1. Wong May Leng v 1. Thomas Patrick Francis Fernandes (BA-12NCC-6-07/2016)

WONG MAY LENG

WONG CHOW SHANG (NO. K/P: 631114-07-5483) ….. PERAYU-PERAYU

THOMAS PATRICK FRANCIS FERNANDES

WONG LAY SHAN (NO. K/P: 880218-10-5162 …..RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN 2 [Dalam perkara mengenai Mahkamah Sesyen di Shah Alam Guaman No: B52NCC-37-04/2015 Bicara Penuh (B)

THOMAS PATRICK FRANCIS FERNANDES

WONG LAY SHAN (NO. K/P: 880218-10-5162 ….. PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF

WONG MAY LENG

WONG CHOW SHANG (NO. K/P: 631114-07-5483) …..DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an appeal by the Appellants who were the 1st and 2nd Defendants, against the decision of the learned Session Judge of 17.6.2016 that allowed the Respondents, the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs’ claim of RM340,000.00. [2] The parties, in this judgment, will be known as they were in the Sessions Court. The terms ‘1st and 2nd Defendant’ and ‘the Defendants’ and ‘1st and 2nd Plaintiffs’ and ‘the Plaintiffs’ may be used interchangeably. Facts [3] The dispute before me is about a sale of business restaurant by way of sale and purchase of shares agreement known as the Restaurant Sale Private Contract dated 2.11.2013. The background facts can be briefly referred to as follows: 4

The Defendants were the main shareholders of the company First Food Connection Sdn Bhd (“FFCSB”) carrying a restaurant business in the name Wai Kei (the Restaurant);

On or around 27.9.2013, the 1st Defendant had contacted the 1st Plaintiff to sell the Restaurant business to the Plaintiffs. There was a discussion between the 1st Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant where the Defendants had made representation that lunch delivery will be at 300 packs per day and net profit will be at RM500 per day where the gross income daily is between RM2,500 to RM3,000 and net profit monthly at RM18,000.00.

The assertion by the Plaintiffs is that based on the representation made by the Defendants, the Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the Restaurant business.

Both Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into the Restaurant Sale Private Contract (“the Contract”) dated 2.11.2013 through the purchase of shares of the Defendants in FFCSB. 5

The Plaintiffs paid the Defendants RM271,000.00 and the Defendants by the name Choy Yin Moi had transferred the security dated 1.11.2013 for the 100% transfer of shares in FFCSB to the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs took over the Restaurant on 4.11.2013 and claimed that many problems occurred and sought assistance through emails and telephone calls from the Defendants since 12.11.2013 but to no avail.

The Plaintiffs through their Solicitors informed the Defendants that there was a breach of contract by the Defendants and terminated the Contract on 20.1.2014. The Plaintiffs also demanded for the return of the sale purchase money of RM250,000.00 from the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs claimed that they had incurred losses ever since they took over the Restaurant’s business and the Plaintiffs finally stopped the business on 21.3.2014. 6

The Plaintiffs claimed that the Plaintiffs had adhered to the Contract particularly clause 6 on contract termination, sale reversal and refund. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants had failed to return the sale and purchase of the shares money to the Plaintiffs and failed to adhere to clause 6 of the Contract that is, failure to refund the entire paid amount purchased within 7 days of termination.

The Plaintiff did not deny that they had to continue with the Restaurant business until 24.3.2014 even after the Contract was terminated on 20.1.2014 in order to mitigate the losses (see page 302-303 of the Appeal Record Jilid I) as the Plaintiffs had to generate income before terminating the Restaurant business.

The Plaintiffs also claimed that they had emailed on 2.2.2014 to the 1st Defendant asking for help to sell off the Restaurant (at page 469-470 Appeal Record Jilid I). 7

After a full trial of three days and four witnesses where two were Plaintiffs’ and the other two were Defendants’, the Sessions Court had on 17.6.2016 allowed the Plaintiffs’ claim for RM340,000.00, being RM250,000.00 for the return of the purchased shares price and RM90,000.00 for the loss of profit as promised by the Defendants. Defendants’ Submission [4] The learned counsel for the Defendants submitted several grounds as in the amended Memorandum of Appeal dated 19.9.2016 (at pages 1-3, paragraphs (1) – (8) of the ‘Rekod Rayuan Tambahan (Jilid III)). Mainly the arguments put forward is that the Session Judge had erred on facts and law without considering or failing to consider:

that the Plaintiffs failed to adhere to the terms of the Contract in particular clause 6 of the Contract;

(ii) that the Plaintiffs continued with the Restaurant business after terminating the Contract; 8

(iii) that the Plaintiffs had waived their rights and/or estopped to sue the Defendants when Plaintiffs continued with the Restaurant business after it being terminated; and

(iv) that the Plaintiffs acquiesced to continue with the Contract based on Section 40 of the Contracts Act 1950. [5] The counsel for the Defendants argued at length on clause 6(a) of the Contract and the issue of consequential order. The Court heard the importance of clause 6 of the Contract and the reason that a consequential order should had been made, claimed to have been overlooked by the Session Judge which resulted the Defendants suffered losses in terms of: - loss of the restaurant; - loss of the company First Food; were ordered to pay back the sale purchase of RM250,000.00 to the Plaintiff; and - to pay the loss of profit of RM90,000 to the Plaintiff. [6] On the Plaintiffs’ argument that the Restaurant’s business cannot be returned as it ended on 21.3.2014, the counsel for the Defendants 9 submitted although the Plaintiffs terminated the contract on 20.1.2014, they had however continued with the Restaurant business until 21.3.2014 and thus the mitigation plead should fail. The counsel relied on the Federal Court case Edmund Chan Kai Khoon v. Abrizah Abdullah & Ors (2010) 6 CLJ 249 that the Restaurant business can and should be returned to the Defendants. [7] It was contended that the Session Court did not consider section 40 of the Contract Act 1950 and counsel relied on the case of Dr. Shanmuganathan v. Perisamy s/o Sithambaram Pillai (1997) 3 MLJ 61, Federal Court decision where the trial judge had overlooked in making a consequential order. [8] On the loss of profit of RM90,000.00, the counsel for the Defendants submitted that the 1st Plaintiff failed to prove and that the Contract did not provide for loss of profit. In addition, to strengthen its argument on loss of profit, section 75 Contract Act 1950 was referred that there must be prove for the losses or for the reasonable compensation. Plaintiffs’ Submission 10 [9] The learned counsel for the Plaintiffs argued before the Court mainly on 3 grounds, firstly in relation to the consequential order to return the Restaurant business and sell off the shares, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that this was never pleaded by the Defendants. It was conceded by the Plaintiffs that the Defendants only pleaded that the Plaintiffs had continued with the Restaurant business after the Contract was terminated under the business name of Wai Kei and nowhere stated that the Restaurant business be returned and that the shares be transferred upon return of the Restaurant business. On this aspect, Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted that no evidence was adduced from both counsels at the trial. [10] The Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed that such consequential order should had been made and referred to the case of Edmund Chan Kai Khoon v. Abrizah Abdullah & Ors (2010) 6 CLJ 249. However, the Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that returning of the Restaurant business and the purchased shares following clause 6 of the Contract would be impossible to comply as clause 6 of the Contract provides for the return of business in full whereas the Restaurant business suffered major losses and that 11 Defendants never revealed their intention to return the purchased shares in exchange for the Restaurant business to be returned. [11] The Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted that the Plaintiffs continued with the Restaurant business after the Contract was terminated to mitigate losses and highlighted this Court the evidence in support at pages 302-303 (Jilid 1) and pages 479-480 (Jilid II) of the Record of Appeal. The Plaintiffs’ counsel pointed that the Defendants knew that the Plaintiffs were seeking their help to sell off the Restaurant business based on the oral evidence of the 1st Defendant (at pages 396-397 of Appeal Record (Jilid II)) and Plaintiffs’ email of 2.2.2014 (at page 469 of the Appeal Record (Jilid II), cross refer with pages 479-480 of the same). [12] The counsel for the Plaintiffs made a distinction on the return of the shares proviso of the contract as referred by the Defendants in the case of Wong Leng Hung v Krishnamurthy Nagaratnam [2005] 8 CLJ 745 and the present case. It was submitted that in Wong Leng Hung (supra) case at pages 746 and 748, clause 4 of the contract mentioned the return of monies first be made to invoke the termination of the contract whereas under clause 6 of the Contract, the Contract is terminated due to breach of 12 contract, “sale will be reversed, Business will be returned to Seller in full and Seller will refund the entire paid amount to Purchaser within 7 days of termination”. [13] In relation to the second argument that Plaintiffs failed to prove for the loss of profit RM 90,000.00, the Plaintiffs assert that the loss was proven by highlighting clause 2.6 of the Contract (at page 559 (Jilid II) of the Apepal Record where the Net profit of Business stated that “Seller will make sure business produces its minimum net profit of RM18,000 per month and produce the same for 3 consecutive months after completion of sale”. It was argued that this was a guarantee given by the Defendants in the Contract of net profit RM18,000 per month, as pleaded by the Plaintiffs and added that the Defendants never challenged on Plaintiffs’ losses for the said period of Restaurant business run by the Plaintiffs, at the trial. [14] On the third ground that the law under Section 40 of the Contracts Act 1950, Plaintiffs’ counsel made reference to the oral evidence of the 1st Plaintiff and the email sent to show that he was in a desperate situation to recover his losses and to sell the Restaurant and by making alternative proposal to the Defendants as the latter did not respond to Plaintiffs help 13 and was not to expand the business (at page 259 (Jilid 1) of the Appeal Record). [15] The Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the Defendants’ counsel argument that the Plaintiffs should have moved out from the Restaurant premise is unreasonable as the premise is rented by the Plaintiffs on a monthly tenancy for RM7,400 and if the tenancy agreement is to be terminated, Plaintiffs will suffer additional loss of RM21,000. [16] The counsel for the Plaintiffs submitted based on its written submission, the Plaintiffs had successfully proven: “D. Kesimpulan

(iv) Dengan hujahan-hujahan di atas, Responden-Respondne telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa:-

Terdapat satu kontrak yang sah di antara Responden-Responden dan Perayu-Perayu dan pihak-pihak adalah terikat dengan terma-terma dan syarat-syarat dalam perjanjian tersebut. 14

Perayu-Perayu telah membuat representasi kepada Responden-Responden seperti yang diplidkan dalam perenggan 7 Pernyataan Tuntutan dan representasi tersebut adalah representasi salah seperti yang diplidkan dalam perenggan 18 Pernyataan Tuntutan.

Perayu-Perayu telah memecah terma-terma dan syarat-syarat Perjanjian tersebut seperti yang diplidkan dalam perenggan 19 Pernyataan Tuntutan.

Responden-Responden berhak membatalkan Perjanjian tersebut dan menuntut pemulangan bayaran harga jualan sebanyak RM250,000.00 serta kerugian keuntungan sebanyak RM90,000.00.” THE COURT’S FINDING: [17] The heart of the matter is in relation to the termination of the Restaurant business and its consequences. The whole of clause 6(a) of the Contract is reproduced here for convenience, as follows: 15 “Clause

Contract termination, sale reversal and refund: The Parties hold the right to terminate this contract 90 days upon completion of sale subject to breach of this contract as described below: a. Breach of this Contract by Seller in terms of non-fulfillment of Value Deliverables as listed in section 2, inaccurate disclosure of information related to the Business such as sales revenue, net profit, liabilities and encumbrances, etc. thus resulting in financial losses or other damages and inconveniences to Purchaser. In the event of Contract termination by Purchaser as a result of breach of Contract by Seller, sale will be reversed, Business will be returned to Seller in full, and Seller will refund the entire paid amount Purchaser within 7 days of termination.” [18] On the issue of the validity of termination, this requires the construction of Clause 6(a) of the Contract. It provides the termination stating that it becomes a breach of contract when there is non-fulfillment of section 2 of the Contract, inaccurate disclosure of information related to the Business which includes sales revenue, net profit and even liabilities. The second paragraph of clause 6(a) stated the consequences of the termination. Again, it relates to the breach caused by the Defendants and 16 stated that the “sale will be reversed, Business will be returned to Seller in full, and Seller will refund the entire paid amount to Purchaser within 7 days of termination.” [19] The counsel for the Plaintiffs made two primary arguments on this issue that there was termination and that the business continued for a while after termination to mitigate losses as there was no reply from the Defendants on the termination notice. The counsel for the Defendants on the other hand generally stated the termination is invalid because of non-compliance of clause 6(a) by the Plaintiffs by continuing with the Restaurant business after termination. [20] Reverting back to the facts and evidence before this Court, there is a history behind the sale and purchase of the Restaurant business. The Plaintiffs relied heavily on the Defendants information and track record which is based on the information only given by the Defendants themselves. The Plaintiffs had through his email of 27.9.2013 had asked for a detailed information of the Restaurant potential income generator. This was agreed by the Defendants’ witness, the 1st Defendant (DW1) herself 17 whom testified during the cross examination (at page 368 of the Appeal Record (Jilid 1)), “S: Miss Wong, sila rujuk kepada Q&A, ms 10, dalam jawapan 17 ini, awak mengatakan bahawa Plaintif telah membuat siasatan yang terperinci, thorough investigation mengenai perniagaan restaurant tersebut dan telah bersetuju untuk mengikatnya saya cadangkan kepada awak bahawa siasatan yang terperinci atau thourough investigation, merujuk kepada soalan dan jawapan, melalui email-email dan juga meeting-meeting diantara plaintif-plaintif dan defendan-defendan, setuju? J: Setuju.” [21] The Plaintiff’s statement based on the record explained that the due diligence carried out on the business were done through emails, discussion and meeting with the Defendants. The Defendants had made representation that lunch delivery will be at 300 packs per day and net profit will be at RM500 per day where the gross income daily is between RM2,500 to RM3,000 and net profit monthly at RM18,000.00. Based on this representation by the Defendants, the Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the Restaurant. 18 [22] The Defendants had replied to the Plaintiffs’ email on 27.9.2013 (at pages 459 and 460 (Jilid II) of the Appeal Record) that the cash collection daily is between RM2,500 to RM3,000 daily and the operational cost is low at under 30%. The following email on 29.9.2013 where Plaintiff was asked by Defendant to consider the food cost of 30%-35% before calculating on the profit. On this basis, Plaintiff relied on the purportedly “exact figure” to calculate the net profit and for cash flow investment (at page 461 (Jilid II of the Appeal Record). The Defendants however did not reply to Plaintiffs’ email and never denied on Plaintiff’s calculation and total of profit. [23] Interestingly, the Plaintiffs were promised of the guaranteed profit from the Restaurant business which became one of the salient points embedded into the Contract. Upon careful reading of the Contract, the purported profit making Restaurant clearly stated in the preamble where the Defendants “declared to be true” that the Restaurant generates a gross revenue of not less than RM80,000.00 per month with a net profit of not less than RM18,000 per month. [24] The agreed “Value Deliverables” are as stated in clause 2 of the Contract where among others are the ‘Business as an on-going concern’ 19 and ‘Net Profit of Business’. The ‘Net Profit Business’ I would say, clearly mentioned the guaranteed net profit of RM18,000 per month: “2.6 Net Profit of Business: Seller will make sure the Business produces its minimum net profit of RM18,000 per month and produce the same for 3 consecutive months after completion of sale.” [25] The Plaintiffs claimed that after taking over the Restaurant business, the Plaintiffs found that the Defendants had breached the Contract by not providing an experience cook and the kitchen crew are not efficient as represented by the Defendants. The Restaurant business started facing problems and the Restaurant failed to generate the net profit of RM18,000 per month as guaranteed in the Contract. Plaintiffs claimed that they had issued complaints but no changes were made until Plaintiffs terminated the Contract on 20.1.2014. [26] Combing through the facts and evidence, this Court finds that the Contract was a valid Contract and all the representation made by the Defendants including the misrepresentation and losses occurred are pleaded in the Plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim (at pages 12 – 23 of the (Jilid 20 1) of the Appeal Record). The Court also referred to the oral evidence of the 1st witness for the Plaintiffs whom worked with the Defendants as well as the Plaintiffs until the Restaurant business was closed down (at pages 47 – 50 (Jilid I) of the Appeal Record). In my mind, in any food restaurant business it would be a reasonable inference that the cook or chef partly if not wholly, contribute to the success of the food restaurant business and this fact was misrepresented by the Defendants. [27] The facts and evidence gathered proved to show that there was misrepresentation, that the information given was not accurate for clause 6(a) of the Contract to be invoked. Clause 6(a) of the Contract provides that upon discovery of the inaccurate disclosure of information of the Restaurant business by the purchaser who is the Plaintiffs here, the sale of the Restaurant business will be reversed where the business is to be returned to the seller in full and seller will return the entire paid amount purchased within 7 days. [28] In order to appreciate the meaning of the Contract which must be ascertained from the words which the parties have agreed upon, the Contract must be read in the context of the circumstances in which they are 21 executed. This Court wish to refer to the case of Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co [1979] 2 MLJ 229 FC Kota Kinabalu where Chang Min Tat Ming, Federal Court Judge observed in relation to the terms agreed by Parties in the context of sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act 1950: “…where the terms of a contract have been reduced to writing, as in this particular agreement they had been, the contract could only be proved by the document itself, and it is not open to the respondent to seek to introduce and the judge to admit evidence that would inter alia, add new terms to it. [29] It is quite clear to me from a reading of Clause 6(a) that the Plaintiffs have the right to terminate the Contract. The Plaintiffs had offered the Defendants time to remedy the breach (email of 4.1.2014 at page 50 of (Jilid II) of the Appeal Record) before terminating on 20.1.2014 which was communicated to the Defendants (oral evidence at page 257 – 258 (Jilid I) of the Appeal Record). The consequences of the termination as provided in clause 6(a) is that the sale will be reversed where the Business will be returned to the Defendants in full and the Defendants will refund the entire paid amount to the Plaintiffs within 7 days of termination. 22 [30] However, there was no reply by the Defendants on the offer to remedy nor did they reply within the 7 days of termination. The termination was valid as there was a breach of contract due to inaccurate information which allows the innocent party, in this case the Plaintiffs, to invoke the termination clause relying on the authority attributed by the Plaintiffs’ counsel in the case of Sim Thong Realty Sdn Bhd v Teh Kim Dar [2003] 3 CLJ 227 (Plaintiffs written submission for Sessions Court, at page 575 (Jilid II) of the Appeal Record). [31] If the construction of the Contract is crystal clear, the Court cannot improve on the contract and should be construed objectively: Attorney General of Belize & Ors v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] Privy Council UKPC 10 where Lord Hoffman delivering the decision had said, “This court has no power to improve upon the instrument which it is called upon to construe, whether it be a contract, a statute or articles of association. It cannot introduce terms to make it fairer or more reasonable. It is concerned only to discover what the instrument means. However, that meaning is not necessarily or always what the authors or parties to the document would have intended. It is the 23 meaning which the instrument would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonable be available to the audience to whom the instrument is addressed. ….. It is this objective meaning which is conventionally called the intention of the parties, or the intention of Parliament, or the intention of whatever person or body was or is deemed to have been the author of the instrument” [32] As the Defendants failed to reply to the termination notice, it proves to show that no refund of purchased shares as provided in clause 6(a) of the Contract is complied with and thus the business of the Restaurant could not be assumed to be automatically be returned to the Defendants. In addition, it would be a reasonable inference that the Plaintiffs cannot be waiting for the Defendants to refund and neither could they sell the Restaurant business immediately to recover the loss and expenses incurred and the option left to mitigate the losses is by continuing with the business of lunch delivery under a different management and later under a new name at the same premise (page 259 (Jilid 1) of the Appeal Record) as the tenancy agreement has not been terminated. 24 [33] The basis relied by the Defendants that the Plaintiffs were still interested to run the Business is an afterthought and does not hold water as the Contract had clearly provide for the consequences of termination. In addition, this fact is corroborated by the email from the Plaintiffs in responding to the Defendants failure to refund where the Plaintiffs sought help to sell off the Restaurant business even after invoking clause 6 of the Contract the oral evidence given by the Defendants (at pages 396 and 397 (Jilid II) of the Appeal Record): “S: Merujuk di ms 56? J: Okay, ini adalah plaintif menghantar email kepada kami meminta pertolongan kami sama ada untuk menjual restoran itu dan melalui telefon dia juga pernah memanggil kami menolongnya, bagaimana ……” “Saksi SD1: Ya, masih menghubungi saya dengan meminta pertolongan, then lagi dia telah meminta saya menjual restoran tersebut dan ……..” On 2.2.2014, the Plaintiffs again emailed to the Defendant stating that, “If you’re able to help me sell the restaurant, I will just let this go and not want to fight with you in court.” 25 [34] In relation to the argument for a consequential order, I have reservation as to the submission made by the Defendants that it could be granted following section 40 of the Contract Act 1950 and Plaintiffs’ counsel submission that this Court can still make the consequential order following the case Edmund Chan Kai Khoon v Abrizah Abdullah (supra). Firstly, after careful perusal of Defendants’ pleadings, I cannot seemed to find the claim for the return of the Business by the Defendants (amended Defence at pages 24-39 (Jilid 1) of the Appeal Record). The Defendants had claimed basically that the Contract was not valid, that the Plaintiffs had acquiesced the Restaurant business and the closing down of the Restaurant business is the risk to be accepted by the Plaintiffs. The fact remains that the return of the purchased price of shares to the Plaintiffs were not agreeable or denied by the Defendants. Based on the termination clause of 6(a) of the Contract, the return of the purchased shares price goes hand in hand with the return of the Business. [35] Secondly, I am bound by the principle on pleadings that is, to make a finding on the basis that it was not pleaded in the pleading or argued at the court below, would be dangerous. I rely on the Federal Court case of Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lin Wen-Chih & Anor 26 [2009] 6 MLJ 293 where Tun Zaki Azmi Chief Justice (as he then was) remarked, “[15] The facts pleaded will inadvertently be related to the legal principles that the party will be relying upon. It is not for the court to decide on what principle a party should plead. It should be left to the parties to identify it themselves. ….. [16] ….. It is therefore dangerous and totally unadvisable, for the court, on its own accord, to consider any point without reliance on any pleadings or submission by counsel appearing before them. ….” [36] In addition, I viewed that in making a consequential order for the return of the Restaurant business simply because section 40 of the Contract Act 1950 was referred to by the Defendants, I turn to the decision in Sambaga Valli A/P K.R. Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur and Others Civil Appeal No.: W-01-(W)-55-02/ 2016 where the Court of Appeal made the distinction between a case of raising additional grounds based on pleadings and a case of taking a new plea not borne out of the pleadings. I viewed that making a finding or an order for the return of the 27 Restaurant business that was not pleaded by the Defendants tantamount to a miscarriage of justice. [37] I agree with the counsel for the Plaintiffs’ argument that the case of Wong Leng Hung v Krishnamurthy (supra) should be distinguished from this case as the facts on termination was on the premise that the monies paid to be refunded first before invoking termination of the agreement. [38] In relation to the contention that the Plaintiffs failed to prove loss of profit amounting to RM90,000.00, the evidence had been submitted in the Sessions Court where it was one of the elements amounting to a breach of contract and the evidence of Plaintiffs offering Defendants to remedy the breach of the contract proves to show that the Plaintiffs suffered the loss of profit as claimed and does not require appellate intervention. [39] The argument by the counsel for the Defendants that the Plaintiffs have no locus standi or the capacity to sue the Defendants as the Defendants never entered into a contract with one Thomas Patrick Francis Fernandes, although this is a minor issue, the Court’s answer is that the Contract was valid as the issue raised is the name rather than the identity 28 where in the latter, it refers to the same person, one of the parties to the Contract. [40] In light of the above reasons, I find that the Plaintiffs had proven his case on the balance of probabilities and dismiss the appeal with cost. Dated: 19 July 2017 (DATIN ZALITA BINTI DATO’ ZAIDAN) Judicial Commissioner Shah Alam High Court Selangor Darul Ehsan 29 SOLICITORS: APPELLANT : BALVINDER SINGH EDWIN TAN Tetuan Shahrul Balvinder & Co No. 31, Room A 3rd Floor Jalan Barat Off Jalan Imbi 55100 Kuala Lumpur [Ref: BS/WML&WCS/lit/2015] Tel : 03-2144 4299 Fax : 03-2145 4616 RESPONDENT : S.H. CHAN Tetuan SH Chan Suite 1208, Level 12, Amcorp Tower Amcorp Trade Centre No. 18, Persiaran Barat 46050 Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan [Ref: CSH/THOMAS/14001] Tel : 012-611 4922 Fax : 03-9057 6924