1. ) Vijaya Kumar A/L Chellapan v Syarikat Pembinaan Cameron Highlands Jaya Sdn. Bhd. (CB-12B-18-12/2023)

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO: CB-12B-18-12/2023

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LAMPIRAN A2 TATACARA PENGENDALIAN PROSIDING MELALUI TEKNOLOGI KOMUNIKASI JARAK JAUH MENGGUNAKAN PLATFORM E-REVIEW Pemakaian bagi Mahkamah di Semenanjung Malaysia 1. Kategori kes bagi pengendalian prosiding melalui teknologi komunikasi jarak jauh menggunakan platform e-Review adalah seperti yang berikut: atau S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg 2. Tatacara pengendalian prosiding melalui teknologi komunikasi jarak jauh menggunakan platform e-Review bagi Mahkamah Persekutuan, Mahkamah Rayuan, Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya, Mahkamah Sesyen dan Mahkamah Majistret di Semenanjung Malaysia adalah sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan dalam apa-ара Arahan Amalan, arahan atau garis panduan yang dikeluarkan berkenaan perkara ini dari semasa ke semasa.” [13] Penelitian kepada keputusan yang diberikan secara e-Review dalam Rekod Rayuan Tambahan tersebut menimbulkan kesukaran bagi Mahkamah ini. Oleh sebab itu Arahan Amalan Ketua Hakim Negara Bilangan 1 Tahun 2021 di atas tidak menyatakan bahawa keputusan boleh diberikan melalui e-Review. Tindakan ini adalah bercanggah dengan Arahan Amalan Ketua Hakim Negara Bilangan 1 Tahun 2021 tersebut. [14] Kewajaran Arahan Amalan Ketua Hakim Negara Bilangan 1 Tahun 2021 berkenaan dengan e-Review itu adalah bagi mengelakkan sebarang kekeliruan yang mungkin akan timbul ekoran daripada penghakiman yang diberikan melalui e-Review yang mempunyai keterbatasan komunikasi secara bersemuka dengan pihak-pihak. S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg [15] Walau bagaimanapun Mahkamah ini hanya dapat bergantung kepada Rekod Rayuan Tambahan berkenaan dengan keputusan tersebut sebagai asas untuk meneliti keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkaitan dengan jumlah gantirugi yang telah diberikan dalam kes ini. [16] Penelitian kepada rekod catatan di dalam e-Review tersebut menunjukkan bahawa jumlah gantirugi yang diberikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut adalah berasaskan kepada anggaran kos untuk kerja-kerja merobohkan struktur haram, kos tenaga kerja yang diperlukan, anggaran kos pembersihan dan perataan tanah. [17] Rujukan silang kepada dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan dalam perbicaraan ini seperti yang terdapat dalam Rekod Rayuan Jilid 3 [KM 5] didapati beberapa sebut harga telah dikemukakan iaitu di muka surat 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489 dan 490. Ini adalah merupakan dokumen-dokumen yang menunjukkan kesemuanya itu adalah sebut harga yang diberikan oleh syarikat-syarikat berkaitan dengan kerja-kerja yang akan dilaksanakan di kawasan tanah tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati dalam nota prosiding tiada sebarang keterangan yang jelas yang menyatakan bahawa kerja-kerja sebenar telah dilakukan di atas tanah tersebut dan jumlah yang dibelanjakan adalah seperti yang diputuskan dengan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkenaan dengan gantirugi tersebut. [18] Persoalannya ialah adakah Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dengan hanya berdasarkan kepada sebut harta-sebut harga tersebut boleh S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg memutuskan jumlah gantirugi tersebut di dalam kes ini. Penelitian kepada kes ini adalah didapati bahawa tuntutan Plaintif adalah berdasarkan kepada undang-undang tort berkaitan dengan pencerobohan tanah. [19] Adalah menjadi prinsip asas untuk gantirugi bagi pencerobohan iaitu pihak Plaintif berhak untuk menuntut gantirugi walaupun tiada kerugian sebenar yang dialami. Jika terdapat kerugian yang dialami Mahkamah perlu memberikan tafsiran gantirugi berdasarkan kepada perkara-perkara seperti yang berikut bahawa: (i) pencerobohan tersebut telah memberikan hasil kepada Defendan tanpa kerugian kepada Plaintif. (ii) kerosakan fizikal kepada tanah tersebut. (iii) pemisahan atau pengeluaran tanah daripada kawasan tersebut. [20] Hal ini telah dirumuskan dalam Clerks & Lindsell on Tort, Eighteenth Edition, London Sweet & Maxwell, 2000 muka surat 957 seperti yang berikut: “A claimant in trespass is entitled to recover damages, even though he has sustained no actual loss. When substantial damage has been caused the measure of damages varies S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg accordingly as the trespass belongs to one or other of the three following classes: ...” [21] Ia juga dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Amsiah Rahim v Borneo Samudera Sdn Bhd [2024] 6 MLJ 78 seperti yang berikut: “[21] We find that the leading authorities on damages for trespass were considered by the learned High Court judge in her judgment. We shall re-state the applicable principles laid down in the said cases. The trite principle is that trespass is actionable per se which means that once the tort is proved, the claimant is entitled to at least nominal damages…” [22] Pada hemat Mahkamah, Mahkamah ini mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar atau mengenepikan gantirugi yang telah diberikan oleh Mahkamah Sesyen sekiranya terdapat penyalahgunaan dan berlaku penyimpangan prinsip undang-undang dalam tafsiran gantirugi tersebut. Hal ini telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Mahmod bin Kailan v Coh Seng Choon & Anor [1976] 2 MLJ 239 seperti yang berikut: “The principle upon which we can interfere with the award has been stated by Lord Wright in Davies v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1942] AC 601 616 617 as follows: S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg “Where the award is that of the judge alone, the appeal is by way of rehearing on damages as on all other issues, but as there is generally so much room for individual choice so that the assessment of damages is more like an exercise of discretion than an ordinary act of decision, the appellate court is particularly slow to reverse the trial judge on a question of the amount of damages. It is difficult to lay down any precise rule which will cover all cases, but a good general guide is given by Greer L.J. in Flint v. Lovell. In effect the court, before it interferes with an award of damages, should be satisfied that the judge has acted on a wrong principle of law, or has misapprehended the facts, or has for these other reasons made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. It is not enough that there is a balance of opinion or preference. The scale must go down heavily against the figure attacked if the appellate court is to interfere, whether on the ground of excess or insufficiency.” The questions here therefore are – has the learned trial judge acted on a wrong principle of law or has he misapprehended the facts or has he made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered?” [23] Berdasarkan kepada prinsip di atas maka Mahkamah meneliti nota prosiding bagi melihat sama ada terdapat asas untuk amaun gantirugi yang diberikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam kes ini. Penelitian kepada keterangan saksi-saksi tersebut terutamanya S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg keterangan daripada saksi-saksi Plaintif iaitu SP 3, terdapat kerugian yang terpaksa ditanggung oleh Plaintif dan kerugian yang dijangka ditanggung oleh Plaintif. Ia melibatkan kerja-kerja yang terpaksa ditangguhkan untuk dilaksanakan ekoran daripada pencerobohan tanah oleh pihak Defendan. Ia telah menyebabkan peningkatan kos bahan pembinaan. Dalam konteks ini Plaintif menyatakan kos peningkatan bahan pembinaan adalah sebanyak RM 282,612.20. Ia telah termasuk di dalam jumlah keseluruhan gantirugi yang dipohon iaitu RM 376,879.20. Ia juga termasuk yuran professional juruukur bertauliah. [24] Pada masa yang sama juga keterangan menunjukkan bahawa kos kerja-kerja pembersihan di tapak tanah yang diceroboh ialah sebanyak RM 23,800.00. Malahan tuntutan gantirugi juga termasuk bayaran professional juruukur bertauliah seperti yang dinyatakan di atas. Apa yang jelas daripada tuntutan gantirugi tersebut ialah berdasarkan kepada anggaran-anggaran dan perbelanjaan yang mungkin akan digunakan serta bayaran professional yang perlu dijelaskan. Adakah jumlah tersebut adalah amaun sebenar kerugian yang dialami oleh pihak Plaintif. Adakah jumlah-jumlah tersebut telah dibuktikan di hadapan Mahkamah sehingga membolehkan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen memberikan amaun gantirugi yang berkenaan? [25] Penelitian kepada nota prosiding dan eksibit-eksibit yang dikemukakan Mahkamah berpendapat ia masih merupakan anggaran-anggaran yang dibuat oleh saksi-saksi Plaintif. Pada hemat Mahkamah ia bukannya satu pembuktian yang sewajarnya dilakukan oleh Plaintif S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg berkenaan dengan gantirugi-gantirugi tersebut. Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang jelas bagi memperolehi satu gantirugi khas ia hendaklah dibuktikan di Mahkamah secara khusus. [26] Selain daripada itu pihak Perayu juga membangkitkan isu berkenaan dengan kegagalan saksi-saksi pakar yang dipanggil oleh pihak Plaintif untuk mengemukakan affidavit seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah Aturan 40A KKM 2012. Ia juga telah dibangkitkan di peringkat semasa perbicaraan. Ini dapat dilihat dalam nota prosiding di halaman 134 dan 135 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 2 [KM 4] yang mana dinyatakan bahawa Mahkamah telah menyatakan sepatutnya isu berkenaan dengan kepatuhan Aturan 40 A KKM 2012 tersebut dibangkitkan di peringkat pengurusan kes mengikut Aturan 34 KKM 2012. [27] Adalah didapati Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak membuat apa-apa perintah berkenaan dengan isu Aturan 40 A KKM 2012 tersebut pada masa itu. Sebaliknya menyatakan bahawa dokumen tersebut telah dimasukkan di bawah Bahagian A, B dan C. Apa yang dapat difahami daripada catatan dalam nota prosiding tersebut tiada sebarang perintah dibuat berkenaan dengan isu Aturan 40A KKM 2012 tersebut walaupun ia dinyatakan dalam hujahan pihak-pihak di hadapan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Aturan 40A KKM 2012 memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: 40A Pakar bagi pihak-pihak S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg Mahkamah dalam perkara yang berada dalam kepakarannya. (1) Melainkan jika Mahkamah mengarahkan selainnya, keterangan pakar yang diberikan semasa perbicaraan mana-mana tindakan, diberikan dalam suatu laporan bertulis yang ditandatangani oleh pakar itu dan diekshibitkan dalam suatu afidavit bersumpah atau yang diikrarkan olehnya memberikan keterangan bahawa laporan yang dikshibitkan itu ialah daripadanya dan dia menerima tanggungjawab sepenuhnya bagi laporan itu. S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg (ii) memberi sebab untuk pendapatnya; S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg [28] Apa yang menarik berkenaan dengan Aturan 40A KKM 2012 dalam kes ini ia telah dibangkitkan semasa keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP 4 iaitu juruukur tanah berlesen. Malahan dalam hujahan semasa rayuan kes ini juga telah dinyatakan bahawa SP 4 yang memberikan keterangan sebagai saksi pakar tidak mematuhi Aturan S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg 40A KKM 2012. Peguam Perayu juga memetik keterangan SP 4 di muka surat 148 Rekod Rayuan ketika SP 4 memberikan keterangan. Dalam hal ini Mahkamah perlu melihat kembali adakah Aturan 40A KKM 2012 itu terpakai bagi SP 4. Di dalam muka surat 130 Rekod Rayuan terdapat keterangan seperti yang berikut: “Mano Encik Logisvarran, hari ini Encik Logisvarran beri keterangan di Mahkamah bagi pihak Plaintif sebagai seorang saksi pakar. SP 4 Expert witness.” [29] Penelitian kepada penyataan saksi SP 4 yang dicatatkan sebagai Penyataan Saksi Kedua Plaintif di muka surat 539 Rekod Rayuan menyatakan berkenaan dengan pekerjaan SP 4 seperti berikut: “1. S : Apakah pekerjaan Encik Logisvarran? J : Saya ialah seorang Juruukur tanah bertauliah dan merupakan Pengarah Urusan Syarikat Juruukur Amanah Sdn Bhd.” [30] Adakah disebabkan SP 4 adalah seorang juruukur tanah bertauliah maka ia menyebabkan pemakaian Aturan 40A KKM 2012 perlu digunakan atau adakah keterangan SP 4 hanyalah merupakan keterangan saksi pakar di bawah seksyen 45 Akta Keterangan 1950. Apakah dengan ketidakpatuhan Aturan 40A KKM 2012 itu menyebabkan keterangan SP 4 tidak boleh dipertimbangkan oleh S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Bagi menjawab persoalan ini Mahkamah perlu melihat secara terperinci Aturan 40A KKM 2012 tersebut, terutamanya berkenaan dengan apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan pakar seperti yang telah ditakrifkan dalam Aturan 40A KKM 2012 seperti yang berikut: “Sebutan "pakar" dalam Aturan ini ialah suatu rujukan kepada seorang pakar yang telah diarahkan untuk memberikan atau menyediakan keterangan bagi maksud prosiding Mahkamah.” [31] Ia menunjukkan pakar yang terpakai Aturan 40A KKM 2012 itu adalah seseorang yang telah diarahkan untuk memberi keterangan bagi maksud prosiding Mahkamah. Ia bukan menunjukkan bahawa apabila seseorang itu memberikan keterangan pakar bagi pihak Plaintif atau pihak Defendan, Aturan 40A KKM 2012 adalah secara automatik terpakai. Pada hemat Mahkamah Aturan 40A KKM 2012 ini adalah terpakai apabila Mahkamah setelah berpuas hati seseorang itu adalah pakar boleh mengarahkan pakar tersebut menyediakan laporan pakar dalam bentuk yang dikehendaki di bawah Aturan 40A KKM 2012 tersebut untuk membantu Mahkamah memahami sesuatu isu dengan bantuan pakar tersebut. Ia adalah sesuai dengan tanggungjawab pakar tersebut untuk membantu Mahkamah dalam memahami isu-isu yang berada di dalam kepakarannya seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Batu Kemas Industri Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Anor [2015] 7 CLJ 849. S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg [32] Sebenarnya Aturan 40A KKM 2012 adalah saling tak tumpah dengan peruntukan di bawah Bahagian 35 The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 di United Kingdom yang memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “ PART 35 EXPERTS AND ASSESSORS Duty to restrict expert evidence 35.1 Expert evidence shall be restricted to that which is reasonably required to resolve the proceedings. Interpretation and definitions 35.2—(1) A reference to an ‘expert’ in this Part is a reference to a person who has been instructed to give or prepare expert evidence for the purpose of proceedings. Experts—overriding duty to the court 35.3—[F3 (1) It is the duty of experts to help the court on matters within their expertise]. S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg Court’s power to restrict expert evidence 35.4—(1) No party may call an expert or put in evidence an expert’s report without the court’s permission. [F5(2) When parties apply for permission they must [F6 provide an estimate of the costs of the proposed expert evidence and] identify— (2). [F9The order granting permission may specify the issues which the expert evidence should address.] [F10(3A) Where a claim has been allocated to the small claims track or the fast track, if permission is given for expert evidence, it will normally be given for evidence from only one expert on a particular issue. (Paragraph 7 of [F11Practice Direction] 35 sets out some of the circumstances the court will consider when deciding whether expert evidence should be given by a single joint expert.)] [F12(3B) In a soft tissue injury claim, permission— (a) may normally only be given for one expert medical report; (b) may not be given initially unless the medical report is a fixed cost medical report. Where the claimant seeks permission to obtain a further medical report, if the S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg report is from a medical expert in any of the following disciplines— (ii) Consultant in Accident and Emergency Medicine; (iii) General Practitioner registered with the General Medical Council; or (iv) Physiotherapist registered with the Health and Care Professions Council, the report must be a fixed cost medical report. [F13(3C) In a claim for a whiplash injury, whether or not it is part of a claim for other injuries— and (ii) may not be given initially unless the medical report is a fixed cost medical report; and (ii) Consultant in Accident and Emergency Medicine; (iii) General Practitioner registered with the General Medical Council; or S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg (iv) Physiotherapist registered with the Health and Care Professions Council. provided that— (a) the report is from a doctor who is listed on the General Medical Council’s Specialist Register; and (b) the report provides evidence of the whiplash injury. (i) being a medical expert; and (ii) having the required medical qualifications for the purposes of diagnosis and prognosis of a whiplash injury. S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg meanings ascribed to them by paragraph 1.1(10A) and (16A), respectively, of the Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents; and Injury Claims Below the Small Claims Limit in Road Traffic Accidents.]] [F14(4) The court may limit the amount of a party’s expert’s fees and expenses that may be recovered from any other party.] General requirement for expert evidence to be given in a written report 35.5—(1) Expert evidence is to be given in a written report unless the court directs otherwise. Written questions to experts 35.6—[F16(1) A party may put written questions about an expert’s report (which must be proportionate) to— S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg unless in any case, (i) the court gives permission; or (ii) the other party agrees. (ii) that the party may not recover the fees and expenses of that expert from any other party. [F18 Court’s power to direct that evidence is to be given by a single joint expert 35.7—(1) Where two or more parties wish to submit expert evidence on a particular issue, the court may direct that the evidence on that issue is to be given by a single joint expert. S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg Instructions to a single joint expert 35.8—(1) Where the court gives a direction under rule 35.7 for a single joint expert to be used, [F19 any relevant] party may give instructions to the expert. [F20(2) When a party gives instructions to the expert that party must, at the same time, send a copy to the other relevant parties.] and S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg relevant] parties are jointly and severally liable(GL) for the payment of the expert’s fees and expenses. Power of court to direct a party to provide information 35.9 Where a party has access to information which is not reasonably [F23 available to another party], the court may direct the party who has access to the information to— and Contents of report 35.10—(1) An expert’s report must comply with the requirements set out in [F24[F25 Practice Direction] 35]. [F26(2) At the end of an expert’s report there must be a statement that the expert understands and has complied with their duty to the court.] S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg unless it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to consider the statement of instructions given under paragraph (3) to be inaccurate or incomplete. Use by one party of expert’s report disclosed by another 35.11 Where a party has disclosed an expert’s report, any party may use that expert’s report as evidence at the trial. Discussions between experts 35.12—(1) The court may, at any stage, direct a discussion between experts for the purpose of requiring the experts to— [F27(a) identify and discuss the expert issues in the proceedings; and b) where possible, reach an agreed opinion on those issues.] [F28(3) The court may direct that following a discussion between the experts they must prepare a statement for the court setting out those issues on which— S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg Consequence of failure to disclose expert’s report 35.13 A party who fails to disclose an expert’s report may not use the report at the trial or call the expert to give evidence orally unless the court gives permission. Expert’s right to ask court for directions 35.14—[F29(1) Experts may file written requests for directions for the purpose of assisting them in carrying out their functions.] [F30(2) Experts must, unless the court orders otherwise, provide copies of the proposed requests for directions under paragraph (1)— F32(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F32(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assessors 35.15—(1) … ” S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg [33] Bahagian 35 The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 United Kingdom telah menyatakan peruntukan yang lebih terperinci dan jelas berkenaan dengan keterangan saksi pakar dan bagaimana Bahagian 35 The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 United Kingdom tersebut perlu dilaksanakan jika dibandingkan dengan Aturan 40A KKM 2012. [34] Penelitian kepada Bahagian 35 The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 United Kingdom dan Aturan 40A KKM 2012 secara serentak dapat memberi kefahaman bahawa Aturan 40A KKM 2012 ini tidak semestinya terpakai kepada seorang saksi yang dikatakan seorang pakar melainkan Mahkamah menghendaki supaya saksi pakar membantu Mahkamah untuk memahami perkara-perkara di dalam kepakarannya. Pada masa tersebut pakar itu adalah dikehendaki menyediakan laporan seperti di Aturan 40A kaedah 3 KKM 2012. Malahan pihak-pihak boleh setelah mendapat kebenaran Mahkamah untuk mengemukakan soalan-soalan yang berkaitan kepada saksi pakar tersebut berkenaan dengan laporan yang disediakan seperti yang terdapat di bawah Aturan 40 A kaedah 4 KKM 2012. Apa yang jelas daripada keseluruhan peruntukan Aturan 40A KKM 2012 itu ialah untuk memberi peluang kepada semua pihak yang berkaitan untuk mengetahui apakah laporan bertulis yang disediakan oleh pakar bagi memberi peluang kepada pihak lawan mengemukakan soalan-soalan yang berkaitan kepada pakar tersebut. Bagi mencapai matlamat utama untuk pakar tersebut membantu Mahkamah memahami perkara-perkara yang berada di dalam kepakarannya. Pakar tersebut harus menjadikan kehadirannya untuk membantu Mahkamah memahami perkara-perkara dalam kepakarannya dan bukan berpihak kepada S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg Plaintif atau Defendan. Laporan tersebut disediakan berdasarkan kepada kepakaran dan profesionalisma saksi pakar tersebut. [35] Setelah memahami maksud Aturan 40A KKM 2012 tersebut adalah sukar untuk Mahkamah ini tidak dapat menerima hujahan pihak Perayu yang menyatakan bahawa disebabkan ketidakpatuhan Aturan 40A KKM 2012 tersebut maka keterangan SP 4 tidak boleh dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah. [36] Mahkamah juga menimbangkan adakah berdasarkan kepada keterangan-keterangan saksi-saksi dan eksibit-eksibit yang dikemukakan telah melunaskan tanggungjawab Plaintif untuk membuktikan kerugian bagi tuntutan kepada pihak Defendan. Dokumen-dokumen yang dinyatakan berkenaan dengan anggaran dan keterangan saksi-saksi pada hemat Mahkamah tidak berjaya melunaskan tanggungjawab Plaintif untuk membuktikan kerugian yang dialami daripada pencerobohan tanah yang dilakukan oleh pihak Defendan. Pada hemat Mahkamah bagi melunaskan tanggungjawab tersebut keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan tidak hanya sekadar anggaran-anggaran atau keterangan yang menyatakan berapakah perbelanjaan yang diperlukan bagi mengembalikan kedudukan tanah tersebut dalam keadaan yang sewajarnya kepada pihak Plaintif. [37] Namun demikian apabila terdapatnya pencerobohan tanah yang tidak menjadi perkara yang dirayu di hadapan Mahkamah ini gantirugi yang sewajarnya yang munasabah haruslah dipertimbangkan S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg walaupun pihak Plaintif tidak dapat menunjukkan secara khusus gantirugi tersebut. Undang-undang berkaitan dengan hal ini telah dirumuskan dengan menarik di dalam kes Taylor (C R) (Wholesale) Ltd v Hepworths Ltd [1977] 2 All ER 784 seperti yang berikut: “In Salmond on the Law of Torts it is said that— 'when a trespass has caused physical damage to the land, the measure of damages is the loss thereby caused to the plaintiff, which in all ordinary cases is measured by the resulting diminution in the value of the property. The measure of damages is not the cost of reinstatement … a cost which greatly exceeds the actual diminution in the value of the land. Thus if an old building is pulled down, the plaintiff cannot recover the cost of putting up a new one, but merely the value of the old unless his house is unique.' Finally, in McGregor on Damages there are these passages: 'It was for long said that the normal measure of damages was the amount of the diminution of the value of the land, a proposition based on what was generally considered to be the leading, but somewhat ancient, case of Jones v Gooday, where the alternative measure of cost of replacement or repair, i.e. the sum which it would take to restore the land to its original state, was rejected … However, as was pointed out in the 12th edition of this work, not only is Jones v S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg Gooday the sole case where a plaintiff in possession and with full ownership was refused the cost to him of replacement or repair of the damage done but Alderson B.'s remark there suggests that the cost of replacement or repair may be an inappropriate measure only because it is out of all proportion to the injury to the plaintiff. That this is the true reason of the result in Jones v. Gooday is now supported by Hollebone v. Midhurs and Fernhurst Builders, a decision which has been adopted by the Court of Appeal, in the context of a claim for breach of contract, in Harbutt's Plasticine v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co … The difficulty in deciding between diminution in value and cost of reinstatement arises from the fact that the plaintiff may want his property in the same state as before the commission of the tort but the amount required to effect this may be substantially greater than the amount by which the value of the property has been diminished. The test which appears to be the appropriate one is the reasonableness of the plaintiff's desire to reinstate the property; this will be judged in part by the advantages to him of reinstatement in relation to the extra cost to the defendant in having to pay damages for reinstatement rather than damages calculated by the diminution in the value of the land.' I think that these passages which I have just read from McGregor on Damages correctly reflect the state of the law. The various decided cases on each side of the line to which my attention has been drawn, and to some of which I have referred in this judgment, S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg reflect in my opinion merely the application in them of two basic principles of law to the facts of those various cases. These two basic principles are, first, that whenever damages are to be awarded against a tortfeasor or against a man who has broken a contract, then those damages shall be such as will, so far as money can, put the plaintiff in the same position as he would have been had the tort or breach of contract not occurred. But secondly, the damages to be awarded are to be reasonable, reasonable that is as between the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendant on the other. That these are the underlying principles is I think quite clear, for instance, from the judgments in Jones v Gooday, and in particular in the judgment of Alderson B. In Moss v Christchurch Rural District Council the plaintiff was the reversioner and could reasonably be and was put into the same position so far as money was concerned as he would have been had the relevant tort not occurred by the award to him of the diminution in value of his property caused by the fire which was the subject-matter of that case. That all these cases do really only reflect the application of the two basic principles to which I have referred to their special facts can, if I may say so, be demonstrated by adopting the judgment of O'Connor LJ in the Irish case of Hepenstall v Wicklow County Council. Again in Hole & Son (Sayers Common) Ltd v Harrisons of Thurnscoe Ltd the facts were that before the relevant accident the plaintiffs had intended to demolish the cottages which were extensively damaged by the lorry which ran into them. At no time had they intended to repair them but so soon as the statutory tenancy in one of the cottages had been determined it had been S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg their intention to redevelop the site by building new and different premises on it in place of the cottages. On the facts of that case clearly the damage suffered by the plaintiffs was only the cost of temporary repairs and any proved loss of rent. To have awarded them the cost of reinstating the premises would have put them in a better position than they would have been from a monetary point of view had the collision by the lorry never occurred, and would in any event clearly have been unreasonable as between the plaintiffs and the defendants. On the other hand, in Hollebone v Midhurst and Fernhurst Builders Ltd the plaintiff was the freehold owner of the damaged premises actually in occupation of them as his dwelling-house, and that house was itself unique. The learned judge found as a fact that the diminution in value due to the relevant fire was just under £15,000. Nevertheless in order to repair the premises and so allow the plaintiff and his family to continue to occupy their own home would have cost nearly £19,000. On these facts the learned judge came to the conclusion that the proper application of the relevant principles to which I have referred required him to award the larger of the two sums. On the facts of that case such a sum was required to put that particular plaintiff in the same position, so far as money could, as he would have been had the tort not occurred and the award of that amount was not unreasonable in all the circumstances as between the two parties. The learned judge referred to the words of Viscount Dunedin in The Susquehanna, namely that no rigid rule or rules that apply in all S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg cases can be laid down, but that one must consider all the relevant circumstances. He referred also to the proposition of Lord Sumner in Admiralty Comrs v SS Chekiang ([1926] AC 637 at 643, [1926] All ER Rep 114 at 118): 'The measure of damages ought never to be governed by mere rules of practice, nor can such rules override the principles of the law on this subject.' Finally, the learned judge quoted the observations of Denning LJ in Philips v Ward ([1956] 1 All ER 874 at 876, [1956] 1 WLR 471 at 473): 'It all depends on the circumstances of the case … The general rule is that the injured person is to be fairly compensated for the damage he has sustained, neither more nor less [and then concluded his judgment in this way [[1968] 1 Lloyd's Rep 38 at 41]:] For the reasons which I have endeavoured to set out, in my judgment the cost of repair is the correct measure of damage in the circumstances of this case, as providing fair and proper restitution for the damage sustained.' Similarly, in Harbutt's Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank & Pump Co Ltd merely to have awarded the plaintiffs the diminution in value of their factory premises caused by the fire would not have been reasonable so far as they were concerned. Theirs were factory S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg premises, they were in production and it was only reasonable that they should get back into production and into full production as soon as they could. It was found as a fact that they had acted reasonably in rebuilding the premises as they did; they sought to obtain nothing effectively better or more valuable than they had had before the fire. In these circumstances the court held that in order to put the plaintiffs into the same position as they would have been had the fire not occurred it was in truth necessary to award them the cost of rebuilding the damaged part of their factory, although this was rebuilt differently from what had been there before, and that such an award of damages was on the facts of that case reasonable as between plaintiff and defendant. Whereas the statement in Halsbury's Laws of England: 'The prima facie measure of damages for all torts affecting land is the diminution in value to the plaintiff or, in the case of a plaintiff in possession with full ownership, the cost of reasonable reinstatement' may well be correct, this is not in my opinion really the statement of any legal principle; it is merely the factual result in the majority of cases of the application of the two basic rules to which I have referred to cases of torts affecting land. Given appropriate facts, there may well be exceptions.” S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg [38] Dalam kes ini pada hemat Mahkamah semasa menentukan gantirugi yang sewajarnya juga perlu mengambil kira bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif dengan memberikan milikan kosong kepada Plaintif, Defendan-Defendan juga diarahkan untuk merobohkan struktur haram dan tidak sah yang telah dibina di atas tanah Plaintif dalam masa tujuh (7) hari. Defendan-Defendan juga dihalang daripada memasuki atau memasuki secara berterusan ke bahagian tanah tersebut. Semasa menimbangkan gantirugi yang diberikan. Ia adalah berbeza sekiranya tiada perintah-perintah tersebut diberikan oleh Mahkamah dan hanya membenarkan tuntutan gantirugi semata-mata. [39] Akhirnya, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa rayuan pihak Perayu adalah dibenarkan, perintah Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkaitan dengan gantirugi tersebut juga diketepikan. Walau bagaimanapun Mahkamah ini perlu mengambil kira bahawa pihak Perayu tidak mengemukakan rayuan terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkaitan dengan tuntutan yang lain. Dalam hal ini Mahkamah perlu menimbangkan bahawa kegagalan pihak Responden membuktikan gantirugi tersebut seperti yang dinyatakan di atas tidak sewajarnya menghakis hak Responden untuk memperolehi gantirugi disebabkan Mahkamah bicara telah memutuskan berkenaan dengan pencerobohan tersebut telah dilakukan di bahagian tanah Responden walaupun Mahkamah ini berpendapat pihak Responden tidak dapat menunjukkan kerugian yang dihadapi olehnya secara khusus. Oleh itu Mahkamah perlu menimbangkan untuk memberikan gantirugi nominal. Hakikat gantirugi nominal ini telah dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg Pertuanan di United Kingdom dalam kes The Owners of the Steamship “Mediana” Appellants; And The Owners, Master and Crew of The Lightship “Comet” Respondents. The “Mediana.” [1900] AC 113 di mana Earl of Halsbury menyatakan seperti yang berikut: "Nominal damages" is a technical phrase which means that you have negatived anything like real damage, but that you are affirming by your nominal damages that there is an infraction of a legal right which, though it gives you no right to any real damages at all, yet gives you a right to the verdict or judgment because your legal right has been infringed. But the term "nominal damages" does not mean small damages. The extent to which a person has a right to recover what is called by the compendious phrase damages, but may be also represented as compensation for the use of something that belongs to him, depends upon a variety of circumstances, and it certainly does not in the smallest degree suggest that because they are small they are necessarily nominal damages.” [40] Mahkamah ini berpendapat setelah menimbangkan keadaan kes ini adalah wajar Mahkamah ini membenarkan gantirugi nominal sebanyak RM 30,000.00 kepada pihak Responden dengan kos sebanyak RM 10,000.00 tertakluk kepada alokator. [41] Penelitian kepada kes ini telah dibuat dengan berhati-hati di dalam ketiadaan alasan penghakiman yang disediakan oleh hakim S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg bicara. Acap kali isu berkenaan dengan kegagalan penulisan alasan penghakiman dibangkitkan. Namun ia masih tidak dapat dinoktahkan seperti dalam kes ini. Kesukaran yang dihadapi oleh Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan di dalam ketiadaan alasan penghakiman ialah Mahkamah tidak dapat mengetahui apakah asas kepada keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut. Ia memprejudiskan pihak Perayu dan Responden. Perkara yang sedemikian tidak sepatutnya berlaku dalam sistem kehakiman yang cemerlang. Walau bagaimanapun Mahkamah ini berdasarkan kepada keterbatasan tersebut tidak dapat lagi menangguhkan pendengaran rayuan ini sehingga menyebabkan keadilan kepada pihak Perayu dan Responden tertangguh. Ia adalah sesuatu yang wajar dielakkan. Bertarikh: 09 hb. Mei 2025 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Perayu-Perayu Manogaran Marimuthu Tetuan Manogar & Co No. 2-5-2, Tingkat 5 Blok B, Jalan Semarak Api 2 Diamond Square, Off Jalan Gombak 53000 Kuala Lumpur Bagi Pihak Responden Gary Xavier Tetuan Kean Chye & Sivalingam No. 10A-10C, Jalan Panglima 30000 Ipoh Perak Darul Ridzuan S/N 8/YuyBUL0ymC2pXSqfqhg