WONG CHAM MEW sebagai Likuidator bagi Bukit Pedoman Sdn Bhd v TAN ENG PUN (JA-22NCvC-58-05/2023)

Content

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM GUAMAN NO: JA-22NCVC-58-05/2023

Lampiran

Lampiran 35 dengan kos sebanyak RM 8,000.00 untuk dibayar oleh Plaintif-Plaintif (“P”) kepada D1 melalui Defendan Kedua (D2) mengambil kira kapasiti D1 yang merupakan seorang bankrap. Fakta Kes 3. Bukit Pedoman Sdn Bhd (“BP”) merupakan pemaju hartanah bagi satu projek bernama JB Perdana Industrial Park-Phase 2 (“projek tersebut”). 4. D1 pula salah seorang sub-kontraktor bagi projek tersebut. 5. D1 dan BP telah pada 21.09.1998 memasuki satu perjanjian jual beli (“perjanjian tersebut”) di mana BP bersetuju untuk menjual empat puluh (40) unit “light industrial buildings (“bangunan tersebut”) dari projek tersebut kepada D1 pada harga RM 12,000,000.00. S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw 6. Hakmilik 40 unit bangunan tersebut tersebut telah dipindah milik kepada D1 sebagai balasan untuk kerja-kerja dilakukan D1 sebagai sub-kontaktor projek tersebut. 7. Projek tersebut merupakan projek tergendala dan telah diabaikan tetapi P mendakwa terdapat RM 5,022,473.87 yang masih terhutang oleh D1 kepada P yang bersamaan dengan 16 unit bangunan tersebut. 8. BP telah digulung pada 13.02.2001 dan P telah dilantik sebagai likuidator BP pada 28.08.2001. 9. Sementara itu, D1 pula telah dibankrapkan pada 03.03.2004. 10. Pada sekitar tahun 2004, P telah memulakan satu tindakan ke atas D1 di Mahkamah Tinggi Seremban (Guaman Sivil 22- 135-Tahun 2004) yang kemudiannya dipindahkan ke Mahkamah Tinggi Johor Bahru seperti mana dalam Guaman Sivil 22-612-Tahun 2009 (“kes 2009”). 11. Pemerhatian Mahkamah ini ke atas kes 2009 mendapati ianya berkenaan tuntutan P ke atas D1 akibat perlanggaran perjanjian tersebut di mana P menuntut sebanyak RM 5,022,473.87 yang bersamaan dengan nilai 16 unit bangunan tersebut. 12. Di dalam kes 2009, D1 diwakili oleh D2 memandangkan D1 sudahpun bankrap sejak tahun 2004 lagi. Tiada pembelaan dimasukkan bagi pihak D1 dalam hal ini. S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw 13. Pada 20.05.2011, tuntutan P ke atas D1 telah dibenarkan dalam kes 2009 untuk jumlah RM 5,022,473.87 dengan faedah dan kos. 14. Melalui tindakan Writ di sini, tuntutan P adalah bahawa D1 telah melanggari penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes 2009 (“penghakiman tersebut”) di mana D1 enggan dan/ atau gagal dan/ atau cuai dalam membayar jumlah yang dihakimkan dalam penghakiman tersebut sebanyak RM 5,022,473.87. 15. P kini mendakwa yang tuntutan Writ di sini difailkan antara lain kerana 16 unit bangunan tersebut masih di atas nama D1 sedangkan bayaran tidak dibuat lagi oleh D1 di bawah penghakiman tersebut. Kedudukan Undang-Undang Berkenaan Pembatalan Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan 16. Kedudukan undang-undang relevan adalah dalam Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 (1) KKM 2012 yang berbunyi seperti berikut:- “(1) Mahkamah boleh pada mana-mana peringkat prosiding memerintahkan supaya dibatalkan atau dipinda mana-mana pliding atau pengendorsan, apa-apa writ dalam tindakan itu, atau apa-apa jua dalam mana-mana pliding atau dalam pengendorsan, atas alasan bahawa-S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw (a) ia mendedahkan kausa tindakan atau pembelaan yang tidak munasabah, mengikut mana-mana yang berkenaan; (b) ia mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan; (c) ia boleh menjejaskan, menghalang atau melengahkan perbicaraan tindakan itu dengan adil; atau (d) ia selainnya adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah, dan boleh memerintahkan tindakan itu digantung atau ditolak atau penghakiman dicatatkan dengan sewajarnya, mengikut mana-mana yang berkenaan. (2) Tiada keterangan boleh diterima atas suatu permohonan di bawah subperenggan (1)(a). (3) Kaedah ini hendaklah, setakat mana yang boleh dipakai, terpakai bagi suatu saman pemula seolah-olah saman itu adalah suatu pliding. 17. Berkenaan prinsip undang-undang yang terpakai dalam satu permohonan pembatalan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 KKM 2012, rujukan bolehlah dibuat kepada Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 CLJ 1 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:- “[26] The tests for striking out application under O. 18 r. 19 of the ROC, as adopted by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder (supra) are, inter alia as follows: (a) it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under the rule; (b) this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it ‘obviously unsustainable’ (emphasis added); (c) S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw it cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence; and (d) If there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 of the ROC; and (e) The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable.” 18. Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam Seruan Gemilang turut memutuskan seperti berikut:- “[27] The Court of Appeal, in Sivarasa Rasiah & Ors v. Che Hamzah Che Ismail & Ors [2012] 1 CLJ 75; [2012] 1 MLJ 473, had adopted the well-settled principle of striking out in the following passage A striking out order should not be made summarily by the court if there is issue of law that requires lengthy argument and mature consideration. It should also not be made if there is issue of fact that is capable of resolution only after taking viva voce evidence during trial, (see Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v. Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 565 (Federal Court)). [28] The basic test for striking out as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder (supra) is that the claim on the face of it must be ‘obviously unsustainable’. The stress is not only on the word ‘unsustainable’ but also on the word ‘obviously’ ie, the degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail. If one has to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issues of law and/or fact, then the matter is not S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw appropriate to be struck out summarily. It must be determined at trial.” 19. Rujuk juga kes Tan Wai Hong & ORs v Malaysian Airlines System Berhad & Ors [2017] 4 MLJ 540 (Mahkamah Rayuan):- [7] The Court will adopt the following as principles applicable to the consideration of an application to strike out pleadings and endorsements: a) In considering the defendants’ application under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a), no affidavit evidence is admissible; b) All the averments in the statement of claim must be assumed to be true; c) The Court should only exercise its powers sparingly and only in clear cases; d) The test to be applied is whether on the face of pleadings, the claim is obviously unsustainable. The matter must be unarguable or almost incontestably bad; e) The burden is on the defendants to show to the Court that the plaintiffs’ claim is so plain and obviously unsustainable or in other words, the plaintiffs’ claim is bound to fail at trial; f) Where there is a dispute as to the factual matrix of the case, the Court would not strike out the pleadings and endorsements; g) The power to strike out pleadings and endorsements should be exercised after the Court has considered all facts, but the Court S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw must not embark a minute examination of the documents and the facts of the case as this is solely reserved for the trial judge; h) A pleading is “frivolous” or “vexation” when its discloses no reasonable cause of action on its face. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “frivolous” as follows: b Law. In pleading: Manifestly insufficient or futile. Black Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (Thomson Reuters, St. Paul, Minnesota, 2009), defines “frivolous” as “lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful…”; and “frivolous suit” as “ A lawsuit having no legal basis, often filed to harass or extort money from the defendant”. Among the definitions of “vexatious” and “vexation” in the Oxford English Dictionary are the following: Vexatious 1. Causing, tending or disposed to cause, vexation. c spec Of legal actions: Instituted without sufficient grounds for the purpose of causing trouble or annoyance to the defendant. And, “Vexation, the action of troubling or harassing by aggression or interference (sometimes spec by unjustifiable claims or legal action).” Black Law Dictionary defines “vexatious suit” as “a lawsuit instituted maliciously and without good grounds, meant to create trouble and expense for the party being sued”. i) The Oxford English Dictionary defines “abuse (of process) as (ii) wrong or improper use, misuse, misapplication, perversion; turning the wrong way, diversion to an improper use, corruption, distortion”. A pleading is an abuse of process if the litigation process is used for improper purpose; e.g., where the proceedings constitute a sham; where the process of the Court is not being fairly or honestly used, or is employed for some ulterior or improper purpose; S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw j) In exercising the power under Order 18 rule 19(1)(d), the Court is not limited to considering the pleadings of the parties, but is entitled to consider affidavit relating to the issues in the case; and k) Where the Court is to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss a claim, it is important that there is no dispute between the parties on issues of facts.” 20. Rujukan selanjutnya bolehlah dibuat kepada kes Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 1 (Mahkamah Agung):- “The principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O. 18 r. 19 (1) Rules of the High Court are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley M.R. in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1899] 1 QB 86, p. 91) and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it "obviously unsustainable" (Attorney-General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co [1892] 3 Ch. 274, CA). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or defence (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238; [1965] 2 All ER 871, CA). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, and objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 (which is in pari materia with our O. 33 r. 2 Rules of High Court) (Hubbuck v. Wilkinson) (supra). The Court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable.” S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw 21. Rujuk juga kes Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 6 CLJ 673 (Mahkamah Persekutuan) di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan prosedur “summary” yang digariskan di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 KKM 2012 hanya wajar digunapakai apabila ianya jelas dapat dilihat bahawa sesuatu tuntutan pada asasnya sendiri tidak berasas (“unsustainable”). 22. Dalam erti kata lain, Mahkamah hanya patut menggunakan kuasa untuk membatalkan sesuatu pliding di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 KKM 2012 apabila ianya ketara (“Obvious”) bahawa sesuatu tuntutan akan gagal. Mengikut kes Serac Asia:- ... We also make this observation on the application of the court's summary power to strike out a pleading under O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 (successor to RHC 1980). Although the power to strike out is a wide discretion, it should be exercised with care and only when the threshold requirement of 'an obvious and unsustainable case', can a pleading be struck out. Perenggan (a) Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 KKM 2012 23. Berkenaan perenggan (a) Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 KKM 2012, Mahkamah akan meneliti pliding yang difailkan untuk menentukan samada ianya mendedahkan satu kausa tindakan yang munasabah. S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw 24. Berkenaan apa yang terjumlah kepada satu kausa tindakan, rujukan boleh dibuat kepada Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 63 (Mahkamah Agung):- “What then is the meaning of " a cause of action " ? " A cause of action " is a statement of facts alleging that a plaintiff's right, either at law or by statute, has, in some way or another, been adversely affected or prejudiced by the act of a defendant in an action.” 25. Selanjutnya, rujuk juga kes Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 222 di mana telah diputuskan bahawa satu kausa tindakan munsabah merujuk kepada kewujudan fakta-fakta dalam sesuatu situasi yang membolehkan seseorang memperolehi remedi ke atas seseorang lain daripada Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini:- “a factual situation the existence of which entitled one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another" 26. Mengenai kaedah yang terpakai oleh Mahkamah apabila berdepan dengan perenggan (a) Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 KKM 2012, rujuk kes Tuan Haji Ishak v Leong Hup Holdings Bhd and other appeals 1996] 1 CLJ 393, Mahkamah Rayuan\ memutuskan seperti berikut:- But O. 18 r. 19(1)(a) only requires that the Court assume the truth of the "primary facts" alleged. It does not require that the petitioner's inferences from those facts should also be assumed to be true, unless those inferences necessarily follow. Nor is the S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw Court obliged to accept the "conclusions" alleged or the relief sought unless the factual basis for those conclusions or relief have been pleaded. In the present case there were nine respondents and the facts alleged against each had to be separately considered. 27. Di dalam kes ini, selain daripada perenggan (a) Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 KKM 2012, D1 juga bergantung kepada perenggan (b) dan (d) Aturan yang sama. Dalam situasi sedemikian rupa, kes Amanah Raya Bhd v Ong Chin Hoo [2019] 6 CLJ 41 (Mahkamah Rayuan) memutuskan bahawa afidavit yang difailkan D tidak boleh dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah semasa meneliti samada perenggan (a) Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 KKM 2012 terpakai kepada kes ini:- The case of See Thong (above) makes it crystal clear that the combination of various limbs of O. 18 r. 19(1) in one single application should not be deemed to render that application irregular and defective. The Court of Appeal has laid down the guidelines for the order of the various limbs to be considered - first, limb (a) should be considered without having regard to the affidavits, then only the court should proceed to consider the other limbs in light of the affidavit evidence. Perenggan (b) Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 KKM 2012 28. Berkenaan apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan “mengaibkan”, ianya merujuk kepada sesuatu tindakan yang “wholly unnecessary” dan tidak relevan. Rujuk kes Technointan Holding Sdn Bhd v Tetuan Tan Kim Siong & The Hong Jet S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw [2006] 7 CLJ 541, di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan seperti berikut:- “I have on several occasions explained the ambit and purview of the words "scandalous, frivolous or vexatious" in O. 18 r. 19(1)(b). Scandalous means wholly unnecessary or irrelevant, while "frivolous and vexatious" mean obviously unsustainable: see Mohamed Nazri, supra; Boey Ai Leng v. Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2002] 1 CLJ 405 and Datuk Ir Che Amran Mohd Yusoff v. Yayasan Melaka & Ors [2003] 1 CLJ 767.” 29. Sesuatu tindakan itu remeh dan menyusahkan pula apabila ianya jelas tidak dapat dipertahankan/ tidak mampan (“obviously unsustainable”) seperti diputuskan dalam kes Technointan di atas. Perenggan (d) Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 KKM 2012 30. Mengenai apa yang terjumlah kepada penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah, P merujuk kepada Godrej Sara Lee Ltd v Siah Teong Teck & Anor [2007] 7 MLJ 153, adalah diputuskan bahawa:- [22] The case of Gabriel Peter, addressed the meaning of ‘an abuse of the process of the court’. At p 384 the Court of Appeal, Singapore said: The term ‘abuse of the process of the court’, in O 18 r 19(1)(d), has been given a wide interpretation by the courts. It includes considerations of public policy and the interests of justice. This S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw term signifies that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The court will prevent the improper use of its machinery. It will prevent the judicial process from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed and will depend on all relevant circumstances of the case. A type of conduct which has been judicially acknowledged as an abuse of process is the bringing of an action for a collateral purpose … if an action was not brought bona fide for the purpose of obtaining relief but for some other ulterior or collateral purpose, it might be struck out as an abuse of the process of the court. Samada Pliding P mendedahkan satu kausa tindakan munasabah ke atas D1 31. Persoalan yang timbul ialah samada pliding P (Writ, Pernyataan Tuntutan dan Jawapan kepada Pembelaan) mendedahkan satu kausa tindakan yang munasabah ke atas D1. 32. Setelah mengamati pliding P dan dibandingkan dengan kertas-kertas kausa dalam kes 2009, Mahkamah ini mendapati yang P tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan yang munasabah ke atas D1. 33. Hal ini kerana P dalam kes 2009 telahpun mengambil tindakan ke atas D1 atas mana penghakiman tersebut telah diperolehi oleh P pada 20.05.2011. S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw 34. Selepas penghakiman tersebut, P juga telah memfailkan bukti hutang mereka dengan D2 pada 04.06.2012 yang mana hanya RM 5,022,473.95 diperakui oleh D2. D2 telah kemudian membayar dividen sebanyak RM 2,053.42 kepada P. 35. Pliding P pula menunjukkan tuntutan mereka sama dengan isu-isu dalam kes 2009 iaitu berkenaan D1 gagal dan/ atau enggan dan/ atau cuai untuk mematuhi penghakiman tersebut. 36. Jelas di sini P tidak boleh membawa tindakan sama ke atas D1 dengan kes 2009 seperti mana dalam tuntutan di Mahkamah ini kerana kes 2009 telah selesaikan dihakimi sebelum ini. 37. Tindakan P dengan ini dihalang oleh Doktrin Res-Judicata berdasarkan kepada pliding P sendiri yang mengakui wujudnya penghakiman tersebut serta hubung-kait rapat di antara kes 2009 dengan tuntutan di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Bagi Mahkamah, isu 16 unit bangunan tersebut sudahpun wujud pada masa kes 2009 difailkan dan bukanlah sesuatu isu baru. Isu hak milik 16 unit bangunan tersebut sepatutnya boleh dan seharusnya dibangkitkan dalam kes 2009 serta telahpun dibangkitkan dan bukannya untuk dibicarakan sekali lagi dalam tuntutan ini. S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw 38. Berkenaan doktrin Res Judicata, rujuk Sathyadhyan Ghosel & Ors v Sint Deorajin Dobi & Anor AIR [1960] SC 941:- The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a i res is judicata, it shall be not adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter - whether on a question of fact or a question of law - has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher Court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in s. of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where s. 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by Courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original Court as well as any higher Court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a Court, whether the trial Court or a higher Court having. At an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. 39. Doktrin Res-Judicata dengan ini menghalang P daripada bergantung kepada isu-isu dan fakta-fakta yang diplidkan dalam kes 2009 daripada dibicarakan semula dalam tuntutan di Mahkamah ini yang dibawa mereka ke atas D1 dan D2 kerana penghakiman tersebut adalah jelas berkenaan S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw tuntutan P ke atas D1 sebelum ini yang telah selesai dihakimi Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes 2009. 40. Rujuk juga kepada perenggan 14 (b) Pernyataan Tuntutan P dalam kes 2009 di mana mereka memohon relif yang sama seperti dalam tuntutan ini iaitu pemulangan hak milik 16 unit bangunan tersebut. 41. Dalam kes Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1997] 2 CLJ 104, Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan seperti berikut:- [1] Once a judge makes a ruling, substantive or procedural, final or interlocutory, it must be adhered to and may not be reopened. Although the first decision was made on a interlocutory matter which was purely procedural in nature, it was nevertheless binding on the court and on all parties to the lis until its reversal on appeal. "[2] A failure to adhere to the principle of res judicata may lead to chaos in the conduct of civil proceedings." 42. Pliding P jika diperhatikan terjumlah kepada satu percubaan di pihak P untuk membicarakan semula kes 2009 sedangkan kes tersebut telahpun selesai dihakimi oleh Mahkamah Tinggi sebelum ini. Rujukan semula kepada petikan relevan dalam kes Serac Asia Sdn Bhd v Sepakat Insurance Brokers Sdn Bhd [2013] 6 CLJ 673 (Mahkamah Persekutuan) seperti berikut:- S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw “The re-litigation of a regularly and properly concluded matter as determined by the court is prohibited by the wide doctrine of res judicata. The judicial process rests on the twin pillars of certainty and finality. A final order or a judgment must be therefore be vigorously protected by this doctrine.” 43. Pada masa yang sama, jika diperhatikan kepada perenggan 17 Pernyataan Tuntutan Terpinda, P mendakwa mereka kini cuba menguatkuasakan penghakiman tersebut terhadap D1 yang membawa kepada pemfailan tuntutan ini. 44. Pada dapatan Mahkamah ini, niat P untuk menguatkuasakan penghakiman tersebut tidak menzahirkan satu kausa tindakan baru kerana ianya hanyalah lanjutan kepada penghakiman tersebut semata-mata. 45. Oleh yang demikian, atas dasar res judicata ini sahaja, sudah cukup untuk Mahkamah ini membatalkan tindakan Writ oleh Plaintif terhadap D1. Samada tindakan P sesuatu yang mengaibkan, remeh dan menyusahkan 46. Sebagai pelengkap, Mahkamah ini juga memutuskan yang tindakan P sememangnya sesuatu yang mengaibkan, remeh dan menyusahkan kerana jelas P tidak berhak kepada relif-relif yang dipohon mereka dalam tindakan ini atas sebab-sebab berikut. S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw 47. Pertama sekali, pengataan D1 masih belum melangsaikan keseluruhan jumlah di bawah penghakiman tersebut tidak bermaksud P mempunyai hak milik ke atas 16 unit bangunan tersebut kerana fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan ialah D1 pemilik berdaftar 16 unit bangunan tersebut. 48. Dalam erti kata lain, hak milik D1 ke atas 16 unit bangunan tersebut tidak boleh dicabar selaras dengan peruntukkan Seksyen 340 (1) Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 (Disemak 2020). Peruntukkan tersebut berbunyi seperti berikut:- “(1) The title or interest of any person or body for the time being registered as proprietor of any land, or in whose name any lease, charge or easement is for the time being registered, shall, subject to the following provisions of this section, be indefeasible.” 49. Kedua, dakwaan-dakwaan dibuat P juga tidak termasuk dalam pengecualian kepada Seksyen 340 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 (Disemak 2020) kerana kausa tindakan P ke atas D bukanlah berdasarkan kewujudan apa-apa situasi yang disenaraikan di bawah Seksyen 340(2)(a),(b)dan(c) Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 (Disemak 2020) iaitu:- “(2) The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible— S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw (a) in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or (b) where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient or void instrument; or (c) where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written law. (3) Where the title or interest of any person or body is defeasible by reason of any of the circumstances specified in subsection (2)— (a) it shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body to whom it may subsequently be transferred; and (b) any interest subsequently granted thereout shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body in whom it is for the time being vested: Provided that nothing in this subsection shall affect any title or interest acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, or by any person or body claiming through or under such a purchaser. (4) Nothing in this section shall prejudice or prevent— (a) the exercise in respect of any land or interest of any power of forfeiture or sale conferred by this Act or any other written law for the time being in force, or any power of avoidance conferred by any such law; or (b) the determination of any title or interest by operation of law.” S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw 50. Maka, tidak ada apa-apa pertikaian fakta yang material di dalam kes ini menjadikan kes ini sesuai untuk diputuskan seperti dalam kes kes Tan Wai Hong untuk permohonan D1 ini dibenarkan. Samada tindakan P satu salahguna proses Mahkamah 51. Akhir sekali, Mahkamah turut memutuskan yang tindakan Writ P di sini merupakan satu salahguna proses Mahkamah kerana ianya jelas dihalang oleh Doktrin Estoppel. 52. Mengenai estoppel, rujukan bolehlah dibuat kepada Seksyen 115 Akta Keterangan 1950 yang berbunyi seperti berikut:- When one person has by his declaration, act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, otherwise than but for that belief he would have acted, neither he nor his representative in interest shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and that person or his representative in interest to deny the truth of that thing. ILLUSTRATION A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain land belongs to A and thereby induces B to buy and pay for it. The land afterwards becomes the property of A and A seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that at the time of the sale he had no title. He may not be allowed to prove his want of title. S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw 53. Rujuk juga kes Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 4 CLJ 283 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan di mukasurat 297 memutuskan seperti berikut:- “We take this opportunity to declare that the detriment element does not form part of the doctrine of estoppel. In other words, it is not an essential ingredient requiring proof before the doctrine may be invoked. All that need be shown is that in the particular circumstances of a case it would be unjust to permit the representor or encouragor to insist upon his strict legal rights. In the resolution of this issue, a judicial arbiter would, when making his assessment of where the justice of the case lies, be entitled to have regard to the conduct of the litigant raising the estoppel. This may, but need not in all cases, include the determination of the question as to whether the particular litigant had altered his position, although such alteration need not be to his detriment.” 54. Di muka 298, Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Boustead memutuskan seperti berikut:- A reasonable man similarly circumstanced as the respondent would have been entitled to assume as the respondent did, that the appellant was agreeable to the imposition of the fourteen day limit. Influenced - and we use that term deliberately - by the conduct of the appellant the respondent paid out on those very invoices. This the respondent would not have done had the appellant protested. The appellant's attempt to raise this point some seven months later, well after the respondent had paid out its money to Chemitrade, must, in our judgment be S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw classified as unconscionable and inequitable conduct. It ought not therefore to be permitted to question the validity of the endorsement. 55. Doktrin Estoppel seperti digariskan otoriti-otoriti di atas terpakai kerana P dengan jelas mempunyai pengetahuan bahawa D1 seorang bankrap pada masa kes 2009 difailkan. 56. Namun demikian, P masih menuntut untuk membawa tindakan ke atas D1 dengan menuntut baki wang yang dikatakan terhutang oleh D1 kepada P seperti dapat dilihat dalam perenggan 14, Pernyataan Tuntutan Terpinda. 57. Selepas membuat keputusan dalam kes 2009 untuk menuntut relif berbentuk kewangan dan selepas penghakiman diperolehi pada tahun 2011, P kini sekali lagi membawa tuntutan untuk menuntut 16 unit bangunan tersebut pula berdasarkan fakta dan isu yang sama. 58. Yang paling penting, selepas memilih untuk membuat tuntutan kewangan ke atas D1 dan berjaya memperolehi penghakiman tersebut, P dihalang kini oleh Doktrin Estoppel untuk menukar kedudukan dan turut menuntut sekali lagi untuk hak milik 16 unit bangunan tersebut juga sedangkan perkara ini telahpun dituntut dalam kes 2009 sebelum ini. 59. P tidak boleh dengan ini menukar-nukar pendirian dan kedudukan mereka yang mana ianya tidak dibenarkan di sisi S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw undang-undang. Dalam kes Lee Loy & Ors v Poh Kam Sang & Anor [2018] 3 MLJ 240 Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan di mukasurat 252 bahawa:- We further agree with the submissions of learned counsel for the respondents that it is clear that the appellants are approbating and reprobating at the same time. While on the one hand the appellants are resisting the summary application and contesting that they are more than squatters who have a right to stay, they are on the other hand, applying to the court to compel the respondents to sell the subject land or be given time to move. In Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) and other appeals [2012] 1 MLJ 761, the Court of Appeal explained the principle of approbation and reprobation: [105] We categorically say that the liquidator cannot blow hot and cold to suit him whenever he feels like it. He cannot approbate and reprobate in the same breath. On the one hand, he claims that the High Court order dated 16 July 2001 overrides or displaces a statute which render the said order invalid and yet he has the audacity to continue to act as a liquidator by virtue of the said order. In the words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others [1990] 3 All ER 376 at pp 383-384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance. S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw 60. Isu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah juga berbangkit kerana jika tuntutan ini dibenarkan, ianya akan terjumlah kepada prosiding berganda atas hal perkara yang sama iaitu 16 unit bangunan tersebut dan perkara ini tidak dibenarkan juga di sisi undang-undang. 61. Berkenaan isu prosiding berganda dan Res-Judicata, rujukan dibuat kepada Seksyen 25 (2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 yang berbunyi seperti berikut:- "Power to dismiss or stay proceedings where the matter in question is res judicata between the parties or where by reason of multiplicity of proceedings in any court or courts the proceedings ought not to be continued” 62. Maka, tuntutan Writ Plaintiff di sini jika dibenarkan untuk dibicarakan akan memberikan peluang kedua kepada P untuk cuba mendapatkan hak milik 16 unit bangunan tersebut sedangkan penghakiman mengenai perkara tersebut telah pun dihakimi apabila P dengan jelas pada masa tersebut menuntut relif kewangan. 63. Mengenai salah guna proses, rujukan adalah dibuat kepada penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Normah Bt Awang Had (Suing as the administrators/ executors of the estate of Tan Sri Dato’ Dr. Awang Had bin Salleh, deceased) & Ors v Dato’ Dr Hj Mohamed Haniffa Bin Hj Abdullah [2016] 5 MLJ 754 yang memutuskan seperti berikut:- S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw "[23] The rule relating to an abuse of process is thus two fold. The first relates to those points wh'ch were actually decided by the court; this is res judicata in the strict sense. Secondly, those which might have been brought forward at the time, but were not. The second sense is not a true case of res judicata but rather is founded on the principle of public policy in preventing multiplicity of actions; it being in the public interest that there should be an end to litigation; the court will stay or strike out the subsequent action as an abuse of process(per Lord Wilberforce in Brisbane City Council vA-G for Queensland [1979] AC 411)." 64. Selain itu, tuntutan P di sini juga akan menyebabkan tidak ada kemuktamadan dalam prosiding Mahkamah kerana kes 2009 telahpun selesai diputuskan Mahkamah Tinggi sebelum ini. P seolah-olah membuat tuntutan secara berperingkat sedangkan kesemua tuntutan mereka sepatutnya dibawa dalam kes 2009 dahulu. Mengenai tuntutan secara berperingkat, rujukan adalah dibuat kepada penghakiman kes Yat Tung Investment Co Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] AC 581 di mana House of Lords menyatakan seperti berikut:- "...where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. 65. Seterusnya, tuntutan P pada dapatan Mahkamah merupakan satu percubaan untuk menyerang penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes 2009 secara kolateral (collateral attack) yang sudahpun tamat dibicarakan dan ini sudah tentu tidak sepatutnya dibenarkan untuk berlaku. Rujukan mengenai perkara ini boleh dibuat kepada kes Tractors Malaysia Bhd v Charles Au Yong [1982] 1 MLJ 320 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:- “In our judgment the Malacca action is tantamount to a collateral attack upon a final decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction. Since writing this judgment we have come across a decision of the House of Lords on this very point in Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police[1981] 3 WLR 906 where a civil case was started obviously to try to overrule a decision of a criminal court. There Lord Diplock said at page 914: My Lords, collateral attack upon a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction may take a variety of forms. It is not surprising that no reported case is to be found in which the facts present a precise parallel with those of the present case. He then cited with approval the following passages as expressing the principle to be followed by the Courts: S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw ... the Court ought to be slow to strike out a statement of claim or defence, and to dismiss an action as frivolous and vexatious, yet it ought to do so when, as here, it has been shown that the identical question sought to be raised has been already decided by a competent court. (per AL Smith LJ in Stepbenson v. Garnett [1898] 1. QB 677, 680-681). ... I think it would be a scandal to the administration of justice if, the same question having been disposed of by one case, the litigant were to be permitted by changing the form of the proceedings to set up the same case again ". (per Lord Halsbury LC in Reichel v. Macgrath [1889] 14 App. Cas. 665, 668).” 66. Akhir sekali, berikutan kedudukan D1 sebagai seorang bankrap, D1 tidak lagi mempunyai pemilikan mutlak kepada 16 unit hartanah tersebut yang kini ditadbir oleh D2 yang mempunyai kuasa-kuasanya tersendiri di bawah Akta Insolvensi 1967. Justeru itu, perbuatan P dalam memfailkan tindakan Writ di sini terhadap D1 juga jelas merupakan satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah kerana terjumlah kepada cubaan memintas dan membelakangi Akta Insolvensi 1967. Penutup 67. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, Mahkamah ini positif dalam dapatan-dapatannya bahawa tuntutan Writ P di sini nyata tidak boleh dipertahankan dan harus ditolak kerana S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw dihalang oleh doktrin res judicata, estoppel dan juga merupakan penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. 68. Lampiran 35 adalah dengan itu dibenarkan dengan kos sebanyak RM 8,000.00 dibayar oleh P kepada D1 melalui D2. Bertarikh: 25.1.2026 …………………………………………. (NOOR HISHAM BIN ISMAIL) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi, Johor Bahru Peguam Plaintif : Tetuan Chih-Jen & Associates Peguamcara Plaintif-Plaintif No 12A-3, Block 5 Jalil Link Jalan Jalil Jaya 6 57000 Bukit Jalil, Kuala Lumpur Peguam Defendan Pertama : Tetuan Aaron Kc Ng & Partners A-3-02, Kelana Square No 17, Jalan 337/26 Kelana Jaya, 47301 Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw Peguam Defendan Kedua : Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia Cawangan Johor Bahru Aras 12, Menara Tabung Haji Jalan Ayer Molek 80720, Johor Bahru Johor Darul Takzim S/N OzcabJ1W5EyL/pheEtjpEw