1. ) Wong Bak Kiong v 1. ) Namiq Kunimoto (BA-22NCvC-129-05/2020)

WONG BAK KIONG (No. K/P: 541006-13-5793)

CHONG SHIUK HIEN (No. K/P: 570907-06-5318)

YEE SIEW POOI (No. K/P: 720705-10-6178) …PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF

NAMIQ KUNIMOTO (No. Pasport Jepun: TF978908)

SERAI SAUJANA MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (No. SEL: 1/2016)

SERAI SAUJANA DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 651725-P)

PENDAFTAR HAKMILIK NEGERI SELANGOR …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN DIDENGAR BERSAMA DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO: BA-22NCVC-451-11/2021 ANTARA SERAI SAUJANA MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PTG. SEL.51/1/1-P/10-11) …PLAINTIF DAN SERAI SAUJANA DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (NO SYARIKAT : 651725-P) …DEFENDAN 02/07/2024 11:57:44 BA-22NCvC-129-05/2020 Kand. 169 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Two suits have been ordered to be heard together in these proceedings, namely, BA-22NCVC-129-05/2020 (“Suit 129”) and BA-22NCVC-451-11/2021 (“Suit 451”). The genesis of this dispute is the lack of accessibility to one of the two fire exits on the 14th floor of Block 2, in a development known as The View @ Serai Saujana. [2] The access to the said fire exit is through the foyer of the 1st Defendant’s unit. As the foyer is part of his property, he had erected a grill at the entrance to the foyer area, making the fire exit only be assessible if the grill is opened. The Plaintiffs claim that the erection of the grill, hindering access in an emergency situation, seriously compromises the safety of the occupants and visitors on the 14th floor of the condominium. Salient facts The parties [3] Before the trial commenced, all parties agreed that the parties referred to for the purpose of the trial and written submissions thereafter, will be the parties in Suit 129. It was also agreed that the determination of the factual and legal issues in Suit 129 will have a direct bearing on Suit 451. [4] The Plaintiffs are the registered proprietors of and currently reside in the unit known as 1506-14-2, The View @ Serai Saujana. This unit is a duplex penthouse. The unit owned by the 3rd Plaintiff is 1504-14-2, which is a single storey penthouse. [5] The 1st Defendant (“Namiq”) is the owner of unit 1501-14-2. Unit 1501 is a duplex penthouse, similar to that owned by the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs. [6] The units owned by the said Plaintiffs and Namiq are located on the 14th floor, which is the topmost floor of Block 2 of The View @ Serai Saujana. There are altogether 5 units on the 14th floor, comprising of 3 duplex penthouses and 2 single storey penthouses. [7] The 2nd Defendant is the management corporation (“MC”), statutorily established in May 2013 pursuant to the Strata Titles Act 1985. [8] The 3rd Defendant is the developer of The View @ Serai Saujana (“the developer”). The units owned by the parties were purchased directly from the developer. [9] The 4th Defendant (“Registrar of Land Titles”) is the entity responsible for the issuance of strata titles. The strata title to Namiq’s unit was issued on 30.5.2013 together with the strata title plan. The dispute [10] There are 2 separate staircases from the ground floor to the 14th floor, which are utilized as fire and emergency exits. The fire exits are located on the opposite ends of the 14th floor. [11] The location of one of the fire exits (“1st fire exit”) on the 14th floor is that which sparked the instant dispute. The 1st fire exit is located at the back of the foyer of Namiq’s unit. The access to the 1st fire exit is through a door at the back of the foyer area. This door opens out into a corridor leading to Unit 1502-14-2 and the 1st fire exit. Several photographs in the agreed bundle of documents referred to at the trial serve to give a better picture of the layout of the foyer and the 1st fire exit. I must say the design is somewhat unusual. [12] Namiq claims that the foyer area was sold to him by the developer as part of Unit 1501-14-02. All the other units on the 14th floor have a foyer in front of their respective main entrances. As he considered the foyer area to be his private property, he installed a metal grill at entrance of the foyer area. Consent was given by the MC to Namiq to erect the grill. The keys to the grille are kept by him. This effectively caused the 1st fire exit to be inaccessible to others on the 14th floor except Namiq and the owner of Unit 1502- 14-2. The owner of the said unit is not a party in these proceedings. [13] The Plaintiffs claim that in the event of an emergency or outbreak of fire, the occupants and visitors of the 14th floor would find it impossible to escape through the 1st fire exit. In addition, personnel of emergency services would also be unable to access the other areas of 14th floor from the ground floor in view of the locked grill. The erection of the grille had therefore created a fire hazard, causing potential harm and imminent risk of danger to life and property to those present on the 14th floor. [14] However, the other staircase which serves as the 2nd fire exit, is within the immediate proximity of the unit belonging to the 1st and 2nd Plaintiff, and is assessible to all on the 14th floor. [15] Sometime in the year 2017, in an attempt to resolve the grille issue, the 1st Plaintiff approached the MC with certain proposals. However, the MC did not accept the proposals forwarded. [16] The 1st Plaintiff then wrote to the Fire Department. An inspection/investigation was conducted into the matter. The Fire Department advised for a meeting to be held by the MC to resolve the matter. The MC attempted to find a solution on numerous occasions with no success. [17] The Fire Department then made a second inspection at the premises. This led to the issuance of a Fire Hazard Notice dated 30.11.2018 to the developer stating inter alia, that the grill was considered to be a fire hazard which the MC was required to open. In addition, the MC was to ensure that the path leading towards the disputed fire exit is unhindered. The MC was also informed that the failure to comply with the notice requirements would attract penal consequences. A summons filed in court thereafter by the Fire Department was however, subsequently withdrawn. [18] The MC had consistently taken the position that it only has rights over the common areas of the condominium and not over private properties. The foyer area was Namiq’s private property, which was not within the MC’s jurisdiction. [19] The Plaintiffs claim is essentially premised on the fact that the MC had illegally sold the foyer area to the Namiq in breach of statutory requirements as to safety and public policy. The reliefs [20] Consequent upon the illegality, the Plaintiffs in Suit 129 seek the following principal reliefs against the Defendants:-

a declaration that the sale of the foyer area to Namiq is illegal and unlawful, and consequently, ought to be nullified;

(ii) a declaration that the registration of the foyer area in Namiq’s strata title and the strata title plan is null and void, and that it is a common property;

(iii) in the alternative, an order to declare a public right of way to be granted through the foyer area as access to the 1st fire exit;

(iv) an order for the grille to be removed immediately by Namiq and/or the MC; in the alternative for Namiq to keep the grill open at all times; and

general, exemplary and aggravated damages against Namiq, the MC and the developer. [21] Suit 451 concerns only the MC and the developer. The MC seeks an order to direct the developer to provide an accessible second emergency exit at its own costs and expense. In the alternative, the developer is to pay the MC a sum of money to be determined by this court to enable it to provide an accessible second emergency exit. The defences [22] Namiq’s position is that the foyer area is owned by him, evident from the strata title issued and the accompanying strata plan. Therefore, he was at liberty to deal with his private property which would include erecting a grill at the entrance to his foyer area. [23] The MC’s defence is that as the foyer area is not common property, it has no jurisdiction over private property. In view of this, the statutory provisions as to safety does not apply to it, and it has no obligation to observe the requirements. [24] The developer disputes the sale of the foyer area to Namiq. It contends that the area was never sold to him. [25] As for the Registrar of Titles, he contends that he had performed his statutory function according to the law in the issuance of the strata title, and is therefore not liable in any way to the Plaintiffs. Issues for determination [26] From the respective positions taken by the parties, the following issues fall to be determined by this court:-

whether the foyer area was sold to Namiq by the developer;

(ii) whether the MC has jurisdiction over the foyer area;

(iii) whether the developer failed to comply with the statutory requirements as to safety;

(iv) whether the Namiq and the MC breached any of the statutory by-laws;

whether the sale of the foyer is illegal as it breaches the statutory requirements as to safety, and whether the sale can be nullified; and

(vi) the appropriate reliefs in the circumstances of this case. Analysis and decision of this court [27] The evidence for the Plaintiffs was adduced through the testimony of the 1st Plaintiff. All the Defendants testified save for the developer. The essential facts upon which parties rely on, are however not in dispute. The case turns primarily on issues of law, rather than factual issues. Whether the foyer area was sold to Namiq [28] On this issue, all the other parties except for the developer, take the same position that the foyer area had been sold to Namiq. In view of the strange position taken by the developer, it is necessary to resolve this factual conflict as it would have an impact on the stand of the respective parties. [29] I am of the view that the documents adduced in evidence sufficiently establishes the fact that the foyer area was sold to Namiq. The Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 2.10.2006 between Namiq and the developer, has the floor plan annexed in the First Schedule. The floor plan shows the foyer area to constitute a part of Unit 1501-14-2. This floor plan was submitted by the developer’s architect to Majlis Bandaraya Shah Alam, the approving authority. Approval was issued on 10.12.2009. [30] Further, the as-built drawing of the said unit seen together with the layout plan of the 14th floor also shows the foyer area to form part of Namiq’s unit. In addition, the strata plan for Unit 1501-14-2 clearly demarcates the foyer area to be within his parcel. The area size and demarcation of the borders of Namiq’s unit was formulated based on the proposed strata plan submitted by the developer in its application for strata titles pursuant to section 9 of the Strata Titles Act 1985. Lastly, the area size of his unit stated in the strata title corresponds to the area size in shown in the Sale and Purchase Agreement. [31] Although the developer denies selling the foyer area to Namiq, it is rather surprising that it led no evidence on an issue critical to it, particularly in view of the Suit 451 brought by the MC. There is no attempt by the developer to contradict the evidence on the strata title plan it submitted for approval by the authorities. As matters stand, a material piece of evidence such as this remains unchallenged. The evidence establishing the sale of the foyer should be accepted as true. (See: Philip Uja v PP [2023] 1 LNS 1937, Court of Appeal). [32] The lack of attempt to contradict the evidence establishing the sale of the foyer area is also telling as the developer is a party which would have personal knowledge on the matter. With no witnesses were called on its behalf, the absence of any witness leads me to reasonably draw an adverse inference from this failure. (See: Malleng Enterprises Sdn Bhd v Leng Fook Sing [2018] 5 MLJ 783). [33] In the result, I find that there is overwhelming evidence that the foyer area leading the 1st fire exit was in fact sold to Namiq, and forms part of his unit. Whether the 2nd Defendant has jurisdiction over the foyer area [34] Arising from the conclusion that the foyer area was sold to Namiq, the question that follows is whether the MC has jurisdiction over the area. The MC takes the position that as it is an area privately owned, it is not common property and it therefore does not have jurisdiction. [35] Common property is defined in section 2 of the Strata Management Act 2013 as,

in relation to a building or land intended for subdivision into parcels, means so much of the development area—

as is not comprised in any parcel or proposed parcel; and

(ii) used or capable of being used or enjoyed by occupiers of two or more parcels or proposed parcels; or

in relation to a subdivided building or land, means so much of the lot—

as is not comprised in any parcel, including any accessory parcel, or any provisional block as shown in a certified strata plan; and

(ii) used or capable of being used or enjoyed by occupiers of two or more parcels; [36] The control, management and administration of the common property by the management corporation is for the benefit of all the proprietors. (See: section 4 of the Third Schedule of the Strata Management (Maintenance and Management) Regulations 2015). The authority of the management corporation to maintain common property has also been reiterated in the case of Dato’ Manokaran Veraya v Perbadanan Pengurusan Apartmen Kayangan & Anor Appeal [2019] 6 CLJ 441 wherein the Court of Appeal held that upon its coming into existence, the management corporation became the proprietor of the common property and had full authority to deal with the common property as a proprietor in relation to its land. By implication, it must also mean that its jurisdiction cannot extend to areas privately owned. [37] Consequently, the MC submits that in view of the lack of jurisdiction over the foyer area, it has no authority to take any action demanded by the Plaintiffs, which include removal of the grill installed and provide access to the residents/visitors of the 14th floor through the foyer. Whether the 3rd Defendant failed to comply with the statutory requirements as to safety [38] In support of their respective case against the developer, the Plaintiffs and the MC both contend that the former had failed to comply with the provisions of the Selangor Uniform Building By-Laws 1984 (“UBBL”) in selling the foyer area to Namiq. [39] The relevant provisions of the UBBL said to be breached are as follows:- By-law 166. Exits to be accessible at all times.

Except as permitted by by-law 167 not less than two separate exits shall be provided from each storey together with such additional exits as may be necessary.

The exits shall be so sited and the exit access shall be so arranged that the exits are within the limits of travel distance as specified in the Seventh Schedule to these By-laws and are readily accessible at all times. By-law 168. Staircases.

Except as provided for in by-law 194 every upper floor shall have means of egress via at least two separate staircases. By-law 169. Exit route. No exit route may reduce in width along its path of travel from the storey exit to the final exit. [40] The 1st fire exit can only be assessed from the ground floor to the 13th floor. To assess the 14th floor, it has to be through the foyer area which is now Namiq’s private property, and upon which he has installed a grille. On the other hand, the 2nd fire exit is readily assessible at all times from the ground floor to the 14th floor. [41] In this regard, I agree with the contention of the Plaintiffs and the MC. There is a clear violation of the statutory requirements in the layout of Unit 1501-14-2. Whether the Namiq and the MC breached any of the statutory by-laws [42] The Plaintiffs also contend that in erecting the grill Namiq had breached the statutory by-laws, Deed of Mutual Covenants (“DMC”) and house rules in the Homeowners’ Manual (“HOM”) for the Condominium. The statutory by-laws places an obligation on the proprietor not to reduce the level of safety in the building or common property or to create a danger to other proprietors of the building, and to further ensure that all fire escape routes shall not be obstructed. Almost similar provisions are contained in the DMC and HOM. The MC is also responsible for failing to ensure that such provisions are observed. [43] The Plaintiffs’ contention rests on a misconception that the 1st fire exit was intended to be accessible to all. The layout plan of the developer was such that except for Namiq and the owner of Unit 1502, the residents of the 14th floor do not have access to the said fire exit. Even if the grill had not been erected, the layout was such that it was intended for public access. One cannot have access to the 1st fire exit without first trespassing on the private property of Namiq. Whether the sale of the foyer area is illegal as it breaches the statutory requirements as to safety, and whether the sale ought to be nullified [44] In reliance of the fact of safety breaches, the Plaintiffs then advance the argument that the sale of the foyer area is illegal and against public policy as the consideration involved is unlawful. Consequently, this portion of the sale and purchase agreement must therefore be deemed unlawful and struck down as being void. [45] Section 24 of the Contracts Act 1950 particularly paragraph (b) and

(e), is cited in support. The provision reads, What considerations and objects are lawful, and what not

The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless—

it is forbidden by a law;

it is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat any law;

it is fraudulent;

it involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or

the court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of the above cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void [46] In support thereof, the Plaintiffs refer to the Court of Appeal case of Ideal Advantage Sdn Bhd v Perbadanan Pengurusan Palm Spring @ Damansara and another appeal [2020] 4 MLJ 93. [47] As this case is heavily on, I find it necessary to set out the facts of Ideal Advantage (supra). One of defendants was a company which had purchased 45 units of condominium from the developer, named as a co-defendant. The Sale and Purchase Agreements between them in respect of 45 units of the condominium provided for 439 accessory car parks. Apart from 5 units of the condominium with only one accessory cark park, the other 40 units had 8-15 car parks accessorised to each of the units. It was in evidence that these car parks were utilised for a commercial purpose by renting them out. [48] The management corporation, as the plaintiff, sought to impugn the sale of the condominiums and to claim ownership of the car parks as common property. The plaintiff contend that the sale of the accessory car parks was to defeat the provisions of the Strata Management Act 1985 (“STA”) which provided that the rights in the accessory parcel shall not be dealt with independently of the parcel to which the accessory parcel has been made appurtenant. [49] The plaintiff’s argument found favour with the court. It held that by renting the accessory parcels out to different individuals, it was tantamount to dealing with the car parks independently and separately from the parcel units. It further held that the defendant company, in purchasing the 45 condominium units together with the 439 accessory parcels, had the intention to run a car park business at Palm Spring Condominium. This was clearly contrary to the provisions of sections 34(2) and 69 of the STA. The sale of the accessory car parks totalling 394 (with the Plaintiff conceding that each condominium unit is entitled to an accessory car park) was therefore held to be illegal. The court also allowed the Plaintiff’s declaration that these car parks be regarded as common property. [50] In reliance on Ideal Advantage, the Plaintiffs here seek to contend that as the sale of the foyer was to defeat the statutory provisions on safety, the consideration is therefore unlawful and the sale relating to that portion ought to be nullified. [51] In my view, there is a clear distinguishing factor between the present case and that of Ideal Advantage. The illegality point was fortified from the facts of the case. The Court of Appeal found as follows, [72] There was also evidence that the accessory car parks were not transferred or sold with any consideration and/or valuable consideration (see s 26 of the Contracts Act 1950). It has been pleaded that the value of the car parks for each condominium which has more than one car park is much higher than the value of the selling price of the condominium. The evidence shows that the additional car parks were given by D2 to D1 for ‘free’ and no valuable consideration was paid. Evidence of the pricing shows that the 45 units of condominiums were sold by D2 to D1 (about 1,000–1,200 sqft whereby the price per square foot was about RM100–RM120). Each car park is worth RM20,000. Eight car parks or 15 car parks were given together with the units, the price per square foot is substantially the same. Eight car parks will cost RM160,000 and 15 car parks will costs RM300,000. The car parks’ value is more than the purchase price of any of the 45 units of condominiums sold by the D2 to D1 which shows that the car parks were essentially given to D1 for free. Compare to what other purchasers have to pay for the other units in the same project before the 45 SPAs (which was dated in 2005), from 2001– 2004 was approximately RM151 per sqft — RM201 per sqft with no car parks or at most one car park allocated to one unit. These details were pleaded (para 11 of the amended statement of claim) and were based on the contemporaneous SPAs and evidence of Lee Bee Kee (DW 1), D1’s Managing Director. Therefore the pricing in 2005 for the 45 SPAs which was around RM100–RM120 per sqft is highly unusual which was lower than the pricing in the year 2001–2004. [73] The 40 SPAs were not at arms’ length and not bona fide. Vacant possession of the 45 units of condominiums were given to D1 before the purchase price were fully paid. D1 took three years to pay for the purchase price (up to 2008) when the terms in the SPAs (dated 2005) provides a three month plus one month period to pay. In many instances the payment of 10% deposit were made after the balance of purchase price was paid. There had been no interest/penalty charged nor any warning letters issued by D2 to D1. [74] The dealing between D1 and D2 is exceptional and not in accordance with the terms of the SPA which could only happen when they have close relationship and/or association between the defendants. A pertinent fact is that both the defendants are controlled by the ‘Lee family’ where, inter alia:

both defendants have the same registered address and share the same company secretary;

both defendants also have the same office address. This is evidenced from the SPAs;

one of D2’s shareholders (Lee Yuk Hui) is also the director and shareholder of D1’s company; and

Lee Yuk Hui is the brother of Lee Bee Kee who is D1’s managing director. These evidence put to rest D1’s allegation of the ‘principle of separate corporate personality’ (as can be found at para 4 of D’s supplemental memorandum of appeal), between D1 and D2. There is more than sufficient evidence of such a ‘sweetheart deal’ between D1 and D2 and the lack of valuable consideration for the car park without the need to refer to such a principle. [52] Taking into consideration the specific findings of the Court of Appeal, I find the facts in the instant case do not come close to that in Ideal Advantage. There, both parties were found to have been aware of the illegality. Here, there is no evidence to suggest that Namiq was aware of the non-compliance with the safety requirements at the time he entered into the sale and purchase agreement with the developer. In any event the developer, is better placed to have knowledge of such matters. Namiq bought his unit based on the layout plan prepared by the developer which presented the foyer area as part of Unit 1501-14-2. [53] I am therefore not persuaded by the Plaintiffs’ contention that based on Ideal Advantage, the sale of the foyer area of Namiq’s unit by the developer is illegal for having contravened the statutory provisions on safety. Neither am I convinced by the alternative argument that the agreement is against public policy within the meaning of s 24(e) of the Contracts Act, 1950 and is therefore void. It would appear to me to be stretching the meaning of public policy provided therein, too far. Whilst I agree that the sale of the foyer which allowed Namiq to erect a grill hindered access to the 1st fire exit thereby breaching statutory provisions as to safety, it is unwarranted to declare the agreement void particularly when there is no evidence that the other contracting party was aware of the breach. [54] In view of my conclusion on the illegality point, there is no question of nullifying the sale of the foyer area. The appropriate reliefs to be made [55] As a result of the grill erected on the foyer following the sale to Namiq, there is undeniably, a non-compliance of the safety statutory provisions, namely the Uniform Building By-Laws 1984. The next question to consider is, upon whom should the liability to rectify lie, from this situation which has arisen? The answer to the question would have a bearing on the orders to be dealt with as prayed for in Suit 129 and 451. [56] I am of the view that the fault lies on the developer. It would be unjust to lay upon Namiq and the MC any of the consequences arising from the developer’s failure. [57] The Plaintiffs in Suit 129 seek an order that the grille be removed by Namiq. Alternatively, they seek a public right of way to be granted through the foyer area as access to the 1st fire exit. The Plaintiffs also seek and an order that the developer is to pay all costs and compensation necessary for the creation and maintenance of a public right of way through the foyer area. [58] In Suit 451, the MC seeks an order that the developer is to provide an accessible second emergency exit on the 14th floor at its own costs and expense. In the alternative, the developer is to pay the MC a sum to be assessed by this Honourable Court to enable it to provide such an emergency exit. [59] Having considered the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that the developer ought to be made liable to provide a second emergency exit. Namiq cannot be compelled to remove the grill erected on his private property. Similarly, the developer cannot be compelled to provide the public access through the foyer as it would impinge on the private property of Namiq. [60] I therefore thought it most expedient to grant the order requested in Suit 451 with modifications to the alternative prayer. This would suffice to address the safety concerns of the Plaintiffs in Suit 129. In the event the developer fails to provide the emergency exit, then the MC is allowed to do so, and the developer is to indemnify the MC all reasonable costs incurred in providing such exit. [61] As for the Registrar of Titles, I note that there is no cause of action expressly pleaded against it save to make the necessary changes in the Strata Title and the plan in the event the sale of the foyer area is nullified and the area is converted into common property. As this does not arise in view of my decision, no order is made against him. [62] For the sake of completeness, I would add that the order as to exemplary damages against the developer and aggravated damages against Namiq is not warranted by the authorities on the award of such damages. There is also no evidence to support the grant of such an award. Conclusion [63] Premised on the foregoing, I make the following orders:- In respect of Suit 129,

The Plaintiffs case is dismissed against all the Defendants;

(ii) The Plaintiffs are ordered to pay costs of RM 20,000.00 to the 1st Defendant and RM 10,000.00 to the 2nd Defendant, subject to allocatur. There is no costs awarded for the 3rd Defendant in view of the circumstances of this case. The 4th Defendant did not press for costs. In respect of Suit 451,

The Plaintiff’s claim is allowed against the Defendant with costs of RM 10,000.00;

(ii) Within 3 months from the date of this Order, the Defendant at their own costs and expense is to provide an accessible second emergency exit at the 14th floor of Block 2 in The View @ Serai Saujana;

(iii) In the event the Defendant fails to comply with the Order in (ii), the Plaintiff is allowed to obtain several quotations for the cost and expense required to provide an accessible second fire exit at the 14th floor of Block 2 in The View @ Serai Saujana for the Plaintiff’s Management Committee approval and the Defendant is to first indemnify the Plaintiff in respect of the said cost and expense before commencement of the construction; and

(iv) Parties are at liberty to apply. Dated: 30th day of June 2024 -sgd- ....………………..….... Alice Loke Yee Ching Judge High Court in Malaya at Shah Alam Counsel for the Plaintiff : Mr. Sean Tan Tee Li (Mr. Lock Jun Qi with him) Messrs. Jeffrey Tan & Chng Counsel for D1 : Mr. Jeev Anand Messrs. Jeev Anand & Partner Defendant Counsel for suit 451) : Mr. S. Thisinayagam And for D2 (suit 129) Messrs. Nayagam & Partners Counsel for D3 : Mr. Wee Choo Keong (suit 129) and Defendant (suit 451) (Miss Yoh Wei Min with him) Messrs. Wee Choo Keong & Faaiz Counsel for D4 : Miss Lubna binti Mohd Fakhrudin (suit 129) Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor