ever unjustly enriched by the alleged monies deposited by the 1st Plaintiff. The Plaintiffs have failed to prove D4 and D11 retained or benefitted from the alleged monies deposited or that such retention (if any) was unjust. (para. 57) In cross-examination by D4 and D11 counsel, the 1st Plaintiff agreed that Loi had never raised any complaint about not receiving the alleged deposits made by the 1st Plaintiff (NOP 1 p. 160) as follows: “YHW: I am going to put to you, I think you have answered this earlier, but I’ll put to you again that at no time had Loi ever come back to you and complained that he never received the monies which you claimed to have banked in cash into those accounts. TIONG: Yes.” Submissions of D6 and D10 (Encl. 224 and 244)
D6 and D10 submissions in a nutshell are as follows:
Both D6 and D10 have no relationship whatsoever with the Plaintiffs and are not involved in any business and/or investment dealings between the Plaintiffs and Loi Hieng Hung.
Both D6 and D10 are not privy to any arrangement and/or transaction between the Plaintiffs and Loi.
Monies received by both D6 and D10 are for valuable consideration. (para 11)
D6 and D10 are in the business of procuring domestic and/or foreign labour. Loi has been using the services provided by D6 and D10 since 2015. Loi will cause monies to be deposited from 3rd parties into the accounts belonging to both Defendants for the services provided. (para 12 and 13)
The Defendants (D6 and D11) submit that the Plaintiffs have failed to discharge their burden of proving that Loi committed fraud against them. The burden of proof under section 101 Evidence Act 1950 lies on the Plaintiffs to establish the alleged fraud on the balance of probabilities. During cross-examination (NOP pp 78-88) the 1st Plaintiff was unable to reconcile the record of all the transaction made.
The Plaintiffs failed to adduce cogent evidence to implicate D6 and D10 for dishonest assistance. The standard of proof for fraud in on the balance of probabilities. (see Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn. Bhd. v. Damai Setia Sdn. Bhd. [2015] 7 CLJ 584 Federal Court)
The Defendants were deprived of the right and/or opportunity to cross-examine Loi. The Plaintiff’s conduct was a tactical manoeuvre in filing two separate actions, one against 20 Defendants in this action and the other against Loi and this tantamount to an abuse of the Court’s process. (para 139 and 142). Both D6 and D10 pray that the Plaintiffs’ claim against them be dismissed with costs. Submissions of D16, D17 and D18 (Encl. 231 and 251)
D16, D17 and D18 submissions in a nutshell are as follows:
the alleged purpose of the investment between the Plaintiffs remains unproven and is illegal (para 7 and 11);
the Plaintiffs failed to prove that there was dishonest assistance and knowing receipts by D16, 17 and 18 (para 29); and
the Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment is unsustainable and pray that the claim be dismissed with costs (para 33). Law on Unjust Enrichment
In the case of Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Limited [1943] AC 32, Lord Wright stated the following at page 61: “It is clear that any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now recognized to fall within a third category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution.”
The High Court in the case of AmBank (M) Bhd v. KB Leisure (M) Sdn Bhd [2012] 7 MLJ 364 at pp 373-374 decided as follows: “[25] …The House of Lords, allowing the claim in part, held that a recipient of stolen money was under an obligation to restore an equivalent sum to the victim if he had not received in good faith and given full consideration for it, and had thus been unjustly enriched at the expense of the true owner. Here, it was held that the casino had not given good consideration as gambling contracts were null and void under the law and the casino was under no legal obligation to honour the bets. However, equity required taking into consideration that the casino had also paid out winnings to the fraudulent solicitor, so the amount that the firm could recover from the casino was limited to the casino's net winnings against the solicitor over the entire course of betting. … [28] Lord Templeman added that in a claim for money had and received by a thief, the plaintiff victim must show that money belonging to him was paid by the thief to the defendant and that the defendant was unjustly enriched and remained unjustly enriched, (Emphasis added.) An innocent recipient of stolen money may not be enriched at all. But an innocent recipient of stolen money will be enriched if the recipient has not given full consideration. [29] Lord Goff of Chieveley explained that at common law, property in money, like other fungibles, is lost as such when it is mixed with other money. However, equity will in appropriate circumstances allow the tracing of stolen money by its rightful owner into the hands of subsequent recipients. As such, an action for money had and received is not usually founded on any wrongdoing by the third party, but on the fact that the third party cannot in conscience retain the money, or … for the third party to retain the money would result in his unjust enrichment.”
The Federal Court in the case of Dream Property Sdn Bhd v. Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 MLJ 441 decided that a cause of action in unjust enrichment can give rise to a right to restitution if the requisite requirements are established as follows: “[117] The above passages from the judgments of the House of Lords are instructive and are significant contribution to the development of law of unjust enrichment. The principle underlying the cases of Banque Financiere de la Cite v. Parc (Battersea) Ltd and Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v. IRC is that, in the context of the present case, a cause of action in unjust enrichment can give rise to a right to restitution where it can be established that:
the plaintiff must have been enriched;
the enrichment must be gained at the defendant’s expense;
that the retention of the benefit by the plaintiff was unjust; and
there must be no defence available to extinguish or reduce the plaintiff’s liability to make restitution.” Dishonest Assistance and Knowing Receipt
The Federal Court in the case of Datuk M Kayveas v. See Hong Chen & Sons Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] MLJU 1499 discussed on constructive trust and referred to the following: “[35] In Paragon Finance pic v. DB Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 Millet LJ said: “A constructive trust arises by operation of law whenever the circumstances are such that it would be unconscionable for the owner of property (usually but not necessarily the legal estate) to assert his own beneficial interest in the property and deny the beneficial interest of another. …” [36] The Court in Takako Sakao v. Ng Pek Yuen & Anor (supra) opined that: “A constructive trust is imposed by law irrespective of the intention of the parties. And it is imposed only in certain circumstances. […] What equity does in those circumstances is to fasten upon the conscience of the holder of the property a trust in favour of another in respect of the whole or a part thereof.”
The Court of Appeal in the case Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v. Robert Doran & Ors and other appeals [2013] 2 MLJ 174 at p. 209 decided that there must be a breach of trust by someone other than the defendant (in our case, Loi), the defendant must have helped that person in the breach, and the defendant must have a dishonest state of mind: “Knowing assistance” is one of two types of third-party liabilities under trust law, established in Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, and based on the following dictum of Lord Selbourne LC: (The responsibility of a trustee) may no doubt be extended in equity to others who are not properly trustees, if they are found … actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui que trust. But … strangers are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps of which a court of equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees. As a general rule, there must be a breach of trust or fiduciary duty by someone other than the defendant, the defendant must have helped that person in the breach, and the defendant must have a dishonest state of mind.”
The Court of Appeal in Ooi Meng Khin v. Amanah Scotts Properties (KL) Sdn Bhd [2014] 6 MLJ 488 listed the elements of Knowing Receipt as follows: “[25] It would be useful to now look at the essential ingredients that would need to be proven by a claimant desirous of benefitting from utilizing this concept of knowing receipt to found his cause of action against the third-party recipient. Again, assistance may be obtained from the case of Zage III’s case where three elements needed to be fulfilled, namely:
a disposal of the plaintiff’s assets in a breach of fiduciary duty;
the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of the plaintiff, and
knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets received are traceable to the/a breach of the fiduciary duty.” Court’s Analysis and Evaluation
I have read and perused the Written Submissions and Authorities filed by the 1st Plaintiff and the Defendants. I have also considered the Oral Submissions and Arguments forwarded and articulated by the respective parties’ counsel on 26.9.2025. D1, D5 and D19
The Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) submitted that the contemporaneous documents and the evidence of the 1st Plaintiff reflected that the transactions were in fact moneylending transactions between the 1st Plaintiff and Loi.
The 1st Plaintiff submits that the 1st Plaintiff does not fall under the definition of moneylending in section 2 of the Moneylending Act 1951 (NOP pp 18 and 24) and that was expecting profits or returns on his investment (witness statement Q6) which never materialized. Further, there is no loan agreement to lend money and that the evidence by the 1st Plaintiff demonstrated that the investments with Loi were made-up stories and a fraud perpetrated on him by Loi. (NOP p 118)
Be that as it may, I am inclined to agree with the Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) submissions that in the 1st Plaintiff is not entitled to invoke or rely on the doctrine of unjust enrichment to recover losses arising from his own illegal and unlawful transactions.
The cause of action for dishonest assistance against the Defendants must be pleaded and in the Statement of Claim the particulars regarding the alleged dishonest assistance purportedly rendered by the Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) to Loi in paragraph 18 is lacking in the manner how the Defendants could have assisted Loi or to plead facts capable of establishing the Defendants had acted dishonestly so as to cause the Plaintiffs to suffer loss.
Needless to say, in the circumstances of this case the particulars of dishonest conspiracy is lacking to support the argument of dishonest assistance. Parties are bound by their pleaded case. (see the case of Mkini Dotcom Sdn. Bhd. v. Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn. Bhd. [2021] 7 CLJ 145 Federal Court) D4 and D11
The 1st Plaintiff conceded that mere legal ownership of a bank account does not necessarily equate to control over the same and that any other person in possession of the ATM card and PIN number could be in control and operate the said account. In cross-examination by D4 and D11 counsel, the 1st Plaintiff is fully aware that Loi was an undischarged bankrupt and therefore prohibited from operating his own bank account and admitted that he held the ATM Card of D4 (wife) and D11 (daughter). (NOP 1 at p. 92)
D4 and D11 have not been unjustly enriched not has D4 and D11 received any of the monies alleged to have been transferred by the 1st Plaintiff. Therefore, the 1st Plaintiff has not right to claim restitution against D4 and D11. The threshold of unjust enrichment in a cause of action has not been met in order to give rise to a right to restitution as outlined by the Federal Court in the case of Dream Property Sdn. Bhd. v. Atlas Housing Sdn. Bhd. [2015] 2 MLJ 441 as follows:
the Defendant has been enriched;
the enrichment was gained at the Plaintiff’s expense;
that the retention of the benefit is unjust; and
there is no applicable defence that extinguishes or reduces the Defendant’s liability to make restitution.
The transactions between the Plaintiffs and Loi are illegal. The 1st Plaintiff alleged that there was an investment scheme introduced and/or represented by Loi into which he purportedly invested a total RM6,736,360.00. The 1st Plaintiff admitted that he had proceeded with the investment despite the lack of any formal documentation. (see NOP 1 p. 7)
The 1st Plaintiff was evasive in cross-examination (NOP 1 p 106) in disclosing the source of funds raises and this raises serious concerns about the lawfulness of the funds and the legitimacy of the alleged transactions.
Therefore the 1st Plaintiff now cannot rely on the equitable jurisdiction of the Court to recover monies where he knowingly participated in a purported investment scheme tainted with illegality. (para. 65 and 70) D6 and D10
The descriptions recorded in the transactions such as “personal loans, audit fees and medical” suggest that these descriptions imply that the monies were disbursed as personal or professional assistance or friendly loans rather than as part of any investment scheme. (para. 48 of Encl. 224)
The Plaintiffs failed to prove the both D6 and D10 assisted in the alleged fraud for dishonest assistance or investment scheme with a dishonest state of mind. (see CIMB Bank Bhd. v. Maybank Trustees Bhd & Other Appeals [2014] 3 CLJ 1 Federal Court). The 1st Plaintiff did not plead the element of dishonesty in the Statement of Claim. (see Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v. Robert Doran & Ors [2012] CLJU 775 Court of Appeal)
Both D6 and D10 cannot be held liable for knowing receipt as they are not aware nor is there any evidence to suggest that they ought to have been aware that the monies received from the Plaintiffs were traceable to any fraudulent scheme allegedly perpetrated by Loi as reflected in their cross-examination by the 1st Plaintiff counsel. (NOP pp. 19 and 27) In furtherance to this, the 1st Plaintiff has knowingly engaged in illegal activity as the 1st Plaintiff has transferred monies in the pretext of paying the “head of immigration and judges”. (NOP p 63)
In this respect, the Court is inclined to agree with D6 and D10 submissions (para 89 and 90) that the chosen method of remittance is highly and strongly supports the inference that the Plaintiffs were aware of the illegitimate nature of the underlying transactions and that such arrangements are inconsistent with lawful, transparent business practices and serve as a further indication that the Plaintiffs were complicit in a scheme that was intended to operate outside the bounds of legality.
Therefore, as a result of the participation in these illegal transactions, the Plaintiffs are estopped from maintaining any cause of action against the Defendants and from seeking any relief in this action. Commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet (no one ought to derive a benefit from their own wrongdoing).
The question of whether a claim brought is founded in contract or in tort, public policy only requires the Court to deny its assistance to a Plaintiff seeking to enforce a cause of action if he was implicated in the illegality and in putting forward his case he sees to rely upon the illegal acts. (see Lee Nyan Hon & Brothers Sdn. Bhd. v. Metro Charm Sdn. Bhd. [2009] 6 CLJ 626 Court of Appeal).
The 1st Plaintiff source of income remains unclear and insufficiently explained. Despite the substantial sums of money involved, 1st Plaintiff was unable or unwilling to provide a transparent account of the origin of these funds. (NOP pp 60 and 61). Be that as it may, the Court is of the considered view that the receipt and retention of the said monies by D6 and D10 do not constitute unjust enrichment. D16, D17 and D18
The evidence before Court in respect of the bank statements of the Defendants show that monies were transferred in the Defendants’ account for various other reasons other that the alleged investment between the Plaintiffs and Loi. (NOP pp. and 93). The Court is inclined to agree with the submissions of the Defendants (Encl. 231 para 10) the monies transferred to the Defendants accounts were specifically for Loi’s personal gain and/or for an illegal investment between parties and therefore it is unjust to claim the monies from the Defendants on the ground of unjust enrichment.
The arrangement between the Plaintiffs and Loi to utilise 3rd party accounts to allegedly run the investments in itself is illegal which raises the inevitable inference that the Plaintiffs are colluding in the circumstances of this case to defraud the Defendants. In cross-examination by counsel for D16, D17 and D18 that the 1st Plaintiff conceded that the arrangement the 1st Plaintiff had with Loi is that funds will be transferred to 3rd party accounts. (NOP p. 98) The Plaintiffs have no right to claim for restitution from the Defendants when the arrangement and investment is illegal in nature.
In respect of the issue whether the Defendants assisted and/or knowingly received the monies, the Plaintiffs are aware ab initio that 3rd party accounts are controlled by Loi to benefit the alleged investment. (NOP p. 100) The Court finds that the Plaintiffs failed to prove that Defendants had knowledge over the alleged investment and/or assisted Loi in the alleged fraud. (NOP pp 104 and 105)
The Federal Court in the case of Detik Ria Sdn. Bhd. v. Prudential Corporation Holdings Limited & Anor [2025] 3 MLRA 544 decided as follows: “[167] The parties should not be allowed to protect themselves against the risk of their illegal transaction being discovered. In other words, where parties knowingly engage in an illegal transaction, they assume the risks associated with it meaning that they become culpable for the illegal act or error in issue.” Summary of Court’s Evaluation
The Court makes the following findings in a nutshell:
the conduct of the 1st Plaintiff constitute an irresistible inference that there was a conspiracy between the Plaintiffs and Loi to defraud the Defendants and/or a scheme to launder illegal funds;
the underlying transactions between Loi and the Plaintiffs are illegal in nature without proof of any valid investment transactions/scheme, hence no restitution shall arise from such unlawful transactions/scheme;
The 1st Plaintiff has failed to discharge the burden to prove his case against the Defendants on the balance of probabilities (see ss. 101 and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950); and
The 1st Plaintiff has failed to establish any case of unjust enrichment or dishonest/knowingly assistance against the Defendants to justify the alleged claims of restitution by the Plaintiffs. 2nd Plaintiff: Undischarged Bankrupt
Counsel for the Defendants (D1, D5 and D19) submitted that on the position of the 2nd Plaintiff’s claim ought to be struck out for want of locus standi. In this action, the 2nd Plaintiff was adjudged a bankrupt on 19.8.2024 as reflected in a letter dated 14.7.2025 (Encl. 217). Nevertheless, the 2nd Plaintiff continued to pursue this action without obtaining the previous sanction from the Director General of Insolvency.
By his previous solicitors’ letter dated 17.7.2025 (Encl. 220) the 2nd Plaintiff confirmed that he would not be applying for the Director General of Insolvency’s previous sanction to maintain and continue with this present action and expressly stated that he has no objection to his claim being struck out by Court.
The Court of Appeal in the case of Goh Eng Hwa v. M/S Laksamana Realty Sdn. Bhd. [2004] 3 MLJ 97 succinctly explains the requirement of a sanction as follows: “The requirement of a sanction is not just a formality. Without the sanction a bankrupt is ‘incompetent’ to maintain action. It goes to his capacity. If he is incompetent to file the counterclaim without ‘the previous sanction’ then the filing of the counterclaim without the previous sanction would have been null and void. The act being a nullity for lack of capacity or competency, the question of pleading does not arise.” Conclusion
In the circumstances, the Court finds that on the totality of the evidence adduced by the 1st Plaintiff and the Defendants’ witnesses, the 1st Plaintiff has failed to prove the claim against the respective Defendants for unjust enrichment, dishonest assistance and knowing receipt on a balance of probabilities.
Consequently, the 1st Plaintiff claim against the Defendants (D1, D4, D5, D6, D10, D11, D16, D17, D18 and D19) for the reliefs below are dismissed with costs as follows:
A declaration that the 1st Plaintiff is entitled to monies paid to the Defendants;
An order of restitution for the monies to be paid by the Defendants to the 1st Plaintiff;
An order that the monies in the bank accounts held by the Defendants be paid to the 1st Plaintiff;
A declaration that the Plaintiffs are entitled to monies paid to the 4th and 11th Defendants; and
An order of restitution for the monies to be paid by the 4th and the 11th Defendants to the 1st Plaintiff.
The claim by the 2nd Plaintiff is hereby struck out with costs to be paid forthwith for lack of previous sanction from the Director General of Insolvency.
In awarding costs to the Defendants for this action, the Court has taken into consideration of the order made by the Court in Encl. 42 in respect of the Plaintiffs’ application in Encl. 4 whereby the Court on 16.7.2021 ordered costs as “costs in the cause”.

Catchwords

Parties

1. ) TIONG WANG HOCK - plaintiff - ejudgment_parties

2. ) SYLVESTER SAN MUN KIN - plaintiff - ejudgment_parties

1. ) SIN KIM KUAN - defendant - ejudgment_parties

2. ) LOO WOOI KEONG - defendant - ejudgment_parties

3. ) OOI HOOI ENG - defendant - ejudgment_parties

4. ) LAU YIEN TOH - defendant - ejudgment_parties